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Abstract
More fully understanding the Levellers suggests a new framework for understanding
Anglo-American constitutionalism and jurisprudence. There was a logical progression in their
constitutional thought, by which the exigent developments of the 1640s conflict continually
pushed the Levellers to articulate new constitutional propositions. It eventually led them to a
fully developed contractual theory for the origins of society based on the continuing consent of
the People, including the rights to revolution and resistance, within a natural rights
framework. The Levellers argued for limitations on the sovereignty of the government by the
People, as opposed to the position of the Monarchists, Independents, and Presbyterians which
all agreed that some constitution of the “King in Parliament” ought to be the final sovereign
within society. The Whig and Tory traditions of the eighteenth century adopted and have
preserved the Independent constitutional interpretation of Leviathan’s sovereignty.
Evaluating the English Civil War, Glorious Revolution, American War for Independence,
and American Civil War as struggles for popular sovereignty suggests a new framework for
understanding the continuity of Anglo-American constitutionalism. When viewed from the
Leveller framework, the War for Independence is interpreted as a war of secession, and the
Civil War as a revolution to establish an Independent constitutional framework. Within AngloAmerican political history, the American War for Independence alone was the conflict which
asserted the sovereignty of the People, and in some sense, the only true Leveller revolution.
Keywords: Leveller, Social Contract, Constitution, Natural Right, Popular Sovereignty, English
Revolution, Lilburne, Walwyn, Overton, jurisprudence, English Civil War, Natural Law.
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For my children, and my children’s children
You shall make such an intaylement of this pretious inheritance we speake of, your libertie, to
your children, and childrens children, that they shall never be able to cut off.
-John Goodwin, Anti-Cavalierism (1642)
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Preface
For all Leveller documents, page numbers in the footnotes correspond to page numbers
from the printed version of the Leveller documents used in my personal research. All
documents were posted by the Online Library of Liberty in digital format and do not have
pagination. These page numbers will be noted within brackets (i.e. [52]) and are intended to
provide the reader with a sense of the relative location of certain quotations in reference to
others within the same document. If the reader wishes to read the context of quotations, it is
recommended that he or she utilizes the digitized archive
(https://oll4.libertyfund.org/page/leveller-tracts) and the “control+f” search function with a
section of words from the original quotation.
Dates and publication locations noted in footnotes represent the original publication
information for documents which have been reproduced online. Original publishers are also
noted when they have been reproduced in the online version. The digital collection in citations
is italicized, and the digital publisher is listed with a colon following where the original publisher
is absent. It was common in English political literature of the 1640s for individuals to sponsor
the publication or printing of specific tracts. These printers or sponsors, even when available,
were not noted.
Unless updated by other editors, all spelling has been retained from the original
publication except for the substitution of a capital “I” for “J” and modernization of the “long s”
from Old English typeset. Reading in the original text maintains the integrity of the original
writer in ways that modernization may subtly undermine. The only way to avoid anachronism
in the study of things like political language and communication, to the degree that it is even
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possible as a modern observer of history, is to read and interact the original writer in as close a
way as possible to how they communicated their ideas to others. Spelling is an implicit part of
this. It also allows for the search protocols above to be better executed, although “errors”
have occurred due to my own typographical errors in accidentally modernizing the language, as
well as failure to note the autocorrect feature of modern word processing in some cases.
Five Appendices are provided for the reader. The first is an index of significant political
groups discussed throughout the research project and is intended to be a resource to the
reader in recognizing key characteristics or distinctive beliefs of a group discussed or referred to
in primary source quotations. The second is a brief history and definition of natural law, natural
rights, and constitutionalism, as a context to the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political
ideas. The next appendix discusses American Levellerism, and this work’s role as a critique of
contemporary critical race theory’s assertion that the political philosophy of the Americans was
inherently racist. This essay demonstrates that the Founders (in this case, Jefferson is used as
the example) were aware of the paradox between their ideals and chattel slavery but were
unable to divine a solution that was philosophically, politically, and economically practical.
Even more significantly, by demonstrating in the main body of the research project that the
Founders’ political ideology was derived from a political tradition that did not incorporate racebased slavery, that the ideology itself could not be racist in nature. The fourth appendix is an
attempt to locate the ideologies of various political groups discussed in this group within a
broad context of Anglo-American ideology, as well as to illustrate the difficulties incumbent in
this process. The final appendix is a short list of Leveller terms, and how they described
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certain ideas in their contemporary vocabulary in ways that differed from other political groups
at the same time.

1
Introduction
In the shortened October days of 1649, a political activist named John Lilburne once
again stood trial. Lilburne had spent a lifetime resisting the tyranny of the English political
system. Earlier in his life, he had run afoul of the King’s censorship laws by importing
unapproved manuscripts from Holland. Prior to the beginning of the First English Civil War, he
frustrated the officials of Charles I’s Star Chamber court by citing Sir Edward Coke’s Petition of
Right and other English principles of jurisprudence to delay and ultimately refuse to testify
against himself. When he was later paraded through the London streets and pilloried, he
refused to be abashed as the King’s supporters had wished. Instead, he used the opportunity
to address the crowd and distribute his political literature. After several years in prison,
Lilburne was released just in time to participate in the birth-pangs of the English Revolution.
“Freeborn” John Lilburne was an agitator. It was this temperament which often landed
him in the Tower of London; six different times in only a decade and a half. Between 1638 and
1653, Lilburne spent more time in prison than as a free man. Yet his ideological commitment to
the rights of all free-born Englishmen came to have a profound influence on the development
of the English idea of “natural rights.” It was this commitment that both got him in trouble, and
to which he appealed in court. His biggest problem in 1649 was Oliver Cromwell’s government,
even though he had taken a personal hand in Lilburne’s release in several of his previous
encounters with English authority. Equally importantly, his actions as an agitator made him
immensely popular, and infamous, with the various factions vying for political hegemony in the
English Revolution. Lilburne’s influence with the crowds of London could be a boon or a curse
to those with political goals.
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As it turned out, it was nearly always one, and then the other. Most recently, Lilburne
and his Leveller allies had tremendous influence on the radicalization of the New Model Army.1
The army had played a direct hand in Cromwell’s ascendency after Pride’s Purge in 1648.2 By
1649, Lilburne’s habit of putting principles above policy had led him to rail in the presses
against Cromwell’s Independent regime, hence his imprisonment in the fall of 1649.
One is immediately struck by the obvious political comparisons that the Levellers often
elicit to our modern conception of the liberal political tradition. They supported broadly
democratic programs that expanded the franchise and sought clear definitions for the rights of
individuals. The Levellers’ insistence on constitutional revolution which held the rights of the
People to be sovereign over the State was a novel idea which had far-reaching impacts on the
subsequent development of the English and later British political ideologies, of which the
American colonies were a part. It is the purpose of this dissertation to properly situate the
Levellers’ contributions within the broader context of the development of Anglo-American
political thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is also of historiographical
importance to pinpoint how much of the amalgamation of democratic and republican principles
that came to be incorporated in the American Constitution and Bill of Rights were novel
American ideas, as is often the claim of American exceptionalism narratives. One of the main
purposes of this dissertation is to argue that the blending of these principles within a natural
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The “New Model Army” was the term used by contemporaries for Oliver Cromwell’s re-organization of
the leadership structure of the Parliamentary forces. Rather than organized based on aristocratic titles, the Army
was “New Modelled” based on something resembling merit. This change was significant, but on some level
aspirational.
2
For more historical context on Pride’s Purge, see Chapter 4.
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law framework was derivative of the received political traditions from previous English
constitutional struggles, and in particular, from the Levellers’ ideas.
Lilburne’s early history of political dissent did not distinguish him from the myriad of
other Parliamentary agitators of the English Civil War like William Prynne or John Bastwick,
whose opposition to Charles I earned them similar prison sentences in the late 1630s. He had
gained notoriety as an officer in the Parliamentary forces, which led to his capture by the
Monarchists and subsequent conviction of treason in 1644. He was released that time as a part
of a prisoner exchange, after his wife successfully led a petition campaign to Parliament.
Lilburne returned to the Parliamentary cause with a hero’s welcome.
By 1645, Lilburne’s broke ranks with the Presbyterians like Prynne, Bastwick, and
Thomas Edwards. By this point, Lilburne was joined by other sectaries, creating a political
group who would eventually come to be known as the “Levellers.” 3 The Levellers were a
group that arguably could be considered a political party in their contemporary time but lacked
the centralization necessary to qualify by modern standards. They were led by Lilburne,
William Walwyn, and Richard Overton. Collectively, they argued that the Presbyterians and
their Parliamentary leaders were just as big of a threat to English liberties as Charles I had been.
Lilburne was then imprisoned by the Presbyterians for violating their newly reconstituted
censorship restrictions which were a point and case of Lilburne’s complaints about Parliament’s
abuses of the people’s liberties. His imprisonment in 1645, which lasted a few months, was
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David R. Como. "An Unattributed Pamphlet by William Walwyn: New Light on the Prehistory of the
Leveller Movement." (Huntington Library Quarterly 69, no. 3, 2006). 371.
Lilburne, Walwyn, and Overton were the core of the Leveller leadership and Como’s research
demonstrates they were cooperating as early as late 1645.
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followed a year later by a fourth confinement, after he accused the Earl of Manchester, a
Parliamentary commander, of being a traitor. As remarkably prison-prone as his career had
been, even this history could have availed him a place with the Independents, which emerged
as the successful political group of the Civil Wars. It was, after all, at Oliver Cromwell’s behest
that Lilburne was yet again granted his freedom from Presbyterian imprisonment.
However, in 1647, the various elements of the New Model Army, including the
Independents represented by Cromwell and Ireton, and the Levellers represented by Colonel
Thomas Rainsborough and John Wildman, gathered with other army Agitators at the Church of
St. Mary to discuss the future of the nation. The Levellers proposed a radical program for the
restructuring of the English political system known as the Agreements of the People. Although
the original Agreements was an army document, it was a summary of the critical points which
had been argued by the Leveller leaders over the previous half-decade. Rainsborough
vigorously defended the idea of a vastly expanded franchise in his famous proclamation that, “I
doe heare nothing att all that can convince mee, why any man that is borne in England ought
nott to have his voice in Election.”4 Ireton ultimately steered the debate away from the
Agreements, and they were never formally adopted as a constitutional framework by the
Independents. The division between the Levellers and the Independents based on their
separate theories of jurisprudence was finally brought to the limelight.
In 1648, the Independents seized control of the Long Parliament by forcibly excluding
MP’s who opposed their program, using elements of the New Model Army as a Parliamentary
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Thomas Rainsborough. “The Clarke Papers Vol. 1.” Ed. C.H. Firth. (Online Library of Liberty: Online,
2011). 274
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bouncer. The event’s namesake, Colonel Thomas Pride, refused entry to those
Parliamentarians whom he deemed hostile to the Independent program. “Pride’s Purge,”
functionally ensured that the newly constituted “Rump Parliament,” instituted by the
Independents, represented the people of England even less than its predecessor had. These
events forced Lilburne and his Leveller allies to make some truly revolutionary claims, chief
among them to assert that the People had natural rights which were sovereign to any
government. This was an importantly nuanced position from the prevailing Parliamentarian
position, which argued that Parliament should be sovereign because it was the institution
designated as the voice of the people. Breaking with this interpretation, the Levellers held that
Parliament’s authority rested not upon the fact that it was the people’s institutional
representative. Parliament’s authority was limited by the requirement that it acted as a
conduit for the power of the People, and not merely as a representative of the people. In short,
that the People were the ultimate sovereign within the English mixed government.5
Pride’s Purge convinced the Levellers that the presently constituted Parliament and “the
People” were not redundant entities. In their view, the government must be forced to submit
to the sovereignty of the People via a negative constitutional framework. The authorship of
pamphlets decrying Parliamentary tyranny were the reason for Lilburne’s imprisonment and
trial in 1649, this time sponsored by Cromwell. It was during this time that Prince, Overton, and
Walwyn, who were imprisoned for similar ideological expressions, joined with Lilburne to write
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The capitalization of “People” herein, and throughout the remainder of this dissertation, is meant to call
attention to the institutional capacity of the collected group, rather than merely as a plural for a group of humans.
Hence, “People” was conceived by the Levellers as an actual governmental institution, much in the same way
“Parliament” or “King” was. Using the lower-case “people” is deliberately referenced to the plural for “person” or
“citizen,” but also signifies no institutional authority within the concept of the idea being referenced.
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and distribute the Third Agreements of the People. The Leveller update to the original
Agreements included a plan for a negative constitutional framework which they believed should
be adopted so that the People’s rights were reserved from the purview of the government. In
1639, the Levellers had joined with many Parliamentarians in the belief that the House of
Commons could be the safeguard of individual liberties. By 1649, their experience taught them
otherwise. Now, the Levellers argued for a government system limited in scope and process by
the People and their rights. In the words of the Third Agreement of the People, any
government official who proposed to violate man’s natural rights, “shall incur the pain due for
High Treason…”6 The Levellers took the final logical step of their interpretation of the English
Revolution: any government official could be guilty of treason, not just a king. Most
importantly, the Levellers defined “treason” as an act against the natural rights of the People.7
“Freeborn John” had yet again lived up to both his moniker and his previous
commitments to oppose tyranny of all kinds. The support that he and the Leveller Movement
had lent to the Independents the previous year had proven to be a double-edged sword. The
Independents failed to conform to the Leveller concept of popular sovereignty, which led to
their accusation that Lilburne was conspiring with Royalists to overthrow Parliament. He was
charged with treason and his blatant violations of the new Independent censorship laws did not
help his case.
During his trial, Lilburne unsuccessfully attempted to stall the court proceedings through
appeals related to English trial procedures. His arguments on points of jurisprudence had
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John Lilburne, Robert Overton, William Walwyn, and Thomas Prince. Third Agreement of the People:
Foundations of Freedom, or an Agreement of the People. (London: 1649.)
7
Ibid.
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various degrees of legal merit, but they were consistent in adopting a general tone of the
sovereignty of natural rights to positive law. Many of the appeals and arguments he attempted
are today enshrined in the due process amendments of the American Bill of Rights. Toward the
end of his hearing, in failure, frustration, and righteous indignation, Lilburne thundered that,
…if you are resolved to have my blood, right or wrong, I appeal to the Lord God Omnipotent,
and a mighty judge between you and me, to require and requit that blood on you and your
posterity to the third and fourth generation!8

God answered. A scaffold which had been erected to increase the seating capacity for the large
number of spectators collapsed. Lilburne was declared “not guilty,” by the jury and released
again. Several years later, Lilburne was arrested again for criminal libel against Cromwell and
various other leaders of the Independent government. This time, Lilburne appealed directly to
the jury, instructing them not to determine if he was guilty or innocent of breaking the positive
law, but whether or not he should be tried at all. Lilburne had taken this step by arguing that in
cases like his, juries were the people’s defense against the injustice of a tyrannical government,
and in so doing, popularized the constitutional principle of jury nullification. The jury agreed
and Lilburne was again acquitted. Lilburne’s courtroom dramatics were a legacy which was
preserved and celebrated within oppositionist histories of the British eighteenth century.
The Cromwellian Parliaments continued to rule with infrequent elections, and after the
Interregnum period, the Restoration ushered a return, of sorts, to the status quo, rather than a
Leveller revolution.9 The subsequent English Bill of Rights (1689) might be cast by some as
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John Lilburne. Defense Remarks in Trial for High Treason. Speech. (London: 1649).
This Parliament was eventually labelled by historians as the “Barebones Parliament.” Given the fact that
Parliamentary elections did not take place during the 1640s and 1650’s, but that the composition of Parliament
changed, historians have needed to distinguish them from one another. The “Long Parliament” lasted from 1641
until 1648 and was a legally elected Parliament based on Constitutional law at the time. It was this Parliament
which raised an army and fought against Charles I. Colonel Pride’s Purge of Parliament in 1648 led to the exclusion
9
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evidence of a Leveller triumph during the greater English Revolution, but it was the fulfillment
of the Independent, not the Leveller vision for the future of English government. Lilburne’s
vision for religious freedom and freedom of speech were curtailed by Locke’s document, which
interpreted the latter as a Parliamentary privilege, and the former as limited to Protestant
toleration. The Leveller Revolution remained unrealized at the end of the seventeenth century
within English society.
Lilburne’s prediction of God’s final verdict against English tyranny was to be stalled for a
few generations. With the benefit of hindsight, the blood spilled in the American War for
Independence could be interpreted as fulfillment of Lilburne’s proclamation. As unruly Boston
colonists were arrested and held without trial and denied representation, they made Lilburnelike appeals to God and natural law. In fact, Lilburne’s courtroom theatrics were a commonly
known, and well-received fact in colonial histories. A 1772 Boston pamphlet argued that,
The Legislative has no Right to absolute arbitrary Power over the Lives and Fortunes of the
People; Nor can Mortals assume a Prerogative not only too high for Men but for Angels, and
therefore reserv’d for the Exercise of the Deity alone. . .10

Just as Lilburne had appealed to natural law and ultimately to Heaven, so too did the American
colonists. Had the American Revolution stopped with the Articles of Confederation, it would
have been a failed Leveller Revolution, since it essentially carbon-copied the privileges already
set forth in Locke’s English Bill of Rights from a century earlier for the people’s representatives

of many Presbyterians and monarchists in Parliament, leaving the overall disposition of Parliament incredibly
favorable to Cromwell and the Independents. This is normally referred to as the “Rump Parliament,” since by this
point only a portion of the legally elected representatives remained. Eventually, Cromwell directed the
establishment of the “Barebone’s Parliament” and the “First Protectorate Parliament” which were both heavily
influenced by Cromwell.
10
The Boston Committee of Correspondence. “The Boston Pamphlet.” America in Class, National
Humanities Center (ed.) (Boston: 1772).
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but failed to empower the People directly. However, in the subsequent definition of the
absolute rights of the citizens in 1791, the Framers instituted the constitutional enshrinement
of individual liberties that had been so precious to the Levellers. In so doing, they had adopted
the Leveller theory of jurisprudence and sovereignty.
Despite the obvious similarities between the Third Agreements of the People and the
American Bill of Rights, most historians have looked no further in English history than James
Harrington, John Milton or John Locke for the English ideological roots of the American political
theory.11 Pocock’s republican synthesis does an excellent job of explaining the republican
ideals which were instrumental in the formation of the American political framework.12 Many
historians have also noted the importance of Locke’s liberal influence on the colonists,
particularly in justifying the right of revolution. However, neither Locke’s liberal influence nor
republican ideology adequately explain the ideological roots of the negative liberties
enumerated by the Bill of Rights, nor the existence of a written constitution.13
In order to investigate and appropriately attribute the degree to which Leveller ideology
influenced the American Founding, it will be necessary to establish what innovations to natural
law principles they introduced to English political thought of the seventeenth century.
Following this, a brief review of the legacy of the Levellers throughout the British world, and
within America in particular, will be investigated and explained. Once the historiography of
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See: Hugh Jenkins. "Shrugging off the Norman Yoke: Milton's "History of Britain" and the
Levellers." (English Literary Renaissance 29, no. 2, 1999). 306-25.
Harrington and Milton were both contemporaries of the Levellers, and some scholarship has been
conducted on the influence that the Levellers may have had on all three of these influential authors.
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J.G.A Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
13
Within political theory, the concept of a negative liberty as opposed to positive liberty pertains to the
relationship between constitution and law. Negative liberties specifically list those laws which cannot be made by
the government, whereas positive liberties are those liberties which the government must enforce by law.
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their direct legacy is understood, the need to evaluate influence by means that extend beyond
direct attribution will be clear. The bulk of the research which follows below will focus on
Leveller ideological commitments, the novelty of such ideas, and the specific language which
they employed in order to reference those ideas directly to natural law. Rachel Foxley noted
that, “…the vocabulary which expressed [political arguments] were the matrix out of which
those arguments grew.”14 The Levellers’ political language, which tied their concept of natural
law to various issues of jurisprudence within English politics, related to a host of modern
political issues like religious freedom, due process, the role of the Magna Carta, suffrage,
property and monopoly. By evaluating the ways that the Levellers reinterpreted key ideas, it
will then be possible to appreciate how much of an influence the Levellers’ ideology had on the
North American colonists over a century later.
The Founders seldom, if ever, cited the Levellers as an influence on their thoughts.
However, the similarities between Leveller ideology and Founding ideology are too pronounced
to be pure happenstance. Shortly after his climactic declaration, Lilburne and other Leveller
leaders faded into relative political obscurity. Lilburne, after one final legal bout in the mid1650’s, settled quietly in a Quaker community for a few years, although it is possible that his life
simply expired before he managed to find trouble again. In the earliest historical accounts of
the English Revolution of the seventeenth century, the Levellers were hardly considered to be
worth mentioning as a political or ideological movement. In the colonies, the term “Leveller”
was associated with the Diggers, rather than Lilburne’s Levellers.
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Early twentieth-century historians were initially excited about the prospect of the
Levellers as the true origin of the liberal political tradition, but most of their claims failed to
withstand a revisionist onslaught during the mid-century. It has only been in relatively modern
historiography that research has demonstrated the significant influence that the Levellers had
on the political and social development of seventeenth-century England. Leveller influence in
the subsequent developments of Anglo-American political thought and in particular on the
ideology of the American Founding is a deficiency in scholarship of the Levellers and American
Founding ideology that this dissertation seeks to address.
Most historians of American political thought prior to the twentieth century, adopted an
interpretative framework of the American War for Independence which emphasized American
exceptionalism and discontinuity with British thought rather than viewing it as an extension of
British thought. Since America was developing its own national identity, this interpretation was
instrumental in the development of a new social cohesion. Historical works like Mercy Otis
Warren’s A History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the American Revolution and
Richard Hildreth’s multi-volume History of the United States of America (1840-53) fulfilled their
roles within the development of the new social consciousness.15 In their works, American
political thought was defined almost exclusively as being a reaction against British ideology, not
an extension of it. As a singular example of this, Hildreth’s fourth volume, which devoted
hundreds of pages to the minutia of the various arguments presented by the Framers, had no
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section at all devoted to British ideas. Even when issues of British jurisprudence were
addressed, Hildreth was singularly focused on the Framers’ ideas, not from whence they may
have come. This early historiography can be contrasted with Forrest MacDonald’s twentiethcentury work, Novus Ordo Seculorum (1985), which covered the same topic but credited mainly
British sources for the ideology of the Founding.16
There was a major shift in this trend around the turn of the twentieth century. The
recognition that British jurisprudence was a major influence on the North American colonists
has been so well-established since that it may be reckoned as close to factual as any issue of
historiography. Historians like David Hackett Fischer demonstrated that the colonists who
came from England and later Britain, brought with them distinctly British ideas about the
world.17 Fischer argued convincingly that the cultural practices and identities of whole
communities in Britain were transplanted to the New World. Frederick Jackson Turner argued
that the eastern coast of North America, was at one point, the western frontier of the British
Empire, and therefore subject to the conditions of his important “Frontier Thesis.”18 Although
these theses demonstrated that the colonies were British in ways beyond politics, the area of
broader consensus among historians has been that the British North American colonists
developed and responded to the conditions of the Americas in British ways.
It was within this general framework that the explanations for the origins of the
American Founding have been developed, such as A.J.P. Pocock’s, “Republican Synthesis.”
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Pocock argued that a major influence upon the Framers of the Constitution and the Founding
generation of Americans was republican ideology expressed by British writers and thinkers.19
Specifically, he claimed that James Harrington’s Oceana was an important intellectual pathway
that incorporated the ideas of Roman republicanism, inspired by Machiavelli’s works, and that
Harrington then translated those ideas into an English context. Through further translations,
like Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato’s Letters, these ideas were consumed and adapted by the
American Framers for their American geopolitical realities. Bernard Bailyn’s prize-winning
research significantly broadened this understanding by evaluating the political literature
disseminated by the American colonists at the time, demonstrating the republican elements
which that literature contained, specifically the humanist ideas of corruption and civic virtue.20
The ideas of corruption, civic virtue, and republican representation were undoubtably
one of the strains of British thought synthesized by the Framers into the American Constitution.
There was also a significant ideological commitment to democratic principles. In his book of
collected essays, James Hankins attempted to debunk Pocock’s republican synthesis and
revitalize the interpretation that the Western liberal tradition was the primary influencer of
American ideology.21 Hankins’ demonstration that Machiavelli had fundamentally
misunderstood the concept of “civic humanism” does a lot of damage to the arguments of
other Renaissance historians, but since Pocock merely stated that Harrington took Machiavelli’s
ideas and translated them into an English political context, whether or not Machiavelli
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accurately represented civic humanism was immaterial to Pocock’s argument.22 Historians in
the democratic school have assumed that American liberal ideas originated with the social
contract theory expressed in John Locke’s Treatises on Government. This assumption ignored
the Levellers, a group that not only pre-dated Locke, but whose rhetoric emphasized popular
sovereignty which was more in line with the libertarian tradition.
One of the reasons why the Levellers may not be readily identified as an influence on
the beginnings of the American Founders is that they have not always been taken seriously as
an influence on English history. The first major work on the history of the seventeenth century
English Revolution was by the Duke of Clarendon, Edward Hyde.23 Hyde’s History of the
Rebellion and Civil Wars in England (1702) was an apologetic historical account, focused on
justifying the actions of the Stuart monarchs throughout the seventeenth century. Hyde’s work
focused very narrowly on the Parliamentary and Royalist forces, and distinguished very little
between Independents and Presbyterians, let alone Levellers. This trend continued throughout
British historiography into the twentieth century, Macaulay and Hume excepted.
S.R. Gardiner and C.H. Firth were the eminent British historians of the turn of the
twentieth century, and it was their work which began to recognize the factions within the
Parliamentary camp. Gardiner’s work, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution,
1625-1660 (1906), mentioned the Agreements of the People, but only as an edited New Model
Army version of a Leveller document.24 Neither the Leveller petitions nor the subsequent
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Agreements of the People written by Lilburne, Overton, Prince, and Walwyn appeared within
his work. Firth’s early scholarship included the editing of the Clarke Papers, which included the
Putney Debates, yet despite his familiarity with the Levellers, the narratives of his well-known
books, such as Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in England (1908) focused on
Cromwell and the Independents.25 Both historians were clearly aware of the Levellers as a
political group, but neither believed them important enough to be more than an aside in the
Puritan-dominated political narrative of seventeenth century England.
Perhaps a large reason for Firth and Gardiner’s bypassing of the Levellers was the
prevailing belief that the primary conflict of the seventeenth century was religious, rather than
political in nature. This was certainly the case when Max Weber published The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism in 1905.26 This interpretative trend has not altogether disappeared
even within modern historiography.27 Indeed, works like Mark Kishlansky’s A Monarchy
Transformed: Britain 1603-1714 (1996) placed significant emphasis on the religious origins of
the turmoil of the seventeenth century.28 Kishlansky gave a larger amount of attention to the
Levellers, in particular when he addressed the Second English Civil War between 1647 and
1649. Even still, he viewed them as an influence within the Independent movement, rather
than an autonomous political movement. The timing of Kishlansky’s publication is worth noting
here, since most synthesis works of the last thirty years have begun to acknowledge the
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influence that the Levellers had to some degree. Other historians, like Rachel Foxley have
associated the Levellers with the sectarian dissenters in the seventeenth century;
demonstrating that no matter how focused on ideology, it is impossible to separate any group
of the seventeenth-century conflicts from the braoder religious context.29
The first time that the Levellers were seriously considered as a political movement was
around the turn of the twentieth century. Theodore C. Peace wrote his doctoral dissertation in
1914 on the Levellers. His work titled, “The Leveller Movement; a study in the history and
political theory of the English Civil War,” was subsequently published by the American Historical
Society. His work was hailed as a discovery of the genesis of the liberal democratic tradition in
the Leveller Movement.30 His enthusiasm for this interpretation was instrumental in the
arguments made by Peter Zagorin and Joseph Frank in the 1950s. In 1954, Perez Zagorin’s, A
History of Political Thought in the English Revolution, accepted Peace’s interpretation.31 The
following year, Joseph Frank wrote, The Levellers: A History of the Writings of Three
Seventeenth-Century Social Democrats: John Lilburne, Richard Overton, William Walwyn (1955)
which proclaimed the modernity of the Levellers in its title, and throughout the pages of the
book.32 These historians believed that the Levellers were purely and ideologically aligned to
modern liberal values. According to their outlook, the only update necessary to make the
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Levellers truly modern in a twentieth-century sense would be to translate the references to
“natural rights” as “human rights.”
These enthusiastic interpretations were significantly tempered by the work of the
revisionist historians of the mid-century. Some, like the Marxist historian Christopher Hill,
allowed for an interpretation of the Levellers as simply a facet of a broadly defined “radicalism”
of the seventeenth century.33 Others from the Marxist tradition, argued that the Levellers were
a conservative group that represented the interests of the propertied bourgeoisie.34 What
unified all of the revisionist interpretations during the mid-twentieth century was the
marginalization of the Levellers as a small component of the radical milieu embodied by the
Independent movement led by Cromwell.
The rise of the Marxist and Socialist historians in the mid-twentieth century marked a
significant shift in the historiography of the English Revolution. It began to be called a
“revolution” rather than a “civil war” or as Clarendon had labelled it in 1702, a “rebellion.”35
Marxist historians shifted their emphasis of the conflict from being a result of a religious
struggle to one of economic troubles. One of the earliest examples of this was Eduard
Bernstein’s Cromwell and Communism (1895), in which he concluded that the Levellers were
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representatives of the conservative bourgeoisie, rather than proletarian revolutionaries who
were working for the benefit of the common Englishman.36
This idea was also exemplified in Richard H. Tawney’s Religion and the Rise of Capitalism
(1926) and his important essay, “The Rise of the Gentry, 1558-1640,” first published in 1941.37
Given its context, Tawney’s Religion and the Rise of Capitalism was best understood as an
attempted economic realignment of Weber’s religious framework.38 Tawney’s essay
reinterpreted the upheaval of the seventeenth century as a function of the social instability
introduced by the gentry.39 Lawrence Stone’s The Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642
(1972), and Christopher Hill’s The Century of Revolution, 1603-1712 (1962) have preserved and
operated within this framework.40 In the work of both Stone and Tawney, the Levellers were
prototypical gentry members, and therefore their political ideologies were expressions of class,
rather than any kind of religious or political ideals.
By the time that Marxist historiography had become more accepted into mainstream
academia, the optimistic view of the Levellers as the first exemplars of universal suffrage had
been destroyed. Most Marxists viewed them as just another bourgeois group, rather than as
the liberal predecessors of Marxist ideology. Bernstein’s work displayed an awareness of this
even in the late nineteenth century, where he correctly identified the Diggers, rather than the
36
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Levellers, as the socialist’s ideological ancestor. Only Hill allowed for religious influence on the
Levellers, freely admitting that Lilburne was heavily influenced by both his religious beliefs and
by Sir Edward Coke.41 His book The World Turned Upside Down, gave longer treatment to the
Levellers, but still tended to place them as just one of a number of radical movements that
collectively destabilized the English political system.42
The same could be said for the work of the opposition to the Marxist revisionists like
Hugh Trevor-Roper.43 Trevor-Roper wrote extensively on the topic of seventeenth-century
England, including his collected essays titled The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, the
Reformation and Social Change (1968.)44 Trevor-Roper agreed with the earlier generation of
British historians and emphasized religion as the main cause of the disturbances of the
seventeenth century. Trevor-Roper claimed that the gentry was in decline within the
seventeenth century, and therefore could not have been, as the Marxists claimed, the
bourgeoisie that orchestrated the counter-revolution. Like the Marxists, Trevor-Roper paid
little or no attention to the Levellers as major influence on the development of the English
Revolution.
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The historian most significant in bringing the Levellers to the forefront of the debate
about influence in the English political development was the Marxist historian, C.B.
Macpherson, in his seminal work: The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to
Locke (1962.)45 Macpherson argued that the Levellers were a political organization, that they
represented an important and distinct dimension of the gentry, and that it was their ideals of
possessive individualism that eventually came to be encoded within the political theories of
Harrington’s Oceana and Locke’s Treatises on Government. In his theory of possessive
individualism, Macpherson argued that the Levellers, Harrington, Hobbes, and Locke all sought
ways to codify all rights as moveable property which reinforced the power of the bourgeoisie as
a part of the social contract. According to Macpherson, it was this principle that led to the
contractual framework of government adopted within the British political system. Despite the
fact that historians have noted problems with his theory of possessive individualism,
Macpherson’s interpretation of the Levellers as an influence on the development of both the
republican and liberal traditions in Britain was, and continues to be, significant.46
Irrespective of his ideological commitments, Macpherson’s book brought a new level of
interest to the Levellers as an influence on the progression of English constitutional thought.
Subsequently, most research about the Levellers was focused on a refutation or refinement of
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Macpherson’s framework. In 1970, Roger Howell and David E. Brewer wrote an article entitled,
"Reconsidering the Levellers: The Evidence of the Moderate,” which suggested that the Leveller
newspaper, The Moderate, had a greater impact than had previously been appreciated. This
reinforced Macpherson’s decision to include them as a major waypoint of English political
progression.47 About a decade later, Michael B. Levy wrote, "Freedom, Property and the
Levellers: The Case of John Lilburne," (1983) as a systematic attempt to refute Macpherson’s
interpretation of the Levellers.48 He argued that they were even more committed as a political
group to the ideals of liberty. The most thorough refutation of Macpherson’s thesis came from
Richard Ashcraft. According to Ashcraft, it was, “the Levellers’ invocation of a natural rights
argument as the theoretical foundation for their political program,” that set them apart as
revolutionaries, rather than as Independent reformists.49 Ashcaft devoted an entire chapter to
the Levellers and the English Revolution as an explicit refutation of Macpherson’s interpretation
in his book covering John Locke’s ideological positions.
It has been an open question among scholars as to the influence that the Levellers had
on the late stages of the English Revolution, and in particular on the work of John Locke and the
Whigs. Peace and the historians of the early twentieth century interpreted the English Bill of
Rights (1689) and the collective writings of John Locke as evidence of Leveller influence on the
Whig political tradition. In “The Radical Dimensions of Locke’s Political Thought,” (1992),
Ashcraft made explicit links between the Levellers’ understandings of the natural law and
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Locke’s own expositions on it later.50 He further argued circumstantially that the Earl of
Shaftsbury was the primary vehicle through which Locke was influenced by Leveller
commitments.51 However, Ashcraft’s arguments about the Levellers, Locke, and Macpherson’s
interpretation have not been universally accepted. David McNally’s 1989 article, “Locke,
Levellers, and Liberty: Property and Democracy in the Thought of the First Whigs,” offered a
different argument, whereby Shaftsbury was interpreted as decidedly anti-Leveller.52
In the most recent scholarship concerning the Levellers, synthesis historians have begun
to strike a balance between the enthusiasm of the early twentieth century for the newly
discovered social democrats and the realities of their actual beliefs and actions within their
historical context. Rachel Foxley’s, The Levellers (2013), has convincingly explained the beliefs
of the Levellers in a manner which both evaluated and accounted for their actual ideological
commitments, while still allowing for the influence that they had over their contemporary
society.53 The basic premise of her work was that one does not need to have a fully consistent
political and ideological framework in order to exert social or political influence. Her work also
explored the influence of the Levellers on the ideological development of the seventeenth
century, rather than simply relying on their mass appeal, the profound number of publications,
and the demonstrations they organized as evidence of their influence. However, Foxley’s work
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avoided a wider focus on the place that the Leveller ideas held within the progression of natural
law theory.
Major works on the Levellers have become more common since Foxley’s book. Michael
Braddick recently released a biography of John Lilburne titled, The Common Freedom of the
People: John Lilburne and the English Revolution (2018) and John Rees wrote The Leveller
Revolution (2017.)54 Both of these monographs argued that the Levellers as a political
organization had a higher degree of influence on the development of events in the seventeenth
century than had been allowed by the revisionists. While Braddick argued that Lilburne and the
Levellers demonstrated very little in the way of a unified or cohesive political program, Rees
allowed that Lilburne personally may not have held consistent views, but the Levellers as an
organization did.55 Foxley, whose work was more ideologically focused, found a broad
consensus among Levellers on many points. What was significant about Rees’ and Braddick’s
scholarship was the compelling arguments they raised allowing for a greater influence that the
Levellers had upon the events of the 1640s. The renewed interest in the Levellers has also led
to the recent 2017 publication of the Putney Debates, edited by Philip Baker.56
Interest in the role of the Levellers within the British political tradition has grown in the
last decade, but scholarship linking the Levellers to the American Founders continues to be
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sparse.57 In the afterword to his biography on Lilburne, Braddick specifically noted this gap in
contemporary scholarship.58 Early in the twentieth century, Charles F. Mullett claimed that
Lilburne was often cited in American pamphlets but did nothing to substantiate this claim with
primary sources.59 Michael Kent Curtis wrote an article in 1991 titled, “In Pursuit of Liberty:
The Levellers and the American Bill of Rights,” which noted the striking similarities between
Leveller pamphlets and the American Constitution.60 While helpful, the essay did little more
than make a comparative analysis and claimed the historical link was largely circumstantial and
incomplete. Michael Spicer did the same thing in a 2004 article titled, “The English Levellers
and American Public Administration,” in which he noted the similarities of American
governance in modern times and the ideals of the Levellers.61
Given the confusion over how to situate Leveller ideals within the broader context of
British political thought, it is not surprising that no major attempt has been made to evaluate
the influence that Leveller ideological innovations subsequently had on the Founding of
America.62 This problem has been exacerbated by the reality that most of the American
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Founding generation suffered from historical confusion about the Levellers, and had divorced
the Levellers from their true ideological positions. Edward Vallance showed that the
eighteenth-century concept of “Levellers” was attached to the inaccurate characterization of
Levellers as holding a socialist commitment to the levelling of individual property.63 Even within
their contemporary time period, the Levellers’ moniker was a pejorative label used by the
Independents who intended to misrepresent them as having socialist or anarchist tendencies.
This became the controlling interpretation of Americans, with the notable exception of John
Lilburne, who continued to be revered for his courtroom anti-establishmentism, apart from his
connection to the political group. Although Leveller ideas were present in the British North
American colonies, they were not attributed as such.
However, Vallance has shown that a far more accurate view of John Lilburne’s personal
ideology persisted in eighteenth-century British histories and was actively incorporated into
political expressions by commentators from across the full British political spectrum at the time
of the Founding.64 This makes Lilburne a key figure to focus upon when addressing eighteenthcentury ideology relative to Leveller ideas, since he served as the historical link between
Leveller principles and the eighteenth-century British world. Rachel Foxley’s 2013 article, “John
Lilburne and the Citizenship of 'Free-Born Englishmen',” demonstrated that Lilburne’s

since the American colonists sought to preserve, rather than dislocate the status quo. The Articles of
Confederation were almost a carbon copy of the English Bill of Rights, but in the wake of Shay’s Rebellion, the
American Founders were forced to innovate. Similar to the terminology distinction of the English Revolution or
Civil Wars, the application of the terminology referring to the “American Revolution” should be understood to
encompass the entire period of time from the Stamp Act of 1765 to the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791.
When referring to the actual protests, rebellions, and warfare from 1765 to 1783, the term “War of Independence”
will be employed.
63
Edward Vallance. "Reborn John? The Eighteenth-century Afterlife of John Lilburne." (History Workshop
Journal, no. 74, 2012), 19.
64
Vallance. "Reborn John?” 19.

26
vernacular was a pathway from the natural rights arguments of his Leveller allies.65 This
indentiies two potential pathways toward demonstrating Leveller influence on Founding
ideology. The first is specifically through colonial perspectives of Lilburne, although as follows
below, this pathway is limited mainly to due process and jury sovereignty. The second, more
fruitful methodology, would be to focus on the ways that Lilburne and the Levellers changed
the vocabulary or use of certain concepts relative to natural law and constitutionalism, then to
demonstrate that those same principles were expressed in similar ways during the Founding.
Historiography of the American Founding, and in particular of the influence of various
political traditions are also relevant to this research project. In the nineteenth century, George
Bancroft’s History of the United States of America, from the Discovery of the American
Continent (1854-1878) introduced the idea that the Founding was largely representative of the
interests of the ruling elites, rather than an ideological conflict.66 Henry Adams, the greatgrandson of John Adams, published The History of the United States of America 1801–1817
(1889-91), and adopted the same framework.67 However, it was Charles A. Beard’s 1913 work,
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States that most clearly articulated
this perspective. 68 Beard almost completely disqualified ideological considerations for the
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Founding, instead espousing a view of American Founding ideals that most closely resembled
Macpherson’s subsequent description of possessive individualism.
By the 1960’s, many revisionist and synthesis historians pushed back against Beard’s
framework while building upon the idea of a continuity of British ideas.69 Bernard Bailyn,
Forrest McDonald, and J.G.A. Pocock represented some of the historians who argued for an
ideologically driven Revolution. Economist and anarchocapitalist, Murray Rothbard delved
deeply into the political ideology of the Founders in his multi-volume work, Conceived in Liberty
(1975).70 These historians investigated the originalist interpretations of the Constitution as it
related to the broader context of Anglo-American jurisprudence in the eighteenth century.71
The tension between a generally Marxist interpretation of the Founders as representatives of
an over-class and an Originalist interpretation seeking to give more credit to their ideological
commitments continues to be a major divide in historiography of the American Founding.72
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Another important historian who must be noted due to his methodological approach
was Bernard Bailyn. Bailyn demonstrated the influence that British republican ideals had on
American political thought.73 He was one of the first to investigate these ideas after editing
American pamphlets from the political crisis preceding the American War of Independence.
Bailyn, like Pocock, focused mostly on the influence of Trenchard and Gordon and other British
republicans as the primary influencers of American political thought. Methodologically, Bailyn’s
book was inspired by the evaluation of political literature intended for mass consumption by
the public. Leveller political tracts are of the same genre of literature, and therefore this
research project will adopt similar methodology to Bailyn’s in the evaluation and exegesis of
political publications in order to establish intellectual influence and development. Given the
aforementioned reality of the negative connotation that the Founders had for the Levellers, it
would not be enough to search American political literature for overt references to the
Levellers. Methodologically, it will be necessary to evaluate the lexicon employed by the
Levellers, and to evaluate the contributions they made to political concepts related to natural
law within Anglo-American jurisprudence. It is especially important to evaluate the Leveller
ideas within their historical context, and to contrast their ideals with those expressed by rival
political groups.
The vocabulary employed by political groups can offer an especially rich appreciation for
political and ideological innovation. Randy Barnett’s Our Republican Constitution: Securing the
Liberty and Sovereignty of We the People, (2016) evaluated to whom the Constitution referred
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when it opened with the phrase, “We the People.”74 He evaluated the political theory behind
rival concepts of what may have been interpreted as the philosophical underpinning of the
opening phrase of the Preamble to the Constitution. Although his book focused primarily on
the opposing ideas surrounding this phrase, the concept that language is often employed to
communicate specific ideological commitments is significant to this study. Carli Conklin’s more
recent book, The Pursuit of Happiness in the Founding Era: An Intellectual History (2019) made a
similar study of the title’s namesake phrase contained within the Declaration of
Independence.75 She argued that it was designed specifically to convey a certain ideological
commitment to republican principles within a natural law framework, but that the full phrase of
rights in the Declaration was never intended to be synonymous with Blackstone’s triumvirate of
“life, liberty, and property.” These recent trends within historiography demonstrate that indepth analysis of lexicon as a way of understanding political ideology and its influences can be a
fruitful historical endeavor.
There are several articles which examine Leveller vocabulary and lexicon. Samuel
Glover’s article, “The Putney Debates: Popular versus Élitist Republicanism,” (1999) argued that
John Lilburne employed extensive study of classic republicans in order to attempt to redirect
Cromwell and his contemporary republicans in a direction more suitable to Lilburne’s
ideology.76 Martin Dzelzainis argued that the mythology of the “Norman Yoke” was common in
many Leveller pamphlets, which has led historians to conclude that they had a strong influence
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on Milton in his 2005 article, “History and Ideology: Milton, the Levellers, and the Council of
State in 1649.”77 Dzelzainis himself rejected this argument, concluding that Milton and the
Levellers had few common ideological bonds. Alan Houston’s article, “’A Way of Settlement:
The Levellers, Monopolies, and the Public Interest,” (1993) concluded that the Levellers
adopted a lexicon, “that contrasted law, right and freedom with will, power and slave.”78
Braddick noted that although Lilburne may have been the most well-known Leveller, he
was notoriously unreliable to utilize as a source for the historian wishing to develop an
understanding of the systematic political ideology of the Levellers, although Foxley and others
have refuted this interpretation. It is certainly true that Lilburne freely interpreted or
misinterpreted historical precedents in ways that he found expedient for his current
predicament. This was normally related to either getting money he believed he was entitled to
by the State, or to escape charges of treason and a death penalty.79 According to Houston, this
has led many historians to conclude that the Levellers simply had no unified program, and it is
this view that has dominated historiography of the Levellers for the late twentieth century, with
Foxley’s work being a notable exception to this trend.80 However, the fact is that political
literature as a genre, is prone to deliberate or optimistic exegesis of precedent and principle.
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Despite these challenges, Lilburne’s diverse legal tactics serve to obscure core
ideological commitments about, and following from, the Levellers’ idea of natural law from
which they did not deviate. Lilburne, and the other Leveller leaders of his time, employed and
amalgamated a lexicon of liberty from a variety of constitutional, legal and traditional sources.
They foreshadowed an ideological pragmatism expressed by the American Founders, who were
also willing to use, and sometimes even misinterpret, the arguments of those who had come
before them. As Gary McDowell noted in The Language of Law and the Foundations of
American Constitutionalism (2010), there is a rich tradition of the abuse of language in the
pursuit of political idealism.81
John Philip Reid noted in his essay, “The Jurisprudence of Liberty, (1993)” that the
common lawyer’s view of the past when discussing the ancient constitution within the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not the historian’s view.82 For this reason, historians
need to understand that the idea of the “ancient constitution” was an extremely fluid concept
for the common lawyer and the activist; one which selectively adapted historical facts to fit the
argument one wished to make at the time. Lilburne, lawyers and Levellers were not attempting
to conduct historical inquiry when they discussed the “English Constitution” to discover the
true nature of rights which did or did not exist prior to the “Norman Conquest;” it was an
ideological tool which was useful to them in the presentation an overall argument. The same
could be said for Lilburne’s eventual use of Magna Carta.
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This is important, because as J.G.A. Pocock has observed, “the most the historian may
attempt is to show that, once we realize as historians that a man’s ideas are to be interpreted
in a certain way, we may understand in the light of that knowledge what his problem in
achieving coherence was.”83 When dealing with politics and even issues of legal significance, it
is especially important to recognize that coherence was the aim of the activist; accurate
historical exegesis was not. If they happened to coincide, so much the better. Lawyers, jurists,
and activists were eminently concerned with presenting coherent arguments, but those
arguments were historically selective in nature, in a way which strengthened the appeal of the
point they were attempting to make to a particular audience.
Richard Ashcraft concluded that although the Levellers were defeated as a political
organization, “the political language they employed in their writings [survived],” particularly the
way in which they connected their political arguments to a specific language of natural rights.84
In the Maryland Toleration Act (1649), the colonists proclaimed that,
“noe person or persons whatsoever within this Province. . .professing to beleive in Jesus
Christ, shall from henceforth bee any waies troubled, Molested or discountenanced for or in
respect of his or her religion nor in the free exercise thereof. [sic]”85

More significant than the appeal for religious toleration was the signature of the Toleration Act,
“the freemen have assented.” Especially in the context of the 1640s, combining the ideas of
“freemen” and consent was a characteristically Leveller way to discuss liberties. 86 In 1676,
Nathaniel Bacon declared himself to be the, “General by Consent of the people,” in order to

83

J.G.A. Pocock. Politics, Language & Time, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1989), 6.
Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, 160.
85
An Act Concerning Religion. (Maryland Toleration Act). In Key Documents of Liberty Collection. (Online
Library of Liberty: Maryland, April 20, 1649).
86
Maryland Toleration Act.
84

33
seize the government officials appointed by King Charles II, as, “traitors to the King and
country.”87 This statement pre-dated Locke’s publications by over a decade, so Bacon’s concept
of the, “consent of the people,” must have come from somewhere other than Locke. The
potential avenue of Leveller influence in American ideology was therefore potentially direct in
nature; and evaluating early colonial documents that contain Leveller-like language in ways that
communicated Leveller ideological commitments is one way to show influence in American
ideology.
Bailyn and Pocock’s arguments focused almost exclusively on the republican ideals
expressed in the American Revolution. Conklin and Barnett added to this framework, by
evaluating the republican commitments conveyed by specific language contained within the
Founders’ documents. McDonald evaluated both republican and liberal ideals but looked no
further into history than Harrington and Locke in the mid to late seventeenth century.88
Politically, the Levellers fit better within the British classic liberal tradition and were not strident
supporters of republican or democratic principles. However, it is not insignificant to note that
Macpherson identified similarities in the arguments of Locke, Harrington, and the Levellers.89 It
could therefore be argued that the Levellers commitments to individual liberty served as an
ideological emulsifier which allowed the republican and liberal ideological traditions to coexist
in the Framing of the Constitution.
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The research which follows will be constituted of two general sections; one which seeks
to explain the development of the Leveller theory of social contract, constitutionalism, and
natural rights over the course of the 1640s, and a second section which focuses on the ways in
which the Americans came to express an identical theory of jurisprudence.
Chapter 1 will focus mainly on the beginning of the English Civil War, and recognize the
reality that religion had a major role to play in Leveller political ideology. Ultimately, it was the
Leveller recognition that a total separation of the Church and State was the only way to achieve
a religiously pluralistic society which became the impetus for the development of their
subsequent political arguments. However, it is important to recognize that by the end of 1645,
the Levellers all recognized that this was a political, rather than a religious argument, and
systematically sought to reframe the issue of religious toleration as a civil issue. Chapter 1
demonstrates that the Levellers recognized and developed a fully modern sense of the freedom
of religion as was subsequently enshrined in the First Amendment.
The next chapter will demonstrate that once the freedom of religion was established as
a positive mandate of the government, that the Levellers sought to recognize what other
potential rights also lay outside the purview of government regulation. Over time, this came to
be expressed in a systematic framework of inalienable rights which is wholly incompatible with
Macpherson’s interpretation of possessive individualism.90 It will be demonstrated that the
Levellers were fully committed to the idea that individuals held certain rights in trust from their
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Creator and that these rights were held universally; they were in an anachronistic sense, human
rights.
As the Levellers continued to navigate the turmoil of the 1640s, it became increasingly
apparent to them that the current constitutional arrangement and the existing ideas of
jurisprudence within English political society were inadequate. Chapter 3 will explore the
Levellers’ development of a new framework for understanding the relationship between the
People and the government. This new framework had implications for the relationship of the
citizen to his representatives, determined which citizens qualified for suffrage, and ultimately
for the contractual view of government which dominated Leveller political theory and located
sovereignty out of Parliament, rather than resident within the representatives of the people.
The implications of this new theory of government, as well as the final separation of the
Levellers and Independents in the later part of the decade will be the final topic of this first
section. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the Levellers became convinced that their ideas were
revolutionary, rather than reformational in nature, and that only by a total reconstitution of the
political arrangement between the People and the government could their theories become
political reality. Specifically, they argued for this in appeals to the army which resulted in the
Agitator Movement and mutinies within several regiments. The release of the Second and Third
Agreements of the People, and ultimately even Lilburne’s acquittals amounted to appeals
directly to the People to assert their authority over the government, and what the Levellers
became increasingly convinced was Parliamentary tyranny.
After the Glorious Revolution, the Independent theory of jurisprudence was entrenched
within English society, and Parliament became the unquestioned sovereign of English society.
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The second section of the dissertation turns to the Leveller Revolution which was instituted and
completed in the British North American colonies. The first chapter of this section focuses on
the intervening time between Lilburne’s trial and the creation of the American Bill of Rights. It
demonstrates how, even from the very inception of the American colonies, certain Leveller
concepts of government were transplanted to the colonies, and how American jurisprudence
and revolutionary rhetoric reflected Leveller concepts. Chapter 5 also demonstrates more fully
why the American colonists were unaware of their Leveller connections, yet, how Lilburne
connected them to Leveller political traditions.
The final chapter will detail the end of the Leveller Revolution in America. In Chapter 6,
it will be explained how the theory of jurisprudence which made the People institutionally
sovereign within their society ultimately gave way to the modern state. It is shown how,
throughout the period known as Reconstruction and the common law interpretations by the
Supreme Court, how the Leveller framework of jurisprudence has been systematically
dismantled in America and replaced by the Independent framework of Parliamentary
sovereignty. It was the Levellers who first introduced the idea that an elected government
could nonetheless be tyrannical, and it is the eradication of the Leveller theory of jurisprudence
within the American political system by the Federal government which makes the articulation
of this idea so difficult within modern political discourse.91
Essentially, the Levellers proposed an ideological framework of consent that was novel
in its time and was the fundamental underpinning for the American Declaration of
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Independence and the driving impetus behind the Bill of Rights. Charles I and the Monarchists
of the seventeenth century argued, as Hobbes later attempted to explain in Leviathan, that the
consent to govern was located in the distant past and transferred wholesale to the monarch
upon the establishment of society. The Presbyterian faction of Parliament concurred with
every aspect of Stuart contractual theory, with the not insignificant distinction that the
legislative Parliament was the ultimate sovereign within English society, rather than the
monarch. What was not different in either contractual framework was the belief that the
original transfer of sovereignty was irrevocably located at some point in the English past.
Cromwell, Ireton, and the Independents held a different view of the social contract,
because of their belief that English citizens had an active right to consent to their religious
practice, within certain boundaries. They still argued for a State-sponsored church, but rather
than being absolute and definitive, there was room for active consent within the sphere of the
religious institution, primarily expressed in Puritan congregationalism. This allowed for a
greater liberty of the press and speech in the Independent framework as long as those actions
fell within social norms. However, within the political institution, the Independents adopted
the status quo belief that the State was absolute and agreed with the Presbyterian faction that
although certain citizens voted for their MP’s, that the sovereignty had been transferred to the
State in the distant English past, time out of mind.
The Levellers were the only political group of their time to argue that both State and
Church were formed based on the perpetual consent of the citizens. Since the consent was
active, this meant that it was, of necessity, also immediately revokable should Leviathan or
Church overstep its bounds. Within their framework of understanding, these concepts were
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inextricably tied to one another since the sovereignty of individual conscience necessitated the
sovereignty of the citizen over State. Furthermore, they derived individual political freedoms
from the belief that the State, whether acting at the behest of monarch, aristocracy, or
majority, could not encroach upon the ability to give (or withhold) consent of any individual
citizen; a belief which will be demonstrated to have had significant constitutional consequence.
It was the Leveller concept of consent and the social contract which was ultimately adopted in
the colonies as the rationalization for the creation of their own independent societies, and as
will be demonstrated below, they recognized and implemented the same logical conclusions as
the Levellers.
In 1639, the Leveller Revolution was in its gestational stages when Lilburne refused to
testify against himself in his Star Chamber hearings. During the waning stages of the English
Civil Wars, it reached its infancy with the final articulation of Leveller commitment to the
negative constitutional framework expressed by the three versions of the Agreements of the
People. After the silence that followed during the Interregnum and Restoration periods, the
revolution appeared to have been murdered in its childhood by its more moderately tempered
Independent twin sibling which had emerged at the same time. Independency survived and
thrived for much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and came to be reinterpreted as
the Whig and Tory political traditions in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. The Independent
theory of jurisprudence which made Parliament, rather than the People, as the institutional
sovereign of society permanently established itself in England with the coronations of William
and Mary and has been entrenched within British society ever since.
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Nevertheless, as history has a way of telling such tales, the Leveller twin which had been
presumed to have perished, was clandestinely transplanted to a remote location, where it
survived and matured, separated by space and time. The estranged Leveller and Independent
frameworks were re-introduced to one another over a century later by the British North
American colonists, who required a philosophical justification to declare independence from
the British governmental structure. By this point, the Leveller concept of jurisprudence was so
ingrained into American ideology that even the greatest proponent for Leviathan amongst the
American Founders, Alexander Hamilton, argued that the enumeration of these individual
rights might lead to the mistaken assumption that they fell within the purview of government
jurisdiction.92 Hamilton’s objections notwithstanding, the final maturity of the Leveller
commitment to natural rights and the articulations of a systematic theory of natural rights
found its ultimate expression in the explicit enumeration of the People’s reserved rights in the
American Bill of Rights.
Words have consequences, and the definitions of those words have a profound
temporal echo. The Levellers consistently referenced, reinterpreted, and tethered key English
ideas and vocabulary to natural law in novel ways. It will be the argument of the following
chapters that in so doing, they fundamentally altered the continuum of political thought within
British society. This alteration influenced reforms to the British political system based on
natural law principles and played an important role in subsequent English events. However,
within the English and British society, these ideas continued to be reformational in nature, and
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progressively modified, but never replaced the mixed constitution. The final overthrow of the
ancien regime was not achieved in England, but in America. Using the Levellers’ lexicon of
liberty, the Americans reserved specific natural rights to the people and ensured that
governmental authority would not “be construed to deny or disparage other [rights] retained
by the people.”93
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Part I: The Leveller Revolution

Though the King be the Supream Officer, which is all, and the most he is; yet he is not the
supreame Power: for the absolute Supream Power is the People in generall, made up of every
individuall.
-John Lilburne, Regall Tyrannie discovered (1647)
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Chapter 1
“The Common Cause”
Early in 1638, John Lilburne was imprisoned for the first time. In his own words, he
stood accused as one of the “notoriousest dispensers of scandalous books that was in the
Kingdome.”1 Although he was prone to exaggeration, he was charged with having facilitated
the illegal printing and distribution of books in England, having obtained them in the
Netherlands and then sent them to various persons inside of England. By historical precedent,
King Charles I, as the head of both the Church of England and the English Government, was
presumed to have the authority to restrict this sort of activity, and the primary vehicle for
prosecuting those who circumvented the Crown-sponsored monopoly on printing licensure was
the Star Chamber Court. After his arrest, Lilburne met others who would play defining roles in
the upcoming conflict over political sovereignty like William Prynne and John Bastwick; Puritans
who had been arrested for similar offenses.
Lilburne’s list of complaints in his first public declaration were what would become a
familiar litany of constitutional, civil, and religious rights that would, in many ways, serve as a
sort of table of contents for his future endeavors and agitation. Lilburne, a man whose family
was of the traditional English middling sort, was obviously well-connected to the printing
business, and The Christian Mans Triall was his first attempt at taking a direct role in writing,
rather than simply publishing the works of others. He complained that his imprisoners had
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“annexed his Speech in the Pillory,” when he moved to speak to the surrounding crowd.2 He
had also created “a petition to the Lords of the Counsell for my liberty.” 3 At this stage in his
experiences, Lilburne displayed a complete faith in the constitutional arrangement as it existed
to protect and defend his liberties as a denizen of England. Over the ensuing decade, this faith
would be frustrated, betrayed, and eventually abandoned by Lilburne and his fellow Leveller
leaders who were brought by the exigent realities of the times to the recognition of the
insufficiency of the present arrangement to defend the liberties of freeborn Englishmen.
During his trial, Lilburne defended many of the rights he claimed as an Englishman,
which earned him notoriety within Anglo-American legal history.4 In his account of the trial,
Lilburne claimed that he repeatedly defended his right to not self-incriminate himself by
replying to his Star Chamber interrogation simply: “I am not bound to tell you.”5 Lilburne was
very free in his responses to other matters and cooperative with the investigation as long as it
did not pertain to self-incrimination, but eventually, the infamously irascible Lilburne told the
Star Chamber judges that, “I am not willing to answer you to any more of these questions
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because I see you goe about by this examination to insnare mee.”6 Lilburne linked his right to
avoid self-incrimination to “the Law of God, and I thinke by the Law of the Land.”7
In his account of the interrogation, Lilburne referred multiple times to the “lawfulnesse”
of the oath he was being required to make.8 Although a self-serving statement, this idea over
time would come to translate into what became a Leveller concept of “constitutionalism.”
From the ideological perspective of the Levellers, these rights came to be viewed as located
externally to the government all-together, inherent within each individual citizen. This view
was in opposition to the Monarchist, Presbyterian, and Independent beliefs that rights were the
result of statutory laws as interpreted and created by the King in Parliament.9 Lilburne and the
Levellers, were systematically pushed to reject the various interpretations of the “King in
Parliament” once the political realities of each faction’s interpretation were shown to be an
insufficient bulwark of the People’s liberty. In its place, the Levellers proposed a radically
different system in which the individual’s rights and the People were the ultimate sovereign. As
Lilburne stood before the Star Chamber however, the issue at hand was religious freedom; in
particular the question of whether or not the King was or could be the head of the Church of
England, and whether or not there could be a Church of England at all.
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Within historiography of the English Revolution, the causes of the political and social
crisis which took place in England, Scotland, and Ireland during the late 1630’s and ending with
the Restoration of Charles II in 1660 are as varied as there have been historians to offer
commentary on the topic.10 Eminent British historians S.R. Gardiner and C.H. Firth both
focused on religion as the primary cause of the crisis which ensued during this time, essentially
interpreting the struggle as one primarily between the Parliamentary coalition concerned about
the popishness of Charles I.11 They went so far as to interpret the primary struggle as that
between the Puritans and the Crown. While this interpretation made sense in light of the
simple fact that the Interregnum was orchestrated by Cromwell and his Puritan Independents,
the narratives of these British historians tended to oversimplify the internal conflict between
the various Protestant sectaries, anachronistically ascribing a disproportionate weight to the
faction which eventually seized power in the late 1640s and 1650’s. It was a classic example of
the victors writing history, or at least anachronistically being featured within it.
German historian Max Weber’s explanation was similar in his The Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Capitalism, although Weber was one of the first to attempt to synthesize the
possibility of the economic and class issues expressed during the conflict with its religious
roots.12 Even more recently, historians like Charles W. A. Prior and Mark Kishlansky have
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argued that religion was the root cause of the struggles which consumed English society for
about two decades.13 Given the dogged focus with which many within the Parliamentary camp
pursued the limitation of the King’s authority in the Church, it makes sense to view things in this
way. However, the role that the Levellers played in the narratives of the English Revolution
written by these historians was cursory at best, and none of them noted anything significant
about the Levellers’ contribution to the religious discussions of their time.
Murray Tolmie’s Triumph of the Saints (1977), went to great lengths to detail the
influence that various religious sects had on the political developments of the 1600’s, including
the English Civil War Period.14 His interpretation included details about the Levellers, and
argued that their failure to activate their political program was directly related to their inability
to connect with the religious sensibilities of many of the people in London.
More recently, one of the leading historians on the Levellers, Rachel Foxley, dedicated
an entire chapter of her 2013 book to the Levellers beliefs about religious liberty. Foxley
believed that the Levellers were deeply concerned about the moral issues of their day, noting
that, “the Levellers spoke constantly not of people’s interests, but of their judgements and
consciences, rights and liberties.”15 Far from being a mere facet of their beliefs, Foxley argued
that, “freedom of religious conscience was a central Leveller concern from the embryonic
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stages of the movement onwards.”16 The Levellers held divergent personal religious beliefs,
but they all agreed essentially that it was not within the government’s scope to limit other
men’s freedom of religious expression. According to Foxley, the Independents tended to want
to retain certain authority to limit religious expression out of the fear of heresy, while
emphasizing the negative presence of compelling religious acts.17 Only the Levellers wanted an
absence of all authority to regulate religious matters from the civil sphere.18 Foxley noted that
Walwyn and Overton both pushed back against the Independent argument that the
government had authority in these matters based on the fact that a rightly constituted
Parliament represented the aggregated rights of the individuals that comprised the society.19
Foxley’s argument was incomplete in several aspects. First, it tended to place a lot more
emphasis on later Leveller pamphlets, while what follows will clearly demonstrate that the
concept of a separation of Church and State was evident from almost the very beginning of
Lilburne and Walwyn’s public writings. It is accurate to state that a concern for religious
freedom was the central issue around which the Leveller movement began to coalesce.
However, given the tenor of their writings from the period before they were in direct contact
with one another, it is clear that the leadership of the Levellers had all arrived at similar beliefs
on the matter of conscience from similar religious and social ideals independently of one
another.
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Foxley also treats the Levellers’ religious commitments as being concurrent beliefs that
were held in concert with other natural rights; merely one of a constellation of commitments
flowing from their ideology of natural rights. However, upon careful examination of their early
writings, it becomes quite clear that while other concepts of their political program began to
emerge in their writings, these ideals were downstream from their commitment to religious
liberty. In other words, they arrived at an ideal of religious liberty first, and then were forced to
build an entirely new political program to ensure religious liberty, including significant
proposals for jurisprudential changes to the constitutional, economic, and political systems
which already existed. Rather than being central to the Leveller concept, religious liberty is
better described as being the primary concern of the Leveller movement; the commitment to
religious liberty became axiomatic for the Levellers, in the sense that once it was accepted as a
settled civil principle, other natural rights and eventually the Levellers’ theory of jurisprudence
were constructed upon its premises and logical conclusions.
Furthermore, as will be demonstrated below, the Levellers are an excellent bellwether
for understanding the primary issues which surfaced at various points in the development of
the English Revolution.20 The Leveller leaders were in the position of being a reactionary force
against each of the prevailing ebbs and flows of power throughout the conflict, working in turn
against the Crown, the Presbyterians, the House of Lords, and finally against the Independents.
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Lilburne, Walwyn, and Overton’s writings, and especially the logic of their arguments, clearly
demonstrated which issues were of primary significance in the public debate about the
situation in England at different points in the struggle.
It is important to recognize that from the outset of the conflict, the Levellers’ beliefs
were not fully formed ideologically. The exigent political and social realities of the day exerted
pressure on their principles which forced re-evaluation and new ideology. Although the seeds
of future positions are evident in earlier Leveller writings, it is unlikely that they recognized
these as ideological positions which distinguished them from their contemporaries at the time.
Lilburne’s continued military service within the Parliamentary forces until 1645 and the unified
fight against Thomas Edwards’ Gangraena from future Independents and Levellers serve as one
example which underscores this reality. Therefore, although the Leveller concept of the
sovereignty of the Individual distinguished them from every other political faction, and certain
concepts and phrases that hint at this ideological difference can be glimpsed by the historian
who is reading Walwyn or Lilburne’s early writings, it is unlikely that either man was aware of
how differentiated his views were from others he would have considered to have been his allies
in 1642 or 1643.
The unique progression of events which led to various factions to hold the impetus for
events throughout the 1640s forced the Levellers to constantly redefine, clarify, or articulate
positions which they had previously taken for granted as a common ideological position held by
themselves and their allies. For the Levellers, each event, and in many ways the light it cast on
their substantive ideological differences, was a major force in driving the articulation a more
systematic view of government, built upon their previously established political axioms. This
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need for greater articulation was what gave rise to the lexicon employed by the Levellers. The
development of this vocabulary became essential for the positions held in the political conflicts
in the later seventeenth-century England, but even more so those which developed in the
British colonies. Since the colonists held negative impressions of “levelling,” and “Levellers,” it
was through the development of a unique lexicon that Leveller ideas came to be transmitted to
the colonies. However, it must not be overlooked that this development was also instrumental
in their own conceptualizations of liberty, sovereignty, and jurisprudence.
Finally, historians have overlooked the doctrinal theology of the individual Levellers as
the genesis for their civil arguments. It may seem to be counterintuitive, but when viewed
systematically, it becomes apparent that virtually universal toleration and religious liberty was
the logical conclusion of the theological beliefs held by Lilburne, Overton, Walwyn, and the
other Levellers. While Lilburne clearly employed a populist strain of argumentation, Walwyn
carefully derived his ideals from humanist rationalism, and Overton often adopted a satirical
angle. However, each man’s argument was unified by a theology of the respective roles of the
Government, Church, and Individual, as each related not only to the other two entities, but also
to their Ultimate Creator.21
From the very beginning of the public life of the future Leveller leaders, religious
freedom was the overarching issue from which all other political commitments flowed. The
controlling concept of religious freedom rooted in a view of the Civil State and the True and
False Ecclesiastical States was articulated by Lilburne in his Star Chamber Trial and
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independently in the writings of William Walwyn. The by-line of one of Lilburne’s earliest
published pamphlets clearly demonstrated that it was intended to be, “a Treatise shewing, that
in the new Testament, is set forth three Kingly States or Governments, that is, the Civill State,
the true Ecclesiasticall State, and the false Ecclesiasticall State.”22 Agreement on the definitions
of these concepts ultimately led each of the Leveller leaders to a distinct political philosophy of
religious freedom as a negative liberty automatically reserved to the individual.
It is anachronistic at this point to talk about any kind of “Leveller” concept of religious
freedom, but it was nevertheless true that many future Levellers including Walwyn and
Overton referred to concepts identical to Lilburne’s three states as a way to discuss the various
spheres of governance. According to Lilburne, there were two primary states: the “Civill State
and the Ecclesiasticall State.”23 In every sense, these were analogous to the spheres of “State”
and the “Church” referred to by Jefferson in his “Letter to the Danbury Baptists.”24 Lilburne
recognized that both the State and Church, as institutions, possessed legitimate means by
which to administrate their institutions and members.25 Using New Testament principles, he
argued that there must be a separation of church and state, since the apostles had admonished
followers of Christ to follow civil laws and authority, and the “Magistrates were all infidells.”26
Theologically, this precluded any kind of religious basis for just civil authority. Therefore,
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straightforwardly and logically, Lilburne quickly moved all religious laws to the purview of the
ecclesiastical state, whilst civil laws remained within the jurisdiction of the civil government.
Lilburne recognized that there were two potential states for the “Ecclesiasticall State,”
which he divided into the “true” and the “false” State.27 In describing the citizenship of the
True Ecclesiastical State, Lilburne adopted a congregational interpretation, limiting each true
state to an assembled congregation, since he found no denominational precedent in Scripture
for anything otherwise.28 However, more importantly, “the Congregations of our Lord Christ
come freely…voluntarily vniting themseues together.”29 In context, the language clearly
mirrored the contractual language previously applied to town charters being established and
legitimized by a social contract between the King and the town. Since entering this
ecclesiastical society was done by individuals, Lilburne was locating the sovereignty to enter
into such a contract within the individual, and not in any other institution or group. The same
line of argument de-legitimized the contemporary clergy of the Church of England, because
they “rise not out of the particuler assemblies.”30 The connection to subsequent Leveller
concepts of jurisprudence was evident in the fact that the true ecclesiastical state even had a
written constitution, a “Charter, which is the New Testament, in possession amongst
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themselves all Lawes & ordinances,” which served as a sort of negative constitution, clearly
delineating the limitations on the True Ecclesiastical State.31 The only question remaining was
whether the Ecclesiastical State could be overlaid upon the Civil State.
Lilburne contrasted this with the “False State” which “brings ten Kingdoms into one
pollitique body & hath set heads over nations to bring them into pollitque bodies
Ecclesiasticall.”32 In his view, what was tyrannical about this arrangement was that the political
state had usurped the authority of the true ecclesiastical state, using the coercive authority of
the civil state as a vehicle for the intrusion. The Church of England, in forcing people to join,
was acting as a false ecclesiastical state and was reducing each congregation to “slavish
assemblies” which “haue noe liberty or power of Christ among them; but a great power ouer
them that keeps them in a spirituall bondage.”33
It is crucial to recognize that to Lilburne and future Levellers, the true and false
ecclesiastical states were hypothetical constructs. Man was not able to distinguish between
the true and false ecclesiastical states, and it was critical to the distinctly Leveller line of
argumentation that the difference between the true and false ecclesiastical state could not be
known with any degree of certainty. Once this premise was accepted, the concept of the
freedom of religion as a negative liberty took root, and in fact was the only logical conclusion
which could be drawn. The Presbyterians like William Prynne, and even to a lesser degree the
Independents, presumed a certain level of certainty about their own religious beliefs as
representing the true ecclesiastical state, whereas the Levellers categorically rejected the idea.
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In a subsequent pamphlet written later that year, Lilburne questioned the entire
legitimacy of the English government, based on the idea that it had usurped its ecumenical
power under false pretenses.34 Since Lilburne had been imprisoned for printing and distributing
books which went against the orthodox teaching of the Church of England and had been
unlicensed, it is impossible to fully separate his legal motivations from what he perceived as his
mistreatment from his views of proper governance.35 It would be fair to note that especially for
John Lilburne, his legal difficulties at the very least reinforced, and in some cases may have
been the realities which drove his ideological innovations. This is evident in Lilburne’s rhetoric,
which adopted a far more populist tone than the other Leveller leaders.36
Since the premise of his captivity was due to a restriction of his freedom of the press by
what he considered to be the false ecclesiastical state, he began A Worke of the Beast by
exploring the legitimacy of government actions in certain scenarios. He concluded that a
wicked man representing a legitimate king still had legitimate power, since the ultimate source
of that power was still right.37 However, “if he that hath noe authority make officers…[this] still
is a false a calling: in regard his authority was not good nor lawful” that put those officers in
power in the first place.38 To Lilburne then, the source of authority was the primary factor to
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be considered when thinking about governmental legitimacy. This framework made it possible
for a just government official, operating under statutes established by the government, to be
perpetrating an unjust government. In his particular case, Lilburne concluded that since the
civil government had no right to censor him in the first place, or to establish a compulsory
church which could govern him, all of the actions of that government in that arena were
subsequently illegitimate as well.39 This was the next logical progression for Lilburne, since he
had already established that the spheres of the civil and ecclesiastical states needed to be
separated.
Although still a far cry from calling for the renegotiation of the social contract, Lilburne
was certainly establishing the roots for such a philosophy in 1638. He called for civil
disobedience when he proclaimed that “we must fight in the field and to their Lawes at any
hand, not ever once to yeild.”40 However, it must be also understood that due to his present
circumstances, Lilburne only conceived of this revolution being used in response to religious
tyranny exercised by the civil government, and not as a general principle resting on the
sovereignty of the individual. Lilburne certainly had objections as to the proceedings of his case
and his civil rights. In 1638, he saw his problems as all derived from the failure of the English
government to recognize the rights of the dissident sectaries and various other congregations.
He believed that the proper response was to “withdraw your selves from these vile men, and
every Popish toy.”41
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The use of the phrase “Popish” by Lilburne bears special note, since he seldom used the
phrase, despite is very common use by other Parliamentary groups. The common usage of
“popish” within his contemporary context was to be explicitly referring to Roman Catholics, but
Lilburne used it in a new way which referred to the exercise of religious authority by the civil
state.42 As the political historian Luigi Marco Bassani has noted, there are times in which
political or social possibilities cannot be discussed until vocabulary is adapted or created which
permits the full articulation of the idea.43 The Levellers encountered several such instances as
they continued to reinterpret certain concepts, and this serves as one example of how their
new concepts came to find expression in already existing terminology, despite its novel
meaning.
The new and uniquely Leveller way of using the term “popish” was to describe any plan
which invested the civil authority with the power of the true ecclesiastical church. This usage of
“popish” rested on the semantic innovation of separating the church into a true and false
church, and more specifically in recognizing that it was not possible to definitively tell the
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difference. The Levellers treated the true ecclesiastical church as an abstraction, whilst
Independents, Presbyterians, Anglicans, and Monarchists all claimed special revelation or
knowledge of what the true state was. Therefore, to William Prynne, the true ecclesiastical
church was the one in which he practiced his faith; to Lilburne, who belonged to a similar
denomination, it was an abstraction primarily meant to separate all religious authority from the
civil state. “Popish” became a Leveller shorthand for any ideology which invested the
government with ecclesiastical authority.
There is no evidence that any of the Leveller leaders were working together or were
even aware of each other’s writings in the London broadsides and pamphlets before 1644.
However, one of the advantages afforded to the historian is the ability to trace the ideological
threads of individuals prior to the point of their convergence, in order to see the ideological
gravity which eventually brought them together. This is true of the Leveller leaders, whose
early concepts of the appropriate spheres of the civil and ecclesiastical states provided a certain
potential magnetism, though yet unidentified to themselves.
While Lilburne was a sectarian, William Walwyn remained loyal to the Anglican Church.
Yet many of the underlying principles related to Lilburne’s three states predominated Walwyn’s
early writings as well. One thing that consistently distinguished Walwyn’s writing was a
humanist strain of logic which was pragmatic as well as libertarian and religiously informed, and
his Anglican church affiliation demonstrated that the Leveller Movement coalesced around a
philosophy of social commitments rather than as an outflow of the sectarianism of the 1640s.
In his A New Petition of the Papists, Walwyn wrote to support a petition made by Catholics to
allow toleration of Catholic practice within England.
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Unlike most of the other agitators of his day, Walwyn was willing to tolerate the Catholic
practice in England, provided that the Catholics were willing to “let every Religion take what
Spirituall head they please…[and] obey the King as temporall head, and humbly submit to the
State and civill Lawes.”44 In Lilburne’s terminology, as long as the Catholics were willing to
forgo their “Popish” tendencies, Walwyn found no reason that Catholicism could not be
compatible with the rest of the belief systems currently being practiced in England. He also
argued that Brownists, Puritans, and Socinians should be allowed to practice openly, provided
that they agree to coexist peaceably with other denominations.45
In order to facilitate this peaceful coexistence, Walwyn, like Lilburne, prescribed that
there be a strong delineation between the civil and ecclesiastical states. He made the
conclusion that the lowest common denominator between all the “many different Religions
now professed in England,” was universal Christian toleration.46 Since “every one [was] hoping
and expecting that theirs alone shall be received and established by this present and powefull
high Court of Parliament,” Walwyn instead proposed that none should be established.47 This
was not only because it was “more convenient for this State,” but was also rooted in the idea
that every man subscribed to his beliefs because he honestly believed that it was the true way
to save his own soul.48 According to Walwyn’s theology, every man was required to obey God
rather than men, and because of this fact, it would violate not only each person’s rights, but
imperil his or her soul to force conformity.
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Logically, Walwyn added, there was a certain level of agnosticism which needed to be
admitted as it pertained to all doctrine, so while he remained dedicated to his own beliefs,
Walwyn was willing to admit that he might not be right. He preferred an open forum of
religious ideas, and to rely ultimately on God’s divine intervention to discriminate between
individual doctrinal nuances, rather than human institutions.49 Walwyn’s writings tended
toward an unassuming tone, and his completely different stylistic and rationalistic quality offer
a clearer and more cohesive program of religious liberty than Lilburne’s. Ultimately, the fact
that both men worked together from 1645 onward, and that Walwyn’s tone and rationale
followed from his earlier arguments, demonstrated that his expressions were compatible with
Lilburne’s framework as well.
Early in 1642, Charles I attempted to arrest the five leaders of Parliament as a means to
assert the Royal Prerogative over ship money and other issues related to taxation and the
respective powers of the Crown and the House of Commons. Lilburne had been released and
was again involved in agitation, and soon to join the Parliamentary forces. As a result of this,
his involvement in the public sphere was more restricted to military action, rather than
pamphleteering. However, Walwyn continued to champion a broader interpretation of
religious toleration in the London circulars. During this time, the future Levellers found political
alliances in the Presbyterian and Independent camps as well, and it would be anachronistic to
apply these labels at all except from the vantage point of the historian, since all of these groups
saw themselves merely as “Parliamentary” during 1642. However, just as the convergent
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strains of logic and thought can be followed for the future Levellers, the key differences in
thought had also emerged as early as 1642.
One such temporary ally was John Goodwin, who was an Independent parish preacher
whose congregants were even more radical than he.50 His congregation included two secret
printers, and while he was a nonconformist and not associated with Goodwin’s congregation
directly, Richard Overton, ran his own illegal printing press on Coleman Street inside Goodwin’s
parish.51 By 1645, Goodwin met almost daily with Lilburne and Walwyn, which demonstrated
the degree to which the Independent and Leveller ideologies remained compatible for years.52
This radicalized parish was one of only thirteen in London where the people of the parish
elected the vicar and it had strong connections to both Thomas Rainsborough and to the New
England Governor, John Winthrop. 53 It was to this parish that New England Puritans came
when they were looking to recruit new American colonial families for their city on a hill
experiment.54 John Davenport did just this with thirty-three families, including the son of a
future regicide, Nathanial Rowe, and used these families as the nucleus for the founding of New
Haven, Connecticut.55 There were even women preachers whose congregations met in alleys,
and the radicalism of the ward in general was so progressive that it even concerned Goodwin.56
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John Goodwin was a radical preacher whose constituents were far more radicalized than he
himself.
In short, Goodwin’s Coleman Street Ward was exactly the kind of place where those
who would come to be identified later as “Levellers” were afforded the opportunity to
experience a democratic and pluralistic ecclesiastical state that was outside of the civil
authority. Freedom of printing in this parish led to a freedom of expression which many
Levellers took for granted. The election of the church hierarchy and the plurality of
congregations fit perfectly with Lilburne’s model for the true ecclesiastical state. And the area
had profound connections to the New World. It is no understatement then, to claim that
Lilburne, Walwyn, and Overton were influenced by, as well as influential in, the same milieu of
ideas which were influential in the thoughts and experiences of some of the earliest Puritan
colonists in New England.
Goodwin himself remained loyal to the Independents and was an enthusiastic supporter
of Pride’s Purge and the regicide, so his eventual trajectory was decidedly not Leveller in
character. However, his philosophical commitments in the earlier part of the decade is
extremely important to understanding Leveller beliefs. As Pocock once noted, “individual terms
and concepts migrate from one structure to another, altering some of their implications and
retaining others.”57 This meant that although Goodwin never associated as a Levellers, his
writings from earlier in the decade were still formative to understanding the development of
the Leveller beliefs in the same way that those Leveller concepts could also migrate to the
Americans despite their self-identified anti-Leveller ideology. Likewise, the ideas of Lilburne,
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Overton, and Walwyn had a privileged migratory opportunity in the English New World, where
the seeds of their libertarian commitments could germinate and grow unmolested by the
domestic English troubles.58
Goodwin argued in an early tract that no man is “equall with God…as universally
righteous and holy, as he…” and therefore no earthly being was to be considered
“unquestionably righteous, worthy to be obeyed, in whatsoever he shall command, without
examination.”59 The right of conscience, and ultimately of determining the lawfulness of a
statute was expressly reserved to the individual, according to Goodwin. This was not only an
emphatic support for the freedom of conscience, but it was also an extremely radical statement
of the sovereignty of the individual. According to Goodwin, Christ would not have prohibited
his followers to “feare those that could only kill the body,” if they were “bound to…obey their
Superiors without all examination.”60
Goodwin universalized the ideas about religious freedom to incorporate “America, and
other Westerne parts,” making these rights not merely English rights, but the rights of all
mankind.61 However, there was a philosophical difference which was apparent between the
future Levellers and Goodwin, even in 1642. Goodwin bracketed the freedom of religious
expression to those of the “Reformed Churches (as we call them) in these parts of the world…at
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least between all that are truly faithfull and sound in that profession which they make in these
Churches.”62 He explicitly rejected the rights of Catholics or certain other sects, which he
declined to identify by name, to be “the Judge, Whether the command or commission of a
King…be unjust or no?”63 It was the Leveller willingness to include sects of all types and
Catholics as equal participants in this judgement which ultimately proved to be the key
distinguishing factor in the Independent and Leveller political programs as they related to the
religious authority of the civil state.
After about a month, Walwyn responded to Goodwin’s tract with his own. Some
Considerations Tending to the Unbelieving, was written specifically to, “undeceive those, whose
judgements are misinformed….concerning the unseasonable difference between the Protestant
and the PURITAN.”64 The connection between Anti-Cavalierism and Some Considerations is
circumstantial, but given the vibrancy of the Coleman Street parish, and specifically the fact
that both Goodwin and Walwyn were invested in and large participators in its culture, it is not
unreasonable to think that Walwyn was attempting to add an asterisk to Goodwin’s treatise.
Whether or not he was specifically responding to Goodwin, Walwyn was explicitly broadening
Goodwin’s answer of who could be “the Judge” to include all Protestants.65
Walwyn began by identifying that the corruption in the English system had come from
the blending of the ecclesiastical and civil states whereby the government officials misused
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clerical authority “to doe their ill intentioned worke.”66 It is telling that most of his
contemporaries would have applied the ubiquitous term “Popish” to this description given their
specific fears of Archbishop Laud and Charles I’s Catholic connections. Yet Walwyn carefully
described it in ways without applying that term. Given his prior defense of the Catholics and
arguments for universal toleration among all Christians, it made sense for him to utilize a more
careful description of the requisites for allowed religion, in order to not be misunderstood by
his audience. Although in this pamphlet Walwyn limited the scope of his argument to a specific
range of sects, his purpose was to reconcile various Protestant groups, not to create an
exclusive list of only those that were worthy of toleration.
Walwyn recognized that the Catholic blending of Church and State was problematic,
specifically citing Florence and Spain as examples of places where the “ill intentioned worke”
took place.67 The fact that he specifically cited these places without the contemporary “Popish”
was even more telling, at the very least suggesting that in Some Considerations, Walwyn took
very careful rhetorical steps to avoid implicating the Catholic faith. There was apparently a
sharp break between Walwyn and Goodwin in the discussion of the English interpretations of
Machiavelli. While Goodwin had a clearly positive view of Machiavelli’s ideas, Walwyn claimed
that the abuses in Florence and Spain had made, “men slaves, furnished with
Machiavils…instructions from Florence, with all the assistance,” that Rome could provide.68 The
Levellers continued to have an negative perception of Machiavelli and the implications of his
writings throughout the 1640s, and the application of his name became a Leveller trope for a
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political figure that was deliberately and systematically divisive as a way to undermine potential
unified action by the People. This was yet another example of early usage of a term by the
Levellers being adopted into their general lexicon in ways that expressed their overriding
ideological principles.
The resultant individual abuses of the Church and State corruption in Italy and Spain was
clear to Walwyn: “Monopolies were once pleaded legal…Ship-money was lawfull…”69 To this
he also added the claim that “griping Judges and avaritious Lawyers,” were not affording equal
protection of the law to citizens of different social classes.70 Walwyn’s Considerations had
other conspiratorial insinuations, including the idea that the sectarian divisions were part of a
government plot to create discord amongst the Protestants who otherwise ought to be unified.
These shadowy figures were attempting to prevent the collaboration of those who “desire to
free themselves from their insulting tyranny,” and were causing the lovers of liberty to
“cherish[] differences concerning forms and circumstances about Religion,” ultimately making
the “Puritan and the Sectaries, as they are called…more odious to the Protestant, then the
Cavalier.”71 The divide and conquer approach was lamentably effective, according to Walwyn.
At the end of Considerations, Walwyn further developed his claims, by arguing that the
clergy of the Church of England were responsible for dividing the people from the King by
upsetting the mixed Constitutional system, and by instructing each that the King had a negative
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voice, whereby his prerogative had been interpreted as ultimate sovereignty. These “evill men
have a power of crossing and making voyd all the debates and conclusions of the Parliament,”
which ultimately resulted in “the freedome of the people [depending] upon one mans will &
understanding.”72 Walwyn cautioned that this was imprudent because it had placed the king at
odds with the people, and led to the current conflict, but as long as they got “advancement,
credit, honour,” and as long as, “their owne ends bee served,” the clergy were unlikely to give
better council to the king.73
Having identified the primary sickness within the English system as being a statesponsored church, Walwyn proceeded then to develop even more fully his arguments for
universal Christian toleration, explicitly linking his argument about liturgical differences in
Protestant denominations to the theological implications of the Apostle Paul’s arguments in
Corinthians about weak and strong brethren.74 Walwyn believed that Paul had argued that
meat which had been offered to idols was indistinguishable from all other meat, but if a
Christian brother was offended by the eating of the meat in Christian liberty, that for the sake
of that brother’s conscience, one who embraced such liberty should abstain from exercising
that liberty when in direct contact with him.75 Walwyn linked the concept of Christian liberty to
the denominational differences which were developing in English society of the early 1640s.
Therefore, even within the ecclesiastical state, Walwyn was reducing the sectary differences to
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superficial differences of Christian practice. They were merely a matter of preference, and not
true issues over which the true ecclesiastical state, if it could have been positively identified,
would have had the authority to exercise control.
Characteristically, Walwyn also included the explicit caveat that even if the differences
in different denominations were important enough to differentiate them between Lilburne’s
true and false ecclesiastical states, that there was a level of agnosticism necessary of an honest
observer because “neither are we certaine that they are faults, we have but so digested them
to our selves.”76 In other words, there was no way to ascertain what doctrines were true or
false when it came to Christian practice. Walwyn frequently referred to these men as “honest”
or “honest-hearted,” as a way to recognize that they were sincere in their convictions, and
therefore it would be morally wrong for the civil or true ecclesiastical states to prohibit them
the free exercise of their beliefs. Although it seems to not be an exclusive list for the Anglican,
he specifically named the “Puritan, Sectary, Brownist, and Anabaptists” as examples of honesthearted men.77 Given the context of 1642, Walwyn was incorporating in this list a broad crosssection of Protestants who ought to be united by a commitment to coexist peacefully with one
another.
As he responded to various circumstances and arguments in the presses, Walwyn’s
concept of the freedom of religion continued to progress closer to universal Christian liberty as
a negative liberty. By 1643, in a pamphlet entitled “The Power of Love,” he explicitly rejected
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the notion of a class-based civil or religious hierarchy because God “regards nothing among his
children but love.”78 This foreshadowed the politically egalitarian spirit of Leveller program,
since the logic that began with God being a respecter of no particular group was applicable to
different institutions of society. He ultimately concluded that the best hope for his
contemporaries lay in the gospel, which was stated “so plainely, that the meanest capacity is
fully capable of a right understanding.”79 His egalitarianism assumed that the Scriptural
principles necessary for the improvement of human society were so easy to understand that
anyone could understand these ideas. This statement also illustrated the use of the term
“mean” as a way for the Levellers to discuss universal human rights. Any time they intended to
make universal statements about natural rights as distinguished from specific civil rights only
available to certain citizens, the Levellers would use the term “mean” or “meanest” to
represent those rights shared by all men.80
As for the religious issues that were at work within the early 1640s, Walwyn’s largest
exhortation to promote peace between the denominations was mutual understanding. He
likened the misunderstanding between the Armenians and the Anabaptistis to be
fundamentally similar to the way the, “Turke is misled in his judgement of Christianity.”81
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Walwyn interpreted the argument made by Paul to “try all things and to hold fast that which is
good; to prove the Spirits whether they bee of God or not,” to be an exhortation to have an
open and competitive marketplace of Christian thought and denominations, so that each man
may understand, and better love, his neighbor.82 In Walwyn’s opinion, this was also so that the
best doctrine might be achieved through the competition of ideas.83 This argument signified
Walwyn’s application of free market economic principles to religious doctrine, with the result
not only being a well-tested understanding of the Scriptures, but equally importantly,
understand and love for one’s neighbor.84
Walwyn anticipated a form of crony capitalism which may emerge in this kind of system,
exemplified by the idol craftsmen in Ephesus, who profited from the misleading of the Ephesian
people and saw the gospel as a threat to their economic livelihoods.85 From Biblical and logical
examples, Walwyn argued for a truly free market of religious ideas which was enshrined as a
negative liberty whose locus of sovereignty was within the individual and defended by the
government from corrupt economic, governmental, or religious influence. True believers were
“haters of tyranny and all arbitrary power, but no other.”86 In The Power of Love, Walwyn was
expressing a sort of systematic libertarianism, although by this point he still viewed it as
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primarily related to religious freedom. The further implications for society were identified, but
not followed yet, although it is accurate to conclude that their genesis was in religious freedom.
Walwyn demonstrated a high degree of faith in the rationalistic capacities of mankind,
although he believed that it had been corrupted by the “many inventions” which had become
the sole object of man’s attention.87 Walwyn demonstrated a republican diagnosis of the
problem, whereby the virtue of mankind had been lost, and needed to be recovered to
“abandon all kindes of superfluities…and thereby obtained a freedome to apply themselves to
the consideration and practise of wisedome and vertue.”88 Unlike the republicans of his day,
Walwyn believed that this was primarily to be achieved through the gospel, rather than public
virtue.89 This distinction helped to identify the philosophical differences between the Levellers
and the Independents. The Levellers ultimately rested in the sovereignty of the individual and
the true gospel to reform the individuals of society in a sphere shielded from government
intervention. The Independents, drawing on republican principles of civic virtue, believed that
this type of virtue was only possible in a religious context which was curated by the
government, albeit in a way that granted significantly more religious discretion than had been
experienced in England in the early 1640s.
Walwyn was not under the illusion that the religious freedom he envisioned could be
achieved solely through the work of the true ecclesiastical state. Although love and toleration
were the goals, there was in the present civil state of England “tyrants and oppressors [that]
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endeavor by might and force to pervert all Lawes,” and that one must be as “bold as Lions, not
fearing the faces of men” in order to resist this tyranny90. Passivism was a foolish response,
according to Walwyn, since this was precisely what tyrants counted on when instituting
programs that violated the people’s rights. This form of passivism was a perversion of God’s
truth and was perpetrated by religious leaders who “interpreted [God’s] sacred word as patron
of their unjust power.”91 Walwyn’s logic was plain: tyrants depend on perversions of God’s
truth to be perpetrated by corrupt religious officials, causing them to be complicit and passive
in the face of tyranny “lest you receive damnation.”92 According to Walwyn, “true Christians
are of all men the most valiant defenders of the just liberties of their Countrey.”93 Toleration
could only be extended to those who, in practice, allowed religious toleration in a reciprocal
relationship. Although Walwyn did not explicitly argue for universal Christian toleration, the
conclusion was implicit in his argument. The only belief that could not be tolerated, according
to Walwyn, was one which sought to use religious officials to establish a monopoly on the
beliefs of the rest of one’s countrymen. This was a corruption of both the ecclesiastical and civil
states. Intolerance was connected to specific groups and sects, and not necessarily connected
to any denomination automatically, and as he continued to participate in the debate about
religious freedom, this conclusion became more entrenched.
By 1644, Walwyn’s arguments for broad religious toleration had become less
mainstream as the Covenanters passed the Solemn League and Covenant and the Presbyterians
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in Parliament began to make arguments for the establishment of a Presbyterian Church in place
of the Church of England. Sectarians like Thomas Goodwin and his fellow petitioners recounted
the toleration they had experienced and enjoyed in the Netherlands and suggested that a
similar model be applied in England. Goodwin’s meaning of “toleration” was plainly oriented
more in line with forbearance than it was toward peaceful coexistence of denominations with
equal status. In the Netherlands, they “received the right hand of fellowship,” from the
“Orthodoxe Churches…[and were] granted to some of us their own Churches…to assemble in,”
at times that the regular churches were not meeting, and according to Goodwin’s pamphlet, An
Apologetic Narration, this was an ideal model for the Presbyterian-led government.94
The Apologetic Narration assumed that there was a true practice which could deduced
from Scripture, and that this practice would be the most desirable to be implemented in a
State-Church throughout England. They were to pattern their church practice on the ancient
hierarchical Church, but there could be a certain level of autonomy within the churches to allow
them the flexibility to change practices in the future. Whereas Walwyn had emphasized and
provided examples of the most controversial sectaries as those whose pursuits were “honest”
and well-meaning, Goodwin’s list was more exclusive than inclusive. There was, in his opinion,
a, “promiscuous receiving and mixture of good and bad,” which was detrimental to sound
religious practice, and therefore there must be limitations to toleration.95
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According to Thomas Goodwin, one of the primary evidences of solid practice was a
commitment to the, “classicall Presbyteriall government…[where] the combination of the
Elders of so many Churches,” were the primary ruling body of each Church.96 Goodwin failed to
recognize the internal contradiction between congregationalism and State-Church arguments.
He argued that people ought to have a say in the governance of their church. In his view, the
only legitimate church could be one in which the congregants elected their local leaders, but he
still argued for an established church. Walwyn had allowed for a much broader and more
consistent system whereby one’s faith might lead one to consent to a diverse range of options.
Goodwin’s toleration also did not extend to the Independent churches that did not have
a Presbytery which would serve as a “sufficient remedy for miscarriages.”97 There had to be a
“powerful or effectual means” to correct errant doctrine or to otherwise deal with those
churches that “fal into heresie, schism, etc…[where] every one is left and may take liberty
without controule to do what is good in their own eyes.”98 These members had to be
excommunicated as an ultimate form of church discipline to maintain the orthodoxy of
Christianity. Universal toleration undermined this authority by allowing people to have new
churches to join if they were excommunicated from one such church, mitigating the blow.
The essential argument of Goodwin and the other dissenters petitioning the Parliament
was not for universal toleration, but rather for what might be considered an exemption based
on the fact that they believed their specific set of beliefs to be representative of true doctrine.
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This demonstrated that some sectaries advocated for an expansion of religious toleration, but
that this expansion had narrowly defined limitations that could not in any way be construed to
be “religious freedom.” The philosophical conclusions of Thomas Goodwin were consisted with
those made by the Independents by the end of the seventeenth century, although the
particular list of who should and should not be excluded sometimes varied. However, the
strong protests lodged by Walwyn against Goodwin’s arguments foreshadowed a similar
Leveller response to the Independent program of the latter part of the decade. Lilburne and
Walwyn had argued that the true ecclesiastical state could never be definitively known, and
therefore broad religious toleration needed to be extended to all who were willing to live in
peace with one another. Goodwin and the Presbyterians argued practically the opposite,
claiming that the true ecclesiastical state was known with certainty, and therefore needed to
use power from the civil state to reinforce its own authority. The Independents split the
difference in a way that fell short of the Leveller ideals in significant ways.
Shortly after the publication of Goodwin’s tract in London, Walwyn wrote The
Compassionate Samaritane. He wrote to refute the arguments which he had originally been
excited to read because he had hoped that Goodwin’s arguments would align with his own.99
He was disappointed when he found that Goodwin and his fellow dissenters had sought to
“procure liberty only to them selves.”100 This was self-serving, and ultimately far from
Walwyn’s aim which was to gain, “common freedome….which is every mans peculiar right so
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far as ‘tis not prejudiciall to the Common.”101 This was an early example of a Leveller being
forced to refine his arguments and extend his logic to new levels of application by the exigent
realities of the shifting political realities of the English Civil War. As the Presbyterians gained
power within the Parliamentary faction, the Levellers like Walwyn were forced to distinguish
their own views in contrast to these developments, often leading to the articulation of
principles which were rhetorically more extreme, even if the logic followed from their previous
philosophical commitments. In this way, rhetorically and systematically, the Levellers were
radicalized as they responded to and distinguished themselves from others’ political programs.
In this case, Walwyn developed the conclusion that any religious practice should be
accepted, as long as those who practiced it were willing to tolerate other religious practices.
The role of the civil authority, or “Commonwealth” was to “afford protection to all peaceable
good men alike,” meaning that the civil authority’s appropriate role in matters of religion was
to ensure equality of religious practice to all peaceful believers.102 Walwyn rested his defense
of the freedom of religion on several logical conclusions. In the first place, civil government
could only deal with “voluntary actions”, and a person’s belief was not a voluntary action.103
Secondly, there was a general “uncertainty of knowledg in this life,” and no man could of
himself “presume…an unerring spirit.”104 From a pragmatic standpoint, this made open debate
a far more compelling and convincing form of resolution between religious disagreements than
force.105 For this reason, there was a “generall interest…to preserve amongst the people the
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distinction concerning Government of Ecclesiasticall and Civill.”106 The consensual framework
which united Walwyn’s logic should not be missed. All civil and religious institutional authority
could only be derived by consent, and the only interest within English society wherein
unanimous consent could be achieved was in the protection of absolute religious liberty.
Walwyn also rejected the argument that the people could not accurately understand
the Scriptures. Therefore, the clergy was not necessary as a divinely ordained intermediary. It
was this line of argument which Walwyn and the Levellers would subsequently apply to the
franchise: they had a firm faith that Englishmen were capable of understanding issues related
to their own self-interests and to make informed decisions accordingly. Walwyn echoed the
Lutheran principle of the priesthood of all believers when he proclaimed that if “poore and
unlearned Fishermen and Tentmakers were made choyce of for Christs Disciples and
Apostles…the simplicity and meanesse of the Apostles,” were able to divine the will of God.107
So too could his contemporary Englishmen. The later arguments about the franchise were
nothing more than civil extrapolations of this religious principle.
The defining difference between Goodwin’s and Walwyn’s positions was theological and
rooted in different conclusions following from the same premise. Both Walwyn and Goodwin
assumed that there was a true ecclesiastical state, and that ultimately it was the civil state’s
responsibility to protect the conscience of its subjects. However, since Goodwin treated the
true ecclesiastical state as a known quantity, it was necessary for the government to ensure
that only true doctrine was discussed in the public sphere. Walwyn, on the other hand,
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assumed that the difference between the true and false ecclesiastical states was not readily
known, and perhaps could never be known with absolute certainty, so the only way to protect
individuals’ conscience in his view was to ensure that each person was absolutely free to pursue
his or her relationship with God in a way unmolested by the government or by other churches.
This placed religion outside of government control, but also gave a positive role for the
government in ensuring that open competition of ideas was allowed to persist.
According to Walwyn, since they were not being offered the ability to make these
choices, the English people lived under a sort of religious tyranny. Both the “Episcopall
Clergie…and the Prebiterian Prelacy…mainely intend their owne respective profits…” which
would inevitably lead to “the basest kind of slavery…whilst each of them…seeke to obtaine
authority to compel the whole Nation to be subject to their doubtfull, yea groundless
determinations.”108 This was “the greatest and worst sort of oppression and tyranny.”109
Walwyn accused all sides of seeking to repress the freedom of speech and the press in an
attempt to maintain their corrupt and tyrannical regimes. This also made them seem as though
they “either…doubt[ed] their owne tenets, or know some grosse errours amonst themselves,
which yet their interests and professions engage them to maintaine.”110 Yet again, Walwyn
placed his faith in competition rather than control.
Finally, Walwyn proposed a thought experiment whereby even if a true ecclesiastical
government could be known, “to compel me…against my conscience, is to compel me to doe
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that which is sinfull.”111 This was based on the Corinthians passage about eating food to idols,
and Walwyn considered such to be both unjust and un-Christian. Walwyn anticipated that to
allow a broad diversity of opinions would sow disunity in the society, but he asserted that this
would only be the case if the “Common cause” was tied to a specific religious denomination,
rather than to a general assertion of all men’s freedom.112
The true “Common cause” was to allow the competition of ideas, so that men could
judge for themselves, and choose the best idea from amongst competing ideas. In the
expression of this idea, particularly as following from all of the previously articulated principles,
Walwyn finally developed the semantics necessary to present a fully defined principle of
religious freedom as a negative liberty. Not only did the government need to abstain from
interfering in the religious practices of others, it also needed to promote the interest of the
“common cause” to protect dissent through the prevention of allowing any religious group
from seizing hegemony within society. Although at first glance, this may have seemed similar
to the republican principle of civil virtue, Walwyn’s common cause ideology was articulated on
the basis of forced non-encroachment of a specific individual liberty, rather than selective
interference based on the good of society.
Walwyn was joined in his basic arguments by the Independent, Henry Robinson.
Robinson’s conspiratorial tone was similar to Walwyn’s in asserting that the ultimate reason for
the current struggle was caused by the “evill Counsellors or Courtiers” in both the church and
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the state.113 Robinson clearly stated that neither the previously Catholic or Anglican doctrines
themselves had been the tyrannical part of the government, but their willingness to use civil
power against opposing viewpoints was ultimately the problem which posed a threat to the
liberty of the English subjects.114 He agreed that there was no Biblical argument that the
Apostles had made which established the right to compel worship, and therefore the civil state
must be kept separate from the ecclesiastical one. The ultimate corruption within the English
government had derived from its usurpation of the “Ecclesiasticall Sovereignty” which had
“inbred corruptions and temptations…[to] unavoidably degenerat[e] into tyranny.”115
The difference between Robinson’s arguments and the Levellers’ was that he drew a
soft line in the toleration of “Papists and Turks,” although he allowed that if their worship took
place “in a qualified and more moderate manner” that even these might be suffered to practice
their religions in peace.116 Drawing from many of the same texts and logical arguments as
Walwyn and Lilburne, Robinson essentially concluded that it was only the Catholics’ official
doctrine of civil collaboration with the ecclesiastical which made them incompatible with
English civil law. For Robinson, the right to religion also required the freedom of press and
speech. He wrote that “you cannot in reason expect, or in equity require, that they should not
have as ample priviledge as your selfe, to deliver their minds freely both in speech and
writing.”117
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Robinson was not the only one beginning to link the freedom of religion to other
important liberties. In a tract written in the summer of 1644 as a continuance of his pamphlet
war against Thomas Goodwin, Walwyn wrote to persuade his readers for religious toleration of
the “Anabaptists, Antimonians, Brownists, Separatists or Independents.”118 He used the
example of Christ’s treatment of the Sadduces, whom he “allowed…to be fully perswaded in
their owne minds…[because] he knew that men might live peaceably and lovingly together,
though they differ in judgement from one another.”119 Since Paul had “instructed [Christians]
to try all things,” according to Walwyn, this could only be achieved by a universal freedom of
the press and speech.120 According to Walwyn, the sectarian divisions and focus on removing
the freedoms of speech, press, and religion were leading to, “the destruction of the common
freedome of [my] deare Country,” and therefore he wanted to exhort his fellow Anglicans to,
“joyne heart and hand with them in all offices of love and mutuall assistance of the
Commonwealth.” 121 The idea of mutual assistance was strongly connected to Walwyn’s
“common cause” ideology, which saw the separation of the church and state as the lowest
common denominator for the preservation of their rights as Englishmen.
John Goodwin pushed back against Walwyn’s arguments, alleging that Walwyn’s
impudence was, “suppressing any Way, Doctrine, or Practice, concerning which they know not

118

William Walwyn. Good Counsell to All those that heartily desire the glory of God, the freedome of the
Commonwealth, and the good of all virtuous men. In Tracts on Liberty by the Levellers and their Critics Vol. 2
(1644-1645). (Online Library of Liberty: London, July 29, 1644), [129].
Antinomian was a common designation for the Quakers. It came from the latin derivation of anti meaning
“against” and nomian meaning “law,” and was based on the Quaker insistence on mystic relationship over religious
adherence to the Old Testament law.
119
Ibid, [130].
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid, [131].

81
certainly whether it be from God or no.”122 Suppression was necessary in Goodwin’s view to a
certain extent, since apostacy was dangerous for the souls of the people in England. Goodwin
did allow that this suppression only extended to, “ways or courses [that religious groups] are
not able to demonstrate” were in keeping with God’s Word.123 Goodwin was not arguing for
universal freedom of religion, but rather for a more narrowly focused freedom toward those
whose views differed in nuanced ways from his own beliefs about true religion. Goodwin also
believed that God would providentially intervene and establish those doctrines which were true
from those which were false. Unlike Walwyn, who believed that the open disputation might
lead to edification, Goodwin instead argued that they should wait, “until God had either untied,
or cut the knot,” between different beliefs.124
Due to his growing struggles against certain individuals in the House of Lords and with
the Presbyterians more generally, Lilburne finally rejoined the pamphlet wars in early 1645.
Lilburne had served with distinction in the Parliamentary forces, having attained the rank of
colonel, and spent some time imprisoned by the Royalists as a prisoner of war until his release
was negotiated as a part of a prisoner exchange. The well-publicized tale of Lilburne’s brave
service, as well as his imprisonment had given him a larger platform from which to argue for his
views on the political developments of the day.
Lilburne’s arguments were in line with the line of thought Walwyn had been articulating,
claiming that the Presbyterian “Blacke Coats” did not have the right to stop “the Presse against
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us, while things are in debate.”125 In an almost identical argument to the one Walwyn had
made, Lilburne argued that it was his liberty when Parliament was in session, to have access to
the freedom of the press. By this point, Lilburne was convinced that the “Blacke-Coats” were a
graver threat to the “Subjects Liberty…then their dear fathers the Bishops.”126 Lilburne saw this
right as held by all “freeborne English Subjects,” as “their Liberty and Privilege.”127 It is telling
that he connected the freedom of Press directly to his concept of a “freeborne English Subject”
because it demonstrated that when Lilburne spoke of the “freeborne English Subject” he clearly
had in mind the concept of Parliamentary accountability to the People, of which the liberty of
the press was an integral part.128 It is also significant that the pivot point to the rights of the
“freeborne Englishman,” the turn of phrase from which “Freeborn” John Lilburne earned his
honorific moniker, occurred via the debate about the separation of Church and State. This was
a critical juncture for the Levellers, who by this point were in direct contact with one another
and had begun to work in concert toward the preservation of individual liberties. They had
begun to recognize that the pragmatic necessities of ensuring the “common cause” demanded
that other ancillary rights of the “freeborn Englishman” also be ensured by the government as
negative liberties.
On theological grounds, Lilburne categorically rejected the idea of any type of
theocracy, arguing that the Jewish theocracy had been abolished by Christ, and that Christ’s
“Institutions in the New Testament are the Antitypes of them.”129 The only proper theocracy
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was the Kingdom of Heaven, which for the time being was not manifest on earth, but was
Christ’s heavenly kingdom. Lilburne took it as a given that “no Parliament, Councell, Synod,
Emperour, King, nor Majestrate hath any spirituall Authrity.”130 Following this line of logic, he
asserted the axiom that there was no Civil or Biblical mandate for any limitations on the
freedom of religion, and that therefore, “to persecute for conscience is not of nor from God,
but of and from the Divell.”131
According to Lilburne, the civil establishment of any church was antithetical to Christian
doctrine, and that King Henry had been equally guilty of this as the Pope was prior to him, since
“he set himself Head in all causes Eccleiasticall and Civill.”132 In Lilburne’s view, Queens Mary
and Elizabeth, and Kings James and Charles had all perpetrated this error by persecuting various
denominations of Christians. In the creation of this list, Lilburne implied that the persecution
and murders of Protestants and Catholics was equally egregious. According to Lilburne, the
only just ruler of the Ecclesiastical State was “Jesus Christ alone to be King of his Saints….it
being too high a throne for all the creatures in the world to raigne in.”133 He went as far as to
argue that if Parliament rightly had the sovereignty to declare the religion of the state by
statute, that “Queen Mary did justifiably in burning the Saints in her dayes that would not
stoope and submit to that Religion she and her Parliament had set up.”134
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Walwyn also wrote early in 1645 to support religious freedom and its associated rights
from governmental intrusion. Both Lilburne’s letter in January 1645, and Walwyn’s A Helpe to
the right understanding of a Discourse, alluded to the fact that their former ally, William
Prynne’s, commitment to a Presbyterian civil government represented a serious threat to the
liberties of the Englishmen.135 Walwyn wrote specifically to defend John Goodwin, against the
attacks that Prynne had recently levelled against Goodwin. Walwyn accused Prynne of “inciting
the Parliament…to acts of tyranny against a people he knows innocent.”136 Since Prynne would
“rage against them had he that command of censure, fine, pillory…which the Archbishop
unjustly usurped,” Walwyn made it clear that he saw no difference in Prynne’s and Laud’s
policies.137 Walwyn also exhorted the Presbyterians to set aside tithes as a support to their
established church, which he allowed would greatly lessen the tyranny of the church.138
Walwyn again admitted that he was in one of the groups that would have been
tolerated by the English Presbyterian government, but that this was not “very well affected to
the Parliament and to common freedome” because it excluded many other groups.139 As
Walwyn’s political philosophy had developed over time, he had come upon an unequivocable
statement in a belief in the inalienable nature of the freedom of religion. He argued that “a
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particular man cannot be robbed of that which he never had; no neither can a Parliament…[be]
deprived of a power which cannot be entrusted unto them.”140 In Walwyn’s view, “Emperors,
Kings, and Popes” were equal offenders to “Councels and Parliaments” in the historical
violation of this foundational right.141 Walwyn was responding in this pamphlet specifically
against what he took to be Prynne’s argument that the Solemn League and Covenant “bindes us
to maintaine an absolute Ecclesiastick power in the Parliament,” which was essentially adopting
the argument that Parliamentary statutes were automatically integrated into the constitutional
arrangement, even so far as it extended to religious matters.142 Walwyn responded to this
claim directly by stating that “what the people cannot entrust that they cannot have; which will
answer all objections of that nature.”143 In other words, there are inalienable rights which
cannot, nor could ever be, surrendered to Parliament. That Walwyn developed this argument
specifically in a debate about the freedom of religion is significant, but once this premise had
been established in his mind, it had further-reaching consequences.
At this point, Walwyn made the jump to the civil sphere based on the ecclesiastical.
Clearly, all men were bound to follow such laws as encouraged public virtue, “but in things
wherein every man ought to be fully perswaded in his particular minde of the lawfullnesse or
unlawfulness thereof; there to leave every man the guidance of his own judgement…[based on]
all sorts of ingenious free borne minds.”144 Since Walwyn had already categorically denied that
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any laws restricting religious exercise could be in keeping with the common good, this
statement was intended to serve as a justification for civil disobedience based on each man’s
conscience. Walwyn set clear delineations on this, the most obvious being that no man had
the right to take another’s property or life, simply because he claimed that he believed he
did.145 The civil authority and laws rightly applied in these cases, so he was careful even in
arguing for the right of civil disobedience to be sure that his argument could not be mistaken as
an appeal to anarchy.
Walwyn also claimed that Prynne’s ideas were “a mixt multitude of unclean testimonies
raked out of the serpentine dens of meer tyrannous Princes, Antichristian, and Machivillian
Councells, erronious Parliaments, and bloudy persecuting Councells and Convocations.”146 He
contrasted his view of tyranny with the “just Parliamentary Government,” which he qualified as
a government which defended the peoples’ “common liberties,” of which one was the freedom
of those who, “though of a different judgement with me in matters of Religion; in which case I
am not to judge or controle him, nor him me.”147 In this statement, Walwyn was clearly
attempting to resist what some political historians like Bassani have termed the rise of the
modern state, under which all power was centralized and sovereignty resided with the State
rather than the individual.148 Prynne’s abuses via the Parliament had forced Walwyn to
recognize that even Parliaments could become tyrannical, and therefore to develop a political
awareness that Leviathan must not be considered sovereign. Even under republican auspices,
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such as those posited by Machiavelli, Walwyn saw this as a threat to English liberty. This also
helps to explain why he sought to retain the right to civil disobedience outside of strictly
religious matters, yet why he explicitly rejected the interpretation that his argument was for
anarchy.
From this point forward, the Leveller leadership became far more invested not only in
religious liberty, but also in the necessary political constitution needed to ensure that none of
Lilburne’s three states, civil, true or false ecclesiastical, were given the authority to dictate to
any person what they had to do in matters of conscience. For example, in Overton’s
Remonstrance of Many Citizens, the Leveller claimed summarily that, “neither [Parliament], nor
none else, can have any into Power at all to conclude the People in matters that concerne the
Worship of God.”149 With reference to all legal legitimacy, Walwyn similarly held that, “only
things natural and rationall are properly subject unto government,” clearly reserving matters of
religion from the civil sphere.150 The logical progression of Leveller ideas had forced each of
them separately to recognize that although the freedom of religion, particularly rooted in their
shared Reformational commitments about the nature of God’s direct interaction with each
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individual, had civil, as well as religious implications; the “common cause” was primarily about
religion.151
As will be demonstrated in the following two chapters, this axiomatic truth about the
necessity of the freedom of religion led to an insistence that ultimate sovereignty rested within
the individual. They also held that a completely different constitutional arrangement within the
mixed monarchy was necessary and new views of jurisprudence as it related to constitutional,
statutory, and common law were appropriate. By the time Lilburne’s A Copy of a Letter and
Walwyn’s A Helpe to the right understanding of a Discourse concerning Independency were
written, a chasm had been created between certain elements within the Parliamentary alliance,
which had originally coalesced to fight against the abuses of Charles I and ensure broader
toleration than Archbishop Laud was prepared to countenance. The first split occurred
between the Presbyterians and the Independents, with the Levellers siding with the
Independents against an institutionalized State Church. However, from a historian’s vantage
point, even during the split over the role of religion between the Presbyterians and the other
Parliamentary groups, the differences in how such positions were discussed and defended
made it obvious that the Leveller position was philosophically incompatible with the
Independents.
Lilburne had begun the argument for religious liberty as a negative liberty in the Star
Chamber, by arguing that there was a true and a false ecclesiastical state and given the reality
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that God had given each man the capacity to make his own choice based on his own
conscience, it was not possible to know for certain the difference between these two states.
This, in turn, had led to the broader interpretation of a “Papist,” not as one who followed the
Catholic faith, but rather as one who was committed to a state-sponsored Church. “Honest”
men, those who simply desired to respond to God based on the dictates of their own
conscience and were willing to live and let live in the matters of religion, deserved protection
from the state against encroachments on their consciences. This right was held by even the
“meanest” of all men, since religious matters were uncomplicated, and all were able to rightly
understand their conscience in these matters. Logically, this demanded that the civil state be
not only separated from the ecclesiastical state, but that it gives no preferential treatment to
one belief or another. Walwyn, responding to the Presbyterian demands for an established
church, adopted the final principle of the “common cause” which amounted to a requirement
for the civil authority to establish dissent as a right for any denomination which did not
incorporate an established church as a part of its official political program. It was from this
ideology of the common cause, that the Levellers then developed the idea of the “Freeborn”
English citizen, and the sovereignty of the individual.
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Chapter 2
The Freeborn Englishman’s Liberties
In the early morning hours of August 11, 1646, Richard Overton was disturbed from his
sleep by the entry of two armed men to his bedchamber.1 According to his account, they
pointed a loaded pistol at him, and demanded that he clothe himself to go with them.2
Overton’s personal effects were rifled through by the intruders, who stole things from a trunk
as well as his own pockets.3 Once freed from the immediacy of his concern for his wife’s wellbeing upon reaching his doorstep, Overton attempted to escape until more men surrounded
him and threatened to shoot if he did not surrender to them.4
By this point, Richard Overton was a known associate of both John Lilburne and William
Walwyn and was involved in the unsanctioned printing and distribution of pamphlets by both
men, as well as adding several of his own criticisms of the Presbyterian-controlled government.
Overton’s religious beliefs were unorthodox in the extreme, holding that, among other things,
there was no physical afterlife or resurrection of the dead.5 That Overton publicly avowed his
heretical beliefs and published pamphlets about them was exactly the kind of activity that could
have only existed in the chaos of the continuing struggle for sovereignty between Parliament
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and Charles I. Sects had sprung up like mushrooms after an English summer rain, and the
Presbyterian-controlled Parliament, led by William Prynne, as well as many members of the
English clergy were attempting to fill the vacuum left by the destruction of the Anglican-State
government with a Puritan-controlled Presbyterian state instead. A year prior, Thomas
Edwards published Gangraena: an exhaustive list of heresies and sectaries that he considered
to be dangerous. In Gangraena, Edwards had first identified the Leveller leaders in connection
to one another as a grave threat to the moral fiber of England.6 Hence, in the early light of a
Tuesday morning, two men barged into Overton’s house to arrest him for the sin and crime of
publishing and distributing his heretical opinions.
In what Overton termed an “invasion upon the rights, properties, and immunities of the
free-born Commoners of England,” his attackers refused to produce a warrant or to even state
the purpose for their violations of “the great Charter of the Laws, freedoms, and properties of
the people.”7 The hypocrisy of the charge laid against the King for waging an unjust war on his
Parliament was not lost on Overton, who wryly noted that, “my case (for that time being) is of
the same nature with that of the Parliament against the King.”8
After his accusers upbraided him for running from their attempts at a what they
considered a lawful arrest, Overton repeatedly protested that,
Gentlemen, I did not flie from Authority, but from violence, hostile invasion, and pursuit, for
my house being in this hostile manner invaded, and looking out of my doores, and espying
Musketeers at my gate, I was struck into a sudden fear of my life: and hearing of no
Magisteriall Authority, nor seeing the least appearance thereof from them, but of hostile
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invasion and assault, menacing nothing but death in my appearance: I therefore (as by
nature I was bound) attempted to make an escape for the present preservation of my life.9

Aware that his situation had afforded him an audience of neighbors, Overton seized the
opportunity to appeal to their sensibilities of their own rights as Englishmen, and to see the
evidence of the tyranny of the present English government.10 Refusing to go quietly, Overton
recalled that as he was being taken away, he vowed,
Gentlemen, I am resolved by the grace of God, that whatsoever either you, or any man… do
against me, I will not let go (by my own or proper consent)…title, or bare-breadth of the just
Rights, freedoms, or liberties either of my self, or of any other individuall, or of this Nation in
generall: stand or fall, live or die, come what come will, on this I am resolved, hoping so to
deport my self according to the Rule of Reason, equity and justice, that if I suffer, it shall not
be for evill, but for well-doing, and righteousnesse sake, for which is promised a blessing.11

The events which occurred during the years of 1645 and 1647 were important to the
overall development of the English Crisis. Although perhaps somewhat premature in their endgame assessment, the Parliamentary coalition fractured over precisely what sort of government
they had fought to achieve. Within this division, the broadly Reformed coalition splintered into
the Puritan Independents, led by Oliver Cromwell and Henry Ireton and the Presbyterians, led
by William Prynne. Matters were further complicated by the reality that the Presbyterians had
powerful allies in the House of Lords. Within English jurisprudence, this made differences of
opinion on religious toleration a default litmus test for one’s general support of the House of
Lords. The Presbyterians saw it as a fully autonomous part of the legislative branch in a
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bicameral system and the Independents as an advisory panel that held little official power other
than that delegated to it by the Commons.
The Leveller engagement in this process was defined by the fact that the Independents
were a valuable ally against the Presbyterians and the authority of the House of Lords, which to
Lilburne and Overton was quite literally a potential key to their release from prison.
Notwithstanding their mutual adversary, the rationale for opposition against the Presbyterians,
both civilly and ecclesiastically, was substantively different for the Levellers and Independents.
Throughout this period, the articulation of those differences led to a growing awareness that
sharing the same foe did not make for anything more than a tentative alliance.
Additionally, by 1647, the New Model Army had become increasingly politicized by the
Independents, and as events went on to develop, this eventually led to the military occupation
of London. A year later, Pride’s Purge of the Parliament constituted a full Independent takeover of the government. Ironically, the Levellers had advocated for a purge of the Commons
well in advance of Pride’s Purge based on radically different criteria for who was excluded
which was related to accountability to the constituents, not political faction. From 1645 to mid1647, Pride’s Purge was in the future, so while the historian can anticipate their coming, none
of the Levellers or Independents necessarily recognized the irreconcilable implications of their
differing philosophies of inalienable rights or English jurisprudence, or in fact probably
recognized the difference between a “Leveller” and an “Independent.”
One person who did recognize the difference was Thomas Edwards, the Presbyterian
minister and author of Gangreana, whose sole purpose in authoring his exhaustive catalogue of
heresies and sects was to help the reader to:
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discern the mischief of Ecclesi∣asticall Anarchy, the monstrousnesse of the much affected
Toleration, and be warned to be wise to sobri∣ety, and fear and suspect the pretended New
Lights, I approve that this Treatise, discovering the Gangrene of so many strange Opinions.12

In his two editions, he mentioned Lilburne and Walwyn each thirty-three times and Overton
ten, dedicating a highly disproportionate amount of attention to the men who would become
the leaders of the Leveller Movement relative to other notable English leaders.13 Edwards
addressed his work to the “Right Honourable and Noble Senatours,” in both Houses of
Parliament, demonstrating his conviction of the legitimacy of both. In response to Lilburne’s
Englands lamentable slavery, Edwards argued that having a state-controlled Church was the
only way to ensure God’s continued provision for the Parliamentary coalition.14 Therefore,
rather than arguing for a separation of church and state, as Lilburne and Walwyn had done,
Edwards insisted that a state-controlled church was an absolute necessity.
To Edwards, prayers for Lilburne’s release from incarceration by various clergy in
London were strongly connected with Lilburne’s position on church and state.15 However,
Edwards also accused Lilburne of not being appropriately deferential to the privilege of
Parliament, and likewise criticized the Commons for not rightly upholding their own privilege
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against Lilburne’s insolence.16 The net sum of this was that “Lilburne and his fellowes” were
able to meet, “at such times and places, and draw up Petitions, and that strange ones too,
medling with manie things before the Houses, and in debate not determined, and against the
known Priviledges of the Houses.”17 In Edwards’ opinion, the very exercise of those rights
which Lilburne and “his fellowes” were coming to take as inalienable rights of the freeborn
Englishman was what warranted his prosecution and imprisonment.
Edwards also had no love lost for Walwyn’s repeated pamphlets written against his first
edition of Gangraena and doubled down in the second edition, defending his accusations that
Walwyn was, “out of his owne mouth and writings condemned for a dangerous man, a Seeker,
and a strong head.”18 His ire toward Overton was less personal, simply clamining that he had
sold books that “had cut the legs of the Presbyterian government.”19 That all of these activities
were linked to John Goodwin’s parish was made explicitly clear throughout Edwards’ writing,
and his arguments made it clear that in addition to the Levellers recognizing the civil extensions
of their religious commitments, Edwards and the Presbyterians recognized it also.20 However,
his limited attention to the Independent Movement as a whole demonstrated that Edwards had
identified the Levellers as the radical wing of the broader Independent Movement, and that it
was the Coleman Street Independent Movement that was gangrenous, not the whole of the
Independent position.21
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In The Araignment of Mr. Persecution, Overton responded to many of the same social
conditions as Edwards, albeit in the completely opposite direction. He used the analogy of a
trial to make certain points related to his views of the connection between religious and civil
liberties. Mr. Persecution was to be put on trial for his acts in England, as according to Overton,
his actions were already well-known to have been in evidence in the Spanish Inquisition and
other places of the Roman Catholic world.22 His Araignment was intended to be a systematic
argument for an expenasion of the freedom of religion in England. In the discourse of the trial,
Mr. Liberty of Conscience even argued that, “Turckes, Jewes, Pagans, and Infidels,” were to,
“grow or live together in the Field of the World.”23 Overton’s only solution was to, “live
peaceably & quietly one by another; bearing one with another, and so of all Religions.”24
Just as both Lilburne and Walwyn had argued, Overton’s Persecution had usurped the
“Prerogative Royall of Jesus Christ over the Consciences of men.”25 This was due to the simple
fact that Christ was sovereign over the Church, and therefore no civil authority could intervene
in matters deferred by Christ. To judge in matters of religion was to “usrupeth that to himselfe,
which Christ hath referred to the Last Day, to wit, to judge them that reject him.”26 Although
the problem of toleration was the root cause of the problems in England, the religious fighting
had called attention to problems within the civil sphere as well. Not only had the State usurped
Christ’s prerogative by attempting to establish a church, but religious preferences then created
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the removal of civil liberties which ought to be enjoyed by Englishmen. Persecution was guilty
of “wast[ing] mens Estates [and had]…hangeth, burneth, stoneth, tortureth,” godly men; the
more godly, the more persecuted.27 Additionally, the presses had been stopped and regulated,
and “imprisoneth men only for the discharge of a good Conscience.”28 In short, they had been
deprived of their lives, liberty, and property under the auspices of religious persecution, and
had “force[d] Millions to make Shipwracke of a good Conscience,” as collateral religious
damage.29 Wherever Persecution “rule[d], no peace publike, or private; no freedome, rights, or
liberty either civil or spirituall” could exist.30
These abuses created a state of warfare between the citizens and the state due to their
unjust usurpations. The “Soveraigne Law, or fundamentall constitution of Civill Government,”
had been violated, and Persecution ought to be, “cut off, least the whole politique body
perish.” 31 Overton’s conclusion, in keeping with both Walwyn’s and Lilburne’s ideas on the
matter, was that based on both religious and civil considerations, the civil and ecclesiastical
spheres had to be kept totally separate. He explicitly charged that all governments ought to
see the suppression of persecution as a duty equal to prosecuting treason and rebellion, since it
represented an equal threat to the people’s safety. Quite literally, the proper place of the
government was to, “see that all may have their Birthright, Liberty, and Privilege,” and since
England was a religiously pluralistic society all, “wrapt up in the skine of one constitution…all by
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compulsion are to be forced to the Civill peace…to this end the Majestrate ought to bind all
Religions, that no Religion have power over other, that all in the Generall have Toleration.”32
Unique to the Leveller line of argumentation, this sovereignty extended even to the
Commons, who were unqualified to rule in this area due to their mortal natures. It was the
acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the individual over religious matters which led Overton
to reject the theory of Parliamentary sovereignty, since it had “arrogate[d] Supremacy over the
State and people” despite being merely “men, not Gods.”33 Giving any government institution,
even that which represented the people, power over the conscience was a “Monopole of the
Spirit” in which the “Divell hath brought his hogges to a faire Market.”34
The events of 1645 to 1647 helped the Levellers to develop two significant innovations
in their political theory, which differentiated them from the constellation of contemporary
political theories. The creation of the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643 was critical to the
Presbyterian take-over of the State and the State-sponsored Church, but for much of 1643 and
1644, it was unclear whether any political faction intended to wield the authority given by the
oath. However, In 1645, the Presbyterian leaders in Parliament began to use the Solemn
League as a rationalization for reinstituted censorship laws, which violated the sensibilities of
the Levellers, and created escalating tensions, particularly after Lilburne and Overton were
arrested for violating these laws. Finally, the end of official conflict with Charles I and the
negotiations between the House of Commons, the House of Lords, and the King created a
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perpetual whirlwind of doubt and insecurity related to the permanence of the freedoms which
had been achieved over the previous years of fighting. It was in being forced to define precisely
what the aim of the fighting had been, where continuing lines of delineation were created
between Parliamentary factions, by which the Levellers came to be distinct.
The first distinct commitment, which will be the subject of this present chapter, was the
concept of inalienable rights based on the Leveller doctrine of natural law, and the contractual
nature of society. The second, which was inextricably tied to the first and the primary subject
of the following chapter, was the constitutional relationship that described the social contract
between the People and their government, as well as the pragmatic implementations of that
contract revolving around the concepts of representation and suffrage. These concepts
developed concurrently, with the second premise being a natural extension of the first, but for
clarity’s sake, these concepts have been separated to be evaluated in greater depth.
In her book on the Levellers and their political program, Foxley has claimed that one of
Lilburne’s main political innovations was the idea of the “freeborn Englishman.”35 He often
referred to it as such or described it as “the Englishman’s birthright.” Foxley noted that the
combination of these terms was not in common use prior to Lilburne, and therefore was not
just a redefinition of existing terms, but a true innovation to distinguish his concepts as a new
idea of an individual’s rights within society.36 Lilburne initially derived this from Chapter 29 of
the Magna Carta, and it was in many ways simply short-hand for all Englishmen, or all free (i.e.
not slave) men in England.37 However, as the following chapter argues, and as Foxley herself
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has noted in her publications, first Walwyn, and eventually all three Leveller leaders recognized
and reoriented their derivation of natural rights away from Magna Carta and into the purely
philosophical realm of natural rights.38
Foxley further recognized that Lilburne’s claims were ideologically radical. According to
Foxley, “what was controversial was the assertion that the free status of Englishmen gave
them, as individuals, political status.”39 She observed that for Lilburne, this was also linked to
the term “denizen.”40 Employment of the term “denizen” held a legal connotation which
demanded that all such people held equal rights, since they were equal in status under the
law.41 As will be discussed later, this was different from “citizen,” who also had voting rights.
According to Foxley, Lilburne foundationally reinterpreted the words “privilege,”
“immunity,” liberty,” and “franchise” to be incorporated in his program of universally held,
inalienable and natural rights, which were held by all freeborn Englishmen.42 This was a total
reversal of the traditional assumptions by most of his contemporaries who held that these were
granted by the governing authority to specific individuals under specific circumstances.
According to Foxley, “in Lilburne’s writing, all Englishmen enjoyed identical political
‘privileges’—which meant that they were hardly ‘privileges’ at all.”43
What Foxley’s interpretation failed to account for was the reality that a true adoption of
all “privileges” as inalienable rights created a fundamental paradox that the Levellers had
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systematically resolved. One of the most basic understandings of Magna Carta as taught in
many school classrooms was that it was that it was a fundamental confirmation of the property
rights of individuals. In granting the representative institution of Parliament the power to
control taxation, Magna Carta enshrined this natural right as inviolable by any except the
People’s own representatives. By granting universal manhood suffrage, this would have given
individuals who paid no taxes the opportunity to vote for representatives that would make
statutes regarding the regulation or taxation of other men’s property. To the Levellers, as it
would be to James Madison in the Founding Era of the United States, this was problematic. To
resolve this paradox, the Levellers very carefully and systematically distinguished between
natural, inalienable rights and civil or political rights.44 Stated in another way, all denizens were
entitled to natural and inalienable rights, whereas there were other political rights such as
suffrage, which were only available to certain citizens that met particular criteria.
As Professor Richard Ashcraft has noted, the Levellers employed the word “mean” as a
way of discussing the universal nature of inalienable rights, such as Rainsborough’s famous and
oft-quoted statement at Putney.45 This word came to be related to the 1680’s use of the word
“indigent” or “idle poor” as another way of expressing the same general idea.46 What follows in
this chapter is an argument that when the Levellers talked about the “poorest he,” as
Rainsborough did at Putney in the context of having the right to vote, he was in fact, referring
to a completely different demographic population than when he claimed that the “meanest
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man in the kingdom,” had the gift of reason, and the inalienable rights which corresponded to
it.47 The commitment to the doctrine of inalienable rights meant that not all needed to be
enfranchised for Rainsborough’s concluding statement that, “every man born in England
cannot…be exempted from the choice of those who are to make laws for him to live under,” to
be true, as long as laws made by the lawmakers were properly bounded.48
The eminent Marxist historian, C.B. Macpherson, attempted to explain the Leveller
solution to this paradox in a different way. Macpherson has argued that the Levellers did not
include alms takers, felons, beggars, and servants in the category of “freeborn” Englishmen; a
conclusion borne out by their treatment of these particular people in many of their writings.49
However, Macpherson treated enfranchisement as being equivalent to “freeborn” which was
not necessarily the case. All that followed from his assumptions was that to the Levellers’ way
of thinking, if servants who have voluntarily become subjected to another man’s arbitrary will
forfeited their right to enfranchisement, they forfeited all other rights as well. This would be
true if the Levellers equated the two but need not be true at all if enfranchisement itself was
not an inalienable right. The Levellers were willing to accept this distinction, provided that
inalienable rights were protected in other ways, such as the negative constitutional framework
that they proposed in their Agreements of the People, in particular the Second and Third
versions written by Lilburne, Overton, and Walwyn.
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There were embryonic concepts of inalienable rights prior to the Presbyterian takeover
of the government and subsequent restrictions on religious expression. Lilburne’s arguments in
A Light for the Ignorant (1638) espoused a view of the explicit relationship between natural
rights and an appropriate separation between the church and the state. Since he took for
granted that the true ecclesiastical state was voluntary, and accountable directly to its
congregants, governed by a written social contract (i.e. the New Testament), Lilburne
articulated his natural rights theory of government regarding the limitations of Parliamentary
authority from the same principles.50 It is not a stretch to say that Lilburne’s libertarian ideals
regarding natural rights and negative liberties was derived from his philosophy of the three
states, and the principles which governed the three states. Furthermore, the best kind of civil
state would be one which mirrored many of the same principles of the true ecclesiastical state
and avoided the tyranny of the false ecclesiastical state.
In A Worke of the Beast, Lilburne went on to argue that men never needed to testify
against themselves under oath, because “he distroyes and vndoes himselfe.”51 In this instance,
Lilburne viewed self-preservation as a given natural right, and from that right, clearly followed
the logical conclusion that testifying against oneself under oath is never justified because it
either forced one to destroy his own self, or to violate his conscience. Either outcome was
unacceptable under the principle of self-preservation as a natural right, from which negative
liberties were derived: one ruined a man in the civil sphere, the other imperiled his soul.52
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In Goodwin’s radical parish, where the ecclesiastical state was already constituted by
the consent of individuals rather than a centralized authority, one would expect arguments like
Goodwin’s declaration that “kingly power or authority is directly and properly the creation or
ordinance of man.”53 Goodwin also accepted the separation of the ecclesiastical and civil
states, and explicitly extended the implications of this reality further than the earlier writings by
Walwyn or Lilburne. Clearly, obedience to the King was limited because “a mans obedience to
the King should not be found disobedience against God.” 54 The overall authority of the civil
state did not overlap with that of the true ecclesiastical state.
The Independent preacher of the Coleman Street parish also consciously articulated a
systematic program for the determination of natural rights as distinguished from civil rights.
The natural question “who shall be the Judge, Whether the command or commission of a
King…be unjust or no?” was raised and systematically answered by Goodman.55 The first
scenario was in matters of religion, where “half an eye is sufficient provision for this decision.”56
It was self-evident to Goodman that when a subject is commanded to do something which
contradicts Scripture, it was an unlawful command and therefore to be resisted by a virtuous
man. However, for Goodman, these commands were limited to Scriptural principles, and unlike
the Leveller arguments which shall be investigated, were more narrowly confined. Additionally,
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the Independents never made any kind of attempt to apply their concept of natural and
inalienable rights to the civil sphere, an endeavor which, as will be seen, the Levellers did
undertake. They fundamentally distinguished their contractual views of the individuals’
relationship to the church and the state.
In the waning autumn days of 1645, the Levellers’ patience for a satisfactory settlement
to the abuses perpetrated against the rights of the people were also shortening. The title of
Lilburne’s 1645 tract, Englands Birth-Right Justified Against all Arbitrary Usurpation, whether
Regall or Parliamentary, or under what Vizor soever, demonstrated his commitment to the
sovereignty of the People over all government “soever.” 57 He clearly meant his argument to be
understood within the context of both the Monarchist and Parliamentary systems which had
recently been experienced in England. Lilburne’s recent disenchantment with Parliament was
partially attributable to his most recent arrest and imprisonment for having written pamphlets
directed against certain members of Parliament. He accused those members of the House of
Peers of hiding behind Parliamentary privilege to avoid the hardships that he and his fellowsoldiers had experienced. However, it was also true that Lilburne’s firebrand spirit and his
consistent attacks on William Prynne’s position on jurisprudence over the course of the
preceding months, had left him on thin ice already. His souring relationship with certain
members of Parliament were at least a potential self-serving motive for his articulation of a
natural rights theory which precluded them from having authority over him. Notwithstanding
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this possible motivation, Lilburne and his Leveller allies constructed a systematic, logical, and
cohesive view of individual liberties in the two years between his imprisonment and the New
Model Army’s Leveller-influenced draft of the first Agreements of the People.
Englands Birth-Right Justified represented a key inflection point in the development of
the Leveller Movement, because it demonstrated a break from the common freedom as the
primary driver of Leveller agitation. The view of the sovereignty of the individual was strongly
correlated to the Leveller view of religious freedom, but Englands Birth-Right Justified sought to
articulate a broader program for individual sovereignty apart from religious toleration. The
intellectual pathways of individual freedom which had so often been trod toward establishing
religious independence became veritable highways for Lilburne, Walwyn, and Overton’s
concepts of other inalienable rights as well.
In attacking the Parliament, Lilburne had violated recent legislation which removed the
freedom of the press. Since Charles I had fled London several years earlier, publishing access
had been virtually unlimited, and it was precisely the sorts of arguments made by Lilburne and
“his fellowes” that the Presbyterians sought to restrict. The Presbyterian-controlled Parliament
had re-instituted many of the repressive civil practices which had been commonplace while a
state-controlled church had been the norm. The Parliamentarians argued that the laws which
they passed had been passed legally through a duly elected Parliament, and therefore were to
be understood as constitutional. The only avenue remaining for the Levellers to attack this
view was to argue that laws themselves could be unconstitutional if they violated individuals’
sovereignty. If there was no sovereignty of the individual, there was nothing to stop a
Parliament “that have sworne obedience to the Laws of the Land…from endeavouring by all
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lawfull means the abolition of those lawes, when they prove inconvenient or mischievous.”58 In
Lilburne’s view, the law-giving authority in Parliament was merely held as the “Kingdom’s great
trust…for defending and improving, and no wise for destroying nor disannulling their
Liberties.”59 This type of argument was a seismic shift in English constitutional jurisprudence.
Walwyn quickly published a pamphlet as an open letter to Lilburne which publicly linked
them in the common cause. Walwyn admired Lilburne’s “undaunted resolution in defence of
the common freedome of the People,” even though there was “some difference between you
and mee in matters of Religion.”60 Walwyn too turned his attention to secular matters in the
Fall of 1645. He noted that “having read, observed, debated, and considered both ancient and
latter times,” he found it critical to have the same “watchfullnesse, it never being out of
date.”61 Citizen education and participation were critical to Walwyn in the defense of freedom,
which helped to further safeguard the liberties of the People. In Englands Birth-Right Justified,
Lilburne had derived this necessity from the Magna Carta.62 Walwyn believed that the Magna
Carta was “more precious in your esteeme then it deserveth,” precisely because the argument
of natural rights was more powerful than one based on Parliamentary statute.63
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Regardless of Lilburne’s undo preoccupation with Magna Carta, Walwyn nevertheless
concurred with his use of Magna Carta as a protection of natural rights, allowing that Lilburne
was “the first indeed, that ever raised this new doctrine of Magna Charta.”64 What Walwyn
understood in Lilburne’s application of Magna Carta was that “a Parliament cannot justlie doe
any thing to make the people lesse safe or less free then they found them.”65 Walwyn
expanded on this concept to formally declare that “Magna Charta (you must observe) is but a
part of the peoples rights and liberties,” meaning that rather than a positive law
acknowledgement of enumerated rights, Magna Carta had merely stated certain rights from a
list of other as yet unenumerated natural rights which the People also retained.66 Lilburne’s
new interpretation was understood by Walwyn as being in direct contradiction to the view that
“Parliament being once chosen, have power over all our lives estates and liberties.”67 This was
in contrast to contemporary English jurisprudence, by which Parliament was considered to be
absolutely sovereign; there was “no pleading of any thing against them.”68 Several decades
prior to Locke’s argument, Walwyn argued that life, liberty, and property were all natural rights
which existed prior to government, and were reserved by the People within the social contract.
By this point, both Walwyn and Lilburne recognized that laws were fundamentally a
restriction of freedom.69 Walwyn stated dryly that “wee shall not find one Statute made to the
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enlargement of that steight bounds, deceitfully and improperlie called Magna Charta,” meaning
that rather than seeing Magna Carta as an agent of liberty, Walwyn viewed it as a violation of
the People’s freedom.70 The Parliamentary statutes, or Walwyn’s “enlargements,” were “ever
to the vexation of the people.”71
It is necessary to recognize that the root of the disagreement between the Leveller
leaders about the nature of Magna Carta was pragmatic, not ideological. The fact that Lilburne
and Overton found it was useful to them was driven by the fact that each of them was
imprisoned in 1646, and held for offenses against members of Parliament, and in particular
members of the House of Lords. Their most immediate concern was to gain release from
imprisonment, and their argument as based on Magna Carta, had legal merit.72 Walwyn, who
was not in prison at the time, saw it as nothing more than a loophole, and something which was
holding back the overall argument for natural rights. Walwyn’s concern was that by focusing
too much on Magna Carta, it would reinforce its status as a constitutional document, and in this
function, Walwyn found Magna Carta to be far too constraining and inadequate. Lilburne and
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Overton never disagreed with Walwyn on this point, but for several months continued to
attempt to use it as a means of gaining their own release from incarceration.
Although Walwyn had not fully developed the idea of a written, negative constitutional
framework in 1645, it was clear that he was developing an awareness that this would be the
best way in which the natural freedoms of the people were protected. Walwyn recognized,
“how far short even those which we call our best lawes, commeth of the marke of perfection,
justice, integrity, and reason.”73 Such a pessimistic view of the “best lawes” indicated that in
Walwyn’s mind, only a negative constitution could defend freedom, since positive law seldom
did anything but further the state of tyranny already in existence. In fact, since Walwyn did not
read all of these liberties into the Magna Carta as Lilburne had been willing to do, it logically
followed for Walwyn that if these laws did need to be written down. Walwyn had found that
positive law always took away freedoms, so a different sort of law needed to be conceived.
The evolution of Walwyn’s arguments for universal toleration as a natural right
developed in conjunction with Overton’s previously articulated policy of compulsory freedom.
Walwyn recognized that even one man within a nation could not be bound to go further than
his “judgement and conscience doe agree thereto,” and as a consequence of this, “so ought the
whole Nation to be free therein.”74 If there was even one dissenting voice in the nation,
religious toleration was requisite for all, and to these “universall Rules of common equitie and
justice, all men and all Authority in the world are bound.”75 In separate ways, both Walwyn and
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Overton had arrived at a strongly entrenched view of the freedom of religion as the first
inalienable right.
This framework of inalienability is at impossible odds with Macpherson’s interpretation
of the Levellers within his interpretation of possessive individualism. Macpherson argued that
the Levellers developed a sense of rights as a sort of moveable property, which could be
surrendered to the state as a part of the social contract. The Levellers’ concept of the common
freedom had developed to the point where it was, in fact, inalienable. What made it
inalienable was that Parliament, while representative of the People, did not have the
jurisdiction to administrate or define that freedom, merely an obligation to ensure that all
citizens experienced it. Theoretically, in Walwyn and Overton’s view, a single dissenting
individual in the whole of society had an ironclad veto against any kind of positive law made by
the remainder of the society. It therefore followed that in a society like contemporary England,
the size of the soceity ensured dissent to any law touching on the restriction of freedom, and
therefore the only just response was to consider the right to be retained in perpetuity to the
People, and quite literally to each individual separately, as an inviolable and inalienable right.
That the Leveller argument rested on theological convictions is one of the realities that puts it
at odds with the general Marxist framework and with Macpherson’s theory in particular.
Operating from within a Marxist interpretation, Macpherson had no way to accept at face value
that the Levellers sincerely believed that natural rights were held by default by individuals as a
trust from God.76
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As the conflict between the Parliamentarians and the Monarchists progressed, the
Levellers, especially Walwyn and Lilburne, developed a view of current events that
incorporated a certain element of providential language, demonstrating that they were not
deistic in their outlook. For example, in Toleration Justified, Walwyn attributed the religious
freedom which had been granted in the previous several years as a “blest opportunity offered
by Almighty God.”77 Walwyn saw the religious toleration which had been experienced recently
as such as “hath heitherto [not] been establisht in any Christian State by the Civill
Magistrate.”78 It was also significant to note the active element of the “Civill Magistrate,” in
Walwyn’s statement. The policy of forced toleration in practice had hit its high-water mark,
according to Walwyn, and it was a precedent which he had hoped to see furthered.
The awareness of the inalienable rights of the citizen increasingly became incorporated
as a part of the Leveller commitment to the rights of the “freeborne Englishman.”79 According
to Walwyn, sectaries had equal claim to freedom of religion “because free-born, because wellaffected, and very assistant to their country in its necessities.”80 Even more significantly, they
had not earned their birthright due to assisting the country in its time of crisis.81 Their
committed temperament toward mutually enjoyed freedom was what had earned them their
place at the table. To Walwyn, their military support for the cause was therefore, “only an
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affirmation, without proof,” meaning that religious freedom was not compensation for support,
but rather a natural right to be enjoyed regardless of one’s affection for the Parliamentary
cause.82 This was a necessary distinction in order to be consistent, since he had regularly
maintained that religious authority belonged solely to God, meaning that toleration could never
be granted by a government, only facilitated. However, the fact that they did support the
Parliamentary fight against tyranny was a sort of bellwether of their commitment to freedom;
they were those honest-hearted men worthy of consideration within the society. The State was
obliged to ensure that each religious group in England, “have a like title and right to
Freedom…Equity of ever mans being Free in the State he lives in.”83 Walwyn had, by 1646,
developed fully into the persuasion that religious freedom was a natural right which ought to
be enjoyed by everyone everywhere, but especially in England, where all men were freeborn.
The Leveller concept of the inalienability of the freedom of religion was rooted in their
theological commitments. One of Walwyn’s foundational understandings of this was a belief
that God himself refused to use what Walwyn referred to as “compulsive power” in matters of
religion.84 According to Walwyn, from a pragmatic standpoint, the only result of compulsory
religion was to increase hypocrisy.85 A second commitment was that governments could only
operate on rights which had been given to man, and since God chose not to use compulsive
power in the matter of religion, it was inconceivable to the Levellers that the civil authority
would exercise power within the Ecclesiastical sphere that God did not exercise.86 This line of
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argumentation lent itself to the idea that there might be other areas where only God had
potential authority, and since God had chosen to remain in abstentia in such matters,
government must follow suit and thus it defaulted to consent.87
The Levellers were convinced by the Presbyterian rescinding of the access to the presses
that freedom of speech and the press were critical to ensuring the freedom of religion they had
recently enjoyed. Walwyn accused the Presbyterians of restricting access to the presses under
the “pretence of stopping the Kings writings,” but to him it was clearly a bigger conspiracy to
control access to the public discussions related to religion.88 Walwyn was also becoming more
convinced that even blasphemous belief was not a threat to true religion, because “the more
horrid and blasphemous the opinion is, the easier supprest, by reason and argument.”89
Practically speaking, the only way that the sort of free-flow of religious ideals that Walwyn
wanted to see in order to refine doctrinal arguments, was to have a freedom of the press and
speech. It was thus that, at least in his own arguments, the freedoms of speech and the press
came to be linked to religion as inalienable rights.
In 1646, Lilburne and Overton co-published their first pamphlet, entitled “The Out-cryes
of Opressed Commons.” This broadside was addressed to “all the rationall and understanding
men in the Kingdome of England…that have not resolved with themselves to be Vassells and

87

There were additional considerations, like the fact that “Papists, Bishops, Presbiters, or whatsoever sort
of men…always suppose themselves to be competent examiners and Judges of other men differing in judgement.”
The Leveller leaders all held strong commitments that this could not be the case, and therefore required that all
recuse themselves from the office of judge. Walwyn pointed out that religion was prone to circular loops of logic,
in which the Prebyters argued that “Sects and Heresies” were only wrong “because they differ and separate from
[Presbyters]. That’s no Argument, unless they can first prove themselves to be in the truth?”87 Walwyn’s
increasing agnosticism about the ability to prove religious truth caused him to become ever increasing that the
very concept of “heresy” would be difficult to establish. (Walwyn, Toleration Justified, [4])
88
Walwyn, Toleration Justified, [2].
89
Ibid, [8].

115
Slaves.”90 For the first time, the Levellers vehemently rejected the claim that had begun to
circulate that they were “Anti-Magistrates,” apparently a common misnomer perpetrated by
their enemies which Lilburne and Overton outright rejected.91
Against Walwyn’s earlier protestations, both Lilburne and Overton continued to be
enamored with the Magna Carta, and in particular with the concept articulated in Chapter 29.
They quoted it as establishing the principle that “no freeman be taken or imprisoned…but by
lawfull judgement of his Peers, or by the law of the Land.”92 However, this line of argument
also had important implications for their developing concept of individual liberties, since it
followed that if man was only to be accountable to his peers, than just laws could only be made
by one’s consent, and therefore within the political realities of 1646 England, by the House of
Commons. Throughout their imprisonments, both Overton and Lilburne repeatedly appealed
to the House of Commons for redress, and it was in large part the Commons’ failure to
interpose itself on their behalf which led to the Levellers’ expanding commitment to negative
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constitutionalism as the only practical defense of one’s liberties, and serious proposals to major
changes in the English political system.93
One of the elements of the Levellers’ ideology which has garnered a lot of attention
from historians is the commitment to the rights of the individual, and the role that suffrage
played in those rights.94 Although they did not support universal male suffrage, all historians
agree that they supported an expansion of suffrage as it was defined in the 1640s. However,
this was a somewhat separate issue from the fact that they remained committed to the idea
that the civil liberties of the Englishman “extends to the benefit of every particular individual
man in the Kingdom.”95 As will be demonstrated below, they clearly viewed voting as a civil
right, and therefore one which not every citizen possessed. This was because in a truly limited
government, there would be restrictions on Parliament’s ability to enact legislation related to
the natural rights of all citizens. Therefore, voting was unnecessary as a restraint against the
encroachment of inalienable rights; that was the function of the constitution. 96
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Throughout much of 1646, Walwyn engaged in an extended pamphlet war with Thomas
Edwards, the author of Gangraena. Characteristically, Walwyn’s first attack against Edwards
came in the form of A Whisper in the Eare of Mr. Thomas Edwards Minister and was about as
mild as the title suggested. The main point of the pamphlet encouraged the “Common
Councell…[to] confirm certain infallible maxims of free Government,” which demonstrated that
he was thinking of the inalienable rights of people as necessary to the establishment of a “free
Government.”97 At this point, it was almost certain that Walwyn had in mind at least religious
freedom, freedom of the press and speech, as well as several due process protections related
to the continued imprisonment of Overton and Lilburne. It was evident from the progression of
Leveller writing that the growing list of negative liberties designated conceptually as inalienable
rights was driven by the abuses of the present government, rather than ideological
extrapolation. The list continued to grow as the Levellers’ perceived abuses of the government
over the following several years, eventually resulting in the Third Agreement.
Walwyn followed his Whisper with a Word More about Edwards about a week later.
Walwyn made it explicit that his only problem with Edwards was that he favored “the
establishment of a compulsive Presbyterian Government,” and that he had a moral obligation,
“in duty to the publick…that I should be opposite in my judgement and endeavors to the
government you intended.”98 It is important here to note that Walwyn did not attempt to say
anything about the Ecclesiastical arguments made by Edwards. However, that Edwards argued
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for a compulsory religion based on Presbyterian Government triggered a specific “duty to the
publick” upon which Walwyn felt called to voice his opposition.99
Walwyn, and by this point all of the Leveller leaders, were treating as a given that
religious freedom was the primary inalienable right, since “of all liberty liberty of Conscience is
the greatest.”100 In states where there was no religious freedom, there was no freedom at all
since, “no truly consciencious person in the world can absolutely intrust the regulation of his
Conscience in the worship of God to any authority.”101 This conviction lent itself powerfully to
the development of the Leveller concept of the inalienability of certain rights. As opposed to
earlier arguments which occasionally equivocated about dangerous doctrines or heresies, by
1646, Walwyn was willing to go so far as to assert universal Christian toleration, since “heresies
and schisms” needed to be confronted by rational argument, not “by banishment
imprisonment or death.”102
Obviously, Walwyn’s gentle Whispers and Words did not have their desired effect on
Edwards and the Presbyterians, which led to Walwyn’s attack with Poyson several months
later.103 Walwyn’s latest edition in the pamphlet war claimed that Edwards was using
Machiavelli’s arguments about reinforcing the supremacy of the State by discrediting certain
citizens.104 Walwyn claimed that he and his allies were the victims of just such a propaganda
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campaign, and that this was strongly connected to the divergent goals within their society
related to issues of religious freedom. Walwyn argued that Edwards had adopted Machiavelli’s
arguments to consolidate State power by marginalizing opposing groups. By merely hinting
that Walwyn and the coalescing Leveller leadership were “blasphemous and hereticall
persons,” the people would respond to Presbyterian propaganda, “through eagerness…overheare and make things worse then they were either spoken or intended.”105 Walwyn
connected Edwards’ attempt to subvert the Leveller beliefs by noting that all their political
opponents had to do was to accuse them of “whoredom, or drunkennesse, and prophanesse,
an irreligious person, or an Atheist.” He insinuated that Edwards’ “arguments” against the
Levellers was essentially a trite and petty defamation campaign of no political substance.106
By the Summer of 1646, the Levellers began to use common terminology in subtle but
new ways. It was typical at the time to refer to Parliament as synonymous to “government.” A
common turn of phrase was to refer to the full government as “The King in Parliament
Assembled,” which was taken to mean that King, Peers (via the House of Lords) and People (via
the House of Commons) were all together in Parliament and constituted the full government.
However, in asserting the sovereignty of the individual and the People to the government,
Lilburne and the Levellers started to adapt this language and to refer to the Parliament as “the
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Commons of England, in Parliament assembled.”107 The idea that the actual Commons was the
individual people, and that via their representatives, they were literally assembled in
Parliament was important. The ways in which the Levellers began to refer to the House of
Commons rhetorically reduced the actual members of Parliament to mere thoroughfares for
the sovereignty of the People, rather than a sovereign political entity. Walwyn’s terminology
was similar to Lilburne’s, and among other turns of phrase, he referred to Parliament as the
people’s “great and generall Counsell in Parliament assembled.”108 The connotation was that
the body, even disassembled, was the true source of power, and Parliament was merely a
bringing of them together in order to do the People’s business.
In Lilburne’s pamphlet The Free-mans Freedom Vindicated, the historian finds an almost
identical logical progression to what Locke would later argue in his Treatise on Government
concerning natural rights and the formation of society and government. Lilburne began by
showing that Adam was imbued with a measure of God’s sovereignty, as God’s image-bearer,
and that since this was the case, “none of [men] having (by nature) any authority dominion or
majesteriall power, one over or above another.”109 It was important to Lilburne to note that all
government was formed by, “donation, that is to say, by mutuall agreement or consent.”110
This arrangement rightly applied to both the spiritual and temporal societies with which man
engaged. Any who presumed to take authority any way other than consent was usurping the
prerogative of the Creator. This basis for society, the consent of the governed, “donating”
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those rights which each enjoyed from God, also became the basis for a developing Leveller
concept of the right of revolution, a right which Locke found to be the only logical conclusion
following from these premises. Lilburne was the first Leveller to extend his arguments about
natural rights to a fully defined contractual view of governance. Derived, as it was in Locke’s
later work, from Christian theological assumptions about God’s relationship with Adam, these
arguments allowed the Levellers to then develop a political program of inalienable rights by
way of reason without direct theological principles. The application of the contractual view of
government theoretically allowed for all sorts of freedoms to be reserved by citizens within a
society, and those freedoms were what the Levellers’ political writings increasingly sought to
identify and enumerate. It remained true that they were often identified as events unfolded.
One such freedom that was becoming far more developed in the Leveller consciousness
was the freedom of the press. Walwyn’s earlier clashes with Edwards had already impressed
upon him the significance of this right, and by the time he wrote Pearle in a Dounghill, Walwyn
connected the freedom of the press to the sovereignty of the people; it being a primary means
through which the people could ensure that the Commons acted in good faith with their own
demands.111 He also more broadly explained that “life, limb, liberty, or estate” were those
rights which could only be judged by the people’s representatives in the Commons.112
Walwyn was still in search of the proper way to refer to the House of Commons in a way
that was properly deferential to their status within society but emphasized the sovereignty of
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the People rather than their representatives. In A Pearl in a Dounghill, he referred to the
Commons as the “chosen Commons of England, the Supreame Power.”113 The phrase was
interesting, because it could be interpreted as being deferential to the legitimacy of the actual
governmental institution. Given Walwyn’s tendency toward cautious admonition and his
penchants for care when suggesting new ideas, it is likely that he was aware that it could be
taken this way and took no pains to avoid the misinterpretation. It was also likely this care
which kept Walwyn from joining Lilburne in prison. However, in light of the future ways in
which the Levellers, including Walwyn, referred to the Commons and their relationship to the
People, it is also possible to see the word “chosen” as representing the actual governmental
institution, and to insert an implied “of the” between “chosen” and “Commons”, meaning the
“Supreame Power” was actually the People. Given the synonymous usage of “Commons” and
“People,” in particular when naming the governmental body in future pamphlets, it seems likely
that this turn of phrase was a transitional link between the established use, and the upcoming
Leveller descriptions which explicitly set the People above their commissioners.
Walwyn concluded that the people had to stand for Lilburne, or risk becoming a “Bond
slave again, to either King, Lords, or any others.”114 The inclusion of the phrase “or any others”
was important, because it marked the attachment of the hypothetical possibility that the
Commons may become tyrannical to the exigent realities of the summer of 1646.115 Walwyn
took another great step for the Levellers in articulating that a revolution, led by the People,
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might be the only way to preserve their freedoms. If the Parliament failed to fulfill the mission,
“for which Parliaments were ordained,” the People would, “abominate them, because, for a
people to be made slaves, by, or in time of Parliament, is like as for a man to be betrayed or
murthered by his own father.”116
The concept of “slavery” was another term which underwent a significant Leveller
transformation. When the Levellers used the concept of slavery, it was in conjunction with a
passive personal response toward tyranny, whether that tyranny was directed toward oneself,
or toward another. It was nothing less than a seventeenth-century variation of the concept
articulated by Dr. Martin Luther King that “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere.”117 As has been previously demonstrated, this concept flowed logically from the
Leveller concept of inalienable rights. The idea of slavery was yet another tactic that they
employed to discuss what they considered to be dangerously passive responses by citizens
toward encroachments upon their natural rights.
The use of the murder analogy demonstrated a new interpretation of individual rights,
since Walwyn’s use of the metaphor rejected certain elements of a patriarchal system. The
patriarchal argument was precisely how many Parliamentarians justified the wide latitude in
the use of power in the name of the People without their direct consent, since they viewed it as
their responsibility to care for the People as a medieval father cared for his children. Prior to
the Leveller arguments made by Walwyn, Overton, and Lilburne, it would not have been
possible to make an analogy of a son to “bondservant” or “slave” in relation to his father, since
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the treatment of a son like a bondservant would have been consistent with cultural
expectations for those roles. The Levellers, and Walwyn in particular, showed an awareness
that there were also social, as well as legal ramifications to the argument about individual
liberty and natural rights. Specifically, this meant that some traditionally disadvantaged groups
needed to be afforded more political equality in the recognition of their inalienable rights.
The continued argument for natural rights also facilitated the possibility for the
description of the House of Commons as a perpetrator against the People, a concept which
prior to the Levellers’ framework, was practically impossible for any Englishmen to allege.
William Larner, one of the printers for many of Lilburne, Walwyn, and Overton’s pamphlets,
was imprisoned for illegal printing, and directed a pamphlet to Sir Henry Vane (the Elder),
because the Commons had “refuse[d] to open your mouths…in presenting our Petitions,
conditions and sufferings, to that Honorable House, may you not be truly said to be such as are
the betrayers of our Liberties.”118 By failing to present those petitions to the entire House, the
Levellers held that their representatives in the House of Commons were violating the People’s
right to consent and participate in their own government. This added the right to present
petitions to Parliament as yet another political right which was linked to natural rights. This
was substantively different from the mainstream concept of petitions, whereby English citizens
had the right to petition Parliament, but those in government held equal latitude to ignore
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them. The connotation of Larner’s pamphlet was that petitions by the people held a status
which compelled action on the part of Parliament.119
As the Levellers moved to a systematic belief in individual sovereignty, they also came to
believe that all prerogative and privilege held by any sector of the society whatsoever was
problematic. Since all government was constituted by the consent of the governed, Overton
argued that the Commons needed to “Estate us in naturall and just libertie agreeable to Reason
and common equitie.”120 The phrase “common equitie” came to be used more and more
frequently, as Lilburne had already argued in Free Man’s Freedom Vindicated that all people
were naturally equal before God, and therefore logically entitled to the same legal rights.121
the phrase was almost certainly an addendum to the concept of the “common freedom” about
which Walwyn and Lilburne had written during preceding years. “Common equitie” was the
civil principle that not only all men enjoyed the “common freedom” of religion, but that they
equally held all natural rights as reserved from the State.
It is also worth noting that by the point of the Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens,
Overton’s derivation of natural rights was bereft of its roots in Magna Carta. It was solely based
on reason, and in fact, Overton had come to agree with Walwyn that the Magna Carta as a
defense of freedom was “a beggarly thing, containing many markes of intollerable bondage.”122
Overton believed that this was true for many of the other statutory laws which existed, which
had “made our Government much more oppressive.”123 Connected to the freedom of religion
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was the freedom of action based on one’s conscience, and Overton argued that conscription
was also a violation of a man’s natural rights. The “binding of a man to an Oare, as a Galleyslave in Turkie,” was analogous to “pressing of men to serve in your Warre.”124 Since all men
were free, conscription was an invasion of their rights to themselves and their consciences.
Meanwhile, Walwyn continued his public argument with Edwards by predicting the
collapse of Edwards’ arguments to reason. The argument was implicit in Prediction of Mr.
Edwards, but given the strong separation of Church and State that he and other Levellers
argued in the past, it was significant to note that when he claimed that “only things natural and
rationall are properly subject unto government” in the pamphlet, that the statement was
reserving moral and spiritual issues to a sphere beyond the civil authority.125
Finally, by the late summer of 1646, Lilburne was ready to join Walwyn and Overton in
deriving the rights of the freeborn Englishman as existent outside of Magna Carta. In his
pamphlet titled Liberty Vindicated against Slavery, Lilburne saw the “Liberties and Franchises”
that the people held as natural rights were held “of Right and Inheritance.”126 He agreed with
his fellow Levellers that the Magna Carta was “no new Declaration,” but merely a restatement
of the “principall grounds of the fundamentall Lawes of England.”127 His old habits died hard,
as later in the same pamphlet, he restated the Magna Carta as the “English-mans liberty.”128
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However, this pivot on Lilburne’s part made Magna Carta the reassertion of pre-existent rights
that Walwyn had argued it was, rather than the source of rights themselves.
It was around this time that Lilburne and most of his Leveller allies began to write of the
natural law as being established prior to the Norman Conquest, which they believed had
created a tyrannical government, and over time, had led to the English “[fighting] our selves
into slavery…Our Ancestors of old lived in the highest pitch of perfect Liberty, and wee now in
dejected servility.”129 The mythology of the Norman Conquest played a prominent feature in
the Leveller rhetoric of natural rights, because they viewed the time prior to the conquest as
having been one in which Englishmen experienced the sort of contractual government that they
were proposing. In so doing, they were merely reorienting a contemporary idea of the English
Constitution as having existed time out of mind. What was significant about the Leveller
redefinition of these concepts was that they were directing it toward natural rights theory,
rather than as a justification of the political principles which were employed by the
Government. It was far more typical of their contemporaries to use these concepts to reinforce
customs or laws which they wished to establish, not the absence of law within a natural rights
framework. It is also important not to make too much of this argument, since Levellers,
Independents, Presbyterians, and even Cavaliers tapped into the mythology of the Norman
Conquest or the idea of English custom from time out of mind as a rationalization for their
political actions. The use of the rhetoric was therefore not unique to the Levellers, but the
purpose to which it was employed was.
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Although it will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, it is important to
recognize that the Leveller concept of natural rights had poignant implications for the present
constitutional arrangement. In one of the by-lines from Overton’s Defense against all Arbitrary
Usurpations, he allowed that the Lords “or any other” could encroach “upon the Soveraignty of
the Supreme House of Commons (the High Court of Judicature of the Land) or upon the Rights,
Properties and Freedoms of the people in generall.”130 The separation of the two by the
conjunction “or” demonstrated that Overton had begun to think of the rights of the People as
being a separate issue to the sovereignty of the House of Commons, although they were still
correlated at this point. However, he was still careful to not make the two equivalent. Later,
he admonished the People to “stick closer to their own representative Body the Commons
assembled in Parliament,” meaning that although both Houses could become tyrannical,
Overton clearly had a strong sense that the House of Lords was the one of the two which was
more likely to be tyrannical.131 The House of Commons, and the People, in Overton’s mind,
should have had a similar enemy, but he also recognized that the People and the House of
Commons were not the same thing, a distinction which was not being made by those who were
supportive of the House of Commons’ prerogative like the Independents, who viewed the
House of Commons as the literal voice of the Commons.
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According to Overton, the People had been given “their own natural immunities…
wherewith God by nature hath inrich’d them.”132 These rights were confirmed by “not onely
Religion, and Reason, but even Nature it self doth bind every man to do according to his power,
whom God hath inabled…whatever perill or danger shall ensue, though of liberty, estate, or
life.”133 Overton fully transitioned to the idea that natural, inalienable rights were not only
confirmed by any conceivable measure such as religion, reason, and nature, but that those
rights were “natural immunities” which stood outside of the government. He also enumerated
these rights as “life, estate, and liberty.”134
Overton, like Walywn, contrasted this concept to the “Machavilians” who were trying to
increase the power of the State at the expense of the People.135 By this point, the Leveller
reference to Machiavelli had become shorthand for one who believed in the centralized
authority of the State, at the expense of the individual’s freedom. The Levellers’ philosophy,
therefore, strongly opposed not only the Leviathan state argued for by Hobbes in the
subsequent decade, but also the republican Interregnum State, since both governments
usurped the rights of the people under government authority.136 To the Levellers, whether one
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was a monarchist or believed in Parliamentary sovereignty, if inalienable rights were under
State jurisdiction in a positive sense, that person was “Machiavellian,” and dangerous to
society. It is this fundamental distinction which, more than any other, fully demonstrates the
unique ideological position of the Levellers in Anglo-American political thought.137
Later in the same pamphlet, Overton explicitly listed the “liberties and freedoms of this
Nation” which he found to be rooted in the golden rule of “do to others as you would be done
unto.”138 This principle was the root of all natural rights, and it included the rights of each to
enjoy the “fruit of his own labor,” the freedom of “Conscience and estate,” and the protection
of property.139 These rights were sacrosanct, and no person could, “invade or intrench upon
the same, more than you would have upon your own.”140 This concept reinforced Overton’s
earlier idea of government-enforced peaceful coexistence, but had taken the principle of the
freedom of religion, and expanded it to encompass additional freedoms. All natural rights were
“my inheritance by lineall descent from the loins of Adam, and so to all the sons of men as their
proper right without respect of persons.”141 The link of this statement to the qualification
“without respect of persons,” was also significant, since it signified the transition of Overton to
a belief in the universal aspect of the Leveller concept of natural rights. Unlike most of their
contemporaries at the time, Overton and the other Leveller leaders were now making the case
that the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and estate were universal to all humankind, or at the
least ought to be, in a justly constituted society.
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Since these liberties were at stake, Overton reinforced his agreement with Lilburne’s
previously held assertion that to stop demanding their just rights as freeborn Englishmen would
be equivalent to consigning others to tyranny. They were aware that the opposition used
precedent and common law as a means of undenizening the people, and therefore sought to
oppose it, even at personal expense. Overton believed that he was obliged to, “not let go of my
own right and property in the equity of the Law, or be an evill president or pattern unto others,
whereby they might again be entangled [in]…bondage by my example.”142
Another important concept to the Levellers that came about at this time was the use of
the term “disfranchisement” to mean the removal of their liberties as citizens, rather than the
violation of voting rights. This showed an advanced concept of the contractual nature that each
person had with the government, since in the Leveller concept, all arbitrary rule was, by nature,
a divorce of the man from his own rights which had been invested in the government as a trust.
Like the other Leveller leaders, in all his claims to popular sovereignty, Overton was careful to
not be taken as an anarchist. He explicitly stated that respect was due to the magistrates in all
matters, except in cases where the law itself was illegitimate.143 However, all the Levellers
circumvented this principle in reference to contemporary events by arguing that laws made in
violation of the social contract were unjust and necessarily invalid by way of their never having
had the authorization to create the law in the first place. In simple terms, “where there is no
Law, there is no transgression.”144 In fact, the only transgression that was possible in this
system was to acquiesce to unjust tyranny by refusing to oppose laws made illegitimately.
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Toward the end of 1646, the Presbyterian government presented a bill to seriously
curtail the religious heresies they saw having arisen out of the absence of a state-controlled
church. Walwyn wrote a pamphlet to attack the bill, accusing the Presbyterians of attempting
to “enslaving of the people to their wils…in effect to establish a very inquisition.”145 Walwyn
accused the government of attempting to reduce the people to “instruments, to subject the
people to their no lesse than popall tyrany.”146 He then categorically refuted the claims of
those who believed that a state-sponsored church was necessary or at least justified. What was
significant about this argument was not the opposition to a state church, or even the concept of
religious tyranny, but the fact that Walwyn understood by this point that a violation of religious
liberty automatically reduced the People to a condition of civil slavery. This further illustrated
the fact that although perhaps a most sacred natural right, the way in which Walwyn and the
other Levellers discussed violations of natural rights was uniform, regardless of whether it was
religion, speech, press, due process, or any other right.
Walwyn’s first point was that the primary goal of the attempts to use licensing to
control the presses was for the control of the information that people had, and to intimidate
others into silence. It was to “beget in men a superstitious beliefe of any thing they say,”
because they were in, “awe & feare of affronting [the government.]”147 It was unlikely that
Walwyn’s opponents found much to disagree with, other than the conclusions of his
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statements. However, to Walwyn, the overpowering of one’s own conscience with brute force
was plainly the highest and most damning argument he could muster.
He went on to argue that the basic argument of the Presbyterians was the same as the
“Turkes and those that believe in strange gods.”148 He pointed out that people in foreign lands
had often labelled true Christian as martyrs and heretics and had persecuted and even killed
them for it. In his opinion, while the particulars of the Presbyterian actions might be different,
the principles were identical. He proposed that in place of this, all agree to trust “the
omnipotent God,” whose logic and reason was “able to support it selfe.”149 In fact, it was not
possible to be sure that “those tenets which are now accounted heresies, may be in the
countenanced truthes of the next age; as what formerly was accounted errour, is now
esteemed truth.”150 In the worst case, this could lead to, “Mordecaies gallows [serving] for
Hamans execution.”151 Walwyn was eminently aware that “mainstream” doctrine had changed
in the past, and this made one who was historically humble at least take seriously the possibility
that it was likely to continue to do so in the future. The best safeguard against all forms of
tyranny, including the protection of one’s own religious conscience, was for the government to
forcefully defend all religious expressions, and the freedoms of speech and the press requisite
for those expressions to transpire.
Walwyn went on to ask if there was any “precept…what command or Authority from
Scripture” to punish those who did not conform to Christian belief?152 As Walwyn was making
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these arguments against the Presbyterians, his logic drew him closer to a policy of universal
toleration, provided that the free exercise of one’s religious beliefs did not encroach too far on
the public peace. He did see some acts, like “reviling railing, bitter taunts, and reproaches,” as
being too severe for merely reason and argument to address, but even in these offenses, he
found the “burning in the cheeke with a hot Iron…to rigorous and severe.”153 There was a very
real need to “be provident and causious in making Lawes of this nature… [because] we may
very well dread the tendensie of the government wich in its first desires is so rigid and bloody
minded.”154 Walwyn argued that all laws are eventually perverted by subsequent generations,
and so even a well-meaning law, if this was one such law, could not be trusted to remain so. It
would almost certainly be “extend[ed]…beyond the intentions of the Law-makers.”155 This
pragmatic argument was also likely rooted in the recent religious crises of the country.156
What was interesting about this argument was how different it was from the earlier
ones developed by the Levellers regarding religious toleration. By this point, they recognized
that the initial argument for freedom of religion was a two-part argument. The beginning
argument was that there were, in fact two spheres of influence, the ecclesiastical and the civil,
a point they had made ad nauseum during the first several years of the English Crisis. However,
once that was established, it was then settled in the ecclesiastical sphere that God did not wish
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for there to be any regulation of conscience. Rationally, since that was the proper language of
the civil sphere, it was of no benefit to the society to regulate any activity from which God
demurred. This could be argued by showing it to be a usurpation of God’s authority, or to be
imprudent to establish precedents which may be distorted, or to show that freedom of
conscience was but one facet of self-ownership. Any of these arguments, once established,
demanded freedom of religion as a precondition to other liberties. However, those liberties
were also preconditions to ensure the civil experience of the freedom of religion. The mutually
reinforcing nature of this argument allowed them to interchangeably focus on civil or religious
freedom as an assertion for the inalienability of natural rights.
Perhaps one of the most often referenced Leveller tracts by historians is Richard
Overton’s An Arrow Against Tyrants.157 Having proven it in his previous writings, Overton
stated simply at the very outset of his pamphlet that “every individual in nature is given an
individual property by nature not to be invaded or usurped by any.”158 Since all were created
equally with the rights of property, liberty, and freedom, “no man has power over my rights and
liberties, and I over no man’s.”159 Following the same logical pathways as Jefferson would come
to express in the Declaration of Independence over a century later, Overton found that
government existed only “for [the peoples’] better being, discipline, government, property and
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safety,” and that these powers were, “communicated,” to the government via certain aspects
of the Peoples’, “natural rights and powers.”160 However, this contractual arrangement
necessarily meant that the powers were limited by the original terms of the contract, and that
inalienable rights were precluded from this arrangement because, “by nature no man may give
that power to another.”161
Lilburne’s arguments joined Walwyn and Overton’s recent assertions in London’s Liberty
in Chains, when he noted that the, “…Wicked, Bloody, UnChristian, Papisticall Remonstrance of
the prerogative men of London…[who] would have us reduced back to the Poppe of Rome
againe, to believe…not onely what is already established, but whatever shall be established.”162
The use of the term “prerogative-men” had come into common usage by all of the Leveller
leaders as a way to specifically describe those legislators who upheld the prerogative of the
House of Lords or the Privilege of the Commons and was essentially a distinctively Leveller way
of referring to “tyrants” within the legislature.
Lilburne followed London’s Liberty in Chains discovered with Vox Plebis less than a
month later. It was apparent that Lilburne was continuing to move away from a republican and
toward a libertarian concept of government at this point. He opened the pamphlet with the
statement that he believed the freedom of the press was specifically connected to the sitting of
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Parliament, and not a right which was universal to citizens at all times.163 This demonstrated
the independent and decentralized nature of the Leveller movement, where there were
notable examples of Levellers contradicting one another on certain principles, and also the fact
that Walwyn and Overton were again more liberal in their conclusions than Lilburne.164 The key
here was that Walwyn had already forsaken his hope for the Commons as a vehicle toward the
preservation of individual liberty, whereas Lilburne still hoped the Commons would come to his
defense against the House of Lords to confront his continued incarceration.
Lilburne may not have universalized the freedom of the press at this point, however, he
was starting to argue that once the accountability it afforded was destroyed, the People’s
legislators would “begin to break the Lawes, and to execute an Arbitrary power upon the
peoples liberties; at that very instant they begin to lose their State.”165 This necessarily resulted
in the need for revolution, in which the people would be “incite[d]…to find out and invent ways
unusuall, and of innovation, to free themselves from their oppressors.”166 Although far less
succinct than Overton’s Arrow against all Tyrany, Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, or
Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, Lilburne was nevertheless articulating a right to
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revolution, born out of the consensual nature of government, and he recognized that the only
recourse of the People when government became tyrannical was revolution.
Lilburne also seemed to have been more aware of the benefit in enumerating the rights
of the freeborn citizen than he had in previous writings.167 He noted that the inalienable rights
of all people were, “Liberty of conscience in matters of Faith, and Divine worship; Liberty of the
Person, and liberty of Estate: which consists properly in the propriety of their goods, and a
disposing power of their possessions.”168 To Lilburne, the liberty of the person was derived
both from Divine and Natural Laws and confirmed by the statutes of the kingdom. Lilburne
repeatedly used the word “tender” toward the application of law, meaning that he wished that
all use of power by the government be light and error on the side of freedom. It was supposed
to be tender, not only toward, “persons of Innocents, & bailable persons only; but also of the
persons of men no plevisable and indicted: insomuch that they ought not to be oppressed by
their Judges.”169 His legal issues certainly informed this commitment to some extent.
Most importantly, Lilburne argued that the “lawes and liberties of the free-born
Subjects of England…” were suprema lex of the Commons of England.170 Lilburne accused the
Commons of bringing about the People’s, “future and speedy ruine… [because] this present
State,” was failing to prevent the tyranny which had daily encroached upon the People’s
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liberties.171 He warned of an impending revolution, since, “it never turns to a States advantage;
to gaine the peoples hatred.”172 According to Lilburne, the way to avoid it was, to leave the
property of the people alone, and to administrate the government in such a way that avoided
the ruins of “Avarice, Pride, Cruelty, and non-observance of the lawes.”173 It was also of note
here that in discussing the non-observance of the lawes, Lilburne was referring to both the
negative liberties which he believed the government should leave alone, as well as the
preferential treatment of certain citizens above others, commonly known as “immunities.”
This redefinition of tyranny was summarized as a “violent forme of Government, not
respecting the good of the Subjects, but only the pleasure of the Commanders.174” This new
way to conceive of tyranny meant that language referring to representation was absent, and
the only real way to judge the legitimacy of the government was by the good of the People,
rather than merely their access to representation in Parliament. It was in statements like these
that the development of the Leveller concept of popular sovereignty found its full expression.
Additionally, the concept of violence as perpetrated by the government toward its people
served to orient revolution as self-defense by the citizens, rather than rebellion against
authority. This rhetorical distinction was also important to the American Patriots.
In his addendum to Englands Liberty in Chains, Lilburne also confirmed the principle
which he had previously stated that rights from “Kings and Parliaments may confirme unto the
people their rights, freedoms and liberties; yet it lies not in their poweer to take them from
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them againe when they please.”175 This statement was an absolute commitment to the
principle of negative liberty, and the commitment to the supremacy of the People.
Overton had adopted equally strong language which reinforced the People’s sovereignty
over the Parliament. In The Commoners Complaint, he stated that the pamphlet’s purpose was
a warning to the House of Commons and reminded them that they were “answerable…[to the]
Soveraign power of the Land,” by which he meant the People.176 By this point, the Levellers
had seen enough of the House of Lords and were calling for its outright abolition as the only
settlement of the government. This was to protect the Peoples’ rights, which were “tender
Plants and Seeds…[that needed] their own natural Dew and Rain from the Superiour Orbe of
Authority.”177 Using the same language that Jefferson later employed, Overton argued that the
“free-Commoners of England…[had to] wet, moisten, and mature the [plants of liberty] with
their bloud, their flesh, and their bones.”178 The hope was that by watering the tree of liberty
with the blood of patriots, that “freedom, equity, and justice might take root, be preserved,
spring up..if not for themselves, yet for their Posterities.”179 What was worth noting was not
the application of the Tree of Liberty metaphor, since it was common imagery within English
political lexicon, but that Overton employed the metaphor in response to the, “Arbytrary
tyrannie and usurpation of the house of Lords over the Commers natural & legal Freedomes
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and Rights.”180 The essential idea behind both Overton and Jefferson’s later revolutionary
writings was that there were certain essential liberties of the people which deserved to grow,
and that the seeds and plants of that freedom were evidenced not within the execution of the
current constitutional arrangement, but in fact outside of it and with the People themselves.
Furthermore, there was a commitment to the belief that violent revolution was the only
recourse to create the environment needed for such rights to flourish.
Just like Lilburne, Overton saw it as the obligation of the House of Commons to listen to
the “complaint of the whole Commons of England, all being equally interested with me in this
contest betwixt the Lords and the Commoners both in life, limb, liberty, and estate.”181 That he
saw it as a contest between the Lords and the Commoners directly, demonstrated that Overton
viewed his imprisonment as a test-case as to whether the people of England would accept the
tyranny of the House of Lords, who were not only usurpers in their attempts to establish the
“cruelty and oppression of their prerogative jurisdiction,” but also to undermine the People’s
unalienable rights.182 From the tone of his writing, it was evident that Overton believed that
nothing less than the legitimacy of the power of the House of Commons was on the line. If it
failed in its mandate to defend the liberty of the People, then the argument for the abolition of
the House of Lords could easily turn toward the Commons as well.
In Walwyn’s petition written the following March for the release of Lilburne and
Overton, for the first time, the Levellers made it explicit that there was a certain element of
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inalienable rights which applied to humanity universally, and not just to men.183 Although they
were advocating nothing like egalitarianism in political rights, there was nevertheless the
acknowledgement for the first time that the Star-Chamber actions were unjust because of the
“compelling of men and women to answer interrogatories tending to accuse themselves and
others…[emphasis added.]”184 In this shift, the Levellers took another step toward a rational
derivation of natural rights, which were held in common by all people. It is hard for a twentyfirst century reader to imagine any concept of natural rights as existent outside of suffrage, but
voting was clearly still tied to property for the Levellers throughout the 1640s, since it would
have been unjust to give a man without property a vote in the legislature where regulations
and taxes on property were made. This meant that they had developed the political rationale
which could apply all inalienable rights like habeas corpus to women as well as men, without
advocating for suffrage to both demographics.
The first right of the people was to ensure that those who were accountable directly to
their appointment (i.e. the House of Commons) were free “from all prejudices of a negative
voice in any person or persons whomsoever,” since this would necessarily prohibit the
accountability of the government to the People.185 Accountability was the precondition to the
settlement of the “Common-wealth in solid peace and true freedome, which is the end of the
primitive institution of all governments.”186 According to Walwyn, no commoner could be tried
by any but under the jurisdiction of those that they had the authority to appoint, and no person
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could be forced to testify against themselves or anyone else or held for refusing to do so.187 All
law suits and trials were to be conducted in a “just, speedy, plaine, and unbuthensome way,”
and all laws should be written in the most plain form of English available, so that, “each one
who can read, may the better understand their owne affaires.”188 The roles and authority of all
civil officers like judges and sheriffs should be “prescribed, and their fees limited under strict
penalties, and published in print to the view and knowledge of all men.”189 Warrants were
necessary for the holding of any prisoner, and they were to be not abused while in prison.190
Additionally, any law that may “tend or may be construed to the molestation and
ensnaring of religious, peaceable, well-affected people,” must be repealed.191 Since judges
were just as fallible as any other person, the “preaching or publishing [of ones’] opinion in
Religion,” should be allowed in all cases.192 Tithes were to be abolished and “nothing in place
thereof imposed;” the petition specifically demanded that all ministers be supported fully by
the voluntary contributions of others. 193
Taken as a whole, this collected list of liberties specifically enumerated by Walwyn bear
a striking resemblance to the American Bill of Rights, a fact which has not totally escaped the
notice of political historians.194 However, rather than noting the superficial resemblance of
these lists, what ought to be more striking is the nearly identical philosophy of inalienable
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natural rights which led to the strategic selection of a particular set of rights. English
jurisprudence identified for both sets of revolutionaries that there were certain rights bestowed
upon the English citizen. Those rights were from God, were inalienable, and were negative
liberties beyond the reach of government, save the responsibility it bore to ensure the People’s
continued experience of said rights, was a step which the Levellers pioneered in the years
leading to the publication of the Agreements of the People. For the Levellers, the selection of
the list was not random, but rather born directly out of their experiences and the recognition of
those rights which were critical to the restoration of liberty within England throughout various
inflection points during the 1640s. As kings, prelates, Peers, and Parliaments all demonstrated
themselves capable of tyranny, the Levellers systematically expanded their philosophy of
jurisprudence to circumvent the tyranny. They developed a political philosophy which enabled
them to label such actions as “tyrannical.” They were not raging malcontents, and
concurrently sought an innovation of a suitable constitutional program which would be
necessary to ensure the continuation of the experience of their freedom.
Several months before the famous debates at Putney, the Leveller leaders had been
pushed to their breaking point. Throughout most of 1646 and the first half of 1647, “Freeborn
John,” the Coleman Street printer, and Walwyn, “the Seeker,” attacked their political enemies
in print. They first attacked the Presbyterian “Prerogative men,” then the institution of the
House of Lords, and eventually even began to excoriate the House of Commons, intimating that
a revolution may be the only remedy to the present situation if the Commons would not defend
the People’s liberties. Overton and Lilburne had exhausted every constitutional recourse
available to them for their unjust imprisonment, like petitions, publishing of pamphlets, and
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appeals to habeas corpus; yet they remained imprisoned. It was impossible to underestimate
how formative this reality was to the Leveller program. The deferential tones at the outset of
1646 had disappeared by the Spring of 1647 since it no longer seemed plausible that the House
of Commons would champion their cause for freedom.
Had Cromwell and the Commons intervened to rescue Lilburne and Overton, the
Leveller movement may have remained a branch of the Independents; more radical than
Cromwell and Ireton, but also not fully radicalized toward absolute popular sovereignty and the
inalienable rights of all citizens of England. However, this was not how events unfolded, and as
a result, the Levellers responded to the exigent needs of their leaders by developing a political
ideology designed to prevent tyranny in all of its forms, as revealed by their experience. This
came to be true even of the People’s own representatives. Thus, it was that by the middle of
1647, though the Levellers were not yet aware of it themselves, a philosophical gulf had been
created between themselves and the Independents which would eventually lead to open strife
and the imprisonment of all three by an Independent-led government. The source of this strife
was not in the rhetoric of inalienable rights, but in the fact that concurrent to the development
of their rhetoric of inalienable rights, the Levellers also developed a new view of English
jurisprudence which they believed was necessary to systematically defend those rights. So,
prior to moving to the final phase of development in the Leveller Movement and their final
break with the Independents, it is first necessary to go back to the beginning of 1646, and to
evaluate the revolutionary approach toward English jurisprudence and constitution which
eventually created that rift.
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Chapter 3
“The Inheritance of Every Subject.”
In the Fall of 1647, leaders within the New Model Army met at the Church of St. Mary
the Virgin in Putney to discuss the political aims of the war being fought against King Charles I.
That war had dragged on for half a decade and still no clear constitutional objectives had been
articulated by the Parliamentary forces opposing the king. Presbyterians, Independents, and
Levellers all vied for the reins of the army and the government. These competitions took place
within the Parliamentary sessions of the House of Lords and Commons but were also waged in
the pamphlets being distributed throughout London. Whichever faction won control of the
objective’s definition would automatically gain the upper hand in defining the revolution. The
purpose of the meeting, conducted by Cromwell’s son-in-law, Sir Henry Ireton, and attended by
other high-ranking officials, was to resolve definitively which faction the army supported.
The Levellers and Independents, although separated by ideological differences related
to English jurisprudence, were united against the commonly opposed specter of a Presbyterian
return to religious intolerance. Many of the Leveller leaders, like John Lilburne and Richard
Overton, had directly attacked the Presbyterian leaders, and been thrown in prison for their
efforts. Cromwell and his Independents in the House of Commons were sympathetic to the
Leveller leaders’ plight but had not intervened on their behalf. This led to the Levellers’
continued radicalization, which had finally developed to the point of a position supporting the
sovereignty of the People, rather than any institution or branch in the English government.
This radicalization brought with it other calls for reform, which were formally written by
radical army leaders like John Wildman and published as the Agreements of the People in
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October of 1647. Endorsed by and expanded upon later by the Leveller leaders, the First
Agreements of the People was a concerted effort by those with Leveller tendencies to codify
and create a written English constitution. This attempt, although never adopted by the
Independents, also could also not afford to be ignored due to the influence that the Levellers
had with the people in London and the army rank-and-file. Cromwell and Ireton’s solution was
to call the meeting, which subsequently came to be known simply as the “Putney Debates.”
In those debates, a rising star in the New Model Army and Leveller sympathizer, Colonel
Thomas Rainsborough, famously declared that rights were shared by all Englishmen, and that
all deserved the right to enfranchisement. This argument resounded powerfully in the Army
since most soldiers believed that risking life and limb for the cause of freedom ought to come
with a guarantee of suffrage. Their arrears were seriously in doubt by this point, and many saw
no reason to defer their citizenship birthright as well. In the meeting, Ireton dissembled,
adopting a more conservative approach whereby citizens above a certain property threshold
retained the right to vote, whilst the remainder of Englishmen’s interests were represented by
the virtue of those who represented them, rather than by their own vote.1
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Colonel Rainsborough’s arguments were not original to him and were likely drawn from
Leveller pamphlets which had progressively constructed a new theory of jurisprudence. The
new theory focused on several related points of principle within the English mixed constitution.
The first was sovereignty, and which institution or group within English society possessed the
ultimate negative voice. The second centered around the relationship between constituent and
representative, and which was ultimately sovereign to the other. Finally, these issues naturally
led to a question of suffrage, and to whom that right, or privilege, was entitled.
As was discussed in the preceding chapter, the Leveller program of jurisprudence
developed together with their concept of individual rights and negative liberties. As they
committed to the concept of inalienable rights, the inadequacy of the present constitutional
and legal arrangement in England came into stark relief.2 There pleas were for institutional
reformation throughout most of the 1640s and refined themselves into a systematic
interpretation of the English constitution that best fit their commitment to individual liberty.
Once events had systematically eliminated each of the present institutions including the House
of Commons and Magna Carta as a suitable target for those reforms, institutional and
constitutional revolution was the only remaining option available to the Levellers.
Rhetorically, it is important to connect the Leveller concept of the “People” to the
individual, because within their theory of jurisprudence, these were identical concepts. As has
been demonstrated in Chapter 2, the Levellers believed that each person in England was the
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holder of certain inalienable rights, and that these rights remained totally outside of
government. Hence, when they referred to the “People” as an institution, it might be more
accurate to say, “each individual Englishmen.” This was substantively different from the
Parliamentary interpretation of “the people” as expressed through their representatives within
the institution of Parliament, and, in particular, within the House of Commons. The primary
purpose of this chapter is to explain how the Levellers developed a theory of jurisprudence
based on this foundationally different interpretation of “the People,” and what they viewed as
the necessary relationship between citizen and State that logically followed from that theory.
These were founded upon on the existence of both a contractual view of the relationship
between citizen and State, as well as the presupposition of inalienable rights.
Within the jurisprudence of seventeenth-century Europe, the status quo position was
that the monarch held an ultimate negative voice. The concept of the “negative voice” in
English government was a short-hand expression for sovereignty and described the branch of
government that held the final veto in matters of law and government practice. For those
monarchists in England, this meant that although the Parliament made laws, the king could
ignore them, refuse to sign them, and administer his own laws in the absence of Parliamentary
Statute through institutions like the Star Chamber. This is often referred to by historians as the
theory of “divine right,” but in the British jurisprudential context, it was referred to as the
“king’s prerogative.” This status quo position was challenged in the 1640s by various factions
which opposed the existing constitutional arrangement whereby Charles possessed the
negative voice. However, these groups were divided by pragmatic as well as philosophical
differences related to which institution they substituted for the king as that sovereign voice.
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One difference was based on the issue of religion; the Presbyterian faction arguing that a stateinstituted denominational church ought to exist and the Independents being open to a broader
array of free-expression to Protestants. What was not at issue between these two factions was
their unquestioned assumption that Parliament, as a governmental institution, was the ultimate
locus of sovereignty within English society, and therefore it was Parliament, not the King, which
possessed the ultimate prerogative.
This broadly defined Parliamentarian position was opposed by the Levellers, whose
program concluded that sovereignty within English society rested with the individual (or
People), rather than with any governmental institution. Ideologically, this required a differing
view of jurisprudence than what had existed within the English world at the time. In the early
years of the struggle, this conflict expressed itself over differing interpretations of
constitutional history and common law. According to J.G.A. Pocock, “English thought of the
seventeenth century, was conducted largely in terms of rival visions…of the institutional past.”3
The Levellers participated as much as any other faction in this debate until about 1646, at which
point their rhetoric became far more radical, although it is doubtful that they fully recognized
this fact.4 Rachel Foxley noted that Lilburne and the other Leveller leaders often misinterpreted
Magna Carta in ways that suited their own program, and the simple fact was that the English
3
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concept of the past was malleable enough to permit precisely this kind of misinterpretation.5 In
a real sense, this was the jurisprudential loophole that the Levellers’ propositions for a formally
written constitution proposed to close.
While it can be useful to observe, as several historians have done, that Lilburne’s
arguments about Magna Carta were inaccurate, this is quite beside the point. Of far greater
relevance to the inquiry at hand was how and why Lilburne and other Levellers first attempted
to co-opt Magna Carta, and to discover the ultimate reasons why they had completely
abandoned these efforts by 1647. In 1645, Walwyn and Lilburne interpreted Magna Carta
differently, Lilburne saw it as a natural extension of freedoms, while Walwyn interpreted it as
part of the Norman Yoke.6 However, what was worth noting about both men’s interpretations
was the natural law commitments that lay underneath each of their interpretations. Walwyn
was critical of Magna Carta, largely because he believed that it had taken away essential
freedoms which were part of the birthright of all Englishmen, while Lilburne interpreted it as a
potential affirmation of the same.7 This reinforced the critical understanding that natural law
was foundational to the Levellers’ understanding of how a just governmental system would
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interact with its citizens. However, as Foxley noted, the Levellers tended to want to push their
interpretation on the existing framework, rather than to create a totally new government.8
The Levellers’ proposals can only be accurately understood within the context of the
broader ideas about the English constitution of their time. Leading up to the Parliamentary
conflict of the 1640s, there were three basic views of the “Lawes and Customes of England”
which guided the general framework of interpretation of the role which law had in England.
According to Paul Christianson, “each interpretation carried practical implications for
contemporary understanding of…the liberties of the people and the governance of the realm.”9
James I’s perspective suited his general goals to expand royal power and influence by claiming
that the customs and laws of England were granted by the king. His main contention was that
the king’s power was derived directly from God, and that kings were accountable to God but
not their citizens. James derisively sneered that “only ‘papists and puritans’ favored ascending
theories of constitutional government” which saw those laws and customs as having been
derivative of the People.10 Charles I whole-heartedly endorsed this theory of jurisprudence,
although he demonstrated a pragmatic willingness to compromise on the point to a degree.
A separate view was that expressed by Thomas Hedley, who adapted Fortescue’s
interpretation that the common law essentially granted power to Parliament as well as the King
in Parliament.11 Hedley’s emphasis was based almost exclusively on the common law, and he
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argued both philosophically, as well as specifically in the Bates Case, that laws of the realm
could not be altered apart from the common law system, and that in significant and material
ways, even Parliament gained its authority from the common law, rather than the common law
from Parliamentary assent. This shared interpretation was that the English concept of the “King
in Parliament” gave each a role to play in the creation of law, but that this shared body was the
true sovereign. In the middle of the English Civil War, the Presbyterians in the House of Lords
were most closely aligned to this interpretation.
Neither of these interpretations of the “Lawes and Customes” of England were of much
use to the Levellers, since neither reinforced their interpretation that ultimately sovereignty
resided with the People. John Seldon’s view of a mixed monarchy was much closer, since it
emphasized the Parliament, and more specifically pushed for an interpretation of common law
which saw its legitimacy perfectly connected to the legislative process whereby the people’s
representatives in Commons supported all laws and legislative change.12 Seldon also rejected
the notion that the Norman Conquest, or any other point in English history, had fundamentally
re-shaped the ancient constitution, since the executive body had always needed the ascent
from the representatives of the People. It was this position, which was adopted by the
Independents, and from which the Levellers’ own position can be observed to have splintered
between roughly 1644 and 1647.
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Although they each emphasized common law, and its role with English society, none
explicitly or even implicitly connected the idea of “lawes and customes” of England with natural
rights. Seldon’s view was the closest, since he equated the customs to the institutional
arrangement, and posited that only through the consent of the People via the House of
Commons, could laws be made legitimate. The law’s legitimacy in his interpretation came from
the Commons’ representative attachment to the People. However, there was no question that
laws which were passed in procedurally correct ways by the House of Commons were still
legitimate. Seldon’s perspective, then, held that the House of Commons held the sovereign
negative voice within the government.
The innovation in the Leveller view of jurisprudence was to juxtapose Hedley and
Seldon’s interpretations within a natural rights framework. To the Levellers, the laws and
customs of England gave Parliament its legitimization as in Hedley’s interpretation but also
required legitimization through the ascent of the constituent members of English society, most
notably the People themselves though their representatives in the House of Commons. This
innovation was not totally novel to the Levellers. Selden and some of the Parliamentarians had
been pushed closer to the Leveller position through the events related to the Five Knights’ Case
and the ensuing debate in Parliament as to whether the king’s prerogative extended to liberties
of habeas corpus. Sir Francis Nethersole asserted that the king did not ordinarily have the
ability to detain individuals without declaring charges, but could do so when doing so was in the
best interest of the people, as established in common law.13 Selden replied that this was so,
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but that “the liberty of the people [was] the greatest welfare of the people.”14 Here it was
telling that Selden utilizes the singular “liberty” whereas the Levellers would have certainly
used the plural, demonstrating Selden’s natural law commitments were still applicable only on
an institutional and conceptual level, and not on the Levellers’ individualistic level. Use of the
singular noun attached it to the singular House of Commons; the plural to the mass of
individuals represented by the House.
However, Selden’s rationalization and rhetoric contained within it the necessary
arguments for the Leveller appeal to natural law as being above Parliamentary sovereignty. In
his speech in the House of Lords, Selden defined only two sources of laws in England: “custom
and an act of Parliament.”15 His purpose in 1628 was to reject any outside sources of argument
for sovereignty, namely the royal prerogative; after all, Charles I was engaged in dismissing
Parliaments that failed to bend to his will regarding the levying of taxes. However, since it did
not suit the argument of the times, it was left open whether custom or Parliamentary acts were
superior to the another. A Leveller reading of Selden’s previous claim that “the liberty of the
people,” was the ultimate definition of the welfare of the people, meant that Levellers could
easily interpret the customs of the nation as natural law, and in cases where it was connected
to the Peoples’ liberties, even Parliamentary acts could be subservient to the higher customs.
This conceptually allowed for the idea that the People’s liberties were sovereign.
Ultimately, the Levellers proposed a revolutionary solution to the existing English
constitution. The Levellers rejected the Parliamentary commitment to a mixed system of
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government or to the idea of a progressive and evolving “ancient constitution,” rhetorically
rooted in the past immemorial. When they reflected on the exigencies of contemporary
experience, the Levellers believed that it would be better to enumerate the rights conferred by
the ancient constitution, which led directly to the impetus for the creation of the three versions
of the Agreements of the People which were circulated in the late 1640s. The act of creating a
written, negative constitution, would anchor the “ancient constitution” to a specific and
enumerated list of rights, rather than a nebulous and potentially changing one. Equally
importantly, the Leveller proposal allowed them to relocate the ancient rights from being
positive liberties subject to Parliamentary interpretation and redefinition, to out of Parliament
as a set of reserved freedoms. Positive liberties were those which the citizens experienced at
the benevolence of the authority, be it King or Parliament. The Levellers came to argue for the
existence of negative freedoms which had been explicitly reserved by the People prior to the
initiation of the social contract, and therefore existed prior to government, and the experience
of which government could not impede.
For the most part, the Levellers retained a commitment to the natural law framework
and tended to rest more in reformation attempts within existing law and society, rather than to
attempt to recreate society. Foxley noted that it was not until late 1649, well after the regicide,
that Lilburne began to articulate something which insinuated that the nation had devolved into
a state of chaos, or back into a natural state from which a totally new contractual society could
emerge.16 For this reason, it should be understood that the Levellers themselves never
embraced the idea of being revolutionary; they would have argued conversely that Charles I,
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the Presbyterians, and the Independents had all taken turns at being the revolutionary, and
that they and the People, were the true defenders of English liberties. Rhetoric aside, it will be
demonstrated in this and the following chapters that much earlier than 1649, the Levellers
recognized certain revolutionary conclusions necessarily followed from the program of
jurisprudence they were constructing.
The Leveller commitment to frequent elections was part of the attempt to stave off full
revolution, since elections which allowed the Parliament to be continuously reconstituted as
the people’s institutional proxy would assert the People’s sovereignty via peaceful revolution.
The Levellers did not want England to move backward into a state of nature; they wanted the
People’s natural rights to be protected.17 They believed these were inalienable and had been
retained in the original contract with the English government, but also believed that they could
be inserted into the framework without further revolution.18 Foxley also noted that the
Agreements of the People was not presented as a new social contract, but rather a better
means to articulate the contract which was already in place.19 Foxley concluded that they were
pushed by political exigencies of the developments of 1649 to innovate further, and to propose
the Third Agreement as a way to redefine the constitution, but this was only after it had already
been done by the Independents which had abolished the Crown and Lords.20
The Independent spokesman, Ireton, also used the ancient constitution as a
reinforcement of the rights of certain people to titles within the mixed Constitution during the
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Putney Debates.21 Since the mixed constitution view required representatives for the
aristocracy, it was a convenient way for Ireton to rationalize a continued role for the landed
aristocracy, even as the popular tide had shifted away from support for the continued existence
of the House of Lords. Philosophically then, he rationalized his proposed limitation on the
franchise by emphasizing that aristocracy had been, and continued to be, an important part of
the ancient constitution. So radical were their designs that if the Levellers were to develop a
theory of jurisprudence which made the People themselves the ultimate sovereign of English
society, they would have to do it without the support of any other faction.
Just as there were preludes to the Leveller program of inalienable rights that were
evident during Lilburne’s early challenges to Star Chamber authority, there were also early signs
that the Levellers possessed an awareness that the present constitutional arrangement was
unsuitable for their designs. There was nothing revolutionary in evidence from Lilburne’s early
writings; he took for granted that citizens were obligated to follow the laws of the civil
authority, since citizens had made both an oath of allegiance to the King, and they were “bound
by virtue of their Charters to walke submissiuely to him their pollitique head.”22 Even within
this framework however, Lilburne still evoked contractual language and referenced the charters
possessed by various townships and cities, whereby he viewed each smaller entity to have
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contractually negotiated with the King to enter into the broader civil authority of English
government, which was an quasi-federalist interpretation of English society.23
In The Work of the Beaste, Lilburne relocated positive, statutory law as subservient to
natural law, when recounting his ordeal before the Star Chamber Court.24 According to
Lilburne, even the Apostle Paul under Roman religious persecution had not been compelled to
make “an Oath to accuse himselfe…[and] my accusers and I were neuer brought face to face to
justifie their accusation against me.”25 The court admitted that Paul had not been compelled to
make an oath against himself, but the laws had changed since then.26 Lilburne retorted that in
this case, the laws were “vvorse and more cruel, then the Lawes of the Pagans and Heathen
Romans were.27” Lilburne challenged the law not on procedural grounds, but because it was
“against the uery law of nature.”28 Thus, in the very early stages of a lifelong struggle against
tyranny, Lilburne arrived at an argument of jurisprudence that negated laws contrary to natural
law, even if he had yet to define what the criteria was for determining that tyranny.
These arguments were in relief to those made by Parliamentarian Independents like
Henry Parker as an initial rationalization for the creation of a Parliamentary army. Parker’s
philosophy was subtlety but completely incompatible with the ideas later expressed by the
Levellers. In 1642, Parker‘s and Lilburne’s factions were united by their opposition to the
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Crown, but many of the philosophical underpinnings that led to the split between the Levellers
and their early allies can be seen in Parker’s writings.
Parker and many of the Parliamentarians adopted the constitutional view of their
contemporary government which made Parliament the sovereign of English society, rather than
the people that it represented. This was evident at the outset of his argument in 1642 when he
allowed that “power is originally inherent in the people,” but was then transferred to the
government once those people enter into society.29 As the people’s representative,
Parliament’s “most highly esteeme[d] Parliamentary Privileges,” were confirmed by the laws
and customs of England’s Charter. This understanding was clearly demonstrated when he was
talking about Charles’s attempt to arrest the five Parliamentarians in 1642 with the phrase: “so
much of the Subjects right in Parliament.”30 In his paternalistic argument, Parliamentarians
reinforced their status, privilege, and power within society by claiming their own privileges
were derived by virtue of their connection to the people, but not from the People directly. To
Parker, this privilege extended in both directions. The King had no authority to usurp the
power of Parliament because to do so undermined the people and their collective authority
wielded by Parliament, and the people had no authority to do so since they had ceded that
power to Parliament.
There was no place in Parker’s republican concept for the sovereignty of the People, or
their natural rights, because those were held by Parliament rather than the People. Although
he allowed that certain liberties were reserved “out of Parliament,” he tended to define these
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as the continuation of an absence of positive law by Parliamentary perogative, rather than a set
of negative freedoms which could not be placed under the government’s jurisdiction.31 After
all, Parker’s Parliament had “an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law, So that all the
right of the King and people, depends upon their pleasure.“32 Furthermore, “Parliaments are
bound to no precedents.”33 This was precisely what Lilburne was told during his first
imprisonment by the representatives of the King’s court. Laws may have existed in the past
which protected a particular right, but in the Star Chamber and Parker’s view, if Parliament
decided that new laws were necessary, Parliament could do so at will.
His rationale for the paternalistic attitude toward the People was that, just as the mob
had been incited against Christ, Parker did not trust the People to be the stewards of their own
rights.34 This allowed for what Parker termed “publike consent,” whereby the Parliament,
acting as a proxy for the people, lent the necessary weight to legislation and government
actions to legitimize them. He could not imagine that “publique consent should be any where
more vigorous or more orderly than it is in Parliament.”35 Acting as the proxy, the wise
representatives in Parliament better administrated and advocated for the people’s interests
than the people themselves. Parker’s views of a good government contained many of the same
arguments that Harrington later made in Oceana for a republican-style of government.
The Levellers did have apparent allies with Independents like John Goodwin, who made
nearly identical arguments to those made over a century later by Thomas Paine against
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monarchy. Goodwin argued against a monarchy based on the Old Testament principle that Saul
was given to the Israelites as a divine concession, rather than directly ordained by God.36
Goodman argued that God supported Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy as equally
“lawfull and just, whether they be simple…or whether they be mixt,” provided that it was
created by the People.37
There was a universality to Goodwin’s early writing which explicitly allowed for the
Leveller, rather than the republican interpretation of his statements. He repeatedly
emphasized the reality that “Kings or Rulers,” (emphasis added) were to be disobeyed in certain
situations. Doing so highlighted the transcendence of a set of principles to those who were in
authority. In other words, tyranny was possible for any government, and not specifically tied to
a particular constitution of government.
Goodwin was not just concerned about the natural rights of the individual; he was
concerned about what he perceived as the degradation of the “civill or politick liberties,”
toward a state of “miserable slavery and bondage.”38 According to Goodwin, Englishmen
normally took this for granted because “libertie is as plentifull amongst us as silver was in
Solomons days.”39 Every Englishmen was “generally borne free,” and Goodman explicitly
rejected the idea that this freedom was in any way connected to wealth.40 In a concept which
foreshadowed the American Constitution’s Preamble, Goodwin exhorted his countrymen to
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fight for “this pretious inheritance…of, your libertie, to your children, and childrens children,
that they shall never be able to cut off.”41
By the end of the 1640s, Goodwin threw his lot in with the Independents rather than
the Levellers. Whether he was aware of it at the time of his writing Anti-Cavalierism or not, his
philosophical defense of natural rights explicitly rejected Parker’s view of Parliamentary
sovereignty which Cromwell and the Independents eventually adopted. Although Goodwin was
not, nor did he ever become a Leveller, his rhetoric in the middle of the decade was fertile
ground for Leveller ideology, and the influence that the minister of the Coleman Street parish
had on the developing Leveller commitments to the People’s sovereignty above those who
represented them should not be lightly dismissed. He simply came to agree with Parker’s
assessment that the people’s mob-like tendencies needed to be restrained with the civic virtue
of wise rulers, and therefore the People could never be fully empowered institutionally.
Initially, William Walwyn’s writing was committed more to almost exclusively religious
issues, so it was not until The Compassionate Samaritane (1644) that he began to write about
the relationship between King, Parliament, and People. However, when he did begin focusing
on this issue, a representative rather than paternalistic view was apparent in Walwyn’s first
sentence, when he addressed his pamphlet “to the Commons of England…whom the People
have chosen for the managing of their affaires.”42 It was, therefore the affairs which belonged
to the People, who in turn, through the process of electing the MP’s currently in Parliament
gave in trust, the authority to manage their affairs.
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Walwyn was still being cautious, and was somewhat deferential to Parliament, arguing
based on precedent that the “presse was to be open and free for all in times of Parliament.”43
To Walwyn, this was unquestionably related to the representative nature of Parliament, and
therefore the People had to be able to speak freely during Parliamentary sessions to ensure
that Parliament was managing their affairs judiciously. Walwyn did not argue for freedom of
the press as a right which existed outside of Parliament, although his case was universal in the
sense that it applied to all Englishmen rather than being limited to members of Parliament.44
It was the separation of the Levellers and the Presbyterians led by William Prynne in the
mid-century over the issue of religion which drove the articulation of new concepts of
jurisprudence to new levels. The Presbyterian takeover of Parliament had created concern on
the part of the Levellers as to Parliament’s trustworthiness and shown them that new theories
of constitution were necessary to defend their freedoms. By 1645, Walwyn’s argument against
Prynne became inextricably tied to the issue of Parliamentary sovereignty. Walwyn accused
Prynne of not addressing the issue of how “improper it is that our Laws should be writen in an
un-knowne language.”45 For Walwyn, it was not just that freedom of religion was to be an
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unquestioned right of all Englishmen, but that any kind of elite domination of the law which
prevented Parliament from being accountable to the people it represented was tyrannical. To
the Levellers, the insistence that laws be written in accessible language to all became a sign of
mistrust for their representatives in Parliament. Correspondingly, they fought for greater
empowerment of the People as their own legal voice.
Lilburne, Overton, and other political activists were also beginning to pick up Walwyn’s
conclusions of the necessity of a completely new theory of jurisprudence to defend natural
rights from Parliamentary tyranny. Lilburne began “Englands Birth-Right Justified,” by
defending the idea of civil disobedience. Although the “Letter of the Law,” may have followed
constitutional means in the creation of a censored press, it was “made…a shadow without a
substance and a body without a soul…” by the fact that it ignored “…equity and reason, which is
the spirit that gives life to Authority.”46 Lilburne continued to reject the idea of positive law as
being superior to natural law. It necessarily followed that legally created laws could
nonetheless be illegitimate under certain conditions. He further stated that if natural law were
not allowed to supersede positive law, England would “have hereby a Tyranny confer’d upon
them legal’y.”47 Compelling obedience to such a corrupt Parliamentary system was akin to
forcing Englishmen to commit suicide in Lilburne’s mind.48 This was a direct attack on the
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prevailing Independent and Presbyterian views of English jurisprudence which placed
Parliamentary statute as the ultimate sovereign.
In Lilburne’s view, the most problematic argument for Parliamentary sovereignty was
the fact that this made the institution sovereign, rather than its legislation. This was obvious
because Parliamentary law “binds the People, but is no rule for a Parliament sitting.”49 Lilburne
argued this undermined the very representative nature of Parliament, since it “cannot be
imagined that ever the People would…give such a Power to those whom they choose for their
Servants.”50 The argument for Parliamentary sovereignty rested on the assumption that it was
its representative relationship to the People which gave Parliament (rather than the King), its
sovereign status. Lilburne’s argument posited that Parliaments which created statutes that
applied to literally every member of society except themselves were divorcing themselves not
just from the People, but even from the People’s interests from which they claimed to derive
sovereignty.
He then further derived his freedom to condemn Parliamentary authority from the “true
intent of Magna Carta…and meaning of the Petition of Right.”51 Walwyn, in his open letter
responding to Lilburne, titled “Englands Lamentable Slaverie,” disagreed with Lilburne’s
interpretation of Magna Carta, although Walwyn found the same rights external to the Charter
itself. However, Lilburne was a populist, and as such, in 1645, he was attempting to co-opt
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English precedents, rather than develop a systematic jurisprudence as Walwyn was attempting
to do.52 Their differences were pragmatic rather than philosophical.
Irrespective of his affinity for Magna Carta, Lilburne did propose meaningful restraints
on Parliamentary power, both in arguing for an explicitly written constitution and that the laws
be written in English, “that so every Free-man may reade it as well as Lawyers.”53 The idea of a
written constitution was unique to the Levellers and flowed from their commitment to negative
freedom. According to Lilburne, the press needed to be free. Parliament had invested itself
with an “arbitrary unlimmited Power,” and a free press was the only way to counter the
“Books, Pamphlets and Libells…full of Lyes, [which] tend to the poysoning of the Kingdom with
unjust and Tyrannical Principles” favored by Prynne and his ilk.54 The freedom of the press also
could have served to stop the unwarranted searches which Lilburne believed were “contrary to
all law, justice, equity, and reason” and represented yet another encroachment on freedom.55
Further steps were needed to ensure that Parliament represented the people, rather
than merely the people’s interests. Lilburne first proposed that those in the army needed to be
separated from Parliament, to prevent the use of the military as a political tool.56 Parliament
needed to be held “once every yeere, and more often, if require[d].”57 The current Parliament
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had sat for over four years, and had therefore robbed the people, through the act of voting,
from the opportunity for “redresse of divers mischiefs and grievances.”58 Voting was not
merely a chance for the people to replace members of Parliament no longer sitting, but also to
“revue and inquire…after the behavior and carriage of those they had chosen.”59 Lilburne held
that regular and frequent elections were the only way to “both preserve the Parliament, and
[the Peoples’] owne native Freedoms and Birth-rights.”60
In England’s Birthright Justified, Lilburne took all institutions of the current mixed
government to task for abuses of power. Not only had Charles I been tyrannical, but even his
judges had been complicit in the removal of the People’s rights. Judges had been ultimately
responsible for the odious ship-money allotments.61 The common thread between the judges
and tyrannical Parliament, for Lilburne, was the professional lawyers who had “made Peace as
devouring as warre, and the Law as cruell as the Sword.”62 Therefore, in his concept of
government, it was critical that real restraints were put on lawyers, who represented an
oligarchy. They conspired through their monopoly of power in Parliament and the courts to
disadvantage the freeborn citizens of England. He bemoaned that, “we were laden with our
Crimes, now we are oppressed with our Lawes: and it is to be feared, least the Common-wealth
(though founded by the Lawes) be founded by the Lawes (or rather by the Lawyers.)”63
In Lilburne’s view, the remedy to this situation was simple. Justice, rather than the law,
had to reign in England. As it had been for the Levellers, this was first and foremost an issue of
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religion. Catholics, Presbyterians, Anglicans, Independents, Separatists and Anabaptists were
all due “Justice, because it is just.”64 Secondly, all of the laws, in particular those of significance
in the constitutional history, needed to be printed in English, “so that every free-man may see
and know his own rights.”65 Finally, corruption needed to be rooted out of the bureaucracy,
which had “unjustly made themselves right by [the Commonwealth’s] treasure.”66 In Lilburne’s
philosophy, justice was connected directly to the ability of the citizen to perpetually engage
with his government.
Overton chose to attack the Parliamentary jurisprudence from a slightly different angle.
He argued that either there could be no such thing as tyranny at all, or that if there was, that
any institution within government could conceivably abuse it. He wrote:
That which is done by the proper Right and Authority of a Power, cannot be an Abuse of the
power, but an absolute execution and fulfilling thereof, and to an abuse of Power, must
either be a Transgression beyond it, that is, doing more then it authorizes, or else a neglect,
or comming short of it; and one of these two must of necessity be, or else the POWER
cannot possibly be abused.67

Throughout The Ordinance for Tythes Dismounted, he systematically argued against all possible
sources of authority for the collection of tithes through the apparatus of the State and
concluded that Parliament either held the final sovereignty and could do whatever it wished, or
it was usurping that power from somewhere; no other logical possibility existed. In Overton’s
view, Christ was clearly sovereign in all matters of religion, and since his kingdom was ordered
by an “Ordinance of Contribution…[the] Compulsive Extraction,” which had been introduced by
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Parliament was a “setting [of] Parliament in [Christ’s] stead.”68 His employment of
“contribution” in contrast to “compulsive” participation embodied the Leveller interpretation of
perpetual consent in social institutions. Any constitutional view which did not allow for the
voluntary “contribution” of citizens, in favor of compulsive legislation, was necessarily
tyrannical by Overton’s definition. However, this was not constrained only to the civil sphere.
Overton sardonically noted that he was so taken aback by Parliament’s nerve, that if it
had not said “Lords and Commons” on it, he would have thought the Presbyterians’ proposal
for an established church to be a “Hell-bred Conspiracy by the Devill & his Angells.”69 He
observed that Parliament had the right to create what he termed a “Politicalll Church,” but
these churches could only “teach the Husband-man how to Plow, the Citizens how to
Trade…the Women to wash their dishes, &c.”70 Like his fellow Leveller activists, Overton’s The
Ordinance for Tythes Dismounted represented a clear progression from a concern over strictly
religious matters to a more foundational civil concern for institutional restraint.
The Levellers’ theory of the constitutional arrangement increasingly led to the
articulation of a negative constitutional framework, whereby the civil magistrate had no
authority at all to rule in matters of conscience. Increasingly, they explicitly included the
people’s representatives in Parliament as those excluded. This belief was evident in Walwyn’s
Toleration Justified pamphlet from 1646. The freedom of conscience was “the principall
branch” of the People’s safety and freedom, which meant that not only did the Parliament need
to refrain from making compulsory laws respecting religion but had a positive duty to ensure
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that such freedom existed.71 Implicit in his argument was the idea that Parliament needed to
enact legislation that would prevent future Parliaments from simply changing statutes, as was
the prevailing view of jurisprudence expressed by Parker, Prynne, and many others. This
became the impetus for a more naked and unreserved constitutionalism which came to mark
many subsequent Leveller arguments.72
Conversely, Parliamentarians saw this issue as an assertion of the positive regulatory
power vested in Parliament. The Levellers posited the opposite: that it resided in the People
themselves, and truly with the individual rather than the People as a group, since they typically
saw the Commons as the People Assembled, or as Lilburne and Overton referred to them in The
Out-cryes of Opressed Commons: “Englands legal, Soveraign power, Assembled.”73 This turn of
phrase quite literally implied that the true sovereign was the individuals, who were assembled
together via their representatives in Parliament.
In order to further institutionalize the People’s sovereignty, the Leveller view of
contractualism began to take shape in 1646. The protection of their “Naturall, Nationall, and
Legall Rights and Liberties,” was the purpose for which the Commons had been “elected,
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invested, and betrusted…with our indubitable and natural power and Birth-rights.”74 A
common Leveller trope around this time to represent all who rejected their view of the
representative nature of Parliaments was to refer to them as “prerogative men,” whom
Lilburne and Overton attacked repeatedly in The Out-cryes of Opressed Commons. The label of
“prerogative men” being applied to MP’s, Peers, and the King’s supporters created a universal
contrast between those who argued for an authoritarian government and a government
established by the consent of the People. “Perogative men” was applied by contemporaries,
but normally applied to the Cavaliers, in conjunction with their support of the King’s veto.
Around this time, the Levellers also started to articulate a far more restrictive idea
surrounding the positive power of Parliament, which became a major point of separation
between the Levellers and their Independent allies.75 Lilburne’s and Overton’s assertations like,
“the House of Commons…[is] betrusted by the people for no other end in the World, but to
maintaine, preserve and defend [the People’s] Lawes and liberties,” was a markedly and
substantively different view of the relationship between the People and their Parliament.76
By 1646, and throughout the remainder of their political activism, there was an
increasingly revolutionary bent to the Leveller arguments. It was evident when Lilburne and
Overton threatened that if Commons continued to turn a deaf ear to their pleas, they would be
forced to “solemnly, seriously, and actually appeale to the people.”77 This was a concept which
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was enabled by their developing view of the relationship that Parliament had as an agent for
the People, rather than as a paternalistic entity charged with the safeguarding of the People’s
liberties on their own behalf. As a proxy, the Levellers viewed Parliament as a vessel which was
actually working for the People’s benefit already, and as such, the idea of actual revolution (as
opposed to Civil War) was conceivable to the Levellers.78 They fully recognized that this would
“dissolve the whole frame and constitution of the civill policy and government of this
Kingdome,” and would therefore revert it to the “originall Law of nature,” from whence a new
government structure could be created.79 However, if this occurred, it would not be at the
initiation of the People, but rather the tyrannical government which ruled by “will and lust, but
not law.”80 In a rhetorical framework identical to that later adopted by the American colonists,
they claimed that since sovereignty resided with the People, it was actually the State, and not
the People, who was the revolutionary. In the Leveller rhetoric, the Parliament was betraying
its trust, and as such, was justly subject to chastisement by the People.

See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of what this meant to the Levellers. It was not a promise to continue
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The developing Leveller beliefs about government operated under the general
framework that, “all Majesteriall Power in England, whatever, are but Offices of trust,” and that
even more importantly, “it is possible, that all or any, of the several Majesterial trustees may
forfeit their, or its trust.”81 Once this occurred, “the trusters are disobleged from their
obedience and subjection, and may lawfully doe the best they can for their owne
preservations.”82 This very rational defense of the contractual nature of social institutions was
almost identical to that which was later articulated in Locke’s own political writings.83 Locke
argued in his Second Treatise that the society itself did not dissolve, but the arrangement with
the government could. Four decades earlier, the Levellers made the same claim by defining
that a return to nature was only respect to the existing governmental institutions, and not a
leaving of society all together.
The core implications of the contractual nature of society having been laid, and what
they considered to be clear evidence of tyranny on the part of the English government, the
radicalism of Leveller tracts continued to escalate. Walwyn began his argument in his 1646
pamphlet, A Word in Season, with the assertion that, “Lawes cannot bee made,” because
nothing can be done, “but by the Authority of those whom the people themselves doe chuse
for Parliament and entrust as their Commissioners with full and compleat power for Their
good.”84 The Levellers adopted the term “Commissioner” as a way to emphasize the
relationship of the Parliament to the People. Within Walwyn’s concept of jurisprudence, laws
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could not be made in the positive sense by government, because they were literally sacrificed
by the People, through a process later referred to as “donation.” According to Walwyn, this
principle extended to the arrangement of the government, wars and peace, and taxation.85
The Peoples’ commissioners, according to Walwyn, in allowing the Lords to become
more powerful than the Commons, had “set Masters over the Parliament...which there can be
no greater treason.”86 Specifically, he was referring to the censorship laws which had been put
into place by the Presbyterian government. This was because the Commons were not “chosen
to that end,” so that even if they had a mind to do it, it would not be lawful for them to do so.87
Religious liberty was an absolute freedom and the People were “absolutely Free to follow the
dictate of their own Understandings and Consciences.”88
By mid-1646, the main Leveller issue, particularly with Overton and Lilburne, who were
each imprisoned and held by the House of Lords, was the idea that not only were laws derived
by the consent of the governed, but the execution and judgement of those laws also ultimately
came from the continuation of consent of the same. The House of Peers did not have
jurisdiction over Lilburne, “a Commoner, in any Criminall cause whatsoever, either for Life,
Limb, liberty, or estate.”89 By this point, to Lilburne, the connection was clear that all
governmental authority was established and executed by consent of the governed, rather than
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at Leviathan’s will. The fact that the Lords was stepping out of its respective sphere of
influence in this manner was an “arbitrary or extrajudiciall way.”90
Walwyn also believed that the Lords had no jurisdiction in the arrest of those to whom it
was unaccountable. He claimed that the “people are in reall bondage to the Lords,” because of
the arbitrary use of power by the Lords, which was unaccountable to the People.91 The laws
being forced on them by the Lords were, “no natural issues of lawes, but the extuberances and
mushromes of Prerogative.”92 The “Sons of conquest…[were] not constituted by consent, not
made by the people, from whom all power, place and office that is just in this kingdome ought
only to arise.”93 The only conclusion to Walwyn’s logic was that the Lords either be reduced to
a mere social club, having no power over any but its own members, or to be extirpated
completely from the constitution of the government.94
Walwyn was also one of the first to argue that the House of Commons was tyrannical.
While Lilburne and Overton remained deferential to the House of Commons, Walwyn was freer
with his criticism. He chided the MP’s that, “it [was] easie to discerne who are [the Lords’]
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Creatures in the House of Commons,” and Walwyn saw this as evidence that the Commons had
been subverted and was in danger of being corrupted completely.95
The Leveller framework also made it possible to imagine for the first time that a voting
citizen of England could be made a slave by Parliament. Some Parliamentarians may have
grudgingly allowed that Parliament, by failing to defend the people, was violating its trust, but it
was totally outside of their framework of jurisprudence to allow that the People could be
enslaved by a Parliament. In this case, it was the inaction of the House of Commons to defend
the rights of the Commons, specifically to Lilburne, which led to the levelling of these charges.
However, a petition campaign led by Richard Overton soon reinforced the same idea, not only
in the cause for Lilburne’s freedom, but also in the need for an assertion of Commoner’s rights
to habeas corpus as protected from the arbitrary rule of the House of Lords.
The very title of Overton’s Remonstrance implied ownership of the House of Commons
by the People themselves, which was an extraordinarily strong statement, and one which had
clearly evolved over time in Leveller rhetoric.96 He used the now common Leveller title of
“Commissioners in Parliament,” and argued that the people who had signed his Remonstrance
were doing so to bring “Parliament to an Account.”97 The People were the Parliamentarians’
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“Sovereign Lord, from whom their Power and Strength is derived.”98 This type of rhetoric was
typical of Parliamentarians, but the emphasis was also on legitimizing the authority of the
Commons, rather than having that power “derived” from the true sovereign of English society.
Overton emphasized that the Commons was merely a conduit for the People’s authority. He
claimed that they had “possessed you with the same Power that was in our selves.”99 The
Commons was empowered by a “trust, which is ever revokable and cannot be otherwise.”100
This revocation was supposed to happen in the annual elections (at a minimum), which Overton
claimed were settled by constitutional law. This was the way that the People, or the
“Principalls” could hold their “Agents” accountable, and all actions taken by the Parliament
outside of this arrangement, “is no lesse then usurpation and an Oppression.”101 This principle
applied universally to the English government, so that, “if Kings would prove themselves Lawfull
Magistrates, they must prove themselves to be so, by lawfull derivation of their Authority,
which must be from the voluntary trust of the People.”102 In short, Overton concluded that all
legitimate government, regardless of the constitutional arrangement, was derived by the
continuing consent of the governed.
Overton reiterated and expanded on this call at the end of the pamphlet, when he
stated that the triennial parliamentary principle was an insufficient measure to ensure the
Commons’ accountability to its principles. He called for the elections to be annual, to be at the
same point every November, and that it should be considered a treasonous offense for anyone
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to interfere in those elections.103 If these measures were to be adopted, “then Wee shall not
doubt to be made absolute Free-men in time.”104 Overton was not yet as radicalized as
Walwyn, so he did not argue that there needed to be limitations on the Commons other than
frequent elections.105 However, frequent elections were a critical part of this arrangement, and
those had been violated for “foure yeeres longer then wee intended,” and he fully recognized
that this was highly problematic.106
Overton and the Levellers were growing more concerned that the corruption of the
Lords was a major threat to the peace of the Commonwealth. This was evidenced in the
arbitrary power that the Lords and King held, namely in the negative voice to cancel positive
law made by the Commons. However, Lilburne’s own experiences, having been imprisoned by
the Lords, was also an impetus for this accusation. With the increasing charges of corruption
came Overton’s corresponding accusation against the “Monopolists, and engrossers of trade: as
the Mendiant Adventurers, and the like.”107 Thus, it was not just the House of Lords as situated
within the Parliamentary structure of the government, but also the economic structures which
supported it that came to be a focus of Leveller attacks during 1646. Overton and Walwyn both
expressed concern about the Lords’ connection to state-established monopoly because they
viewed the government as interfering in their own economic pursuits.108
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Samuel Shepheard from the House of Lords offered a solid contemporary criticism of
Leveller jurisprudence as a comprehensive ideology, forcing the Levellers to innovate their
ideology even further. Shepheard accused Lilburne of not having enough of a legal background
to understand the actual policy implications of the Magna Carta, and he defended the actions
of the Parliament which, “none ever deemed (Lilburne excepted) to be illegall, or contrary to
Magna Charta, or the Subjects Liberty.”109 It was crucial to his framework that he continued to
operate within the jurisprudential framework already established, making it impossible for the
Parliament to act outside of its authority, since its authority was institutionally sovereign, as
supported by his interpretation of the Magna Carta.110 This was a fair criticism of Leveller
rhetoric, and in particular of Lilburne’s attempts to redefine Magna Carta for his own purposes.
It was also partially irrelevant to the development of the Leveller ideological program, since
Walwyn and Overton had moved away from the Magna Carta, and by the following year, so had
Lilburne. Each of the Leveller leaders eventually abandoned it as an inferior derivation for the
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People’s liberties; substituting wholesale natural law arguments regarding the “ancient
constitution,” which circumvented Magna Carta and Parliamentary statutes completely.
The House of Lords (or Peers) had was becoming problematic for many of those with
both Leveller and Independent leanings. There was social as well as political reasons for this.
The original Magna Carta had been instituted by the feudal barons of the thirteenth century
and must be primarily understood as a feudal document. In the intervening centuries, the
yeomen farmers and gentry within English society had become steadily more influential. In
particular, as England had begun to make the transition to a maritime power in the seventeenth
century, the foreign commercial trade had a large role in some gentry gaining a tremendous
amount of influence.111 The Levellers especially, but the gentry more generally, began to see
the government-instituted monopolies as a way to put downward limitations on the otherwise
upwardly mobile middle class, and the House of Lords as the governmental apparatus which
primarily defended and initiated those monopolies. This was intermingled with the general
idea of the Independents that the House of Commons should be sovereign within the
governmental constitution and society more broadly. If the House of Lords lost a negative voice
or veto ability to Commons actions, then they were literally an institutional redundancy with no
real purpose; if they retained a veto they were obstructionist and elitist.112
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Shepheard accused Lilburne of being guilty “at the common Law before and since
Magna Charta.”113 The Levellers seldom referenced common law, because they were
developing the belief that common law’s flexibility was part of the problem and precisely why a
negative constitution to limit the actions of government was necessary. Another interesting
turn of phrase which highlighted the subtle differences in Parliamentary rhetoric was
Shepheard’s claim that something was ordered “by the Lords, in Parliament Assembled.”114 By
this, it was clear that Shepheard merely meant that both elements (Lords and Commons) were
assembled, and therefore the act which had taken place was in keeping with the mixed
constitution. The Leveller use of the same phrase was meant to highlight the concept of the
Common(er)s of all England being summarily represented (“assembled”) in Parliament, as
opposed to scattered throughout their individual provinces and persons.
Shepheard defended the power of the Lords, “as deriving their power from him who
hath it from God.”115 This was an extraordinary statement to make at the time, given the
reality that when he was writing the pamphlet, the Parliament was waging a war against “him”
who had given the Lords their authority. This line of logic ran completely counter to the
Leveller concept of individual freedom, which was clearly derived from the equity of humanity,

113

Shepheard, The Famers Fam’d. [122].
Ibid, [120].
115
Ibid, [124].
This was essentially a slight deviation from the monarchist position, since it was arguing that the Lords
was empowered by the monarch, who had been empowered by God. However, Shepheard did seem to believe
that in the case of clear apostacy (which Charles I’s supposed Catholicism represented,) the Lords could intervene
without usurping that authority. This put a “true” view of religion as the ultimate sovereign, although the
mechanism by which the English society could actually determine such a thing was a matter that Shepheard, and
many of his Presbyterian allies, never fully defined without the circular logic that went right back to their own
doctrinal distinctives. Although this was problematic from a humanistic perspective, since it was primarily the
Levellers who were attempting to construct a view in this manner, it should not be assumed by the historian that
this circular logic would have been troubling to most English thinkers of their time.
114

183
rather than some having special privilege by divine right, however indirectly. Shepheard’s
solution to the tyranny England had suffered under Charles I was to ensure that the statesponsored religion was denominationally pure as he defined it and to replace the power of the
King with that of the Lords. In his view, this was confirmed even by the people’s own
representatives, since the “Honourable House of Commons will not but maintaine, as they
ought, the Priviledge of the House of Peers.”116 Shepheard’s argument represented a shift from
absolute monarchy to oligarchy and demonstrated the type of argument which eventually led
to both Independent and Leveller calls for the abolition of the House of Lords.
Tracts like Shepheard’s rebuttal to the Levellers reveal several important problems
which confronted the Levellers in 1646. It helps to explain why they continued to attempt to
work with those whose views of jurisprudence were clearly at odds with their ideas to some
degree. Some elements within the Presbyterian faction designed to entrench the Peers as a
perpetual oligarchy under the auspices of a vaguely republican framework, or perhaps even as a
reconstituted monarchy. However, both frameworks relied on the divine right argument made
by the Monarchists which had united many different Parliamentary factions against Charles I in
the first place. These were political views that had been explicitly rejected at the outset of the
conflict by many within the Parliamentary coalition, and that they continued to be a real threat
in 1646 gave Independents and Levellers a reason to keep their evident differences in political
programs tabled as an issue to be resolved later. Religious freedom was, after all, still the
foremost concern of the Levellers, and all tyranny was not created equally. In this respect, they
demonstrated a remarkable pragmatism to their political advocacy.
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Common enemies notwithstanding, the Levellers continued to articulate and develop a
constitutional framework that incorporated serious and revolutionary propositions to the
existing system. In Liberty Vindicated against Slavery, Lilburne described the idea of a negative
constitutional framework, which legitimized and limited governmental structures. Rather than
attaching the English Constitution to Magna Carta, he referenced the reader to the
“fundamentall Lawes,” which lay beyond the Magna Carta and were able to take “any
Judgement…given contrary to any of the points.”117 Not only the actions of the judges, but
even “all Statutes and lawes are Null and void, which are or do any ways tend to the infringing
of the [P]eoples rights and liberties.”118
On June 24, 1646, Charles I’s primary forces surrendered to Parliament, and he was in
the custody of the Scots. Given the Scottish people’s connection to Presbyterianism, there was
increased anxiety among Levellers and Independents that this would lead to stronger
Presbyterian influence over the English government. For their own part, the Presbyterians,
especially in the House of Lords, began to rigorously enforce the censorship laws on the press,
which was what had led to Overton’s arrest in the early part of August. It was during this tense
time that Lilburne began his re-evaluation of Magna Carta to the English constitution as a
confirmation of rights, rather than a foundational constitution. This was evident in his August
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21 pamphlet, entitled Liberty Vindicated. Liberty Vindicated was a transition for Lilburne as it
represented his first attempt to discover a negative written constitution in English precedent
apart from Magna Carta.119 In his subsequent writings, it was clear that he viewed Magna Carta
as wholly inadequate. Since it was the closest thing in English jurisprudence to a written
Constitution, Lilburne and the Levellers eventually found the need to propose the Agreements
of the People as replacements to the current system.
In the opening paragraphs of A Defiance against all Arbitrary Usurpations, Overton
connected many Leveller criticisms of Parliamentary overreach under the broad category of
“usurpations, and invasions of the naturall Rights, properties, and freedoms of the people.”120
These usurpations included the “machivilian policy of the Kings, Lords, and Clergy-men.”121
Thus it was that the intertwining of Church and State powers was a clear, but certainly not the
only, example of tyranny. Likewise, he claimed this arrangement had existed since the Norman
Yoke had disestablished the House of Commons as the legitimate authority of the English
government.122 Of late, the “[p]rerogative fetters of the House of Lords,” was yet another
example of this usurpation, but the way that Overton had begun to talk about them made it
clear that he saw each as connected in principle to a tyrannical government.123
Echoing Lilburne’s arguments, Overton insisted that he could only be tried by the
Commons. This principle was derived from the concept that it was only by his own consent that
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the laws and verdicts would be validated. Overton claimed that laws could only apply if a
citizen agreed first to be constrained by those laws via a process of consent. This was not done
on an individual basis. To do so would have surely led to anarchy, but it did apply to groups of
people who had representatives within the government. His commitment that the
“represented should be tried by the Representers,” was at least partially based in his faith in
the House of Commons as opposed to the Lords in 1646.124 However, he was unwilling to cede
total control to even the Commons, and as time went on, this kind of language slowly faded to
a focus on natural rights exclusively; just as the previous preoccupation with the Magna Carta
fallen out of favor in the interest of popular sovereignty.
Overton followed this pamphlet with one of the most powerful assertions of popular
sovereignty prior to the American Declaration of Independence by writing An Arrow against all
Tyrants. In it, Overton argued that since sovereignty ultimately resided within the people, the
furthest it could ever go was “from the represented to the representers – all this kind of
sovereignty challenged by any…is usurpation.”125 Even that sovereignty was allocated by
donation and was contingent upon continuation of consent. It followed from Overton’s
assertions that the only power that the king could have was executive in nature, and in no way
legislative.126 Additionally, An Arrow against all Tyrants was the first time that the Levellers, in
conjunction with their articulation of natural rights, prescribed a strict separation of powers
between the different branches of the government as a necessary institutional restraint.
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At the same time, Overton reached the point that he gave up hope for the House of
Commons as an institution of justice without significant reform. He began his excoriation of the
Commons by stating that they would “be branded to future generations for England’s Bloody
Parliament.”127 They should have known better, since the “cruelties, tyrannies, and
martyrdoms of the papal and episcopal clergy was one of the greatest instigations to this most
unnatural war,” but since that had occurred, this Parliament had begun to “settle a worse
foundation of cruelty.”128 The overall tone of the Arrow against all Tyrants was combative in
nature. It was the beginning of the Leveller shift of their focus toward an appeal to the People
and the army, which were the only two political entities remaining whereby to secure freedom.
Whichever of those two ultimately intervened on the People’s behalf, it further emphasized the
revolutionary tones which Leveller tracts had begun to employ by late 1646.
Meanwhile, Walwyn’s pamphlet war with Thomas Edwards continued, which by this
point had led him to equally revolutionary positions.129 Walwyn argued that it was necessary to
recall all Parliamentarians who “conceive they can justly submit their consciences to others
arbitration,” because there was no “opinion so evill as molestation for Religion.”130 The “liberty
of discourse, and liberty of writing,” were vital to men “ever…kindly be[ing] brought to be of
one mind.”131 In his Parable, Walwyn forged a clear linkage between the freedoms of speech,
religion, and the press, since this shared freedom was the only common denominator under
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which a free and religiously pluralistic society could be united. He saw this commitment to
liberty as a “fortresse to defend me from the wiles and force of Machiavilian Pollicy.”132
Lilburne’s writing was also beginning to explore and develop a refined philosophy of
representation which represented a serious challenge to the mainstream view of most
Parliamentarians. In London’s Liberty in Chains discovered, Lilburne specifically addressed the
“illegal election of great Ministers and Officers for the administration of Justice,” in the city of
London, which had resulted in “the people [being] deprived of this their just right and
liberty.”133 Lilburne saw that many of the leaders of the city had been appointed, rather than
elected by the people, and he interpreted this as a grave threat to their long-term liberty. He
argued that “the miseries wherewith a Tyrant loadeth his people, cannot bee so heavy as the
burthens imposed by a cruell City,” because the local government had the greatest influence on
the daily experiences of the citizens.134 His application of certain principles of government to
multiple levels also indicated that Lilburne was attempting to connect the processes and
philosophy of representation at the local level to those of the national level. It was yet another
way to assert the Leveller maxim that all legitimate government action of any scale and sort,
was derived by the active consent of the governed.
Given the recent events of Charles’ surrender and custody with the Scots, and the
Presbyterian Parliament’s restrictions of freedom, Lilburne also hoped that locally elected
officials in London would circumvent the power being exercised by what he considered to be a
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tyrannical Parliament and King.135 In order for this to work, those officials in the local
governments, including the sheriffs and city commissioners, had to represent the People truly,
rather than those who had appointed them to their positions from positions of power. In this
argument, Lilburne developed a quasi-federalist understanding of government, whereby local
governments that were more accountable to the People should intervene to protect the People
from being “inslaved…[and] captivated to the Lawes, covetous Lusts, and the Arbitrarie
unlimitted power…of your illegally imperious lording Magistrates.”136 In this way, Lilburne was
adding local governance as another potential bastion for the defense of the People’s
sovereignty to the pre-existing Leveller arguments about the militia or insurrection.137
As the Levellers wrestled with the issue of representation, it was not just the
relationship between the citizen and the commissioner which required clarification, but
specifically who was to be represented. The bondage that Lilburne warned the citizens of
London against was not just for the wealthy or the land-owners; it applied to the “meanest
Baron of this City of London,” who was entitled to their rights as Englishmen.138 It was their
“just and due Right and Liberty, for any free Citizen and Baron to give his vote in the election of
the Major, and Sheriffes, and other the publike Officers…(by the) Fundamentall Lawes of this
Kingdome.”139 He then turned explicitly to the question of whether by “Barons” the laws
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meant “some special Citizens of note,” and concluded that it was, in fact, intended to reference
“all Free-holders of this Kindome…[who] were called Barons…[and that] every Free-holder hath
this ordinary jurisdiction.”140 These ideas were critical in the evolving Leveller concept of the
franchise. It was strongly connected to their previously established pattern of thought that all
men are created equally, and therefore there could be nothing other than direct consent which
empowered a government official. It logically followed from this concept that anyone who was
able to give consent was therefore free and vice versa. The best thing that any citizen of
England could do was to “rationally…discover the privilege, that is the Right, Due and Propiety
of all the Sons of Adam.”141 He later clarified that this obligation applied to the “meanest
Cobler and Tinker, as well as of the greatest Gentleman or Nobleman.”142
Lilburne believed that “the Law is not onely the inheritance of every subject, but also
the onely security he hath for his life, liberty, or estate.”143 This phrase was instructive in
representing the fullest idea that Lilburne was developing. The law applied to every subject or
“denizen” which meant that every person living in England was afforded due process of law in
all cases. However, only certain citizens held property (“Freeholders”), meaning that although
the law protected the property of all subjects equally in theory, since only some had property
to be protected, only Freeholders ought to have a say in the creation of laws that affected
property.144 Servants and others who did not hold property did not, therefore, have any less
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rights than anyone else in England, but as a practical reality, they had no right to consent to
laws regarding property since that would be an arbitrary expression of power.
This theory was made possible by a strong commitment to placing the rights of due
process and other inalienable rights out of Parliament. Regardless of enfranchisement, since
Parliament could not make laws respecting certain matters, unpropertied citizens were
protected by the very nature of the original social contract. Simply put, all men, including the
meanest, were born equally free, but that freedom could entail different levels of participation
in the government based on the extent to which law could affect the citizen. Universal suffrage
was unnecessary so long as non-property rights were protected by constitutional means.
These considerations notwithstanding, Lilburne favored a greatly expanded franchise to
be extended to the people of England. Many citizens were being “disfranchised, and
undenezed…because they have not in land 40. X. per annum, and so shall have no vote at all in
chusing any Parliament man, and yet must be bound by their Lawes, which is meer
vassalage.”145 This statement appears to be born out of the concept that any man, of any
property whatsoever, needed to have a right to vote in Parliamentary elections, since the
members of Parliament had the potential to make laws which impacted his property. Based on
this argument, it is logical to conclude that Lilburne’s concept of the “meanest” citizen in
England had a dual interpretation. With respect to voting for Parliament, it referred to any man
who had property. With respect to institutional sovereignty within the constitution, it applied
to literally every person living in the country. Within the expanding Leveller constitutional
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framework, sovereignty over life and liberty existed out of Parliament, and therefore were not
threatened by a limited franchise.
His proposals for reformation of the Parliament also included amendments to the
current representation process in England, such as the fixing if the number of representatives at
somewhere between 500 and 600 representatives, who were “equally to proportion out of
every County,” based on the taxes paid by that district.146 This further reinforced that Lilburne
saw the Parliament, which by this point he conceived to be exclusively the House of Commons,
as essentially related to the administration of property. It was only fair in his mind, that each
citizen had representation which was proportionately equal to the “proportion that comes to
their share,” of the tax revenue, “to pay toward the defraying of the Publique charge of the
Kingdom.”147
By the end of 1646, Lilburne explicitly abandoned Magna Carta as the foundation of the
liberties of the citizens in Vox Plebis. He wrote that:
the Liberties of the Subjects of England, as touching their persons, are not grounded meerly
upon Magna Charta, but are of a more ancient foundation…the Statute of Magna Charta
being onely a Declaration, or Confirmation of those former Lawes which by Divine right, and
Nature, we inherit.148

Since Walwyn and Overton had already moved on to a similar line of thinking, from this point
forward, the Leveller leaders used Magna Carta only as a confirmation of rights that existed,
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rather than as the basis of those rights. This also allowed him to conclude absolutely that these
rights “defend[ed] the Common liberty of England from all illegall & Arbitrary Power
whatsoever, be it either by Prince or State endeavored.”149
Lilburne continued to clarify his commitment to the rights held by all citizens and to
distinguish those rights which were held only by those who had property. No freeman could be
deprived of his property, except by lawfull judgement of his peers. However, even those who
did not have property were still protected by the law, as he made explicitly clear when stating
that the latin word, “liber Homo, or free Man, extends to all manner of English people.”150
Lilburne used London as a case study for what was happening across the country in his
second installment of London’s Chains. Since rights were held by all Englishmen, the “poorest
that lives, hath as true a right to give a vote as well as the richest and greatest,” in local
elections.151 It can be summarized by Lilburne’s theory of consent, and the federalist nature of
the argument he made in the original Londons Liberty in Chaines that Lilburne viewed
participation in elections within the local municipality as an absolute right to be held by any,
since those laws might apply to more than property. The “poorest that lives” left no rhetorical
room for a distinction between servants and free-holders, and the fact that the terminology of
freeholders here is absent underscored this point.
This was not an inconsistent position for the Leveller to posit, since his overarching
axiom for suffrage at all levels of government was the requirement that the laws made by those
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elected would directly affect the enfranchised person. He also pivoted toward the power of the
people in juries as holding a negative voice to statutes as well, as a further institutional
empowerment of the People over the State.152 This made the People as represented in the
jury, the final sovereign in the case of all laws, whether instituted at the local or national level.
Since any person could be arrested for a violation of the law, it also made sense to Lilburne that
those same individuals be able to elect their sheriffs and local government officials.
Lilburne saw local government as a separate level of government which possessed its
own sphere of sovereignty based on its relationship with the People. Lilburne added a new
type of tyranny to the summary of previously established ones. First was the “Popes unwritten
verities,” which Lilburne saw to be representative of any claims to religious authority within the
State.153 The second tyranny was “Kings unlimited Prerogatives,” which undermined the
representative authority of the House of Commons.154 The third type of tyranny was
“Parliaments unknown Priviledges,” which prevented them from being held accountable to the
laws they made and also unable to be recalled by the People.155 Finally, to this list, Lilburne
added “the Lord Major, Court of Aldermen, and the rest of the Prerogrative men of Londons
implicit faith,” who were harming the people of England “against justice, reason, equity,
conscience, and the word of God.”156 Lilburne concluded that these four evils together
represented an “unlimited, uncontrollable power,” and required the People to specifically
enumerate “what the power is you give them, and draw it into writing…that so farre and no
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further they shall goe.”157 Lilburne now explicitly called for a written negative constitution, and
formally listed those powers which no earthly government could but confirm and protect.
At the beginning of 1647, Lilburne focused on regal tyranny because it was at this stage
that Lilburne and many of those who had supported the Parliamentary revolt were concerned
that there would be a Presbyterian settlement with King Charles I. This led to a new pamphlet
entitled, Regall Tyrannie discovered. The consensual language of the byline underscored the
fact that since so many in England did not consent to be governed by Charles, it would be
tyrannical to re-constitute the monarchy.158 By this point, he took popular sovereignty to be a
settled principle for the legitimization of all power, and explicitly defined tyranny as “any man
whatsoever…to appropriate and assume unto himselfe, a power…to rule..without [the
people’s] consent.”159 According to Lilburne, the “tyrannical usurpation of a King…” was due
not to “God approbationally institut[ing] it…[but] suffer[ing] it to be, as he doth all the other
evils and wickednesse in the world.”160 Lilburne derived from Deut. 17:14, the principle that
the People were to choose for themselves a king and therefore, “to me it is very cleer, that all
Government whatsoever ought to be by mutuall consent and agreement.”161 Later, using the
same argument from 1 Samuel regarding Saul as Thomas Paine, Lilburne explicitly rejected
monarchy as a government well-disposed to promote liberty. The People were asking God for
an arbitrary king who would “rule and govern them by his own will [just Tyrant like].”162
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Lilburne continued to argue that by nature, no man was sovereign over another, and
therefore consent was the only source of authority that could be given to a king. Furthermore,
since a king only gains his crown “by contract and agreement…[he] is bound to that
contract.”163 Interestingly, Lilburne also clearly saw the need for “every individual [to be]
included,” in this contract, meaning that he implicitly rejected the idea that Parliament had the
right to sacrifice rights in the form of new statutory precedents, since each man had his own
right to consent.164 Statutory legitimacy was only established by “all the...individuals knit and
joyned together by mutuall consent,” and with respect to negative liberties originally held out
of Parliament in the social contract, this legitimacy was literally impossible, and therefore
always illegitimate.165 Lilburne had arrived at the logical foundations of constitutionalism.
Lilburne’s view of the social contract was set against that articulated by Charles I,
Shepheard, and later by Hobbes that the ruler “did owe an account of his actions to none but
God alone.”166 Lilburne was incredulous that Charles I could be so brash as to claim that,
“Kingdomes are Kings own…as if Kingdomes were for them, and not they for their
Kingdomes.”167 Therefore, just as Locke set out explicitly to reject the divine right arguments
made by Robert Filmer, so Lilburne was self-consciously rejecting the same argument and
seeking to articulate a competing view of the social contract which interpreted the People,
rather than the King, as the sovereign actor in the initiation and continuing execution of the
social contract.
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It followed rationally that, “if the King before the Kingdome…and the Parliament be the
Representative Body of the Kingdome…the Parliament are bound in duty to those that trust
them, to see that the king dispose aright of his trust, being that right that the King hath as
King.”168 Lilburne’s view had developed to the point where not only was the King to be
institutionally bound by the actions of Parliament, but that Parliament was equally limited by
the People. In this context, the Parliamentary negotiations with Charles I were not just a
breach on the part of the King, but also a betrayal by Parliament of its responsibility to preserve
the People. The negative voice of the King could never be allowed to “over-whelme the Liberty
of the People,” or the Kingdom would descend to tyranny.169 The only possible conclusion was
that Charles I had “broken his contract and agreement” with the People, and therefore by the
laws of justice, was rightly exposed to the People’s retribution.170 Lilburne restated a now
familiar Leveller commitment that, “no judicature can be justly erected, or set up, unless it
legally derive power from those that have a legal power to erect, constitute, or institute it.”171
According to Lilburne, the Parliament failed to recognize that “the absolute Supream
Power is in the People in generall, made up of every individual, and the legal and formall
supream Power is only…chosen by them, and assembled in Parliament.”172 The dichotomy
between the “People in generall…(and) every individual,” was important for the Leveller
concept of just governance. The only way these two ideas could be juxtaposed within this
framework would be to incorporate negative liberties based on inalienable rights that
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absolutely defended the rights of “every individual,” while still continuing to recognize the
power of the “People in generall” to assemble their collective powers within Parliament
through the act of election. However, Parliament was not just bound to recognize the
inalienable rights of the individual by abstaining from the passage of certain laws, but also to
“receive rules, directions, and limitations from [the People], and by them,” for those laws which
they ought to make.173 In other words, it needed to be accountable to the People.
The arguments gave way to a petition, known commonly as the “Large Petition” and
likely written by Walwyn and other Leveller leaders. It was presented to Parliament in March of
1647. It began by establishing that Parliament was the most just form of government because
it had its “foundation in the free choice of the people.”174 The petition included for the first
time, an enumerated list of the negative liberties of the People which had been reserved at the
initiation of the original social contract. The Large Petition did not just put into writing a list of
liberties that were to be held as inviolable; it also included the provisions that laws be written
in plain language, and accessible to all. The Large Petition was the first attempt by the Levellers
to put rhetoric into action, and to propose a written constitution that specifically enumerated
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the negative liberties of the people, as well as the specific limitations of the government to
ensure that it did not encroach upon these liberties.175
The Leveller leaders had established that freedom of conscience was a basic right which
required an absolute separation of Church and State. From this logic, they had developed the
belief that the only way to ensure this separation took place was to enshrine that right as an
inalienable natural right. It had followed logically to the Levellers that there were other
corresponding rights which also had to be inalienable if freedom of religion was to be
experienced in full. Throughout the developing crisis of the 1640s, they were forced to adjust
their theory of jurisprudence and the constitutional arrangement that existed within England,
as their experience of freedom fell short of their lofty descriptions. Eventually, this led to the
articulation of a theory of sovereignty which held that the People held ultimate institutional
sovereignty, out of Parliament, rather than in Parliament assembled. Repeated proposals for
reformation and a limited government were ignored by Monarchists, Presbyterians, and finally
by the Independent rejection of the Agreements of the People and the Large Petition.
Reformation was no longer possible; the Leveller Revolution needed to begin, as a means of
reconstituting the society, specifically with a formalized constitution which enshrined the rights,
liberties, and freedoms of the People out of Parliament. The question was: “How to get such a
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reconstitution from the current political situation?” Logically, no Parliamentary statute could
do, since it did not possess proper authority to act on the behalf of the People in issues
concerning natural law. There was an army in London, but it was an open question in 1647 as
to whether it operated under the command of the House of Lords, the House of Commons, the
Army Grandees like Cromwell, Ireton, and Fairfax, or acted as a citizen militia at the ultimate
direction of the People.
Yet even if the army proved to be a tyrannical engine opposed to Leveller reform,
Lilburne had one final recourse in the argument previous mentioned, that juries themselves
represented the People, as a final authority on law. As the events of 1647 to 1653 were to
demonstrate, the Leveller leaders would ultimately fall back to this final buttress of the
People’s liberties, and it is the argument of a jury’s prerogative to rule on issues of law as well
as fact, which would constitute the final Leveller gambit for the common cause.
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Chapter 4
“The Rod Over Their Heads”
Colonel Thomas Rainsborough was a hero in the New Model Army and within the
Leveller activist circles. By the Fall of 1648, he had successfully led sieges on several of the
remaining Royalist strongholds in England and distinguished himself as a loyal and adept
military commander in the Parliamentary struggle against the Cavaliers. He had also been
chosen by the Agitators to represent the radical army leaders at Putney with the firebrand,
John Wildman. Rainsborough was perhaps the only man in England who had earned the
necessary respect from both Lilburne and Cromwell needed to bridge the gaps that were
emerging in their political programs.
A month after leading the siege which had resulted in the surrender and execution of
the Cavalier commanders Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle, royalist forces attempted to
assassinate Rainsborough.1 The Independent-controlled New Model Army, Presbyterians, and
Monarchists were all vying for hegemony within the English political system, seeking leverage
wherever it could be found. The political and social deadlock was slowly wearing down the
war-weary nation. For their part, the Levellers made overtures to every side: offering to
couple their program of inalienable rights and a negative constitutional framework expressed in
the Agreements of the People with the governmental arrangement preferred by each faction.
Throughout this period, they also attempted to position themselves as a settlement which
would protect most of the interests of all sides; a sort of political lowest common denominator
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of liberty. In short, they recognized that the authoritarian-individualist political axis existed on
a separate dimension from the traditional conservative-liberal axis.
When their overtures were treated with disdain, the Levellers took to the presses and
attacked the tyranny of each faction, including increasing attacks against the Grandees for the
continued use of martial law in London.2 According to John Rees, “the execution of Lucas and
Lisle and the attempted murder of Rainsborough were a microcosm of the banking up of
hostility in the wider society.”3 The deadlock had persisted for much of 1647 and all of 1648,
and tensions were rising. England demanded a resolution to the conflict.
In October, Rainsborough had been ordered by Ireton and Fairfax to take over the siege
of Doncaster Castle, another Monarchist stronghold. The governor in the region was too
influential for Parliamentary forces to ignore, but too loyal to Charles to be trusted.
Rainsborough’s orders were to assume command of the forces in the region and bring the siege
to a conclusion, but the governor was uncooperative, so the Colonel’s efforts were slowed. It
was in this circumstance that Rainsborough was assassinated by a contingent of twenty-two
Cavaliers, early in the morning on October 29, 1648.4 Rainsborough’s high-profile death
multiplied and amplified the voices of the Independents and Army radicals who had begun to
call for the execution of Charles I. They viewed this as a way to permanently end the deadlock
between Monarchist and Parliamentary forces. Those loyal to the Crown relished the death of
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the highly acclaimed New Model leader, gleefully evoking imagery of Rainsborough being
tortured in hell in their broadsides and publications.5
According to Rees, “the funeral of Thomas Rainsborough was a planned, political
demonstration of the Leveller movement.”6 Depending on the source, estimates of those who
participated in the funeral procession ranged from 1500 to 5000, most of whom were wearing
distinctively green ribbons which identified them with Rainsborough’s personal colors.7 As Rees
and other historians have noted, these green ribbons were publicly connected to the Levellers
in a readily identifiable way.8 The impact of the Colonel’s funeral within London demonstrated
the political capital available to the Levellers, although it was undoubted that given the hawkish
demands echoed in many of the presses sympathetic to Rainsborough, there was no small
measure of hot-blooded malice which caused people otherwise unassociated with the Leveller
political ideology to identify briefly with a movement they believed could end the monarchy.9
All of England sought a final resolution to the decade of bloodshed, and it would be in the six
months following Rainsborough’s death that the Independents, Presbyterians, Royalists, and
Levellers made their final attempts to define the revolution of the 1640s.
About a half a century before the Levellers were recognized as a political group by
Thomas Edwards, William Shakespeare’s Juliet posed the question: “What’s in a name? That
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which we call a rose, By any other name would smell as sweet.”10 Yet, as the play unfolded,
Shakespeare answered Juliet’s question with a subtle, but resounding, “everything.” The starcrossed lovers are doomed by their names. It was only through ironic, needless, and wanton
tragedy that truth was revealed to demonstrate that character is not determined by labels.
It behooves the historian, when reflecting on the power of words, to also consider the
interpretative power conferred by the use of terminology like “English Civil War,” “English
Revolution,” or “Leveller Revolution.” However, to determine which historical label is correctly
attached to the Levellers, these terms of themselves, require greater definition. The difference
between a “civil war” and a “revolution” is fundamentally determined by the ultimately
victorious party’s interpretation of the status quo. “Civil Wars” are so labelled by those who
supported a status quo, emphasizing the struggle between two or more factions within a
country in which the group that defended the status quo was victorious. When considering the
arch of the events between 1642-1660 in England, it seems appropriate to term the collection
of those conflicts as “Civil Wars,” since the Restoration of Charles II in 1660 re-established the
King in Parliament, and a limited sovereignty to the Crown was restored.11 The typical
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delineation of the “First, Second, and Third English Civil Wars,” within this framework are to be
understood as three distinct phases of the same general conflict, for there is no way to argue
that the beheading of Charles I at the end of the “Second English Civil War,” was in any way a
final reinforcement of the status quo. Civil wars simply cannot end with the execution of the
previously held sovereign of the society.
There is also a validity to the application of the term “English Revolution,” as
Christopher Hill has in The Century of Revolution 1603-1714.12 Rather than choosing to focus on
the Civil Wars, many historians have accurately noted that when Charles II’s younger brother,
James II, pushed his concept of absolute sovereignty too far, in particular where it came to the
matter of religious freedom, the conflict of 1641 was renewed. Although James was a
practicing Catholic, his advanced age upon ascending to the throne initially “imparted urgency
to the King and patience to everyone else.”13 As long as he did not make radical changes to his
brother’s program of general tolerance, the Whigs were content to wait for the next monarch’s
ascension. However, James’ Declaration of Indulgence had made plain the interpretation that
religious liberty was not a natural right; in his interpretation it was an allowance by the King of
England for his subjects. The Declaration contributed to increased anxiety among the
Protestants that James II intended to restore Roman Catholicism as the State Church. It also
represented a direct attack on the Test Act of 1673 which had been passed by Parliament to
disenfranchise Catholics. This was not only a religious issue, but one which created a
constitutional crisis of sorts, since James was attempting to reorient the political compass back
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toward monarchial sovereignty, both in indulging his subjects with the liberty of conscience, but
also in negating Parliamentary statutes by fiat. The birth of James’ son, James Francis Edward
Stuart in June of 1688 increased this anxiety to a near breaking point, since he was baptized in
the Catholic church, and immediately supplanted his older sister, Mary (a Protestant), in the
line of succession. It was this conflagration of religion and politics which led to the Whig party
in Parliament’s re-assertion of the House of Commons’ sovereignty.
William of Orange, a Dutch Protestant married to Mary, was subsequently invited to
England to investigate the birth of James II’s son and the conditions of freedom within the
country.14 James subsequently fled the country, which left the Parliament in a constitutional
crisis. William had not actually intended to conquer the nation, and neither the Parliamentary
Whigs nor the Tories had those designs either; all had merely thought to pressure James in
ways that furthered their own political agendas.15 Eventually, it was decided that James had
“deserted” the throne, which left the matter of the ascension up to Parliament.16 After the
installation of his daughter Mary, and her husband, William of Orange on the throne, it was
implicitly recognized within England that Parliament, rather than the king, definitively
possessed the negative voice.
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When viewed from this interpretative and temporal angle, the struggle can no longer be
termed a “civil war,” since the side which stood for the status quo arrangement of 1641 was
defeated. Designating it a “Glorious Revolution,” as many historians have done, made it seem
as though there was a sudden transfer of power within the government which made
Parliament, for the first time, the political sovereign of English society. This ignores the glaring
fact that precisely the same conflict was fought in the 1640s, and that the constitutional
arrangement of 1690 was not substantively different from that of 1650. In this case, the
application of the term “English Revolution,” emphasizing the continuity of the events between
1641-1689 which led to the rise of the Parliamentary interpretation of jurisprudence, is
appropriate.17 The Bloodless Revolution’s luster was marred with the bloodshed of the 1640s.
The careful application of these terms, when technically described as above, tends to
eliminate confusion within a historical narrative. It is the duty of any historian to carefully
select, and at times explain, the usage of such terminology in this way. However, as was
discussed in the preceding chapter, the challenge for the historian is also to recognize that the
historical narrative of the politician has far more pragmatic and often propagandistic purposes.
The historical narratives of many places and times bear out the reality that the application of
strategically inaccurate terminology can have a damning effect on one’s political enemies. Time
often causes these effects to be mitigated, as words and meanings change, but this makes them
no less influential in their own time and place. This reality complicates the task of the historian,
since one cannot simply accept terms or ideas from the time period he or she is studying
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without qualification. There are even times when the historian must point out the deliberate or
incidental misapplication of terms within the period in question, and substitute in the historical
narrative more precise terms, even if seemingly anachronistic.
Lilburne, and his “Levellers, so-called,” were acutely aware of the power of words, as
were Cromwell, Ireton, and the Independents who sought so assiduously, and ultimately
successfully, to attach the moniker to the movement.18 Lilburne and Walwyn especially,
unsuccessfully attempted to fight against the propaganda war waged against them as
“Levellers.” Just before their final departure from the Independent Movement, Walwyn had
observed that men were subject to “so much feare and scrupulosity…they become mere
Pendants; fierce and violent censurers of all things; they are not accustomed to themselves.”19
He saw that it was “worth our labour, to study how to reduce our minds into the most friendly
disposition.” To Walwyn, this meant freeing the masses from the thrall of their overlords who
instituted Machiavellian schemes to divide and conquer by appealing to their rationality. The
war of words and terms were decisive in the Independent defeat of the Leveller Revolution.
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Given the great importance attached to the correct application of terminology in
determining the tone of a historical narrative, it is critical that the historian carefully consider
what the Levellers were.20 This required consideration of what the Levellers were attempting
to create, as well as what their overall significance has been in the greater story of AngloAmerican jurisprudence. The purpose of this chapter is to seek to answer the first part of this
question, after which, a more thorough investigation of the second question may be considered
for the balance of the project.
Ultimately, the interpretation of the Levellers hinges on three connected, but separate
considerations. The first consideration is ideological. It seeks to locate the Levellers within the
broader categorizations of Western political programs.21 The ideological historian is concerned
with discovering the most accurate application of concepts like republican, social democrat,
classical liberal, and so forth to the systematic ideology expressed by the Levellers.
The next consideration is to determine precisely what the most accurate label is for the
Levellers as a group, within their own social context. Historians have debated as to whether
they were an activist group, a political party, a movement, dissenters, or even an
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inconsequential construct of disproportionate historical interest, created by the anachronistic
temptation to impose modern programs onto the Leveller arguments.
The final consideration is to locate the consequence and meaning of the Leveller actions
within their contemporary period. Were they revolutionaries or counterrevolutionaries,
military agitators or populists, a bourgeoisie movement directed toward preserving power, or a
proletarian revolution to bring equality to the masses?
Some historians have attempted to evaluate the Levellers only in terms of their
ideological contributions. In fact, this interpretative vein was the impetus for the academic
interest in the Levellers as a distinct group in the mid twentieth century, first expressed in Perez
Zagorin’s, A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution.22 A year later, Joseph Frank
believed that he had traced the ideology of social democracy to its Leveller roots.23 Other
historians have adopted an essentially one-dimensional view of the Levellers as a group whose
ideology is their lasting contribution to history. Jack McMichael and Barbara Taft interpreted
Walwyn and the Levellers as agitators who fought for democratic reform and represented the
“precursors of the movement for constitutional democracy,” but ultimately, “witnessed no
victory.”24
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Responding Frank’s and Zagorin’s initial enthusiasm, the revisionist historians of the
1960s redefined the Levellers’ significance to the development of Western political ideology.
Within the Marxist dialectic, C.B. Macpherson reduced Leveller ideology to support his theory
of “possessive individualism,” by arguing that the Levellers had a systematic ideology of
contractual rights which continued the oppression of the working-class Englishmen by
reinforcing bourgeoisie hegemony in English society.25 Richard Ashcraft devoted a chapter in
Revolutionary Politics & Locke’s Two Treatises of Government to the explicit refutation of
possessive individualism posited by C.B. Macpherson, particularly as it related to the
franchise.26 These historical debates have reduced the Levellers’ significance to one of
ideological considerations, although in the case of the Marxist narrative, with some implications
as participants in their sweeping narrative of history.
Other historians have narrowly constrained the significance of the Levellers to their
arguments about the franchise. Christopher Hill’s section dedicated to the Levellers discussing
the politics of the 1640s carefully distinguished their arguments about the franchise from the
Diggers, who were socialists, and the Independents, who were republicans.27 Hill’s analysis of
the Levellers largely depended upon the framework in which that analysis took place,
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demonstrating the overall importance of identifying all three considerations noted above.
Although he never used the explicit terminology of the bourgeoisie and proletariat, his analysis
was clearly locating the Levellers as a mostly conservative force, seeking to expand, but not
disrupt the existing class distinctions between the working and ruling classes.28
There have also been a significant number of historians who have interpreted the
Levellers as a group of political malcontents who lacked any serious ideological vision.
Christopher Hill’s Levellers were confused populists who were married to a nebulous concept of
“reason” without a solid understanding of English law or constitutionalism.29 They were
committed to a program of democratic reform, but without fully understanding the
implications of their ideas, or how those ideas interacted with English jurisprudence. They
were obsessed instead with the myth of the Norman Yoke, which had introduced perpetual
tyranny to the English people.30 Lilburne “held the Bible in one hand, Coke in the other,” but in
Hill’s view, ultimately manipulated both to his own political purposes, rather than incorporating
them in a systematic and serious political program.31
Mark Kishlansky has also adopted this interpretation of Lilburne and the Levellers,
claiming that Lilburne was an “uncompromising firebrand…[who] had the rare capacity to see a
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nettle whenever an olive branch was offered to him.”32 Kishlansky’s Levellers were nothing
more than a haven for disaffected soldiers with personal vendettas but no ideological
aspirations. Hugh Trevor-Roper claimed that the Levellers were a group of revolutionaries to
the ideological left of the Independents but gave such incidental treatment to their significance
so as to essentially relegate them to the footnotes of the historical narrative of the 1640s.33
Conrad Russell has utilized them similarly, as a means to locating the ideology of the
Independents, but not as a significant contributor to the direction of the events in the 1640s.34
In his biography of John Lilburne, Michael Braddick noted that “what we think about
Lilburne depends in part on what we think was at stake in the revolution that gave rise to his
political career.”35 He argued that these interpretations of Lilburne, and by extension the
Levellers in general, were shaped by whether one was a Whiggish proponent of the balanced
constitution, a Tory supporter of the absolutist interpretation. Braddick equated them to the
“radical Whig interpretation,” which emphasized natural law principles rather than the political
and pragmatic exigencies of the day.36 As it was with the other historians of this interpretation,
Braddick’s agnostic interpretative view was informed, in large part, by a general dismissal of the
notion that systematic ideology was influential on Leveller actions. According to this view, the
obsession with Leveller ideology was imposed upon the Levellers by subsequent viewers of
history, rather than a part of the Leveller Movement in its time.
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Finally, there are those historians who have attempted to unify the Levellers’ ideological
commitments with the contributions they made to the events of the 1640s, as well as seeking
to understand how those events contributed to the Levellers’ ideology. Ian Gentles carefully
distinguished the civilian Leveller movement from its merger with the Agitators in the New
Model Army between 1647-49.37 This distinction was necessary, given the focus of his book on
The New Model Army, because it acknowledged the broader “Leveller” movement which
existed outside of its influence on the Army. Gentles generally interpreted the Levellers as a
radical off-shoot of the Independent movement but recognized that their significance lay within
themselves and their own actions, not merely as a means to understanding the Independents.38
Foxley has agreed with this assessment, recognizing that the aforementioned
“revisionist treatments of the Levellers and the later 1640s cannot wipe out the contribution of
the Levellers to the radicalization of parliamentary thought.”39 She further recognized that the
Levellers were important in the political actions of the New Model Army, and in laying the
philosophical groundwork for the Independents’ execution of Charles I and the abolition of the
House of Lords.40 In short, the “Levellers’ historical importance rests on their ideas as well as
their actions,” and both of these were products of the times in which the Levellers acted and
thought.41
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John Rees has claimed that the Levellers were “first and foremost an organized group of
political activists.”42 He believed that the Levellers, because of their organization and influence
within London and the New Model Army, were instrumental in the direction of the events of
the 1640s.43 Rees’ Levellers were connected to and used by the ultimately victorious
Independents, but were distinct in their own aims and purposes, meaning that “the revolution
that they helped to create turned out to be the one they could only half-accept…but they only
failed after it was victorious.”44 While dedicating the largest portion of research to the
ideological development of the Levellers, it is nevertheless a holistic perspective of ideas,
actions, and consequences to which this research study has aspired. One of the most
important understandings from this perspective is the degree to which the Levellers’ ideas
evolved in response to the political, constitutional, and social ebbs and flows of the 1640s.
The developing commitment to constitutional reform and the contractual framework for
understanding the People’s rights within their society certainly pushed the Levellers in a
revolutionary direction. Overton’s arrest in late Summer of 1646 may have been the catalyst
for this growing awareness, given that he had been imprisoned explicitly for violating
censorship laws regarding religious liberties. He himself recognized this fact, declaring that “if
[the government] transgress and go beyond the bounds of rationality, justice and equity, I shall
to the utmost of my power make opposition…to the last gaspe of vitall breath…let me have
justice, or let me perish.”45 It was at this point that the Levellers recognized that the
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Presbyterian-controlled Parliament represented a serious threat to the natural rights
framework which they had been proposing. From that point forward, the Levellers argued for
explicit limitations on Parliamentary authority, functionally seeking to define specific ways to
constitutionally relocate sovereignty within the government to the People.
As has been demonstrated in Chapter 3, within the Leveller framework, “the People”
was an abstract term which embodied the collective, inalienable rights of every individual. As
will be demonstrated below, this never meant that they were committed to a program of social
democracy; the inalienable rights of the People were simply too fundamental for them to
conceive of allowing a majority rule. However, popular sovereignty, as an institutional restraint
on the legislative branch was a crucial part of the system they proposed, since they often
recognized that within the government, the House of Commons was predominant.46
Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of the Levellers’ proposed revolution was the
significance of jury trials. In Vox Plebis, Lilburne introduced the concept that juries played a
critical role in the constitutional system which existed to ensure that each man fully
experienced his rights. On one hand, this shift was necessary for Lilburne, since his previous
appeals to the Commons had gone unresolved and he remained imprisoned. Therefore,
arguing for jury sovereignty served his primary aim of obtaining his freedom. However, since
Lilburne had recently moved toward a rationalization of the People themselves as the ultimate
sovereign and bastion against tyranny, this also required him to locate exactly where the

46

They often used the term “soveraign” in describing this situation, but as has been discussed above, this
does not mean that they meant it in the most technical sense. When referring to Parliament as “sovereign” the
Levellers meant this more in terms of institutionally predominant among the branches of government. As their
writings clearly bore out (See Chapter 3), they held that the ultimate sovereign authority in society was the People.

217
People’s sovereignty was expressed within the constitutional system, and the English jury
developed into a critical aspect of this proposal. Jury sovereignty was, therefore, both
personally expedient and a natural conclusion of Lilburne’s previous ideological commitments.
When Lilburne stated the principle that no man should be “arraign[ed], tr[ied], or
condemn[ed]…but by the lawfull judgement of his Peers,” he was shifting the argument which
he had previously made that the rightful adjudicators were the representatives in the
Commons, to the “Peers” being the “verdict of 12. Men, and not otherwise.”47 This was
explicitly a commitment to the idea that juries should rule on points of law, not merely guilt.
Lilburne exegeted the Latin meaning of “peer” in the original law and attempted to show that
“the word Peers vinvocally signifie[d] both” the Lords as well as a man’s equals.48 He then
derived this principle from various “judgement[s] of Parliaments in this point, and the
fundamentall lawes of the Land.”49 Lilburne was always prone to self-serving interpretations of
foreign languages, common and constitutional laws, so his analysis is suspect as a point of
English law. However, there was no mistaking its coherence with the Leveller desire to see the
People’s voice further expressed in government. Therefore, although his use of legal precedent
was questionable, the role that he came to see juries playing in the constitutional process
overall was a reasonable and natural extension of his overall philosophy of the People’s
sovereignty.
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Lilburne also defined specifically what the constitution, or the lex-terrae was, which was
how juries were to be instructed in rendering their verdicts. It was firstly, the “absolute
perfection of reason,” based on Lilburne’s understanding of Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes.50
Secondly, it was the common law of England, as confirmed by judicial precedent.51 Third, it was
to be in keeping with the “customs received, and time-out-of-mind observed and approved by
the people of this Kingdom.”52 Finally, it was the “antient Constitutions, and modern Acts of
Parliament, made by the Estates of the Realme; but of these only, such as are agreeable to the
Word of God, and law of Nature.”53 Any laws which were not in keeping with these principles
were not “to be observed or obeyed by the people, as being contrary to their Birth-right,” and
by implication, this also meant that juries were to disregard laws which the People were to not
observe.54 Lilburne’s logic referenced everything back to the natural law framework which the
Levellers had developed, and, as demonstrated in the above chapters, essentially used the
second through fourth points to confirm, rather than derive, the standard by which juries
should render judgement. Essentially, juries were to receive their instruction from natural law
and English principles of freedom, rather than judges, Parliaments, common or positive law.
The power of the People was connected to the Leveller understanding of the consensual
nature of government, and the title of Lilburne’s first tract of 1647 made it clear that all “power
(in the hands of whomsoever),” was granted by the People only for their own “good, benefit,
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and welfare.”55 Furthermore, he derived the right of revolution by arguing that any time an
earthly power was used to the detriment of these ends, it was “justly resistable and
revokeable.”56 What was yet to be resolved at this point, and what the Levellers spent much of
the following years arguing, was the means by which the People could revoke the government’s
authority, since they took the authority for granted by this point.
At the end of April 1647, Lilburne printed a collection of his previous writings from his
continued imprisonment by the Presbyterian-controlled House of Lords, which summarized his
general disposition to continue resisting the arbitrary government he feared was being created.
According to Lilburne, Parliamentary acts were only valid when they acted “according to the
Law and just customes of Parliament, within their bounds.”57 Parliamentary supporters
interpreted “within their bounds” as referencing the appropriate power given to Parliament by
statute (“Law and just customes”). However, Lilburne’s subsequent claim that “I am (actively)
only to obey you in lawful things,” made it clear that he was attempting to constrain
Parliamentary statute by natural law.58
One of the boundaries which Lilburne believed to be critical was to have regular
elections, because a permanent and unelected Parliament was “the greatest abridgement and
destruction to our lawes, liberties, and properties that can possibly be imposed upon us.”59 The
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unelected nature of the presently situated Long Parliament made them “unpuestionable,
lawlesse, & uncontrowleable” until the People were given the opportunity to vote. The
Triennial Act (1641) was not being followed due to the emergency status of the conflict with the
King, so “the People, are without a Bol-worke to preserve them from being followed up by
unlimited prerogative.”60 The bulwark could be partially restored “if we have a fresh
Parliament every year…it will be as a rod kept over their heads to awe them.”61 At this point
Lilburne was also willing to consider the appointment of a committee to represent Parliament
when it was not in session, although future exigencies showed the Levellers that this was not
sound doctrine, and it never became a permanent feature of their constitutional proposals.62
As Lilburne and Overton continued to agitate for their freedom from prison, the Army
became politicized by the events of 1647. In January, the Scots, who had been supporting and
protecting Charles I, negotiated a settlement with Parliament, and abandoned Charles to
Parliamentary confinement at Newcastle. Rather than galvanizing the Parliamentary
supporters, the captivity of the King created a factional standoff. Charles proved willing to
leverage his support and negotiate with all sides, which created a crisis within the previously
allied Parliamentary factions: primarily the Independents and the Presbyterians. Since
Cromwell and the Independents controlled the New Model Army’s loyalty, the Presbyterians
suddenly undertook to disband the Army, ostensibly because the war with the King was over.
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The Independents feared that disbanding the Army prior to reaching a constitutional
settlement and certain concessions from Parliament would lead to the creation of a
Presbyterian tyranny, with the House of Lords gaining the negative voice within the political
system. For their part, the soldiers had not been paid for their service and were unwilling to
disband until their arrears were paid. The most principled of the soldiers were concerned that
the People’s voice would not be considered unless the Army remained. Rather than disbanding
as ordered, the Army seized control of London, and began to operate as an institutional
restraint against the Parliament which had created it. Control of the Army itself defaulted to
the Grandees, led by Cromwell, Ireton, and Fairfax. However, there was an Agitator Movement
which placed considerable upward pressure on the high command from lower in the ranks.
The Agitator goal was to re-orient the Army to a consensual framework and made them
naturally predisposed to the political arguments previously made by the Levellers.63
It was in this context that some leaders within the regiments most inclined to the
Levellers issued A Solemne Engagement of the Army, in which they presented “a Declaration of
their Resolutions, as to disbanding; and a briefe Vindication of their principles and intentions in
relation to divers scandalous things suggested against them.”64 The Solemne Engagement was
frequently referenced by the Leveller leaders, and was in keeping with their general aspirations
for the Army, which differed significantly from Cromwell and the Independents. The authors
were aware that they had an obligation to ensure that they were not, by disbandment,
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consigning all freeborn people of England to be subject to a tyrannical government, not the
least reason being that once disbanded, they would be nothing more than freeborn citizens
themselves.65 In short, they believed that the cause of the People and the Army were one and
the same, since the Army was comprised of freeborn citizen soldiers. Therefore, they resolved
“that without such satisfaction and security…we shall not willingly disband, nor divide,” until
such time as there was “an establishment of common and equall right and freedome to the
whole.”66
Within two weeks, Ireton had presented his own interpretation of the Solemne
Engagement through the Declaration of the Army.67 The differences between Ireton’s
Declaration and the Leveller-approved Solemne Engagements was subtle, but foreshadowed
the division between the once-allied groups. Ireton allowed that the Army was “called forth
and conjured, by…Parliament, to the defence of our owne and the peoples just rights and
liberties.”68 However, according to Ireton, these rights and liberties were vindicated by the
“just power, and Rights of this Kingdome in Parliament (emphasis added).”69 He further stated
that “all authority is fundamentally seated, in the office.”70 Therefore, he clearly believed that
the Army was, in fact, the creature of Parliament, and that it could be disbanded once
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Parliament reflected the “peoples just rights and liberties.” The Presbyterian control of
Parliament at the present time was the final obstacle to disbandment. The obvious solution to
Ireton, was that “the Houses may be speedily purged of such members…for Corruptions, or
abuse to the State, or undue Elections.”71 In short, once the Independents cherry-picked those
Parliamentarians they deemed fit for their seats, the Army could rightfully acquiesce to
whatever conditions the Parliament set on it, including potential disbandment.
The difference in these two interpretations of the Army’s relationship to the
government could not be more fundamentally opposed, even though the implications while the
Presbyterians were in power were identical. The Levellers argued that the Army was a militia of
citizen soldiers, who served the People directly and acted as an institutional restraint against
government on behalf of the People. The Independents, on the other hand, interpreted the
Army as a Parliamentary tool, to be used in defense of liberty, as defined by Parliament in
normal circumstances, or in the extreme, by what the Parliamentarians ought to be,
exemplified by the Independent faction.
Independents and the Levellers shared a mutual concern about the continuation of the
present Parliament, which caused Walwyn to muse at the irony that “there [was] in this Nation,
then a continuall Parliament, already drawing to the end of the seventh yeare; or that this
Parliament should begin in suppressing the High commission, Star-chamber, Bishops, Popish
Lords, and all oppressors.”72 While Ireton at least paid lip-service to the idea of regularly
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elected Parliaments, his desire to purge the Houses was explicitly an attempt to avoid “a
present or suddain dissolution of this Parliament.”73
Walwyn had no such concerns about an immediate dissolution and re-election of a new
Parliament, and extended the argument made in the Solemne Engagements by arguing that
“the same necessity and publike safety that justifieth the Parliament against the King, will also
justifie the Army against them.”74 The Army was, at the present moment, “the onely orderly
meanes for the peoples safety…after the tryall of all other lawfill and possible faire and
submissive meanes.”75 In the Summer of 1647, Walwyn and all the Levellers held a general
confidence that “it is not to be imagined, that the Army meaneth in any wise to usurpe the
government.”76 The Levellers’ faith in the Army, or at least in its leadership, proved to be shortlived. It was important to note that only the Army, and not Parliament, garnered Walwyn’s
confidence.
Like Lilburne and Walwyn, Overton had also confirmed his belief in the right of the
People to exert sovereignty over the “degenerate Representative Body.”77 By this point, a
common Leveller refrain had been to rely on the argument that “nothing which is against
reason is lawfull,” and any government which had laws against Nature was not only tyrannical,
but invalidated. As their arguments and actions bore out, their solution was a sort of civil
disobedience movement, motivated by the Christian principle of doing unto others as one

73

Rushworth, Declaration of the Army, [171].
Walwyn, The poore Wise-mans Admonition, [180].
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid, [181].
77
Richard Overton. An Appeale from the degenerate Representative Body the Commons of England
assembled at Westminster. In Tracts on Liberty by the Levellers and their Critics Vol. 4 (1647). (Online Library of
Liberty: London, July 17, 1647), [207].
74

225
would have them do unto them, which had been the Leveller justification for their previous
derivation of reserved freedoms. This principle, when applied in a consistent way, required the
Levellers to pursue legally valid processes to prosecute usurpers and tyrants, rather than
extralegal procedures such as armed revolution. In their view, a self-defensive militia fit into
this ethical, legal, and constitutional framework. As was typical of Leveller political ideology,
these ideas began as philosophical ideations that developed into specific programs over time.
Overton summarized these positions, taking for granted that it was “an undoubted
principle of reason…[the citizen] may, to save, defend and deliver himself from all oppression,
violence and cruelty whatsoever.”78 This was the purpose of the Army’s “present honourable
and Solemne Engagment,” and that since “the equity of the Law is Superior to the Letter,” the
current Parliament had forfeited its powers, which had reverted to “the hands of the
betrusters, as their proper centure.”79 Civil disobedience in this case, was not only valid, but
required, since authority had “retreat[ed] to the Fountaine…all authority is fundamentally
seated in the office, and but ministerially in the persons; therefore the persons in their
Ministrations degenerating from safety to tyranny, their Authority ceaseth and is only to be
found in the fundamentall originall.”80 Sovereignty reverted to its natural state: the People.
To Overton, since the government was in breach of the social contract, it was invalid,
but the hypothetical office retained its authority. He did not argue that society itself was
disintegrated, just that the present Government was invalid until it could be reconstituted upon
elections duly held in keeping with the People’s rights. Until such elections could be held, he
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appealed “unto the Body Represented, (the true originall Soveraigne Authority of Parliaments)
the free borne Commoners within this Kingdom of England, and Dominion of Wales for
protection and reliefe against those obstructors of justice and judgement.”81 In Overton’s
opinion, the Army and the “free borne Commoners” were one and the same body. Overton
went even further in linking the Army’s current fight against disbandment with his own struggle
for his liberties as an Englishman:
“Wherefore (truly honoured and faithfull Armie) thinke it not strange that thus in particular I
have presumed to cast myself and my cause into the verge of your solemne engagement for the
publique…now you cannot engage and declare for the generall, but the particulars thereof must
be jointly and severally intitled thereto: Therefore this which I thus claime and expect from your
hands, you cannot in justice and honour to your owne undertakings deny me; if you doe, you
must deny your selves, and your solemne engagement, and so render your selves to the
Kingdome as others have done before you, even deluders and deceivers of the people, and
thereby instate the people into a just capacity of Insurrection against you, as well as your selves
are now against others.”82

Finally, Overton concluded with specific petitions, many of which were common to
previous Leveller documents. However, the inclusion now that there were “articles concerning
Courts of Judicature, offices and Officers of the Law,” demonstrated the new concern for citizen
sovereignty over the judiciary seen previously in Lilburne’s writings.83 Overton and the
Levellers displayed an awareness that if the rule of law was to be effective, a democratization
and separation of the executive and judiciary from Parliament was essential. After all, it would
be these systems, in conjunction with empaneled juries, that would offer rulings on the legality
of Parliamentary acts in civil cases. As such, only courts “established by the just old Law of the
81
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Land” were valid, court proceedings needed to follow due process established, and most
importantly, “all such Officers…[were] to be chosen by the free Commons, as Mayors, Sheriffes,
justices of peace, &c. may be left to the free Election of the people.”84
John Wildman, a former officer in the army, and one of the Leveller advisors to the
Agitators in the Army, confirmed Overton’s interpretation of the Solemne Engagement.85
Wildman later participated as the representative for the Agitator rank-and-file at the Putney
Debates alongside Rainsborough, and was imprisoned with Lilburne in 1648 for a pamphlet
they co-published.86 Wildman was considered to have had a hand in the authorship of the first
Agreements of the People. He claimed that the “Army took up Armes, in judgement and
conscience, for the peoples just rights and liberties, and not as mercenary Souldiers, hired to
serve an arbitrary power of the State.”87 Both Independents and Levellers employed the
argument that the members of the army were not “mercenaries,” but were employed in the
service of a higher principle. The difference lay in how that employment was to be understood.
The Independents saw their engagement to defend the people’s liberties in Parliament; the
Army was always a creature of the State. Wildman categorically rejected this argument in The
Case of the Armie Truly Stated, claiming that, as “free Commons,” it was their “right and
freedome due to them” to resist disbandment, because they did not “stand as Soldiers only to
serve the State.”88
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Wildman significantly reinterpreted the Solemne Engagement as well, proposing that in
addition to the conditions the agitators had already stated, that “a law paramount be made,
enacting it, to be unalterable by Parliaments,” that an election of a new Parliament be held
freely every two years.89 He also called for a Parliamentary Committee to be appointed that
would identify and provide restoration to all people who had suffered “oppressions by unjust
proceedings in the law.”90
Having stated more clearly what he believed the case of the Army should be, Wildman
then followed his tract with an appeal to the Army by the People. In it, Wildman was the first
Leveller in print to recognize that the Grandees were attempting to steer the Army in a
direction which ran counter to the purposes of the People. He pointed out that although their
words had appeared to be in keeping with the Agitators’ purposes, their actions ran contrary to
their rhetoric and advised that they should “keepe [them] from thence altogether, and as much
at a distance from these pretended friends, as ye did once upon enemies.”91 Being present in
the ongoing Putney Debates at the time put Wildman in a unique position to see the nuanced
differences in Ireton and Cromwell’s vision for the Army which ran counter to the proposed
Leveller Revolution. In the voice of the People, Wildman exhorted the Army to:
“deal plainly with Ireton, by whose cowardly or ambicious policy, Cromwel is betrayed into
these michievious practice; &…by whose dissimulation many of the [agitators] are
corrupted, and become treacherous to you…let him know yee know him, and hate his
courses….And if Cromwell instantly repent not…let him know also, that ye loved and
honoured just, honest, sincere, and valiant Cromwell, that loved his Country, and the
liberties of the people above his life…but that Cromwell ceasing to be such, he ceaseth to be
the object of your love.”92
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In short, speaking for the People, Wildman demanded for the Agitators to give their
commanders an ultimatum which, if ignored, should lead to full mutiny.
In Leveller tracts like Wildman’s Cal to all the Souldiers of the Armie, it was also clear
that the Levellers and their program were being forced to answer criticisms by their opponents
of being anarchists. Wildman admonished the Agitators to “be not frightened by the word
ANARCHY,” or to be concerned with the labels of “Sectaries, sedicious persons, troublers both
of Church and State, and so not worthy to live in a Common-wealth.”93 Future Leveller tracts
took even greater efforts to counter the accusation of “anarchist” than they did that of
“Leveller,” although the two often appeared together.
As a leader privy to forthcoming Leveller publications, Wildman previewed the
“substantiall and firme AGREEMENT, for just freedom and common right,” which he had a hand
in drafting, and was published about a week later.94 The purpose of the forthcoming
Agreement of the People, Wildman claimed, was so “that this nation may no longer flote upon
such wavering uncertain and sandy foundations of Government, which have been one of the
greatest causes both of all your, & and our predicessors miseries.”95 This statement was as
powerful and succinct of a statement explaining the purpose of the Agreements as was ever
issued by a Leveller leader. There was no room for doubt that Wildman viewed the Agreements
as a new constitution for the government, and that a free society required a written
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constitution for liberty to exist. The Army, and people of London, only needed to wait a week
to see the particulars of the new constitution proposed by Wildman and the Agitators.
Published anonymously but signed by many of the leaders in the Army who had Leveller
sympathies, the first Agreements of the People has received a lot of attention from historians
for its clearly liberal agenda. What receives a lot less attention, but that the preceding chapters
should at this point make plain, was that there was nothing novel to the first Agreements which
had not already been developed over the course of the preceding half-decade. In important
ways, it represented an attempt by Levellers to draft the official document which they had been
claiming was necessary. It included all of the characteristic Leveller demands like the people’s
right to participate in elections, regular Parliamentary elections, and a termination date for the
present Parliament.96
It incorporated a list of reserved, or negative liberties and asserted that “the power of
this, and all future Representatives of this Nation, is inferior only to theirs who chuse them,”
and was “expresly…reserved by the represented to themselves.”97 These enumerated rights
began with
matters of Religion…[which] are not at all intrusted by us to any humane
power…constraining any of us to serve in the warres, is against our freedome;…no person be
at any time questioned for anything said or done, in reference to the late publike
differences,…in all Laws made, or to be made, every person may be bound alike,…[and no
Law should be] evidently destructive to the safety and well-being of the people.”98
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The Agreements was also clear that it was not a petition, because “No Act of Parliament is or
can be unalterable, and so cannot be sufficient security, to save you or us harmlesse, from what
another Parliament may determine.”99 This statement clearly linked the Agreements to the
Leveller doctrine of jurisprudence, since it was the only program which held that Parliamentary
statute did not automatically become constitutional law. As the name suggested, the
Agreements could only be made between the People and their Government directly, and never
through such an intermediary as Parliament.
Although Lilburne, Walwyn, and Overton were not directly involved in the writing of the
first Agreements, they were kept well-abreast of events, and most of the concepts expressed in
it aligned strongly to the political program they had already outlined. In the months prior to its
writing, Cromwell had personally visited Lilburne in the Tower of London and had requested his
cooperation in gaining the support of the Agitators within the New Model Army.100
Contemporary newspapers noted that Lilburne had almost constant visitors and insinuated that
he was conducting or at least advising the Agitators.101 In the ending days of 1647, both
Cromwell and Lilburne desired to find a way to remain politically and ideologically united. It is
important to recognize that while historians can easily see that this was not possible, there was
some enthusiasm amongst the Leveller leaders for the prospects of an adoption of the
Agreements based on Cromwell’s seeming desire to compromise with them.
Once published, they vigorously defended the articles it outlined. Lilburne was acutely
aware of the accusations that the Levellers were anarchists and stated plainly that “the
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destruction of the Lawes dissolves the arteries & ligaments that hold the Body together: he
that takes away the Lawes, takes not away the allegiance of one Subject alone, but of the whole
Kingdome.”102 To ensure he was not taken as an anarchist, the Leveller leader argued that
society itself had not been dissolved, nor were even the laws of the nation. Lilburne’s shift was
important to understanding the way in which the Levellers claimed that all government could
be reconstituted without returning society to the state of nature. According to the Leveller
concept, the rule of law held society together, even in absence of a government. This was how
Lilburne could hold that each element of English government was tyrannical and yet still justify
resistance without being anarchical, because even in the intervening space between dissolution
of Parliament and the election of a new Government the society (viz. laws) persisted.
According to the Levellers, martial law was not a validly constituted government,
especially for “[c]ommoners that are not under the obedience of the Army.”103 Lilburne argued
that the Army constituted a separate society, formed by “mutuall agreement amongst all
Souldiers.”104 This was a brilliant argument on several levels, and Lilburne’s statements
demonstrated that he recognized it. Firstly, since the Army was formed by consent, it was
subject to the same conditions as English society, and therefore mutiny based on the principle
of popular sovereignty was not mutiny at all.105 Additionally, the citizens of England were
explicitly excluded from the contract, because they had not consented to enter that society,
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and therefore were not subject to its rules.106 Finally, since the Army was formed by mutual
consent between those who subsequently became soldiers, it had never been “an Army by the
Parliaments wills.”107 Lilburne’s argument categorically and logically divorced the citizen soldier
from the Government, instead connecting him to the People.
Wildman and Walwyn were also aware of the need to abandon hope that the Army, as
an institution, could be trusted. The King, Parliament, and now the Army, had all proved to be
“flesh and not spirit, they are but men, and not God…It is with us as if we fled from a Lyon, and
a beare met us, and fled from a beare, and leaning our hands on the wall a Serpant bites us.”108
The conclusions they made were plain, as Madison later stated in Federalist 51, “you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself.”109 The Levellers were no anarchists, and therefore believed the first part of this
statement to be true, but also recognized that the only way to oblige the government to control
itself was to retain institutional sovereignty in the People, rather than any institution of men.
As a new year began in London under military law, Parliament continued to operate
under nominal Presbyterian influence. Charles I remained uncommitted, and if either
Parliament or the Independent-controlled Army brokered a deal with the King, it would tip the
scales decisively in their favor. For his part, Charles recognized this fact, but also overestimated
his own position in negotiations, and refused to commit to either side, always seeking a better
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settlement of his own position. As such, 1648 persisted in a stalemate, with the King,
Presbyterian Lords, and Independent Army each seeking a settlement which asserted their own
institutional sovereignty within the mixed constitution. By this point the Levellers, having fully
committed to the People’s sovereignty, refused each categorically.
The Presbyterian William Prynne continued to appeal to all sides at the start of 1648, in
his pamphlet entitled A New Magna Charta. The New Magna Charta for England was to be “in
pursuance of the solemne League and Covenant,” and it was no coincidence that Prynne
attempted to style his constitutional proposal in terms of Parliamentary statutes and
precedent.110 He made overtures to Charles, that the “Kings Majesties person be maintained,
and his Authority preserved.”111 His most significant concession to the Independents was that
“our Gift and Grant of these Liberties, the Nobles and Commons are become our men from this
day forward, of life and limb, and of earthly worship, and unto us shall be slaves and vassalls for
ever.”112 There was no way that Charles was willing to accept Parliament’s definition of his
“Authority preserved,” and certainly no way that the Independents would be willing to be
“slaves and vassals” in all issues of earthly worship, so Prynne’s failed proposal to each side
serves to illustrate how deadlocked each side was with respect to the Presbyterian proposal.
Henry Marten, perhaps the most sympathetic MP to the Leveller ideology, merely
concluded sarcastically that, “I do hold that as Pharaoh was then most kinde to the Israelistes
when he slighted all their poore addresses, so the Lord was then their complete deliverer when
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he shut out all communication with their oppressors, by drawing off a Sea betwixt them.”113
Marten, in a position as a potential bridge between the Presbyterians, Army, and Levellers,
clearly believed that any compromise that might be achieved needed to be done without
Charles I.114 He was never given the opportunity to explore these potential compromises,
because the communication between the King and other factions were not terminated.
For their part, the Levellers continued to propose solutions to the deadlocked situation
as well. Building on his previous logic from Englands Freedome, Souldiers Rights, Lilburne
began using “native country” as a phrase which emphasized the state of society outside of
government, ruled by natural law and those positive laws in conformity with reason.115 He also
began using the term “Magistracy” for government, to emphasize the law’s superior
relationship to all institutional authority. It was plain to him that “all Magistracy in England, is
bounded by the known and declared Law of England and while they Act according to Law, I am
bound to obey them.”116 However, Lilburne’s caveat to this statement was that in the case of
tyrants, “[I} am tied in conscience and duty to my selfe and my native Country therein to resist
and withstand them.”117 In adopting this terminology, Lilburne clearly defined the aim of the
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revolution which had been fought, as well as the sides. Tyranny was opposed to the “native
Country,” and the natural law and rights of the People were the arbiter of that conflict. The
final issue left to be resolved at this point was what the arbitration process was to look like.
Simply giving in was not an option. Lilburne exhorted the People to “play the
Englishmen, not foolishly or Willingly to betray your liberty into their hands, but in this case,
part with them as you would part with your purse to a Theefe that robs you upon the high
way.”118 Lilburne’s metaphor was an apt one, since the implication was clear in the respect that
one should not simply hand away his purse to the thief, yet it was an open question as to what
level of force was warranted in the process of resistance. A man might run away, seek the
protection of other strong and just citizens, or stand his ground to defend his property. The
way in which he intended his metaphor to be interpreted was a question to which Lilburne did
not immediately propose a solution.
One of the more pressing issues to Lilburne was to reorient any or all of the other
factions to the principles of natural law, rather than the particular differences of their ideas for
the institutional arrangements within the mixed constitution. If they would merely examine
themselves, they would “scarce believe that such different Principles and pretentions are held
out to view,” and yet that these could “…serve the same ends.”119 This was the explicit purpose
of a review pamphlet he wrote and published early in 1648. To him, it was self-evident to any
who “maturely weigh[ed] and compare[d] the past and present state of affaires in this
Kingdome…the present distempers and future threatned danger thereby, doe all grow out of
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the same root, and flow from the same fountaine; and will lead…[to] the settling of Tyranny,
and inslaving the People.”120 In his view, the problem was that the constitutional arrangement
needed to be of secondary significance to the People’s freedom, but the current deadlock was
only focused on the secondary issue of institutional dominance.
Despite the clear falling out of the Levellers and the Presbyterians, there were not
irreconcilable differences within Lilburne’s framework if Parliament was willing to accept
restraint from the People. Since consent was the foundation of all magistrates, the House of
Commons “alone represents the People of this Nation,” and therefore was to be the preeminent institution within the government.121 However, it only represented, and therefore
must “be always accountable for the discharge of this trust, to the People in their Representers
in Parliament.”122 His solution to the political deadlock was for Parliament to reconnect itself to
the People, and to “let not your eares bee any longer deafe to our importunate cries…Oh
dissolve not all Government into the prime Lawes of nature and compel us to take the natural
remedy to preserve ourselves.”123 The only possible way to preserve themselves without
dissolving the government, in Lilburne’s view, was for Parliament to accept a negative
constitutional framework. Given Lilburne’s developing framework for the relationship of
natural law to society, the emphasis of the magisterial role of government was a way to point
to its responsibility to see to the execution of natural law within society, as opposed to the
mandate to create positive law for the society.
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The potential of the Leveller position in 1648 was strong, because they were, in some
ways, institutional agnostics. They allowed for many different models of government which
could resolve the problems that had caused the revolution in the first place. They were also
poised to rhetorically position themselves not only as a conservative faction, but also as a
peaceful one. As Lilburne put it, if “all people would joyne together as one man, to cry
uncessantly to the Parliament for establishing those foundations of justice and freedome, that
their peace might be secure to them.”124 This statement appeared in a tract which asserted the
Peoples Prerogative, which, given the contemporary use of that term to denote the ultimate
veto within society, clearly demonstrated that Lilburne was now thinking explicitly along the
lines of absolute popular sovereignty. Nothing prevented the entire Kingdom from peacefully
resolving the political deadlock, as long as “the powers of King, Parliament, and [P]eople may
be destinctly and particularly declared and setled.”125 What continued to be so radical about
Lilburne’s proposals was that he made it explicit within his framework that the People were one
of the fundamental institutions of English government. Even more radical was the assertion
that they were the ultimate sovereign within that society.
Quoting his “Comrade Mr. John Wildman,” Lilburne approved of Wildman’s position
that, “the freedome of this Nation will never be secured, until the extent of the power and trust
of the peoples representatives, and the peoples reservations be clearly declared in reference to
the Legislative power.”126 No matter what institutional arrangement persisted in English
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government, “no state can wisely be confident of any publique Ministers continuing good,
longer then the rods is held over there heads.”127 Therefore, although they may have
possessed a framework that gave a place to King, Lords, and Commons, their insistence on
maintaining a rod to control each in turn, foundationally rejected the sovereignty for which
each faction was vying, and ultimately made the Leveller program incompatible with all other
factions. In rhetorical terms, they were uniters; but in ideological terms, they were alone.
The initial Leveller enthusiasm for the prospects of the citizen Army dissipated into fear
and dread, as it began to operate extra-legally. As such, it became a greater threat to the
People’s liberty and safety than any government institution had been. According to Lilburne,
this was because the Army was acting on behalf of the corrupt interests of the Army leaders,
rather than the People. The use of martial law was an “arbitrary Government of the Army,”
which was only necessary in times of war.128
The Army’s initial defiance to the King was used as the template for the direction the
revolution ought to continue to move. In Lilburne’s analysis of the past events, this had meant
that when individuals like Charles I, or Hollis and Stapleton had tried to usurp the government
to their own corrupt ends and purposes, the Army (and actually citizen-soldiers) had “refuse[d]
to serve the Arbitrary power of the State and agreeing together as English men, to stand upon

127

Lilburne, The Peoples Prerogative and Priviledges, [128].
Ibid, [169].
The fear of a standing army was, of course, not a Leveller invention since it was and continued to be a
uniquely English tradition for centuries. The accusation against George III of stationing troops in America during
peacetime was a common complaint of the Americans in the eighteenth century. This tradition was because
England was an island nation which did not need a standing army for self-defense against other nations as was the
case in Continental Europe. Given these geographic considerations, armies came to be viewed as tools of
oppression by tyrants. What was unique about the Levellers was their argument for the Army to be viewed as the
People’s militia, rather than the Government’s tool. The Presbyterians and Independents both viewed it as under
the direction of Parliament and the Monarchists as subject to the King’s Prerogative.
128

240
Principles of Right and Freedome.”129 Regrettably, the new war council ruling London by
martial law “differed from the rules of Warre in the manner of its constitution, this was not to
be constituted by the Gens. Wil or according to the degrees or officer of men in the Army, but
in a Parliamentary way by the Soldiers free election.”130 Thus, the Army and the society were to
reflect one another, with the People ultimately retaining the sovereignty over both through
free election based on the principle of consent. Lilburne concluded that there could be no
legitimate political act by the Army in governing through martial law, since it had not been
established by “mutuall consent throughout the Army.”131
Lilburne also unsuccessfully engaged in an attempt to redirect the term “Leveller” to
Cromwell and Ireton. In a subsequent tract, he alleged that “the levellers, viz. Cromwell and his
grandee faction hath in good earnest already de facto levelled all our lawes and liberties…and
hath destroyed our lawes and liberties and properties, and set up an absolute tyrannical
arbitrary Government by sword.”132 This illustrated Lilburne’s hopes for the flexibility of the
trope “leveller” within the English political lexicon at the time. The fact that he listed
“properties” as one of the things being set under the tyrannical Cromwellian order was atypical
for Leveller shorthand which normally referenced “lawes and liberties” as he had done in the
preceding paragraph. He was aware of the damage done by the Independent accusation that
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Lilburne’s desire to destroy aristocratic legal privilege would also lead to destruction of
property. By including property in the subsequent statement, Lilburne was trying to redirect
“leveller” to the concept of “usurper.”133
The radical but nuanced nature of the Levellers’ position was, at times, not fully
understood by their opponents, who demonstrated a lack of understanding for the framework
of the People’s sovereignty. When Prynne attacked “these Lilburnists and Levellers” in his
LEVELLERS Levelled to the very GROUND, he characterized their views as having asserted that
“the House of Commons, the ONELY SOVERAIGNE POWER OF THIS KINGDOM, as they stile[d]
it,” in their argument for doing away with the House of Lords.134 He either deliberately
misrepresented or could not understand a framework where the Commons would be the
dominant institution of government, but this was a totally separate issue from the ultimate
sovereign of society. Not only to Prynne, but also to the Independents and Monarchists,
claiming that the People were sovereign was akin to anarchy.
Unlike Prynne or the Independents, Robert Filmer, whose arguments for monarchial
government became the impetus for Locke’s Treatises on Government, argued that the
Levellers were guilty of the same error as “the Papists [who] make use of for the power of the
Pope above Kings; the very same by blotting out the word Pope, and putting in the word
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People.”135 Perhaps more clearly than any other opponent of the Levellers, Filmer understood
and even agreed fundamentally with their concept of sovereignty and how it functioned in
society, although not where it resided within that society. He fully recognized that “we
mistake, the question is not, whethher there shall be an Arbitrary power; but the only point is,
who shall have that Arbitrary power, whether one man or many.”136 Filmer noted that a
democracy would merely put the “power of making Lawes in a multitude,” but could not
change the fact that sovereignty conceptually existed within the society.137
Filmer’s book was intended to be a refutation of the only “Author” he claimed he could
find which justified a limited monarchy, written anonymously.138 There are several clues which
point to the notion that Filmer had selected this tract particularly as a means to attack the
contemporary Leveller ideology. He quoted the author as claiming that “by originall
constitution the society publick confers on one man a power by limited contract, resigning
themselves to be governed by such a law,” which was certainly a position only held by the
Levellers at the time.139 Furthermore, Filmer’s “Author” claimed that “the sole means of
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Sovereignty is the consent and fundamentall contract, which consent puts them in their
power.”140 According to Filmer, the Author “sp[oke] big of the radicall, fundamentall, and
originall power of the people as the root of all Soveraignty.”141 Ultimately, Filmer quibbled with
the Leveller position of the social contract because he claimed that only the Monarch could
define what the “fundamentall Law” is. Filmer did not reject the Leveller concept of
sovereignty, he rejected its connection to natural rights and the People. Both began with the
fundamental understanding that sovereignty could never be institutionally shared within a
“mixed constitution” and thus explicitly sought to locate sovereignty. However, since the
Levellers argued that this sovereignty resided with the People, rather than a governmental
institution, Filmer attacked them as anarchists because their ideas would “end in confusion &
destruction of all Government,” due to the subjective nature of natural law.142
Another anonymous dissenter from the Levellers’ concept attacked the mildness of their
description of the present “disagreement, or falling out,” between the People and the
government.143 According to the author, they were not merely the presenting of the
Agreements as a new way to settle the government; the Leveller Revolution could only be
accomplished with “Swords and Guns [which will not] convince mens reasons, and inform their
judgements of the equitie and justice of things.”144 Whether or not the author’s
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Treatises of Government,, 164-165) yet Filmer’s writing as a reaction to the Levellers is a compelling argument,
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characterization of the Levellers’ idea of civil disobedience was correct or not, statements like
these demonstrated that for different reasons, the Levellers’ contemporaries viewed them as
revolutionaries. It was precisely because of attacks like those made by Prynne, Filmer, and
others, that the Levellers continued to develop their arguments about the social contract,
sovereignty, and the type of revolution justified by the exigent realties of 1648.
As was often the case of the Levellers, Walwyn was the first to publicly address these
issues. In the late Summer of 1648, the Putney Debates had proven to be ineffective, and the
Army Grandees were exerting increased political pressure as the King, Presbyterian-controlled
House of Lords, and the Independents remained in political gridlock. Walwyn wrote The Bloody
Project as an attempt to refocus the goal toward the common cause.145 The previous struggles
against King, Presbyterians, and the Army had been similar to one who was struggling to escape
quicksand. Walwyn noted that the “quarrell we have at this day in the Kingdome, is no other
than a quarrel of interests, and Partyes, a pulling down of one Tyrant, to set up another, and
instead of Liberty, heaping upon vur selves a greater slavery then that we fought against.”146
Disunity and infighting would only perpetuate the misery already experienced; and a reserved
list of liberties was the only remedy available.
Walwyn agreed with Filmer’s basic premises of sovereignty against mixed monarchy. If
each branch of the government was equal in sovereignty, then the King had never assented to
war in the first place, and therefore it was unjust for Parliament to declare war. He found it
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ludicrous that “there should be either three or two distinct Estates equally supream.”147
Sovereignty, of its own nature, could only be absolute and not shared, but within his
framework, it followed that this power could only be held by the People.
By Walwyn’s understanding, the stakes were also high, because without the moral
justification of sovereignty, what was being engaged upon by the soldiers was nothing less than
murder. After all, what else could an unjust killing be called? If sovereignty was shared, it was
not possible to truly know which side was right and just war theory needed to be abandoned as
a rationale for armed conflict. Walwyn argued that, at the very least, this alone was grounds
for a reserved freedom to be exempted from all conscription, because “a free people…are to
use the understanding God hath given you.”148 This concept was rooted in Walwyn’s
application of religious principle to civil realities; only the legitimate sovereign had the authority
to exercise capital justice via force. One way this could be expressed was by the People’s militia
against an armed tyrant, which was how he interpreted the war between the Parliamentary
Army and the Monarchists between 1642 and 1646. The other expression of popular
sovereignty in capital cases was through the execution of justice in accordance with positive
law in agreement with natural law. Given that by mid-1648 there was only one army remaining
in England, the first case could not apply; and the fact that extralegal military tribunals were
executing citizens negated the second. In this case, Walwyn argued, the killing was murder,
which imperiled the souls of those who were complicit in the usurpations of the People’s
sovereignty.
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Logically, given the reality that sovereignty could not be shared, and that killing to usurp
just authority was murder, at least half of all Englishmen fighting in the armies (and in Walwyn’s
view, probably more than that by a large margin) were murderers.149 Walwyn pleaded with his
countrymen: “why then persist you to divide and fall into Factions?”150 Highlighting Lilburne’s
earlier concept of a shared goal for peace and freedom which Walwyn believed the Leveller
proposals could provide, he encouraged civil disobedience. He recognized that “the King,
Parliament, greatmen in the City and Army can do nothing without you.”151 Bloodshed was
unnecessary; defensive non-compliance would suffice as long as the People rejected
factionalism and united under a common program of “the just freedom and happiness of a
Nation, being above all Constitutions, whether of Kings, Parliaments, or any other.”152
According to Walwyn, as long as England returned to the rule of law, and the People insisted on
the recognition of their natural rights, there would be peace.
An anonymous author further defended the Levellers’ position against Filmer’s
characterization of them as anarchists in Salus Populi Solus Rex. The author recognized the
right and even duty to resist government encroachment upon their natural rights, as had been
argued by the Levellers for years. The writer then raised Filmer’s question about how those
rights might be determined in the case of a disagreement as to their nature. The answer was:
“common, plain, general, and universal reason, and Moral principles.”153 Since these self-
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evident principles may also sometimes come into dispute, Parliament was the appropriate
adjudicator, but the People were not bound by arbitration in that process, and still had the right
to dispute with Parliament in cases where disagreement persisted.154
This was not anarchy, because the very doctrine of government “will not permit
Governors to destroy the people.”155 As the English rendering of the Latin title of the tract
suggested, the people’s safety is their sole sovereignty. The author saw government as a
necessity, because “without all Government…one man will be a devil to another…” but it was
“better to have a good one, then a bad one.”156 Revolution, such as the one currently being
engaged in by the People on behalf of their rights and liberties, was therefore not a struggle to
return England to the state of nature, but rather to reconstitute for themselves a government
which better secured their freedom. This did not amount to a reconstitution of society itself,
merely the People’s prerogative to reform their government in order to better protect
themselves, which was tantamount to the sole purpose of government within the original social
contract. In this way, the Levellers and their allies had arrived at a contractual understanding of
society which made actions undertaken by the People as being fundamentally reformational in
nature. In a very important sense to the understanding of subsequent political thought, it was
literally impossible for the People to be revolutionary based on Leveller ideology.
The author also responded to Filmer’s accusation that this might lead to some sort of
arbitrary rule of the mob in a democratic system. The author first posed the question: “what
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mean you by the people…is not the major part of the people, the people?”157 He then rejected
this claim on the grounds that although it would be sound policy if the major party could be
trusted to be rational in all cases, it could never be taken for granted that the “major party was
the rational, knowing, and considerate party.”158
Given the use of Latin, which was uncharacteristic of most of the Leveller leaders, it is
tempting to see this pamphlet as an early republican document. The theme of the people’s
safety common to the English republican ideology cannot be missed. However, there were also
characteristic rejections of the absolute authority of the Parliament, which would not have
satisfied contemporary republican concepts of jurisprudence. It is likely that the author of Salus
Populi, Solus Rex represented one who was trying to reconcile the Independent and Leveller
strains of thought into a cohesive framework. That it could be done so effectively
demonstrated the cause for optimism that many of the Levellers had for their ideas to be
incorporated under a general framework of inalienable rights and the People’s sovereignty.159
At the end of 1648, the Independent Colonel, Thomas Pride and his regiment arrested
Presbyterian MPs, and barred access to the chamber to others. It was a naked usurpation of
power on the part of the Army, which effectively dispensed with the political standoff that had
gripped the nation for over a year. Pride’s Purge of the Parliament initiated the Rump
Parliament and cemented the Army’s control of the English government. Charles I no longer
held bargaining power, and when he refused to acquiesce to Cromwell’s demands, he was

157

Anonymous, Salus Populi, Solus Rex, [325].
Ibid, [326].
159
It also helps to explain why the Levellers and Independents met at Putney toward the end of 1647 and
again at Whitehall in December of 1648. It was not until after the execution of Charles I that the irreconcilable
differences between the Leveller and Independent ideas of sovereignty were fully appreciated by either side.
158

249
executed for treason in January of the following year. The House of Lords was dismissed by the
end of the month, leaving only the House of Commons controlled by the Army, which despite
having teetered between the control of the People and Cromwell, remained enough under
Cromwell’s influence to affect the recent coup without serious repercussions. The impact of
this sequence of events cannot be overstated, since in short order, it simultaneously eliminated
many of the Levellers’ previous enemies, broke the political deadlock, and based on the
Levellers’ notion of such things, instituted a new arbitrary power in the House of Commons.
In important ways, it forced the Levellers to confront Cromwell’s policies head on,
rather than merely attempting to predict what his policies might be based on rhetoric and
theory. Prior to Pride’s Purge, the Independents had been meaningfully limited in their
aspirations by institutional checks and balances in the government and army. After the
abolition of the Lords, there were no political barriers to the wholesale implementation of
Independent jurisprudence. This reality quickly disenchanted the Levellers with their one-time
allies, in particular when the debates at Whitehall in December of 1648 failed to institute a
negative constitution and immediate re-election of Parliament.160
At this point, the Levellers began to make the case that the Independents were a violent
revolutionary faction seeking to prolong the bloody struggle for the rights which had already
been theoretically secured several years earlier when Charles I had been captured. It also left
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the People as the only possible defender of their own liberties against Cromwellian tyranny. In
this closing sequence of the English Revolution of the 1640s, this meant that Cromwell’s
Independents could now turn “the edge of their malice…against such as have yet so much
courage left them as to appear for the well establishment of Englands Liberties.”161 The last
remaining factions with influence were the Levellers and the Independents, and only one would
get to determine the objective to which the previous decade’s bloodshed would be applied.
The Levellers were acutely aware of the potential dangers of fighting fire with fire. In a
ghost-written piece signed by five military officers, the Leveller leadership argued that bringing
the leaders of the New Model Army to justice by legal means was the only peaceful outcome
consistent with their social values.162 The Leveller leaders alleged that “Cromwell and
Ireton…thought they had got the souldiery fast by the brain,” and that “by their Machiavelian
pretenses, and wicked practices, they are become masters and usurpers of the name of the
Army, and of the name of the Parliament; under which Visors they have levell’d and destroyed
all the Authority of this Nation.”163 Not mincing words, the tract compared the struggle
between the Levellers and Cromwell to be analogous to a struggle “betwixt Christ and Belial,
light and darkness.”164 Mutiny was the only option.165
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The shift in rhetoric allowed two important logical positions for the Levellers. The first
was to emphasize civil disobedience and mutiny, which they saw as a seizing of the reigns of
command by popular uprising within the ranks, but not without more violence than necessary
as a way for the Army to speak as the People’s voice. Given previous Leveller arguments about
the nature of the relationship between the citizen-soldier and the People, this was a latent
argument in Leveller logic. The second argument they made was to claim that they were an
anti-revolutionary force, and that the Independent forces were those who were attempting to
violently transform society. The Levellers were able to cast themselves as the heroic defenders
of the peace of the kingdom, seeking to consolidate what had already been won. The
Independents were the lawless revolutionaries who sought to usurp control by extraconstitutional measures and subject the People to tyranny yet again. They were the snake on
the wall, which threatened the People’s liberties after they had recently escaped the royal
“Lyon” and the Presbyterian “Bear.”
Walwyn immediately attacked the Independent Revolution initiated by Pride’s Purge.
He charged them with justifying their actions “without having any warrant for such
commitment but their Swords,” and in so doing, had exposed the naked ambitions hidden by
their empty claims “profess[ing] themselves [Parliament’s] Servants and Protectors.”166 The
normally gracious Walwyn was evidently shaken by these events, and resorted to heated
accusations against Cromwell as nothing more than a “Great Conqueror” who had brought an
“Anarchy and Tyranny under the power of a perfidious Army, worse than any slavery under the
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great Turk,” and claiming that the “Jesuits have laid this plot.”167 Now it was undeniable to
Walwyn that the Army was the worst of all of the factions to have laid hands on the
instruments of power, because the military dictatorship instituted by Cromwell left no effective
institutional restraint and allowed for no balance of power within government.
About a week after Pride’s Purge, the Levellers published their Second Agreements of
the People, technically unattributed in print.168 Given Cromwell’s systematic rejection of all
Leveller attempts to redefine the purpose of the New Model Army, the Second Agreements of
the People was intended to be an update to the original constitutional proposal from the
Agitators to limit future abuses of power by the government. It began with a pledge to “hold
ourselves bound, in mutual duty to each other, to take best care we can for the future to avoid
both the danger of returning into a slavish condition and the chargeable remedy of another
War.”169 This statement encapsulated a key Leveller concept that the only way for the People
to act institutionally was by mutual consent to one another in a united manner, opposing the
Machiavellian designs at exploiting internal strife that they had been warning their countrymen
about for almost a decade.
Electing a new Parliament was a necessity, so the Second Agreements provided that new
elections would occur by the end of April.170 The Second Agreements also updated the list of
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negative freedoms as written in the first Agreements. It retained the prohibitions against laws
restricting the freedom of religion, conscripting any forces, or establishing titles and special
privileges for those holding titles.171 They also added to the list of freedoms, plainly stating that
government could not “levell mens estates, destroy property, or make all things common.”172
The army high command was explicitly placed at the direction of all future Parliaments,
beginning with the one to be elected upon the previously established timeline. To refuse the
direction of Parliament was a treasonable offense guilty of death.173 The verbiage of this clause
clearly excluded the men serving in the army themselves, since they represented the People,
and according to Leveller doctrine needed to be free to exercise their consciences as freeborn
Englishmen. The People could not threaten their own safety, but the Grandees did.
The Levellers also added an additional demand that Parliament not “intermeddle with
the execution of Lawes, nor give judgement upon mans person or estate, where no Law hath
been before provided.”174 Even before the abolition of the House of Lords and execution of the
King, the Levellers’ concept of sovereignty allowed them to recognize that under the framework
of sovereignty held to by Monarchists, Independents, and Presbyterians, it would have been
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absolute in the hands of the government, which was, at the moment, controlled by Cromwell.
They began to develop systematic and institutional principles connected to the separation of
powers as a natural extension of their understanding of how sovereignty worked. They had
also seen firsthand that institutional deadlock had forestalled one branch of government from
usurping the others effectively until Pride’s Purge conquered the entire government apparatus.
A separation of powers had showed promise, and the Levellers wished to employ it to full
effect, in conjunction with other innovations for a new judiciary.
To this end, it was recommended that the next Parliament “erect a Court of Justice in
every Hundred in the Nation, for the ending of all Differences arising in that Hundred, by twelve
men of the same Hundred.”175 The Leveller leaders combined an elementary form of
federalism with the concept of an empaneled jury, each of which would embody the People’s
sovereignty officially within the various levels of the institutional framework of the varying
levels of the English government. Having local elections establish the juries provided a way to
avoid ceding jurisdiction over cases to king, Commons, Lords, or a military tribunal in future
cases of law. It also kept the “ending of all Differences” within the locality where the difference
had occurred to begin with, further increasing the accountability of the commissioners to their
proper Sovereign.
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In articulating the constitutional principles of the Second Agreements of the People, the
Levellers proposed a negative constitutional framework which enumerated inalienable rights as
beyond all government jurisdiction.176 They proposed electoral reform which expanded the
franchise to all non-dependent “Natives or Denizens of England.”177 For the first time, they had
added proposals for institutional reforms which separated certain powers within the
government, and more importantly, they sought specific ways that they could instill the People
directly within the framework of government apart from Parliament. Juries became the key
component of this newest, and final Leveller innovation.
Lilburne continued to develop both the ideas of a firm establishment of the social
contract and specific implementations of the People’s sovereignty in Englands New Chains
Discovered. Lilburne was optimistic about the Second Agreements’ chances of adoption, since
“those that trust, and those who are trusted hath appeared a thin acceptable to this honorable
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House.”178 However, the Independents’ reticence in supporting this program required several
alterations to his previous positions. For example, Lilburne was no longer willing that
Parliament should ever be in recess.179 He was all too aware that a Parliamentary-appointed
Council of State would be nothing less than a Cromwellian tyranny, particularly with the Rump
Parliament already being representative of such a small portion of the current population. This
was the first tract in which a Leveller argued for the branch of government most accountable to
the People to be continued as a permanent fixture of government.180
However, Lilburne also agitated for additional modifications to the second Agreements,’
a campaign which eventually concluded with his participation in the proposal of the Third
Agreement. He claimed that the People were not happy with Parliamentary oversight over the
judiciary, “since the alteration of the usual way of Tryals by twelve sworn men of the
Neighborhood” was no longer the procedural norm.181 That a jury trial was a right of every
Englishman was “a constitution so equal and just in it self, as that they conceive it ought to
remain unalterable.”182 Lilburne wished to ensure that the right to jury trials was not just a
positive liberty, but in fact a negative freedom which was considered inalienable. That he saw
it as a “constitution” also hinted at the characteristic Leveller concept of the People as an
institution within the government. By this point, Lilburne interpreted the jury trial as the “great
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and strong hold of our preservation,” and argued that it was the best way to prevent
usurpations of the People’s rights.183
He further took issue with the fact that it was allowed that Parliament “have the highest
final judgement,” in the Second Agreements’.184 The context of this statement made it clear
that Lilburne had no qualms with the idea of Parliament being the predominant branch within
the government, but the People still held a higher judgement. Based on the way he
constructed his argument at this point, it was clear that he believed it was bad form to have
“the Lawmakers…be Law-executors.”185 Lilburne, with Overton and Prince, later expanded this
idea to claim that allowing Parliament to have “law executing power..[the People] had then
chosen and impowred a Parliament to have destroyed them.”186
Tellingly absent from the Leveller line of thinking throughout this period were any cries
for a reestablishment of a king or the House of Lords as institutional restraint upon Parliament.
It was worth noting that especially at a time where they were developing an acute awareness of
the need for a separation of powers within the English government, the primary vehicle for
such limitations of Parliament was the inalienable right to a jury trial and a judiciary established
on principles of law. To the Levellers, the jury would literally embody, rather than simply
represent, the People as the final arbiter, not just of the crime which had been committed, but
of the validity of the law itself which had made the act a crime in the first place.187
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Even if Parliament had been the legitimate sovereign at one point, a point the Levellers
did not concede, since the “Faction of a trayterous party of Officers of the Army, hath twice
rebelled against the Parliament, and broke them to pieces, and by force of Armes culled out
whom they pleased…they are a mocke power and a mocke Parliament.”188 By early April, in the
Levellers’ minds, there was not even a tattered remnant of a legitimate government left, so the
only option remaining was for the,
“Free People of England, as well Soldiers as others, ought not to contemne all these mens
commands, as invalid and illegal in themselves, and as one man to rise up against them…and
apprehend and bring them to justice in a new Representative chosen by vertue of a just
Agreement of the People.”189

Walwyn added a soldier’s code to guide this mutiny, such that the mutineers should
“preserve the love of the people toward you.”190 After choosing new leaders in a democratic
fashion within the military ranks, the soldiers should be courteous in the streets to all they
meet and “beware of entertaining il thoughts of any man, or of any condition of men without
good proof.”191 However, to ensure absolute commitment to the principles for which the
People had fought, no citizen-soldier should ever cede his conscience to the direction of his
commanding officers, since “nothing will make your Officers so perfect tyrants, as this kind of
blind obedience in you.”192 Walwyn was delivering an ultimatum to all soldiers; choose to
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disobey your orders, model anew the New Model Army on the premise of the People’s
sovereignty, or be complicit in the demise of their freedom.
From their “causeless captivity in the Tower of London,” Lilburne, Overton, and Walwyn
finally and officially enumerated the final and most radical of the Agreements of the People,
perfected by the “AFFLICTIONS [that] make men wise;” representing the “ultimate end and full
scope of all our desires and intentions concerning the Government of this Nation.”193 They did
not view it as a revolutionary document, but rather as “right use of that opportunity God hath
given us to make this Nation Free and Happy…to set bounds and limits both to our Supreme,
and all Subordinate Authority.”194 As the self-proclaimed final and perfected proposal for a
negative constitutional framework of English government, the Third Agreement bears careful
scrutiny, both for its internal logic, and for the notable revisions from the previous versions of
the Agreements.
Parliament was established as the pre-eminent branch of government, with the
requirement that only free men not dependent upon others could vote or serve in
Parliament.195 A majority of the Parliament always had to be present, with a clearly defined
number of two hundred and four for a vote to be considered legal.196 No member of the army
or treasury could serve in Parliament, and any lawyer must cease practicing law for the term of
his office.197 No member of Parliament could serve for consecutive terms, each Parliament was
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to last for only a year, had to be seated at least four months before recessing, and could remain
in recess for no more than two months before reconvening.198
The immense lengths to which the Levellers went to ensure the accountability of the
legislative branch to the People was breath-taking, given the status quo position of
Parliamentary sovereignty held by the Independents and Presbyterians. The extreme term
limitation of no one serving for more than one term consecutively was an electoral innovation
which would have placed extreme limitations on the People’s commissioners and reflected the
deep reservations which the Levellers held against any republican notion of the inherent virtue
of the representatives of the People. Their careful considerations for potential conflicts of
interest also sought to neutralize all ulterior motives, so that reflecting the actual views of their
constituency could be the only goal of the MP.199
These restraints being established, the Leveller leaders also outlined an exhaustive list
of negative freedoms. The normal prohibition on the “compel[ing] by penalties or otherwise
any person to any thing in or about matters of faith, Religion, or Gods worship,” was
incorporated as the prime, inalienable right.200 It is unclear from this language whether the
Levellers were arguing for universal freedom of religion, or merely freedom to practice the
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Christian faith, since the redundant statements could be construed in either direction.201 What
was clear was the continued broadening of the concept of “freedom of religion” for the citizen,
which now included the “profession of his faith, or exercise of Religion according to his
Conscience.”202 The only legal disqualification for office based on religion was if one asserted
that the Pope or another foreigner was the true sovereign of England, rather than identifying as
a Catholic.203 The final Agreements was more than a mandate for Christian toleration within
clearly defined limitations, as had been proposed previously by the Levellers, or within the
limited program of toleration advocated by the Independents.
Since petitions were a bother, and in the Levellers’ experience also ineffective, they
furthermore proposed to seriously expand the list of negative freedoms, beginning with the
right that none could be compelled to testify against themselves in a criminal case.204 Legal
proceedings were to be ended within six months, conducted in English, and all were to be able
to represent themselves, or choose another to represent them.205 The accused must have the
opportunity to present witnesses to defend themselves, and all trials were to be conducted by
jury, over which only the People directly, and never the Representative Body, could determine
the means for establishing the jury.206 Capital cases were restricted to murder and treason
against the Agreement, property could only be confiscated if one was convicted of treason, and
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all punishments must be commiserate with the crime committed.207 The Second Agreements
had incorporated many of the same ideas, but as issues to be addressed at the next Parliament
rather than negative freedoms; Lilburne and his compatriots were no longer willing to place any
trust at all in the good will of Parliament, even one presumably elected by the People.
To prevent military dictatorship, the Levellers also proposed that all military officers be
appointed and dismissed at will, directly by the MP from their district.208 Finally, since
experience had taught them that Parliamentarians “make little or nothing, to innovate the
Government…to introduce an Arbitrary, and Tyrannical power, and to overturn all things into
Anarchy and Confusion, where there are no penalties imposed for such destructive crimes and
offenses,” the Levellers proposed that it be treason for any Parliamentarian to attempt to
circumvent the Agreement, and that all co-conspirators that do not “enter or immediately
publish his dissent” also be charged with High Treason.209 This provision, placed at the end of
the Third Agreement was so revolutionary in its contemporary context that its significance
cannot be overstated. For the Levellers to place so high a value on the unalterable nature of
their constitutional proposition that it would be treasonous to attempt to undermine it or
automatically implicate any who did not immediately oppose those who did, was a radical
break from the concept of Parliamentary Privilege. It did, however, underscore just how
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committed the Levellers were to instituting full sovereignty of the People over their
government in all cases.
In a moment of unparalleled intellectual humility and consistency, all three Leveller
leaders and Thomas Prince acknowledged the self-defeating temptation which revolution
afforded them. After posing the hypothetical scenario that if they were to acquire control of
the government, they would in turn become tyrannical, the Levellers admitted that they
“mistrust[ed] our own hearts.” 210 They had seen how unsuccessful previous attempts based
on principle had been to establish a just government, and the temptation to force the nation to
do what it ought was great. However, it was precisely because they could not trust even
themselves with power that they “have proposed such an Establishment, as supposing men to
be too flexible and yeelding to worldly Temptations.”211 Not only that, but the sort of
government which they sought to establish could not rely “upon strength, or forcible
obstruction; but solely upon that inbred and perswasive power that is in all good and just
things…so to procure their own Establishment.”212 A revolution to establish the People’s
Establishment could never be attained by any but the People themselves, and only through the
force of reason, rather than “forcible obstruction.” The new constitution had to be initiated by
consent, and to be immutable by any who was in the government, so as to properly constrain it.
The Levellers recognized that there were several pillars upon which society and the
constitutional arrangement of the institutional government needed to be restructured. They
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supported the Independent position that the House of Commons needed to be the pre-eminent
branch of government. However, they coupled this with a unique theory of consent which
included an expanded franchise, a prescribed recall election process, annual elections, and a
permanently seated Parliament. These reforms were necessary to ensure that the People
controlled the Parliament, and not the other way around.
These reforms notwithstanding, the Levellers furthermore demanded additional
safeguards of the People’s freedoms, in the form of a written and explicit negative constitution.
All three of their Agreements of the People, as well as The Large Petition (Sep. 11, 1648) were
proposed by the Levellers as such. These were essential parts of the Leveller Revolution, and
they never compromised or left this position. The failure of the English system, at any point, to
adopt a negative constitutional framework, demonstrates a serious interpretive problem for
any narrative which claims that the Leveller program of jurisprudence was successful. They
certainly never would have agreed with that proposition, given the centrality of the concept of
a written constitution to their idea of consensual government.
The Levellers were seeking to define a revolution they believed to have already been
won. The changes to the English constitutional arrangement proposed in each of their
Agreements of the People were too radical to be considered reformational, although they
seemed to have failed to recognize how revolutionary their claims were, and preferred a
reformational self-identification. Part of this was attributable to the fact that virtually every
major faction in England at the time, including the Levellers, attempted to position themselves
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as a fundamentally conservative movement.213 Concepts like the “Fundamental Laws and
Statutes” and “Ancient Constitution” in England were rhetorically empty vessels, devoid of
objective legal definitions. Only the Levellers recognized and sought to use the conflict which
had already been fought to provide objective definitions to this otherwise nebulous
arrangement. When viewed from the sense of constitutionalism, this would have made them
the most revolutionary of all factions that emerged during the English Civil Wars.
However, the Levellers also insisted that their revolution be carefully confined to the
legal realm. Throughout the late 1640s, they systematically argued that the only means to
accomplish their revolution was through the civil courts. It was not that they were unrealistic
about the need for bloodshed to reconstitute society; they merely recognized that the fighting
to establish the English Revolution had already potentially taken place, and the only issue left
was whether it was to be understood as an Independent Revolution or the People’s
Revolution.214
The place in which this argument took place between 1648 and 1649 was largely within
the New Model Army and the increasingly Independent-controlled presses. The Levellers
systematically sought to redefine the army as a militia of the People, rather than as the army of
England, which they took to functionally serve as the strong arm of whatever faction happened
to be in control of the government at any moment. Many pragmatists argued that seizing
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control of the army was an exigent reality of the times; the Levellers recognized that the legal
process was vital to the issue of true sovereignty and that military dictatorship could never be
used to install a free government. The historian’s assessment of the Leveller Revolution of the
seventeenth century as a bid toward a complete ideological reformation of government must
acknowledge that it was ultimately unsuccessful.
There was one area in which the Leveller Revolution was successful, and that was in the
empowering of the People through due process and jury trials. That Lilburne and his fellow
Levellers were tried for high treason and acquitted by a jury in 1649 was a major victory for the
Levellers for two reasons. First, it represented a return to the rule of law within the civil court
system for which they had been striving the previous three years. Countless numbers of
Leveller supporters in the army had been summarily executed by military tribunal and even
King Charles I was executed by a kangaroo court, but John Lilburne and the Leveller leaders had
the opportunity to present their treason case before twelve men from the neighborhood.
More importantly, those twelve men interposed themselves between citizen and State on
behalf of the People, and they were recognized as the ultimate negative voice by the English
political society.
The period between Overton’s arrest in 1646 and the acquittal of Lilburne, Overton, and
Walwyn in 1649 was critical to the historical evaluation and definition of the Levellers. In the
scope of seventeenth-century history, as even the name by which we know them today
demonstrates, the Levellers were a group defined by their contemporary opponents. They
were rejected on the grounds of being anarchists and social revolutionaries. Closer analysis of
their ideology by the historian reveals that they were neither.
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The application of “Leveller” principles to the developing crisis within the Army in 1647
suggested that there existed a Leveller Movement autonomous from the Army Agitator
movement. That they garnered such attention from opponents from across the factional
landscape suggests that they were a legitimate political threat. The development of the
Leveller ideology ultimately expressed in the Third Agreement was not a hackneyed populist
proposal, but a serious and systematic constitutional proposal to defend the freedoms, liberties
and sovereignty of the People in perpetuity. They were constitutional revolutionaries when
compared to Charles in the early parts of the 1640s but were reformists when compared to the
Independents after Pride’s Purge.
What was truly revolutionary was their creation of a theoretically cohesive plan for the
imposition of the People’s sovereignty within government through combination of a selfdefensive citizenry including the power of juries to rule on facts and legitimacy of law, the
power of the written constitution, and their commitment to the enshrinement of natural rights
within a negative constitutional framework based on continual consent of the governed. This
sort of revolution, to establish a nation’s framework upon the real, rather than merely the
theoretical consent of the governed, required no conquest and no warfare other than what was
initiated by outside tyrants. The Leveller Revolution was a legal and constitutional revolution
rather than a political, social, or military one; holding within it the seeds of a truly Bloodless
Revolution.
The Leveller concept of “popular sovereignty” was at strong variance with a majoritarian
program, and this was what made it truly unique. It was democratic, without in any way
seeking to create a democracy; Levellerism was the original classic liberal political tradition.
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The best way of stating the Leveller position was that the majority were sovereign over those
things which they had a right to be, assuming reserved freedoms based on the tenets of natural
law. This power was expressed by those enfranchised individuals in the frequent and
perpetually conditional election of representatives who served at the will of the represented.
This being a given, the Levellers further had resolved the paradox of enfranchisement,
property, and consent. The only theoretically just way of allocating suffrage necessarily
connected to the influence that the laws made by those elected had upon the People. To grant
the vote to all, gave those with no property the power to dispose of the property of those who
did via government taxation. To withhold suffrage bound individuals to laws over which they
had not given their consent.215
The Levellers resolved this paradox with the innovation of a negative constitution.
Individual freedoms could be protected if substantial reservations were made via a written,
negative constitutional framework. This framework held the rights of the individual as
sovereign to, and ultimately totally beyond, Parliamentary edict. There was no longer a need
for all citizens to have the right to vote, since the laws could not dispossess them of their
natural rights. At the same time, they insisted that perpetual consent was the basis of all
government, and therefore a vigorous democratic system must be employed. It was the
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Leveller framework which, for the first time in modern history, gave meaningful democratic
power to the people of a nation without subjecting the individual to the power of mob rule.
Perhaps most important to the historical interpretation of the “Levellers so-called,” was
their failed revolution to relocate sovereignty within society from the Government to the
People. As Foxley noted, the “’free state’ which was established in 1649 struggled to find
legitimization precisely because it was not constructed based on the principles of popular
consent,” which had been proposed by the Levellers.216 It was this distinctive which set them
apart from all other factions involved in the English Revolution, and in fact continues to
distinguish them as an outlier within the political traditions of English history. John Lilburne
and the Levellers failed to alter the prerogative power of the Government with respect to the
English citizen; but the final verdict on the success of the Leveller Revolution depends on how
wide an angle the historian is willing to cast the lens of time and space.
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Part II: The Leveller in U.S.
And from this fountain or root all just human powers take their original - not immediately from
God (as kings usually plead their prerogative) but mediately by the hand of nature… every man
by nature being a king, priest and prophet in his own natural circuit and compass, whereof no
second may partake but by deputation, commission, and free consent from him whose natural
right and freedom it is.
-Richard Overton An Arrow Against All Tyrants and Tyranny (1646)
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Chapter 5
“The Consent of the Governed”
The Leveller ideology of the constitutional implications of their ideas of consensual
government were expressed by the Patriots in the American War for Independence. One
potential avenue for evaluating this claim was illustrated in the events that followed March 5,
1770. For the past seven years, the British Parliament had attempted to exert greater control
over the colonies, which had, for their part, resisted what they considered to be a usurpation of
the authority of their properly elected legislatures. Boston had been a major center of colonial
resistance, and a group of political activists, known locally as the Sons of Liberty, had been
engaged in unruly and subversive activities which prompted the British to respond with a
greater military presence in Boston. The Sons of Liberty increased their agitation in response to
the heightened British military presence in Boston, which they held as a violation of the British
principle of having no standing military during peacetime.
The preceding days had created a general antagonism between the soldiers and the
colonists, as colonists abused the soldiers, who, on occasion, had returned the favor in kind.1 In
the late afternoon of March 5, an altercation between a British private and a colonist quickly
escalated into a full-blown standoff that threatened the safety of the British military garrison
house.2 The cauldron of the past few days boiled over and the colonists threw ice at the
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soldiers who responded with a lethal volley into the crowd, killing five and wounding six.3
Colonists almost immediately took to calling the event “The Boston Massacre.”
A Boston newspaper, the Boston-Gazette and Country Journal, reported that the
violence had been the inevitable consequence of British interference in legitimate American
government. It bemoaned the stationing of soldiers during peacetime, but then went on to
claim that the British claims of restoring order were a mere pretext to “awe & control the
legislative as well as executive Power of the Province.”4 It sarcastically reported that later that
night, a mob addressed itself to the Lieutenant Governor with “a Freedom and Warmth
becoming the occasion.”5 Given the attitude in Boston toward the British, one can imagine
what kind of “freedom and warmth” was appropriate in the mind of the newspaper writer.
After his repeated assurances that he would see justice done, the mob retired for the evening.6
As had been the case for Rainsborough’s funeral, the arrangements in Boston on March
8 were a carefully staged political event. The procession itself, which made certain to pass
through the King Street junction, or according to the newspaper writer, the “Theatre of that
inhuman Tragedy,” was attended by “an immense Concourse of People, so numerous as to
be obliged to follow in Ranks of six and brought up by a long Train of Carriages belonging to the
principal Gentry of the Town.”7 Conditions in the town were so hostile toward the soldiers that
Gregory Townsend, a personal admirer of the soldiers’ officer Captain Preston, wrote to his
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brother that he was concerned that “[p]oor Preston will stand a very bad chance if his trial
comes on speedily before the Passions of people are a little Subsided.”8
A struggle then ensued for the prosecution of a fair trial. To the Sons of Liberty, this
meant a quick trial so that an almost certain pronouncement of guilt would be made; the
governor, Thomas Hutchinson, and others sympathetic to Preston and the soldiers’ situation,
argued for patience.9 Some of the most extreme agitators in Boston planned to break into the
jail, take custody of Preston, and pronounce their verdict extralegally by lynching.10
Had the crowd followed through on this course of action, or had the trial been rushed or
doctored by the colonists, it would have been similar to many of the kangaroo courts that the
Levellers repeatedly argued against, including the one which had condemned Charles I. Or, the
British could have ordered that the trial take place by military tribunal, as Cromwell had, to gain
control of the justice process. Yet this was not what happened. Preston, and later, the soldiers
under his command, were brought up on charges in a Massachusetts court. They were
dismissed by a jury which was admittedly packed with royalists, yet the colonists generally
accepted the legitimacy of the verdict.11 The same held true for the trial of the soldiers who
were under Preston’s command. In his trial notes, Adams recounted charging the jury, that
they were “under oath to determine this cause by law and evidence.”12 When they returned
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their verdict, the people were satisfied in the particulars of this case, that justice had been
done.
Lilburne and the Levellers could have only hoped, and repeatedly asked for, exactly
what Captain Preston and his men were afforded in Boston in 1770--a trial by peers as near to
himself as possible (which had to include Royalists, since the soldiers presumably supported the
British government), in which those twelve men from the neighborhood determined guilt based
on the law and facts of the case. The sovereignty of the Massachusetts jury to make these
determinations was not questioned by either the British or the Americans. Despite reasonable
anxiety among the colonists and the British that the soldiers would not receive a fair trial, all
agreed to abide by the sovereignty of the jury in a case involving a British military officer.
When faced with far less diverse conditions during 1648 and 1649, also involving agitators and
unrestful circumstances in the city of London, Cromwell and the Independents had repeatedly
resorted to military tribunal. In the trials following the Boston Massacre, as well as the debates
leading to them, the Patriot view of sovereignty was affirmed, and with it, the Leveller
interpretation and implementation of sovereignty as expressed within the justice system.13
Of necessity, the following two chapters will address the Leveller Revolution and its
effect in America in a far less focused, and much longer temporal expanse than has been
applied to the development of the Leveller ideology in the previous chapters. However, it is
important to assess the long-term impact of the Leveller concepts of constitutional law and
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jurisprudence, and to do so requires an evaluation of the American system’s development. The
influence of Leveller ideological commitments as well as the pragmatic experience of Leveller
constitutional law in the American colonies began at their inception and formally continued to
the end of the nineteenth century. As they were in England, the American Levellers were never
a majority, but they had tremendous influence on the constitutional and legal revolutions of
the country.14 This chapter will explore the American concept of the sovereignty of the People,
as it was both experienced and expressed through American constitutionalism, beginning in the
colonial era. The final chapter will briefly discuss the end of the Leveller Revolution in America,
which occurred at the end of the nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court disagreed with
Adams’ instructions to the Boston jury in December 1770, that juries had the authority to rule
not only on matters of fact, but also on matters of law.
It is first important to situate the three general frameworks for understanding the
ideology which gave rise to the American nation.15 There are three main schools of
interpretation regarding the American Founding; one which claims that the Founders were
primarily influenced by republican ideology, one which claims a more liberal and democratic
philosophy, and finally a synthesized argument which attempts to demonstrate that both
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systems were blended in the Founding. There have not been previous attempts within major
studies of Anglo-American ideology to connect the ideology of American political groups to the
Leveller frameworks of jurisprudence, constitutionalism, and popular sovereignty.16
One of the most influential arguments to be proposed regarding the republicanism of
the Founding has come from J.G.A. Pocock’s republican synthesis. In his Machiavellian Moment
(1975), Pocock has argued that the republican tradition which was present in the Founding was
based on classical republicanism, translated by Machiavelli and the Florentines, read and
adapted by James Harrington and the republicans of the Interregnum and the Whigs of the
Glorious Revolution, and finally incorporated by the American Patriots into a new system of
government in America. Pocock argued that a Neo-Harringtonian republican system of thought
“anchored in that Aristotelian and Machiavellian tradition” was ultimately responsible for the
“constitution-making which followed…[although it] necessitated a further revision of the
classical tradition, and in some respects a departure from it.”17
Pocock was building upon the arguments made by historians like Bernard Bailyn, who
had noted that what made the American Anti-federalists distinct from a traditional republican
tradition was the modification of their arguments around what Patrick Henry called his concept
of “self-love.”18 According to Bailyn, Henry and others who had opposed the ratification of the
Constitution had done so because of their concern over “the uncertainties of implied rights”
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which had been the genesis of much of the political malaise which had afflicted the British over
the past century.19 Implicit and explicit in the arguments of the Republican Synthesis, is the
idea that the British republican tradition encountered a new set of circumstances in the New
World, which caused the American colonists to respond in novel ways, creating an American
form of republicanism.
These arguments are balanced by other historians who have made more democratic
cases for the ideology of the American Founding. James Miller noted several decades ago that
this view was common among American lay people, who “share the firm conviction that they
are living in the first - and not only the greatest - modern democracy. So deep is this conviction
that even many otherwise skeptical historians share it.”20 Historians like Pauline Maier have
held that democratic representation of the people within the government was the primary
motive for the actions of the federalist party.21 As was noted in the Introduction’s review of
historiography, some historians like James Hankins have gone so far as to argue that the entire
Republican Synthesis is wrong, and that far greater attention needs to be given to the
influences of the liberal tradition, which developed primarily from John Locke.22
Jack Rakove and others have suggested that both republican and democratic ideals were
present in the American Founding. In his critique of Gordon S. Wood’s version of the
19
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Republican Synthesis, Rakove noted that Bailyn and others have suggested that there was a
profound difference between the republicanism of the colonists in 1776 and their more
pragmatic mistrust of the virtues of man in 1787.23 He essentially argued that the ideology of
the colonists was changed by the exigent realities of the intervening time between the
Declaration and the Framing, and that by that point, the Federalists and Anti-federalists were
both advocating for a more mature and less ideologically driven republicanism.24 Forrest
McDonald noted that although the Founders, almost to a man, agreed upon the need for the
creation of a government “to protect people in their lifes, liberty, and property…obtained
through a republican form,” that the republican and democratic ideals they expressed were
ultimately incompatible.25 He concluded that the process of reconciling these two ideals
ultimately came to give new meaning to both “republican” and “federalist” as they had been
thought of prior to the creation of the United States of America.26 This redefinition had only
occurred because the fusion of the democratic and republican principles had, of necessity,
transformed both.27
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Toward the end of the 1640s, the Levellers argued that their natural law framework was
the common denominator between the disparate groups vying for hegemony within the English
political system.28 It will be the assertion of this chapter’s argument that the Leveller
framework was the common cause they believed it to be, and the democratic and republican
elements were blended successfully by the colonists because they adopted a Leveller
framework. This provided a baseline of freedom for all people within a government structure
legitimized by the active consent of those whose stake in government was greater due to
property interests.29 Most importantly, this framework created a reality in which the People
had retained sovereignty, and the government itself was nothing more than their agent.
James D. R. Philips claimed that the execution of King Charles I in 1649 was the end of
the first of three British revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.30 According
to his framework, the second revolution was concluded in 1689 in what has been called “The
Glorious Revolution” and the third concluded in 1787 with the creation of the United States
Constitution. This explanation was partially correct, but one must ask what was settled in 1649
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which was not undone in 1660 with the Restoration of Charles’ eldest son, Charles II? It might
be argued that the role of the House of Commons had been successfully established as a
limitation on the King’s prerogative, but if this was true, it was certainly a reality which escaped
Charles II’s brother, James II. It seems more accurate then, to reduce the number of potential
British revolutions to two.
Christopher Hill proposed a framework for the first English Revolution as the period
between 1603 and 1714, because the ascension of George I to the throne in 1714 cemented
Parliament’s sovereignty within the British government.31 That George took the throne in
accordance with the Parliamentary settlement with William and Mary left no doubt that the
People’s representatives were empowered as the preeminent authority within the government.
The historian must not simply pick arbitrary time periods, or even those of great social
unrest or violence to determine what to call a “revolution.” There must be some sort of criteria
by which these determinations can be made, and in the case of the Anglo-American world of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it is helpful to identify that there were three primary
views of constitutional relationship between People and State. The status quo position, at least
in terms of the broader European context of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was that
the monarch held an ultimate negative voice. This is often referred to as “divine right,” but in
the British context specifically, it was referred to as the “King’s Prerogative” in Parliament, or as
the “negative voice.”
This status quo position was challenged in the 1640s by various factions which opposed
the existing constitutional arrangement. However, these groups were divided by pragmatic as
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well as philosophical differences related to jurisprudence and institutional sovereignty. The
pragmatic differences were rooted in the issue of religion, with the Presbyterian faction arguing
that a state-instituted denominational church ought to exist. The Independents were more
open to an array of denominational diversity among Protestant groups. What was not at issue
between these factions was their unquestioned assumption that Parliament, as a governmental
institution, was the ultimate locus of sovereignty within English society.
This Parliamentarian position came to be opposed by the third view, espoused by the
Levellers, who concluded that sovereignty within English society rested with the People, rather
than with any governmental institution. They developed a set of reserved freedoms, which
they believed needed to be enumerated and held as beyond all governmental influence.
Therefore, while Presbyterians and Independents held that the People’s liberties existed in
Parliament, the Levellers explicitly argued that these rights properly existed out of Parliament.
Ideologically, this required a different view of jurisprudence than what had existed
within the Anglo-American world at the time. According to Pocock, “English thought of the
seventeenth century, was conducted largely in terms of rival visions…of the institutional
past.”32 However, as will be shown below, the Independent, Presbyterian, and Royalist views
shared a commitment to the concept of the ancient constitution, even if they differed on
precisely how Parliament was to operate. It is important to note that the ultimate system of
jurisprudence and the concept of the ancient constitution adopted by the Americans was
substantively different from that of the British in the Glorious Revolution.
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The rival visions within seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British society are often
described by historians in terms like “classic republican-monarchist,” “Whig-Tory,” or “CourtCountry.”33 These are helpful and real distinctions, but they were reformist-minded
movements which all agreed to argue over the specific implementation of the ancient
constitution. Whigs generally adopted an Independent commitment to the sovereignty of the
House of Commons, with the King and Lords having a more ceremonial role than an actual veto
on legislation. The Tories emphasized a more comprehensive view of the King, Lords Temporal,
and Commons in Parliament as the proper constitutional arrangement.34 It might be said then
that the Whig-Tory rival visions of governance took place within the traditional Left-Right
framework of Western politics. None of them argued seriously for the systematic codification
of the constitution within a negative constitutional framework like the Levellers had done. The
permanent re-orientation of that arrangement toward unquestioned Parliamentary sovereignty
was enough of a political shift to be considered revolutionary. In very important ways, the
Leveller orientation was neither Left nor Right, but rather on a totally different axis which
sought to relocate sovereignty away from government regardless of its constitution toward the
individual. In a Left-Right political debate, the Levellers were down.
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However, the Leveller view of the ancient constitution did not disappear from the British
consciousness, and it was on the grounds that the People’s rights existed outside of all
government that the American colonists revolted. Therefore, it makes sense to add to the list
of rival interpretations above that of “Leveller-Independent.” Within this framework, the
Leveller view was that of authority held out of Parliament and ultimate sovereignty within
society resting with the People. The Independent view was that of the legitimacy of
government deriving from the people, but having been transferred to the legislative branch,
which has become sovereign based on its relationship to the People.35
While the Levellers progressively distanced themselves from the various uses of the
ancient constitution in favor of natural law, it was ultimately Thomas Paine, who was able to
“reject both the constitution and its history, though in a manner so reminiscent of Lilburne and
Walwyn that one wonders whether he did not belong to the tradition even in his rejection of
it.”36 The Americans were Levellers, although for reasons which will be outlined in greater
detail below, they were unaware of their Levellerism as such. However, in the historical inquiry
of ideas, the historian is not obliged to accept that actors in history are only influenced by prior
groups or ideas if they are consciously aware of them. Chapter 5 will demonstrate the
subconscious influence of Levellerism on American constitutionalism, particularly in the
American views of social contract and religious liberty as an inalienable right. Even this view is,
to some degree, incomplete since the Americans knew and venerated Lilburne the dissenter,
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just not Lilburne the Leveller.37 Chapter 6 will argue that the Americans were conscious of
their Lilburnism, and since Lilburne was a Leveller, they ought to be considered Levellers as
well.
As was discussed particularly in Chapter 4, the English concept of the ancient
constitution was rhetorically and historically flexible. Writing toward the conclusion of the
Interregnum, William Prynne argued that “the authority of the House of Lords was established
by common law, and by…all the Commons of England from age to age assembled in
Parliament…who alwaies consented to, desired, and never opposed the Lords sitting…in
Parliament.”38 For his part, Charles II’s Declaration of Breda which came immediately before
the Restoration asserted that he wished to see restored not only the Monarchy and Peers, but
also to the people their “their just, ancient and fundamental rights...in a free Parliament.”39
The declaration continued to grant liberty of conscience, but procedurally only once it was
presented for his royal “consent to such an Act of Parliament, as, upon mature deliberation,
shall be offered to us, for the full granting that indulgence.”40 Thus it was that the Independent
Revolution of Parliamentary sovereignty was temporarily thwarted upon the Restoration of the
Crown in 1660, because the King was indulging the people via Parliamentary statute. However,
it was still anti-Leveller in the sense that Parliamentary statute, however it came to be codified,
was still held as superior to natural law and the People’s sovereignty of conscience.
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The Neo-Harringtonians subscribed to the Polybian belief that democracy, aristocracy,
and monarchy would all fail if they were pursued in pure forms.41 Alexis de Tocqueville’s
observation of the potential legislative “despotism of the majority” of democracies was a
representative example of this style of Neo-Harringtonian suspicion of all pure governmental
forms.42 Thus it was that Tocqueville could actually applaud the inefficiencies of the American
government as critical political innovations, rather than particular idiosyncratic problems. It
was viewed as necessary to mix these, and within the British constitutional debate of the
eighteenth century, both the Whigs and Tories attempted to create the right constitution
between these different forms of government, expressed in Parliament as the Crown, Lords,
and Commons.43 Machiavelli had described the results that would occur if these systems
became imbalanced as “corruption.” The British Whigs supported the idea that Parliament’s
main purpose was to preserve the independence of property against this corruption.44
According to Pocock, the Neo-Harringtonian Whigs believed that “human liberty and all human
excellence,” depended upon one’s financial independence, which protected him from being
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unduly influenced.45 Corruption, which was an important aspect of the Machiavellian concept
of government, was to be addressed in government by ensuring that Parliamentary members
remained committed to their pursuit of the common good.46 The Levellers fundamentally
believed it could not be addressed by Parliament at all, and therefore negative constitutional
freedoms were the only practical restraint on corruption.
The Independent spokeman, Henry Ireton, also used the ancient constitution as a
reinforcement of the rights of certain people to titles within the mixed Constitution during the
Putney Debates.47 Since the mixed constitution required representatives for the aristocracy, it
was a convenient way for Ireton to rationalize a continued role for the landed aristocracy, even
as the political tide was shifting away from supporting the continued existence of the House of
Lords. Philosophically then, he rationalized his limitation on the franchise by emphasizing that
aristocracy had been, and continued to be, an important part of the ancient constitution. The
country Whigs, like Shaftsbury, Neville, and Bolingbroke, adopted this interpretation as well,
and reached all the way back to the ancient constitution before the Norman Conquest, when
they commonly accepted as historical fact that the Commons had existed.48 This line of
argument was directly refuted by the Levellers, and later by Harrington and ultimately by the
Americans, as a sign of aristocratic tyranny which was rooted in the feudal society.49 Pocock
claimed that the desire of many Neo-Harringtonians to reinforce and entrench the political
hegemony of the aristocracy extended to Trenchard and Gordon’s “objections to the Church of
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England’s charity schools” on both the grounds of “educational activity” as well as an
opposition to “social mobility.”50
During the Glorious Revolution, Sir Robert Atkyns, a judge and lord chief baron of the
Exchequer court, clearly connected the “ancient Right and Inheritance” of all Englishmen to the
“House, or the Commons by their Representative” which he held had always been a part of the
British system of governance.51 This view had been challenged by that of James II, who
believed that the rights of Englishmen existed “by virtue of our royal prerogative to issue forth
this our declaration of indulgence, making no doubt of the concurrence of our two Houses of
Parliament when we shall think it convenient for them to meet.”52 James II’s failed attempt at
re-establishing the royal negative voice represented the last challenge within British
constitutional history for the concept of divine right. From that point forward, it was
understood that the concept of the “King in Parliament” was a constitutional formality, and that
the actual execution of law was under the purview of the Parliament rather than the King. This
is clearly demonstrated by the evolution of the Prime Ministerial role throughout the
eighteenth century in English government, under which Parliament assumed an ever-increasing
responsibility for the executive functions of its own legislative undertakings.
By James II’s vacation of the throne, and the subsequent development of British
jurisprudential history, it can be definitively asserted that Atkyns’ view of the relationship
between the ancient constitution and Parliament was settled in 1689, hence ending the first
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English revolution. That interpretation clearly held that the institutional body of Parliament
was sovereign within English society, and specifically that the Commons had pre-eminence
within the Parliament. It is not trivial to note that this view saw the use of the term
“Parliament” as being literally synonymous to “government.” The Act Declaring the Rights and
Liberties of the Subject, commonly known as the “English Bill of Rights” did virtually nothing to
assert the rights of the People out of Parliament. It claimed that James II had “endeavor[ed] to
subvert…the laws and liberties of this kingdom” primarily by usurping the authority that
Parliament rightly held, and reestablished the rights for Parliament, not the People.53
There was no direct issue with his raising an army, suspending laws, levying money and
taxes, or prosecuting people for crimes, since all of these rightly fell within the sphere of
appropriate governmental influence. The problem was that James did those things “without
the consent of Parliament.”54 According to Parliament, James II was not a tyrant for violating
the People’s natural rights, he was a tyrant because he had usurped the authority of the House
of Commons. The Independent framework of jurisprudence and ancient constitution was
ultimately asserted when it claimed that he had used “the pretended power of suspending the
laws or the execution of laws by regal authority without consent of Parliament (emphasis
added.)”55 Implicit within this argument was that any suspension of any law, if it had the
consent of Parliament, would automatically be held to be constitutionally valid. Furthermore,
only because the English Bill of Rights had been passed “in due form by authority of
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Parliament,” could the rights of the People “be declared and enacted that all and singular the
rights and liberties…are true, ancient, and indubitable rights of the people of this kingdom.”56
Hence, the English Bill of Rights (1689) was a document to affirm governmental sovereignty
over and above the People, and Parliamentary sovereignty over the Crown, rather than a
Leveller enshrinement of liberty within an enumerated list of reserved freedoms.
John Locke was a unique outlier among seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political
writers in not attempting to use the ancient constitution to justify his philosophical
arguments.57 The rationalist instead attempted his arguments from a purely philosophical
perspective, positing certain assumptions about the nature of man, and then deriving his
conclusions from the logical conclusions to which those arguments led. Most other jurists and
philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries within the broader British world of
jurisprudence found it helpful, or even necessary, to base their arguments on some sort of
historical precedent or evaluation.
Throughout the eighteenth century, the British continued to espouse the view of the
ancient constitution which allowed for it to be modified or changed by Parliament.58
Bolingbroke talked alternately about “this Constitution inviolate,” while in the very next clause
allowing that it might be drawn “back to the Principles, on which it was originally founded.”59 A
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British judge from the turn of the nineteenth century, John Reeves, found that “the Petition of
Right…secured old Rights than gave new ones…” and, “the Bill of Rights was rather a new
security to old Rights.”60 In this way, the British view of jurisprudence became a combination
of positive Parliamentary statute combined with a progressive common law view which allowed
for Parliament and the British courts to jointly redefine the “ancient constitution” in whatever
ways suited the current political needs. The principles of the ancient constitution may become
dislocated, misplaced, or lost for a time, but the government always had the potential to
restore these principles by amending the current positive law to match its pre-conceived notion
of what the ancient constitution was. Quite literally then, no current Parliamentary statute
which was adopted in a procedurally valid manner could be unconstitutional.
There was no need for an official written constitution according to this progressive
interpretation of the ancient constitution, and in fact, such a constitution might even become a
procedural encumbrance, which at its very fundamental level the Levellers had indeed intended
for it to be. British jurisprudence held that all British citizens had rights time out of mind, and
that these rights were protected within the mixed system of government which was
represented by the King in Parliament. From the British point of view, when the Commons and
Lords Temporal in Parliament made new laws in the colonies regarding direct taxation, and King
George III allowed these taxes, this became confirmation that no British rights could have been
violated. The three institutions of mixed form of government had cooperated to establish the
statute, and such laws were automatically constitutional. As Reid summarized, “the law they
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taught was not law locked in a changeless time but immemorial law constantly reaffirmed both
by usage and by redefinition.”61
The progressive jurisprudence of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also
involved the concept of implied consent. British jurists and thinkers justified their view of the
unwritten ancient constitution by arguing that if the people had been unsatisfied with the law
or precedents, they would have elected a Parliament with a different disposition, and
subsequently the constitution would have been amended. According to Reid, “the argument
that common law and custom were laws popularly consented to would later anger Thomas
Jefferson and Jeremy Bentham, but in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was a
contention that reenforced the jurisprudential pretentions of constitutionalism.”62 This idea
had equally vexed the Leveller leaders of the 1640s. Given these differences, it is reasonable to
argue that the Leveller concept of a constitution was substantively different from the prevailing
British view before and after the English Civil War but was identical to the ideology which
caused the divide between the Americans and British in the mid- to late-eighteenth century,
just as it had separated Leveller from Independent the preceding century.
It was considered a settled fact of jurisprudence by both the British and their American
colonists, that the ancient constitution applied in America.63 This was largely possible because
of their divergent views of the ancient constitution, and by the fact that while the British
Parliamentary system applied a progressive view of the constitution, the Americans applied a
natural law interpretation of the same. This had also been the case for the Levellers, who
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adopted a view of the ancient constitution as something existing prior to Magna Carta and
apart from statute or custom per se. The difference was for the Levellers, “ancient
constitution” was philosophically identical to natural rights, whereas for the Independents of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was “Parliamentary statute and custom.”
Parliament held a metaphorical “blank check” from the People, based on the
eighteenth-century British interpretation of jurisprudence. The ancient constitution existed
time out of mind but was constantly confirmed by Parliamentary statutory law which combined
the democratic, aristocratic, and monarchic aspects of British society. The only role which the
People had within this system was their implicit consent in not insisting that Parliament change
the laws or changing the membership in the House of Commons by voting differently. When
the Levellers had been presented with this theory of constitutionalism, it was tacitly rejected in
favor of a contractual framework of reserved and explicitly enumerated freedoms held out of
Parliament. When presented with same choices, the American colonists also rejected the
progressive view of ancient constitution in favor of the Leveller’s interpretation.64 As will be
demonstrated below, much of this was due to the similarities in their assumptions about the
consensual foundation of society, which itself was rooted in the ideas of inalienable rights,
primarily expressed by religious freedom.
Carl Becker described the colonial attempts at rationalizing the revolution as a “timid
groping about in the dark in search of the half-forgotten British Constitution.”65 Becker treated
it as a settled fact that the belief about Magna Carta expressed in the colonies during the

64

Reid, “Jurisprudence of Liberty,” 247.
Carl Becker. The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas. (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 85.
65

293
Revolution was a Parliamentary innovation of the seventeenth century.66 Since the Levellers
held a similar position in this regard, they were the most likely genesis for the interpretation
finally adopted by the Americans, since both groups viewed Magna Carta as a confirmation of
previous held rights, rather than an explicit (and potentially temporary) limitation on an
otherwise unlimited government.
Since the Americans adopted a framework of government which was identical to the
Levellers in several important ways, it is important to ask whether the Americans were Levellers
themselves? Before one can assess this question, an even more immediate one suggests itself:
Did the Americans know about the Levellers?
In London in 1649, the governor of the colony of Plymouth, published a book entitled
“The Danger of Tolerating Levellers In a Civill State” attacking the American colonist, Samuel
Gorton.67 Michelle Burnham affirmed that Gorton did have Leveller connections through his
radical religious beliefs, which placed him Leveller-influenced churches, but also that his claims
of jurisdiction in regard to the land claims for which he had left Massachusetts and travelled to
London resonated with the contemporary Leveller beliefs in 1646.68 While far from definitive,
F.K. Donnelly has argued that Nathan Hale’s celebrated quotation about having one life to give
for his country may have been inspired by Lilburne, who was “often quoted in eighteenth66
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century American political pamphlets,” and had appeared in Biographia, a work with which
Hale and many other Founders were likely to have been familiar.69
Lilburne’s biographer, Michael Braddick, has noted that Lilburne has been cited in
several American Supreme Court cases, mostly covering the 5th and 6th Amendments, although
all of those occurred in the twentieth century.70 He also allowed that he had a “reputation
among radical Whigs as Freeborn John,” and that “Patriot Whigs” used his surname as a pen
name in their writing.71 He also claimed that Lilburne’s biography in the popular, mideighteenth century, Biographia Britannica was detailed and accurate, and would have been
known by eighteenth-century scholars on both sides of the Atlantic.72
Michael Spicer evaluated the role that the Levellers have played in American
jurisprudence and made three conclusions. The first conclusion was that there was a
correlation between the Leveller ideology of decentralized government and the American
tradition.73 While this may be true, it did nothing to connect the Levellers to the Americans
through anything but cursory comparative analysis. The next connection Spicer found was the
role that the Levellers played in developing English constitutionalism to create a decentralized
government.74 Absent compelling evidence that the Americans patterned their constitutions
on Leveller proposals like the Agreements, this claim is also correlational but unhelpful.
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However, his final connection, that “the Levellers may well have contributed to an important
tradition… [of] raising questions concerning the legitimacy of existing governmental and
administrative institutions” is a topic which is relevant to this investigation.75 Even more than
being relevant, it is crucial to understand, and has been demonstrated above and will be
restated below, that the Levellers possessed the only systematic framework of sovereignty
within the seventeenth-century political milieu in which this kind of rejection of institution
without a revolution within society could take place. It was precisely this pathway that led to
the American colonists to their Declaration of Independence from King George III.
Republicanism and democracy were often seen as opposing principles by the Founders.
In Federalist 55, Madison considered how many representatives were appropriate for the
House of Representatives. He equally mistrusted a large number which gave strong and close
democratic representation to citizens, and a small number which ran the risk of insufficiently
diffusing power. Too many representatives would make America close to a direct democracy,
the result of which, as in the case of Athens, even if every “citizen [had] been a Socrates; every
Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”76 However, he also took seriously the claim
by some that a scant sixty-five representatives was “so small a number [which] cannot be safely
trusted with so much power.”77
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Many of the Americans were also concerned about democracy’s tendency to empower
the poor or those who did not pay taxes to redistribute income from the wealthy to themselves
via the coercive power of the government. They often referred to this principle as “levelling,”
which was how Ireton and Cromwell had attacked Lilburne, Walwyn, and the Levellers, and why
Lilburne had so stridently defended them against this accusation. A dictionary, printed in 1789,
identified the word “Leveller” to mean: “one who makes any thing even; one who destroys
superiority, one who endeavors to bring all to the same slate.”78 Cotton Tufts attacked the
democratic priniciples of 1787 in a letter to John Adams as being espoused by:
“the Disappointed Whigs & Convention Men…most of them Mushrooms that have sprung up on
a sudden are tools of the Former but in Principle Levellers— The Debtors join their Force hoping
for an Annihilation of public & private Debts, among these are some whose Characters once
shone with Lustre— But are now meanly courting the Populace and practising the Arts of
Corruption.”79

This terminology was already familiar to Adams, who had observed that a jury that refused to
allocate damages to wealthy citizen simply due to his or her status were unjust. This was
uncommon, but he allowed that there were some “Levellers, but they disgrace Jurys,” and to
refuse judgement on this premise “would be a stain of this excellent and noble Tryal by Jury.”80
He later voraciously attacked John Taylor, asking him if he would “profess himself, a
downright Leveller? Will he vote for a community of Property? Or an equal division of
Property?”81
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However, just as in the 1640s, the term “levelling” had a double meaning. Writing to
James Madison at the time of the call for the Constitutional Convention, George Washington
understood that “levelling principles” were connected to political equality and generally viewed
them as a good thing.82 In his opinion, only where these principles had been eliminated was
there a risk of the calls for a return to monarchy. He hoped that the Convention would see the
wisdom of investing more power in the General Government as a means to preventing that
from occurring. To Washington, Shays’ Rebellion had demonstrated that “any system, without
the means of coercion in the Sovereign, will enforce obedience to the Ordinances of a Genl.
Government; without which, every thing else fails.”83 However, the General Government
needed not only to prevent future rebellions by enforcing law and order in the separate states,
but also needed to restrain the states from encroachments upon the liberties of the citizens.
He believed that the “State of Massachusetts have exceeded the bounds of good policy in its
disfranchisements—punishment is certainly due to the disturbers of a government, but the
operations of this act is too extensive.”84
Hence, it can be demonstrated that the Americans were aware of the concept of
“levelling” in both of its forms, and that, just as in Lilburne’s and Walwyn’s time, the
circumstances strongly controlled the overall connotation of the term. “Levelling” in the
context of property was seen as a form of socialism and was to be strongly and vehemently
rejected. It was this connotation with which Ireton saddled the Levellers, and the one which
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they categorically rejected.85 It was also connected with a democratic form of government,
which the Independents feared would lead to mob rule and anarchy; at least relative to their
conservative social stance. This form of social equality through the legal system was supported
by the Levellers and seen as necessary for liberty by George Washington.
It is possible that Adams, at least, linked his Anti-federalist antagonists with the Levellers
from Cromwell’s era. In a letter from the satirist, John Trumbull, to Adams, Trumbull explained
to Adams that,
he who could advance principles the most agreable to popular pride, and the most
destructive to all energetic government, was the best Whig & the greatest Patriot. Many of
these, who rose into high rank at that time, were not superior as Politicians to
the Levellers & King Jesus—men in the times of Cromwell. As we have improved in the
science of Government, they have lost their popularity. You have names several of them in
your letter, not one of whom has escaped the lash of our political Satirists, & lost his
influence with the intelligent part of the community by adherence to his original principles
of Democracy.86

In its context, Trumbull was responding to several of Adams’ letters complaining about various
members of the Anti-federalist party, and their recent attacks on his policies.87 The context
seemed to link the Levellers from Cromwell’s time to the principle of unrestrained democracy,
which Adams strongly opposed. Although this was a mischaracterization of the Levellers’ actual
position, it at least suggested that some of the Americans were aware of their connection
between contemporary political activities and the historical precedent of the Levellers.
Trumbull equated Adams’ political enemies, the Anti-federalists, with the Levellers. Despite
this fact, it is important within the context to recognize that Trumbull acknowledged that he
was trying to discredit the Anti-federalists, and there is no indication that he realized that
85
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Cromwell had done the same to the Levellers. The irony of his claim ought not to be lost on the
historian. Trumbull had no idea how apt his comparison truly was, even if, and perhaps even
more so because, it was a mischaracterization of the English Levellers.
Another potential avenue of influence between the Levellers and the Americans was
through the ideology of John Locke.88 Richard Ashcraft has suggested that there was a
relationship between Locke and the Levellers which transcended the incidental relationship
suggested by C.B. Macpherson.89 Ashcraft claimed that “the form of the argument and social
composition of the audience to whom such arguments were direct, suggested to
contemporaries that the Shaftesbury-led Whigs were attempting to revive the Levellers’
movement.”90 William Walwyn’s son-in-law was a well-known London radical in the 1670’s
whose court case was a highly publicized case related to the oft-defended Leveller bastion of
liberty, habeas corpus.91 Ashcraft claimed that this was at least partially via Shaftesbury’s
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involvement in the radical Whig-dominated Green Ribbon Club, whose name was an overt
reference to the ribbons worn at the funeral procession of Colonel Thomas Rainsborough.
The primary connection of the Green Ribbon Club to the Levellers seems to have been
within the pejorative vein already noted above. O.W. Furley showed that the opponents to the
Exclusionary Whigs associated with the Club, and characterized them indiscriminately as
Levellers, Fanatics, Republicans, and Commonwealth Men.92 This characterization appears to
have been at least partially accurate, since the Green Ribbon Club’s radical activity included the
involvement of no fewer than twenty-four members in the Rye House Plot against Charles II’s
and his brother’s life in 1683.93 According to Roger Lund, the Club included a “yeasty mixture of
Whigs and Dissenters.”94 Lund has convincingly argued that clubs like the Green Ribbon Club,
and other coffee houses like the Calves-Head, Kit-Cat, and Hellfire Clubs were secret societies
that gathered eclectic groups of citizens for purposes which are ill-understood to modern
historians, due in part, to the primary evidence of their activities being in the writings of their
opponents who had obvious biases.95 There were satires by Whig opponents in the early
1700’s which characterized the defense attorney of the Rye House plotters, John Freke, as a
new Lilburne.96 Given the activities of the Green Ribbon Club, and its explicit connections to
the Rye House Plot, it seems most likely to conclude that its association was more to the
popular groundswell of anti-government activity which took place during and after
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Rainsborough’s funeral, rather than an attempt to connect to the Leveller framework of
governance expressed in ideological terms.
Given the abundance of evidence that “Leveller” was still being used as a negative
association by Whig opponents, it seems likely that Locke and his associates would have been
familiar with the Levellers. However, it also explains why he would have been reticent to cite
them directly or be explicitly connected to them. Ashcraft believed that although there is no
evidence of a direct link for Locke’s having read Leveller literature, he had “identif[ied] himself
with a particular political language selected from among a range of available choices.”97 This
expressed itself in how Locke described both the State of Nature, and the conditions under
which certain citizens were eligible to express suffrage.98 Mark Knights has characterized
Locke’s views on the franchise as being “neo-Harringtonian or neo-Leveller” for the similarities
in his arguments and rationalization for the expansion of the franchise without extending it to
universal manhood suffrage to that of the Levellers.99 As was established in the preceeding
chapters, the Levellers believed that holding natural rights as inalienable made it not only
possible, but necessary to limit the franchise to those who possessed property, because to do
otherwise would violate the property rights of those who paid taxes.100 However, it was
absolutely necessary within this framework that no man had natural sovereignty over the
other, in respect to natural or reserved freedoms; these could only be established through
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consent, and in certain cases, such consent could never be given to the government and must
be reserved to the People.
That Locke was responding to Robert Filmer’s philosophy of government is completely
beyond question, since he specifically addressed Filmer in his First Treatise in the byline of the
essay itself.101 That Filmer had engaged in the pamphlet war with the Leveller “anarchists” has
been addressed in Chapter 4. Although he disagreed with them on philosophical grounds,
Filmer did present a fair summary of their general principles of sovereignty. Therefore, it seems
possible that even if Locke was not explicitly doing so, in defending the “anarchists” that Filmer
was attacking, Locke was systematically setting out to derive and prove the Levellers’
philosophy of sovereignty. In the absence of a direct link between Locke and the Levellers,
Filmer then becomes a potential medium through which Leveller ideology was still transmitted
to Locke, and therefore also to the Founders.102
For these reasons, there are strong reasons to believe that some of the Americans were
self-identified Lilburnists and many of the Patriots and Framers were unwittingly Levellers. The
most obvious reason for this is that one could not be a Lilburnist without also being a Leveller.
However, there are also reasons to believe that even if Locke or Harrington were not Levellers
themselves, that they were responding to the social conditions that the Levellers had a
significant hand in shaping during the 1640s. In different ways, both Harrington and Locke’s
addressing of the Levellers’ opponents would have been implicitly shaped by the Leveller
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philosophy. It also cannot be ignored that the Americans, in redefining Harrington’s and
Locke’s philosophies, adopted a Leveller framework of sovereignty, rather than the
Independent view of Parliamentary sovereignty that both Harrington and Locke supported.
It is also true that the seeds of a Leveller Revolution were latent within the early
American colonial charters, which many Americans viewed as the creation of a written social
contract based on the framework of consent. These systems were fundamentally at odds with
the prevailing British constitutional framework for society. One of the most obvious reasons
why the American Revolution was so long forestalled, was that for pragmatic purposes, they
functioned within a Leveller concept of jurisprudence by default through the British policy of
salutary neglect. This policy functionally granted a quasi-federalist governmental structure to
the colonies if they dutifully played their role in the Empire’s economic system. Political and
social autonomy became a hallmark of colonial life to which Americans became accustomed.
Within this dynamic, many of the colonial charters had created local governments which
operated based on the Leveller, rather than Parliamentary, concept of consent. These were not
explicitly patterned after the Leveller beliefs, although the fact that many colonists had been
religious dissenters in England certainly contributed to their desire for reserved liberties, in
particular the freedom of religion.103 However, this became only one of the beliefs which
created a general philosophy of consent within colonial constitutions.
The Acts and Orders of Rhode Island (1647) created a system whereby the towns of
Rhode Island entered into a federalist arrangement, based on the consent of their citizens, and
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served as the constitution for the colony. The “power to transact” in the creation of the
constitution was only valid because “the major part of the Colonie was present.”104 The
audacity of the Rhode Islanders to “voluntarily assent, and…to receive and to be governed by
the Lawes of England, together with the way of the Administration of them, soe far as the
nature and constitution of this Plantation will admit,” demonstrated a contractual view of
government that was in perfect harmony with their Leveller counterparts in London. The
statement “so far as the nature and constitution of this Plantation will admit” hinted at the idea
that the men of Rhode Island believed they had a right to reserve certain rights to themselves,
rather than to be subjected to the government of England.105 After establishing the laws, the
Acts and Orders enshrined juries chosen by the People, and most of the Leveller tenets of due
process, as a right of all who stood accused of a crime.
The colonists of Rhode Island believed that their charter had given them the authority to
create a new society, rather than remaining directly associated with English society. Their
constitution proclaimed that “Wee do joyntlie agree to incorporate ourselves, and soe to
remaine a Body Politicke by the authoritie thereof, and therefore do declare to own ourselves
and one another to be Members of the same Body, and to have right to the Freedome and
priviledges thereof.”106 The declaration of themselves to be “Members of the same Body”
evoked the idea that they were forming a new, voluntary society, which was in accordance with
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the charter granted by Parliament. Since the charter gave them “powre to governe ourselves
and such other as come among vs, and by such a forme of Civill Government as by the
Voluntarie consent,” the contractual view of government by consent became the foundational
jurisprudence in the American colony, which viewed itself as a federated state.107
That Rhode Island adopted a framework similar to the Levellers may be more than
coincidental. Roger Williams was known for his liberal religious beliefs with respect to the
freedom of religion and the separation of the Church and State, which eventually led to the
establishment of the colony. Williams’ views were well-established prior to his first return trip
to England in 1643 to acquire the patent which empowered him to establish the colony of
Rhode Island. Jessica R. Stern has suggested that Williams’ ideas were derived from the
application of reason to his theological beliefs and his experiences with the Pequot Indians in
Massachusetts.108
However, during his first return trip to England, Williams published his The Bloody
Tenent of Persecution (1644), which employed tones that were similar to those being used by
Walwyn and Overton around the same time. Williams held that civil affairs were distinctly
separate from religious affairs, and that nothing in Scripture prescribed a state-sponsored
church.109 Even “Paganish, Jewish, and Turkish” religions were to be tolerated, and attempted
to be persuaded to Christianity, rather than forced by the state.110 Just as the future Leveller
leaders were doing, he strongly attacked all forms of persecution, avowed that liberal religious
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toleration was the only way to enjoy peace within a nation, and opined that “uniformity of
religion” was responsible for “greatest occasion of civil war, ravishing of conscience,
persecution of Christ Jesus in his servants, and of the hypocrisy and destruction of millions of
souls.”111
Given Stern’s conclusions about the timing of Williams’ ideas, it would be anachronistic
to say that his ideas were derived by contact with Lilburne or Walwyn’s work. However, in the
publication of The Bloody Tenent, Williams’ voice certainly joined with the Levellers’ arguments
in significant ways. For example, Williams’ pamphlet was written as a discourse between Truth
and Peace. This tactic was also employed in the Leveller pamphlets on religious toleration of
the same period. Overton’s Arraignment of Mr. Persecution was released the following April,
and Walwyn’s medical Consultation of the diagnosis of Thomas Edwards followed in 1646. The
nineteenth-century editor of Williams’ tract noted that his work was ultimately judged to be
too liberal for the Independents.112 As has already been demonstrated in the previous
chapters, the Levellers and Independents self-identified as the same faction in 1643-44 when
Williams was in England.
Despite their apparent differences on matters of religion, an Independent MP, Sir Henry
Vane (the Younger) was instrumental in getting Williams the charter for the establishment of
Rhode Island.113 In 1643, Vane was a member of the Parliamentary war party, which was
opposed to the group that wished to seek accommodation with the King. William Walwyn and
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Henry Marten were well-known defenders of the war party’s agenda in print, and Vane would
have certainly been aware of Lilburne since he had recently distinguished himself defending
London, and even more recently was famously released from a royalist prison at the behest of
Cromwell and other prominent Parliamentary figures.114 Given Vane’s Independent leanings,
and his clearly favorable disposition toward Roger Williams, it is clear that when Williams
visited London in 1643, he was running in the same political circles as Walwyn, Lilburne, and
Overton. It is reasonable to conclude that Williams was exposed to the ideas of the future
Levellers, and that his own publication was likely one that they would have also read and may
have influenced the development of their ideas as well, especially given the radical tendencies
which united them on the extreme of the Independent political spectrum which later coalesced
into the Leveller Movement.115
In neighboring Massachusetts, the Laws and Liberties of Massachussetts (1647)
endeavored to codify their laws along many of the same principles. The colonists there found
that:
a Common-wealth without lawes is like a Ship without rigging and steeradge. Nor is it
sufficient to have principles or fundamentals, but these are to be drawn out into so many of
their deductions as the time and condition of that people may have use of. And it is very
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unsafe & injurious to the body of the people to put them to learn their duty and libertie
from generall rules, nor is it enough to have lawes except they be also just.116

The Massachusetts colonists’ rationalization was a direct refutation of the contemporary
English system of jurisprudence which referenced the fundamental laws without writing them
down. The Levellers had repeatedly argued for laws to be written, and for Parliament to be
prevented from creating laws and then prosecuting offenders ex post facto.
Massachusetts also empowered the People by expanding the power of juries. Apart
from being drawn from local jurisdictions from amongst the freemen of the town to bring
verdicts, juries in Massachusetts were empowered to “present in their verdict so much as they
can” if they found one guilty but not as accused, or “in open court to advise with any man they
shall think fit to resolve or direct them, before they give in their verdict.”117 This trust in the
liberty of juries opened avenues for any juror to question points of law, since he could
hypothetically challenge a judicial interpretation of law in open court by, in effect, calling his
own expert witnesses.
The Lord Baltimore wanted to ensure that universal Christian toleration was practiced in
his proprietary colony. Although not as strong as the Leveller Agreements, which had been
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published around the same time, Maryland’s Act Concerning Religion criminalized libel for
slandering anyone by the name of “heritick, Scismatick, Idolator, Puritan, Independent,
Prespiterian popish prest, Jesuite, Jesuited Papist, Lutheran, Calvenist, Anabaptist, Brownist,
Antinomian, Barrowist, Roundhead, Sepatist, or any other name or terme in a reproachfull
manner relating to matter of Religion.”118 Although the Levellers never argued that use of
divisive terms should garner civil penalties, with a few limited exceptions, they used lists such
as this one in exactly the same spirit: as a way to be inclusive to people of various beliefs,
rather than as an exclusive list.
It also bears noting that the Act Concerning Religion evoked consensual language in
matters of religion. The entire document listed dozens of laws which were being created by the
Lord Baltimore for the operation of his proprietary colony, but the clauses which dealt with
religion were “with the advise and consent of this Assembly Ordeyned & enacted.”119 As long
as a resident was willing to confess Christ, he or she should not “from henceforth bee any waies
troubled, Molested or discountenanced for or in respect of his or her religion not in the free
exercise thereof within this Province…nor any way compelled to the beliefe or exercise of any
other Religion against his or her consent.”120 The Act Concerning Religion fully recognized that
freedom of religion was a reserved and inalienable right, that the right belonged to all men and
women, not merely freemen, and that the freedom extended to practice as well as belief.

118

An Act Concerning Religion. (Maryland Toleration Act). In Key Documents of Liberty Collection. (Online
Library of Liberty: Maryland, April 20, 1649).
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid.

310
Perhaps the most illustrative constitution created in the Americas based on the Leveller
principles of jurisprudence was in Pennsylvania by the Quaker, William Penn, and the Charter of
the Liberties and Frame of Government of Pennsylvania (1682).121 Penn fully recognized that
civil and spiritual governments were separate entities, and that this was connected to the
sociological differentiation in each’s operation. He wrote: “the difference lying here, that the
one is more free and mental, the other more corporal and compulsive in its operations.”122
Logically, freedom could only come from God, and punishment from government. Since
Parliament and Kings were of the government, Penn’s framework demanded a view of freedom
which was consistent with the Leveller concept of inalienable rights.123 As was demonstrated in
Chapters 1 and 2, the Leveller concepts of liberty and consent had begun as a commitment to
the codification of religious freedom as a negative liberty; it should not be considered
coincidental that the Americans inherently balked at a Parliamentary assertation of sovereignty
regarding the religious freedom granted by their charters.
The principle of popular sovereignty was summarized succinctly in Penn’s preamble,
when he declared that he was agnostic as to the particular frame of government, based on the
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recognition that “any government is free to the people under it (whatever be the frame) where
the laws rule, and the people are a party to those laws, and more than this is tyranny.”124 This
statement summarized the essential Leveller belief that law must be the guiding principle of
government, but that the People must have institutional control over the process by which
those laws were created. Penn’s definition of popular sovereignty was fundamentally
irreconcilable with the prevailing Whig principles of Parliamentary sovereignty.
The colony was to be run by the governor and a provincial Council, which were to be
elected by the people.125 In order to ensure that the Council was accountable to the people, no
member may serve more than one consecutive term, which was to last for three years, with a
third of the total council re-elected each year.126 All bills proposed by the Council had to be
printed and posted for at least a month before they could be voted upon.127 Penn additionally
provided for a General Assembly, “[t]o the end that all laws prepared by the Governor and
provincial Council aforesaid, may yet have the more full concurrence of the freemen of the
province,”, which although not divested with the power to vote for laws, did have an advisory
role with the Council.128 There would be direct elections by the freemen of the “persons, to
serve for Sheriffs, Justices of the Peace, and Coroners, for the year next ensuing,” from which
the Governor would choose half to serve.129 To ensure that the constitution was not altered by
greedy or ambitious men, or without the support of the freemen of the colony, any law which
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changed any part of the constitution had to be approved by the Governor, and six-sevenths of
the Council.130
The charter also enumerated a list of liberties which would be “for ever held for
fundamental in the government thereof,” as they were explicitly outlined in the constitution.131
For his new colony, Penn explicitly accepted the Leveller definition of a freeman as any who
paid “scot and lot to the government,” and this automatically granted the resident the ability to
both vote in elections and serve in government.132 All trials were to have twelve men, “near as
may be, peers and equals” to the accused, and were to be short, in English, and conducted in a
manner so as to be plainly understood.133
Echoing Maryland’s toleration principle, if one held to the idea of an “Almighty and
eternal God,” and was willing to live peacefully with others, he or she should not “be molested
or prejudiced for their religious persuasion, or practice, in matters of faith and worship, nor
shall they be compelled, at any time, to frequent or maintain any religious worship, place or
ministry whatever.”134 In fact, Penn went further than his contemporaries, by not even
requiring the believer to confess Christ, merely the eternal God.
Penn’s constitution embodied practically everything that the Levellers had stood for. He
granted religious freedom to a group of people so diverse that Judaism was explicitly allowed
and embedded a revision process that would have been so rigorous (approval of 86% of the
General Assembly and elected Council, and the Governor), that it essentially enshrined this
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liberty as a negative and inalienable right.135 Equally as important, not only were the People
empowered in the election of their government, but also in the processes of the judiciary. Not
trusting the government to stay within its bounds if not clearly stated, the constitution, which
was explicitly a negative constitution with a super-majority revision process, concluded by
summarizing all positive law as “all other matters and things not herein provided for, which
shall, and may, concern the public justice, peace, or safety of the said province; and the raising
and imposing taxes, customs, duties, or other charges whatsoever.”136
The colonial charters established during the seventeenth century were not inspired
directly by the Levellers. However, given the influence they held in the presses of the 1640s, it
seems probable that some men involved in the creation of the colonial charters were familiar
with the Levellers and their ideas. What was more important was the fact that the exigencies
of the creation of colonial government required a framework based on consent which held the
People as sovereign. The governments were so remote that they had to operate on the
Leveller principle of popular sovereignty to a large degree, simply to be responsive to pressing
needs of the daily operations of the colony and the diverse populations of immigrants they
hoped to attract. They were also so small that they were hardly worth the trouble of governing
more directly by Parliament, hence the policy of salutary neglect. Therefore, whether they
were established upon carefully reasoned principles like Penn’s, or as a naked attempt to
attract large numbers of settlers like the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, British
colonists in America experienced and participated in governments constructed upon the
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principles of consent, religious freedom, due process and some form of institutional restraint
on the government by the People for over a century.
At least in some cases, these ideas were so strong that they led individuals to rebel
against their government, as was the case with Nathaniel Bacon in Virginia. Bacon believed
that the Royal Governor was administering the colony in a way that reinforced his power and
status, and that of his friends, at the expense of the general welfare of the People. Specifically,
to reinforce the lucrative trade with the local Indians, he claimed that Governor Berkley was
refusing to allow certain colonists like Bacon, to defend themselves. To that end, Bacon wrote
his Declaration of the People, accusing Governor Berkley of betraying his trust, and violating the
contract between the government and the governed.
According to Bacon, who had raised militia in the outskirts of Williamsburg to defend
the colony against Indian attacks, Berkley had called up an army “even against the consent of
the people, for the raiseing and effecting civill warr and distruction, which being happily and
without blood shed prevented.”137 Bacon’s definition of a justly constituted army could only be
consistent with the Leveller idea of a citizen-militia, since he saw Berkley’s reliance upon British
soldiers and his own created army as “effecting civill war.” Plainly in his view, the “Commons of
Virginia” had already decided what was needful and would, “with one accord defend our selves
against the common Enimy.”138
According to J.G.A. Pocock, “The most the historian may attempt is to show that, once
we realize as historians that a man’s ideas are to be interpreted in a certain way, we may
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understand in the light of that knowledge what his problem in achieving coherence was.”139
The rhetoric of Nathaniel Bacon’s Declaration is of far more value to the historian than
attempting to exegete his philosophy of government. The Levellers and later American rebels
produced scores of political literature, which allows the political historian to evaluate how they
responded to various situations and attempted to create a cohesive program. There were
unquestionably ulterior motives for Bacon’s claims to represent the People, but that does not
change the fact that he chose to use these rationalizations, and they were perceived by many of
his peers to be valid arguments.140 The same could be said of Lilburne’s appeals to his jury.
Among Bacon’s arguments were the general Leveller interpretations of consent, the right to
revolution, and the application of just war theory to these concepts within a militia context. In
Bacon’s context, the “problem in achieving coherence” was counteracted by the predisposition
of those who followed him to accept his justifications expressed in his Declaration.
These illustrations also demonstrated the political reality of the colonies which led to
the experience of Leveller jurisprudence by default. There was a glaring problem of sovereignty
within the colonies which was wholly unsuitable to all but the Leveller interpretation. In the
case of Pennsylvania, it was land granted to Penn by Charles II, with “divers great powers,
preheminences, royalties, jurisdictions, and authorities, necessary for the well-being and
government thereof.”141 The Rhode Islanders had received their charter “by virtue of an
ordinance of the Parliament of England, a free and absolute Charter of Civill incorporation.”142
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Maryland’s charter was established by “Lord Baron of Baltemore absolute Lord and Proprietary
of this Province with the advise and consent of this Generall Assembly.”143
In all of these examples, there was the formation of a distinct political society apart
from England. Since, as Filmer and Walwyn had correctly noted, sovereignty cannot be shared,
the formation of the society raised the question of the sovereignty from which that society had
been formed.144 The Charters of Liberties and Privileges in New York anticipated and clarified
this issue to a certain degree when it stated that “the Supreme Legislative Authority under his
Majesty and Royall Highnesse James Duke of Yorke Albany &c Lord proprietor of the said
province shall forever be and reside in a Governour, Councell, and the people mett in General
Assembly.”145 However, many of the other colonial constitutions assumed that the
reconstitution of their separate societies in the New World had been accomplished by the
consent of the governed who were all physically located in America.146 Even Penn and
Baltimore, who had been given full authority in their proprietary colonies, had relied upon the
sovereignty and consent of the People, rather than royal sovereignty, to justify their authority.
None of the colonies were established under a federalist framework. John C. Calhoun
later outlined his theory of federalism in a way whereby limited and delegated sovereignty
could be contractually ceded by the People to various institutional levels, but the development
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and articulation of this framework was only possible after it was experienced; not in the
reverse. Since this framework of sovereignty was unavailable to the Proprietors and colonists,
they could rationalize the social authority for the constitution of their new societies based on
the Royalist, Independent, or Leveller concepts. The Independent interpretation was untenable
from a colonial perspective, because although they were Englishmen, there were no serious
plans in the seventeenth century to grant representation to the colonists in Parliament. From
the English perspective, it was less problematic because they were represented indirectly by
the virtues and administration of Parliament. However, since the colonies were largely
understood to have belonged to the Monarch rather than the State, Parliamentary sovereignty
over the colonies at the time of their establishment was nonsensical, and therefore not
attempted.
The remaining theory of Statist sovereignty which could have been applied in the
colonies was that of Monarchical sovereignty. The political tides of history were already set
strongly against this argument within English society. The inclusion of the consent of the
governed in the New York Assembly acknowledged that basing the formation of any English
society in 1683 on the sovereignty of the monarch alone was also untenable. As time
progressed, and Parliament continued to erode the legitimacy of any argument about the
sovereignty of the King, they failed to recognize that this destroyed any claim to sovereignty
that the English government had within the constitutions of their colonies. It was into this
vacuum that a fully developed concept of consent as the basis for their societies developed in
the colonies. Since their states were established based on their direct sovereignty, the concept
of “representation” in the colonies aligned with the Leveller concept of commissioners directly

318
accountable to the People, rather than the paternalistic republican concept of virtuous
representation of the people’s interests held in Parliament.147 The reality was, that the true
revolutions in America took place when each state reconstituted itself as a new political society
based on the sovereignty of its freeholders. It merely took a century before the British
Government recognized and responded to the Leveller Revolutions of America and by that
point, it was too late.
In 1779, during the American War for Independence, Brigadier General Francis M’Lean
issued a declaration in Penobscot Bay that “the allegiance due to the ancient constitution
obliges [us] to resist to the last extremity the present system of tyranny in the British
Government.”148 This statement echoed the Independent minister, John Goodwin, who had
concluded in his 1642 tract that there existed certain situations where men not only had a right
to disobey orders by a King; it was a “matter of duty and obedience to God.”149 Goodwin’s
statements were almost identical to Franklin’s later conclusion that “rebellion to tyrants is
obedience to God.”150 Franklin’s newspaper drew this phrase from a cannon discovered in
Jamaica which was connected to John Bradshaw, the judge who had sentenced Charles I to
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death.151 Bradshaw had been legal counsel for Lilburne in 1646.152 What was significant about
this phrase was that it appeared first in the writing of a pastor, years before anyone conceived
of putting a king on trial for treason. It was not simply an ex post facto rationalization for a
politically expedient legal finding. It was, in fact, a concept that was the logical conclusion of
the application of the separation of civil and ecclesiastical power espoused by the Levellers.
The idea expressed by Goodwin, having been reiterated by Lilburne, Bradshaw and
Franklin, was then drawn close to its logical conclusion by M’Lean, who generalized the
statement to incorporate the whole of the “British Government.” Furthermore, he claimed that
it was due to his allegiance to the ancient constitution that this resistance was necessary.
When M’Lean talked about the “ancient constitution,” he was no longer referring to the ancient
constitution of the Whigs or the Tories, it was a placeholder for what M’Lean understood to be
natural and pre-existing rights of all Englishmen. To phrase this in constitutional language that
would better fit British jurisprudence, M’Lean made it explicitly clear that the ancient
constitution existed out of Parliament. As has been shown above, this was a natural conclusion
for the Americans, who believed their colonial societies had been derived based on their own
innate sovereignty as individuals, and that their consent was the continuing basis for the
legitimacy of their governments.
M’Lean and the Americans were able to draw on precedent like the Commentaries of Sir
William Blackstone, who stated that the liberties that all Englishmen enjoyed were not, “mere
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infringements of the king’s prerogative…but a restoration of that ancient constitution.”153
Americans like James Otis often coupled this understanding with the idea of a set of natural
rights existing prior to the Norman Conquest.154 In a completely British fashion, the accuracy of
their historiographical interpretation was immaterial to the overall implications of American
ideology. They had anchored the ancient constitution to the concept of the natural rights that
existed out of Parliament, rather than ascribing to the then-settled British concept that the
People’s liberties were expressed in Parliament. In short, like the Levellers from the previous
century, the fundamental problem between the British government and its colonists in the
1760s and 1770s was an issue of natural rights, and the corresponding relationship of whether
those rights existed in or out of Parliament. As has been established above, the American
experience led them to adopt the latter, or it might be said “Leveller,” perspective.
This was demonstrated by the 1774 Declaration of Rights and Grievances issued by the
First Continental Congress. After Parliament had issued the Intolerable Acts and closed
Boston’s harbor with a blockade, representatives from each of the thirteen British colonies met
to discuss the colonial response and responded with a petition directly to the King. They clearly
stated their view of the sovereignty of the People, and the existence of their rights out of
Parliament. The first declaration stated that the People, “are entitled to life, liberty, and
property, and they have never ceded to any sovereign power whatever, a right to dispose of
either without their consent.”155 This fact was established in three separate places according to
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the colonists: the “immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution, and the
several charters or compacts.”156 The Declaration clearly articulated the Leveller commitment
to the sovereignty of the People and the importance of actual representation. They outright
resolved that the “acts of Parliament are infringements and violations of the rights of the
colonists.”157 It was significant to note that although the general principles of the English
constitution may have been violated by Parliament, the actual constitutional violation was
against the laws of nature and the “charters and compacts” which already existed in the
colonies. While claiming to be loyal colonists, they made the argument that they were separate
states by virtue of their constitutions, legitimized by the consent and sovereignty of the People.
It must be noted that even based on the progressive British view of constitutional
jurisprudence, many of the acts passed by Parliament between 1763 and 1774 would have
been declared “unconstitutional.” They failed to meet the implied consent requirement. The
reality that the Parliament responded to colonial protests by repealing most of the laws would
have been argued by those in the British Government as proof of the purity of the
representative status of the British government.158 Legislation only became constitutional
within the British system after an undefined period of time during which the citizens had the
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right to petition the government for changes to the legislation. Based on British thinking, the
absence of such petitions, or at the very least an ineffectiveness of those petitions, implied the
consent of the people, and verified the constitutionality of the legislation. The reality was that
the American Patriots, like the Levellers before them, were forced to articulate new views of
constitutionalism, jurisprudence, and sovereignty only once their petitions fell on deaf ears.
This process had repeated itself several times within British constitutional history.
Parliament did not fully commit to the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty until Charles I
refused to sacrifice his prerogative. The Levellers did not abandon the concept of
Parliamentary sovereignty until Parliament stopped responding to their petitions. The Whigs
only forsook the arrangement of the shared powers of the King in Parliament once James II
ascended to replace his brother. The American colonists did not abandon their commitment to
the argument that they were British citizens until Parliament and King George III “neglected”
their responsibilities to act as the defender of the colonists’ constitutional rights.
This was, in large part, because the default state of society within any British
constitutional system was liberty. The British concept of liberty required an active and
continued infringement by the government before it came to be perceived as a threat. One of
the hallmarks of the Leveller view of constitutionalism was the belief that written constitutions
were the only way to break this tendency in favor of a clearly established boundary. The
colonists already had those boundaries in their charters and were determined to defend them.
In the words of King George III, the colonists were nothing less than declaring “Revolt,
Hostility, and Rebellion…[by] assum[ing] to themselves Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
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Powers.”159 As has been shown above, these powers were understood by the colonists to have
been created by consent within their constitutions. The Declaration of Independence made it
clear that they did not have any qualms about “assuming to themselves…the Executive
Powers,” but as for the rest they believed those powers had always been within colonial
jurisdiction. The British Parliament had understood this issue well, and concluded that the
governments of the colonists needed to be changed so that they were
granted and ordained, that… eight and twenty counsellors or assistants should yearly, once
in every year, for ever thereafter, be, by the general court or assembly, newly chosen: And
whereas the said method of electing such counsellors or assistants, to be vested with the
several powers, authorities, and privileges, therein mentioned.160

They could no longer be entrusted with the privilege of self-government; the charters needed
to be revoked. By the decree of Parliament, which incorporated the King, Lords, and Commons
in Parliament assembled, it was therefore concluded that “every clause, matter, and thing,
therein contained, which relates to the time and manner of electing the assistants or
counsellors for the said province, be revoked, and is hereby revoked...”161
From a rhetorical perspective, at least as far as the colonists were concerned, this made
the British government the revolutionaries, since it was they who were attempting to
reconstitute the colonial societies. The Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental
Congress recognized this in its Preamble, which stated that “whereas, since the close of the last
war, the British parliament, claim[ed] a power of right to bind the people of America by statute
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in all cases whatsoever.”162 The Massachusetts Government Act was “impolitic, unjust, and
cruel, as well as unconstitutional, and most dangerous and destructive of American rights.”163
British MP and the well-known colonial sympathizer, Edmund Burke agreed with their
conclusions.164 He observed that “their governments are popular in a high degree; some are
merely popular; in all, the popular representative is the most weighty; and this share of the
people in their ordinary government never fails to inspire them with lofty sentiments, and with
a strong aversion from whatever tends to deprive them of their chief importance.”165 Based on
his observations of colonial governments, the consent of the governed as expressed through
their legislative bodies, was foundational to their ideas of liberty.
To Burke, this was plainly linked with the British constitutional principle that the
“privilege of granting money as a dry point of fact…acknowledged in ancient parchments, and
blind usages, to reside in a certain body called a House of Commons…[which] the colonies draw
from you, as with their life-blood, these ideas and principles.”166 He sarcastically quipped that
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“perhaps we might wish the colonists to be persuaded, that their liberty is more secure when
held in trust for them by us (as their guardians during a perpetual minority) than with any part
of it in their own hands?”167
Burke, as Lilburne and the Levellers had done over a century earlier, understood
obedience as the People’s most powerful consent to government.168 He viewed the Sons of
Liberty in Massachusetts as continuing to be governed by the rule of law, which had “originated
directly from the people; and was not transmitted through any of the ordinary artificial media
of a positive constitution.”169 Burke concluded that the Parliament was guilty of executing
arbitrary rule in the colonies, because it had unilaterally, arbitrarily and “wholly abrogated the
ancient government of Massachusetts.”170
Burke’s arguments about the relationship of the People to government were within the
Leveller vein of jurisprudence on many levels. He explicitly argued that the self-government of
a people that produced a society based on the rule of law was superior to Parliamentary
statute. The idea of self-government was derived directly from “ancient parchments,” which
within the context of taxation, was clearly a reference to Magna Carta. He outright rejected the
republican view of Parliamentary sovereignty as a “trust” by which the “guardians” could better
administrate justice and peace than the People “in their own hands.” Finally, he recognized the
legitimate constitutional status of the Massachusetts charter, and implied that the attempt to
abolish it had made the British government tyrannical toward its colonies.
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Reid has noted that “slavery was also the word that American whigs used when they
discovered that parliament and not the ‘law’ was to be their rule.”171 This use was identical to
the Leveller employment of the same vocabulary. However, most contemporary Whigs would
not have been able to understand the idea that “Parliament” and “law” could be antithetical to
one another. In fact, as G.H. Guttridge once observed long ago, the British Parliamentary Whigs
“were the great upholders of parliamentary supremacy at home and abroad; and they had an
unshakable belief in the complete authority of parliament over the American colonies.”172
Some historians have attempted to describe the Americans as “American whigs” as Reid did, or
as “radical whigs,” but neither term seems to fit, given the differences in the concepts of
jurisprudence expressed by the whigs and the colonists. What Burke had noted, and the
colonists in their Declaration and Resolves argued before him, was that the consent of the
People, rather than the actions of an elected legislative branch, was the legitimizer of
governmental authority. That the Declaration and Resolves were written as a petition to the
British King is vital to understanding the colonial mindset. They recognized the constitution of
the British Government, and accepted the various branches of government, so long as the
People’s sovereignty was respected. However, to them, this constitution was the King (typically
represented to them by the royal governor), and their colonial legislatures and judiciaries
(including local juries), since this was how their consent was expressed in their separate
societies.
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The proof that the colonists thought this way about their sovereignty and their
legislatures was contained within the Declaration of Independence. The first thing that is often
underappreciated by most Americans about the Declaration of Independence was that it was a
rejection of King George III’s role within the constitutional framework of colonial government.
Since the Glorious Revolution, it was understood that Parliament was indeed, sovereign within
British society, so the Declaration was not tendered to the King because the colonists believed
he had become a tyrannical, absolute monarch. The Declaration of Independence was a
notification to King George III that the colonists no longer considered him to be the executive of
their otherwise continuing governments, as had been established by their charters. What is
wholly missed is that the Declaration was not seen as a termination of the social contract,
because the colonists held as absolute, that their own legislatures were pre-eminent to the
British Parliament in London.173
This point was made explicit when, in the list of grievances, the colonists complained
that the King had “dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly
firmness his invasions on the rights of the people,” but more importantly they continued by
claiming that “He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be
elected; whereby the Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People
173
Declaration of Independence. In Key Documents of Liberty Collection. (Online Library of Liberty:
Philadelphia, July 9, 1776).
When they complained that the King had “subject[ed] us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and
unacknowledged by our laws” they were referring to Parliament. This was a radical claim to any strain of
contemporary British political thought but was perfectly in line with the Leveller concept of representation. It was
further reinforced in the conclusion of the document, when the colonists argued the distinction between
Parliament and their own legislatures when they stated that “we have warned them [British brethren] from time
to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us.” The use of the third
person possessive pronoun “their” in reference to Parliament, rather than the first person plural pronoun “our”
made it explicit that the colonists believed that they had a separate governmental framework, in keeping with
their own charters.
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at large for their exercise.”174 Within the American minds, there was only one place the
legislative powers could have been located, and that was within their own elected bodies. In
dissolving those legislatures, the power automatically reverted back to the People, because the
society itself could not be destroyed, and the People’s sovereignty was absolute. In absence of
their duly elected representatives, the People’s sovereignty being “incapable of Annihilation,”
simply returned to the People themselves until they could elect new representatives.
The colonists could not rely on the military, because it was “independent of and
superior to the Civil power.”175 These clauses, all a part of the “List of Grievances” paint a
picture of complete tyranny, as it could only be defined by the Leveller theory of jurisprudence.
Whig, Tory, Independent, Presbyterian, and Monarchist political theories could not have
systematically created such a list of grievances, because there was still a Parliament in
Westminster that represented the people’s interests. Therefore, even though the Founders
among the American colonists were not self-conscious Levellers, many of them are better
understood as American Levellers than American Whigs or American Tories, because their
concept of “representation” was incompatible with both contemporary British parties.
The American Levellers were what came to be known in their time as the “AntiFederalists” or the “Jeffersonian Democrat-Republicans.” Just as their English predecessors had
been, the American Levellers were ultimately the losers in a propaganda war over their own
name.176 The “Anti-Federalists so-called” vigorously defended their interpretation of
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federalism within the latent contractualism characteristic of the Levellers’ theory of
sovereignty. According to the Anti-Federalists, the People had contracted with their separate
societies amongst the united states in America. Within the limitations of their own contracts
with the People of their state, each state government then delegated, or subcontracted, a
constitutionally specified amount of its own legitimate powers to the national government. To
evoke Leveller terminology, the “Commons…[were] the originall and fountaine of Power,” and
that which was reserved by the People, was automatically beyond the reach of the national
government, and could only be accomplished at the state level by a constitutional change, since
the state could not delegate powers it did not possess itself from the People.177 This
understanding also explicitly required a Strict-Constructionist framework for understanding the
United States Constitution.178

brought into political discourse.” The exception to this, which is discussed in Chapter 6, was John Lilburne, who
within some eighteenth-century minds, had somehow shed his association with the damaging moniker, and had
come to be associated with his identiy as a “patriot of the seventeenth century struggles and…role in establishing a
radical concept of the rights of juries.”
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Here Lilburne was using the term “Commons” to refer to the People, not to the institution, which was
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The debate about sovereignty has become tied to the issue of slavery within virtually every historical
evaluation of the time period. As Luigi Marco Bassani remarked, “there is an abundant body of literature which
analyzes the whole of American history from the Revolution to the Civil War from the perspective of slavery. The
purpose of this chapter is not to question or challenge these perspectives directly—slavery was certainly a part of
the South’s desire to retain individual state sovereignty during the antebellum period--it is to call attention to the
simple fact that slavery and sovereignty are not inextricably linked. As the arguments by the Levellers should make
abundantly clear, there were intellectual pathways within Western political thought which cohesively argued for
popular sovereignty. During the time of the War for Independence, the Founders traversed these same pathways
at a time in British history when one would have needed to have possessed super-human foresight to imagine the
abolition of slavery by the British throughout their empire in 1833.
The fact that the Leveller commitment to the institutionalization of individual sovereignty was distorted
by slaveholders to retain the sovereignty necessary to preserve the peculiar institution, is downstream from the
development of the philosophy. Historians or laypersons should not make the anachronistic mistake of
inextricably linking pre-existent ideological logic with one of its many potential consequences in a backwardly
causal relationship. Thus it was that the Leveller arguments about the sovereignty of the People could lead to the
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James Jackson’s disagreement with Madison during the debate about the creation of a
Bill of Rights was based on the concern that by enumerating certain rights and not others, it
would implicitly grant powers to the national government which otherwise had been excluded
by not being listed in the Constitution.179 The argument then, was not about the fact that the
rights existed, but in how best to protect the rights of the People. While Jackson was arguing
against the creation of the Bill of Rights, it is important to recognize that he had a general
predisposition toward keeping faith in the legislature and its representative nature which
Jefferson and Madison had forsaken. In their view, the People’s sovereignty was too precious,
and must be defended by a negative constitutional framework, which explicitly reserved those
rights to the People. Jackson trusted the legislature’s virtue to not overstep itself. That
Madison was correct in advocating for the Bill of Rights over Jackson’s objections would be
made clear by the developments of the Adams administration.180

American theory of popular sovereignty and federalism which created the Declaration of Independence and
Calhoun’s theory of state’s rights (including secession.) That these arguments provided an effective political
mechanism for the continuation of the enslavement of millions of people was not a logical conclusion of the
philosophy, it was merely an effective tool. This becomes important when understanding Calhoun’s theory of
delegated sovereignty, since his arguments were used to strengthen the institution of slavery in the South.
Irrespective of his purposes (which the historian cannot fully judge anyway), it also remains true that his
articulation of a political theory which solidified the sovereignty of the People could be, in a technical sense,
theoretically untainted by slavery.
Just because one sharpens a machete in order to commit murder does nothing to change the fact that, as
a newly sharpened implement, it is equally useful for clearing a thicket. The reality is that in contemporary
political historiography, it is most common for the historian, teacher, and politician to argue that the ideology of
state and individual sovereignty needs to be cast into the fire, rather than re-oriented toward the appropriate
purposes, such as those which gave rise to America.
179
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Representatives, 1st Congress, 1st Session. Library of Congress. (New York: June 8, 1789).
“There is a maxim in law, and it will apply to bills of rights, that when you enumerate exceptions, the
exceptions operate to the exclusion of all circumstances that are omitted; consequently, unless you except every
right from the grant of power, those omitted are inferred to be resigned to the discretion of the Government.”
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““The gentleman endeavors to secure the liberty of the press; pray how is this in danger? There is no
power given to Congress to regulate this subject as they can commerce, or peace, or war. Has any transaction
taken place to make us suppose such an amendment necessary? An honorable gentleman, a member of this
House, has been attacked in the public newspapers on account of sentiments delivered on this floor. Have
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In 1798, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, which authorized the President to
detain or deport any alien he determined to be “dangerous to the peace and safety of the
United States,” without following the due process of law.181 Even more onerously, they also
made it illegal for any citizen to “unlawfully combine or conspire together, with intent to
oppose any measure or measures of the government of the United States” or to “write, print,
utter or publish…any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government
of the United States.”182
The Anti-federalists attacked this violation of the Bill of Rights in the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions. In Madison’s Virginia Resolutions, he asserted that the national
government was an agent of the states, and as such, was only empowered so far as the
Constitution had allowed.183 Citing the 10th Amendment, the Virginia Resolution appealed to
the other states to join with Virginia in the undertaking of “necessary and proper measures…[to
maintain] the authorities, rights, and liberties, reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”184 The Resolutions in General Assembly written by Thomas Jefferson for Kentucky,
went even further by arguing that the states which had created the national government,

Congress taken any notice of it? Have they ordered the writer before them, even for a breach of privilege,
although the Constitution provides that a member shall not be questioned in any place for any speech or debate in
the House? No.”
Ironically, Jackson chose the freedom of the press as his example for why a Bill of Rights was
unnecessary. Given the subsequent developments related to the Alien and Sedition Acts, history proposed a
different answer to his rhetorical question than Jackson himself did in 1789.
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“being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction; and
that a nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts.”185
Within the emerging debate about the respective sovereignty of the separate states and
the national government, Madison’s arguments about the necessity of a legitimate government
to defend, and never usurp the people’s liberties, proved to be bi-directional in nature. He had
argued in the opening of the debate for the creation of the Bill of Rights, that the national
government needed to force states which did not recognize the People’s freedoms of
conscience, press, and jury trial to enshrine these negative liberties as beyond government
intervention.186 However, as the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions demonstrated this did not,
in his mind, grant sovereignty to the general government, any more than it had to the state
governments. In all cases, the People were sovereign, and their consent remained the basis for
government, regardless of whether it was at the state or national level. This argument could
only be logically consistent if it held that People held the ultimate sovereign and could delegate,
out of that sovereignty, certain responsibilities to various levels of government. Hence, one
could have pre-eminence over the other in the employ of the defense of the People’s freedom,
but never sovereignty over the People themselves.
Irrespective of one’s opinion of his stance on state sovereignty or slavery, Bassani has
noted, “Calhoun [was] in fact the most lucid political thinker of the American resistance to the
modern state.”187 Throughout his monograph, Chaining Down Leviathan, Bassani understood
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the modern state to be that condition of a political state which possessed sovereignty rather
than the People. Within this framework, the Levellers would have been the original opponents
to Leviathan within the Anglo-American tradition. From this perspective, Calhoun was the most
influential defender of American Levellerism and the People’s sovereignty during the
antebellum period. As has already been noted, although his political theory was used to defend
the institution of slavery, this was but one of a myriad of potential encroachments upon the
sovereignty of the individual which Calhoun was attempting to address.188
As the Levellers and Patriots had argued prior to him, Calhoun adamantly rejected the
theory of progressive governmental sovereignty which set the legislature as the institutional
sovereign within a society. He recognized that in a perfect society, this would lead to the
condition in which the power of suffrage made the representatives “the true and faithful
representatives of those who elected them—instead of irresponsible rulers.”189 However
perfectly they were represented by their government, Calhoun believed this did nothing to
“counteract, in the least, the tendency of the government to oppression and abuse of its
powers.”190 He claimed that this created the dangerous reality that the majority of the voters
came to be confused with the People themselves, and “thus, also that all the rights, powers,
and immunities of the whole people come to be attributed to the numerical majority; and,
among others, the supreme, sovereign authority of establishing and abolishing governments at
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pleasure.”191 Calhoun, as the Anti-Federalists, Patriots, and Levellers previous to him,
understood that the suffrage was not a means to create a “popular constitutional government,”
through which the constituents governed their nation via a sovereign legislature, because “the
numerical majority, instead of being the people, is only a portion of them.”192
While Calhoun recognized that written constitutions were certainly beneficial, he also
saw that it was a mistake to assume that “the mere insertion of provisions to restrict and limit
the powers of the government, without investing those for whose protection they are inserted
with the means of enforcing their observance, will be sufficient to prevent the major and
dominant party from abusing its powers.”193 Within his current political context, Calhoun
recognized that the minority would be forced to espouse a strict constructivist interpretation of
the written constitution in order to defend its freedoms from the encroachments that could be
perpetrated by the majority, which required no greater protection that that afforded by the
ballot box.194 Even armed with a strict interpretation, Calhoun advocated for institutional
restraint exercised by the People, which would in turn limit the national government.
The underpinnings of Calhoun’s argument were characteristic of the Leveller arguments
made two centuries earlier. As had been the case of the Levellers’ claims during the 1640s, and
the Patriots’ of the late eighteenth century, Calhoun’s philosophy was shaped by the exigent
political realities of his historical context. As such, he adapted them to the arguments of his day
regarding state sovereignty. Calhoun’s primary concern was to solve the problem of how to
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truly, rather than merely in theory, reserve the “rights, powers, and immunities of the whole
people” within the political structure.195 When he discussed the “whole people,” Calhoun was
careful to adopt the Leveller ideology of discussing them as an all-inclusive group of individuals,
rather than as a theoretical group from within the State of Nature upon which the sovereignty
of the legislative branch was predicated.
Irrespective to the issue of slavery, Abraham Lincoln made it explicit that the American
Civil War was being waged to establish what Bassani had termed the “modern state.” Lincoln
held that, based on the Constitution, “the Union of these States is perpetual.”196 Not only that,
but the majority, as expressed in the ballot box, was “the only true sovereign of a free people.
Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or despotism.”197 As Bassani noted,
despite his rhetoric, there was no continuity between Lincoln and the Founders, given the
radically different views of sovereignty that each espoused.198 Prior to Lincoln, within the
American political sphere, “tyranny” was the condition of domination over the rights of the
People by the government. After the Civil War, “tyranny” came to be fundamentally
understood by Americans as the social condition perpetuated between different citizens or
groups, between whose conflict the government must arbitrate.199 It was upon this basis, just
as the Independents had done to the Levellers over two centuries earlier, that Lincoln could
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sincerely accuse those who held the rights of the individual to be sovereign to state
prerogative, to be anarchistic.
Lincoln did not survive the war, and therefore his crusade to establish a modern state
based on the consent of the majority also faltered. After the war had ended, nobody was quite
certain what to do about Jefferson Davis, who sat in government custody presumably awaiting
trial. According to legal historian Cynthia Nicoletti, Attorney General James Speed and others
were “concerned about the war’s corrosive effects on the rule of law.”200 This reality made the
“Constitution seem less pliable in 1866 than it had a year and a half earlier.”201 The parallels
between Jefferson Davis and King Charles I should not be ignored. Each was the figurehead for
the losing force in their respective nations’ quintessential civil conflicts. Each had been charged
with treason by the remnants of a government which, in very important institutional and
structural ways, represented the victorious element of what had existed prior to the struggle.
By the time that it charged and tried Charles I for treason, the House of Commons did
not resemble anything like a legally constituted Parliament, as conceived by the institutional
arrangements proscribed by English precedent. Pride’s Purge had forcibly excluded many
legally elected MP’s. Many others, seeing the direction that the Commons was moving, simply
stopped attending Parliament. Parliament had sat for almost a decade without elections being
called. By anything other than the most creative of republican rationalizations, the
demographic make-up of the Parliament which executed Charles I violated the constitutional
procedures by which to constitute the legislature. In the United States, the rebel states, which
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President Lincoln had claimed had not left the nation, no longer had representation in
Congress, and were under military rule. In both cases, broad portions of previously established
citizens were disenfranchised, and the government proceeded in what Levellers of any time
would have considered to be “arbitrary,” in the sense that they had no opportunity to consent.
In the conclusion of her monograph on the trial of Jefferson Davis, historian Cynthia
Nicoletti asked the rhetorical question: “why [were] the prosecutors…so willing to believe
[defense attorney] O’Conor’s statements about his eagerness to bring the case to trial?”202
What Nicoletti failed to account for in the answering of this question was the reality that
although most of the Unionists completely dismissed the legitimacy of secession, they were
also acutely aware that they were not the only voice presenting arguments as to the legitimacy
of secession. The Declaration of Independence, which had articulated the Leveller framework
of consent and sovereignty of the People’s inalienable rights, had been overridden by Lincoln’s
competing concept of the Constitution, which was a return to the Parliamentary position of
government authority above that of the individual.
The Leveller Revolution had been so complete within the burgeoning American nation,
that in an analogous situation, the American-written Constitution and the People’s
commitment to the rule of law which accompanied it maintained strict roles of separation
between the various branches of government. There was an overall concern that the process
be conducted in legal ways, rather than simply achieving the results sought after by certain
individuals within the Unionist government. Just as Thomas Preston had received a fair trial, so
too must Jefferson Davis, and this was precisely the problem, because it was assumed that he
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might be declared “not guilty” in a trial of his peers, as proscribed by law. This was not
dangerous if he was a dissenter at the level of a John Lilburne, but as the elected president of
the dissenting American faction, such a verdict could easily turn into a support for the concept
of secession more generally.
Another difficulty that the Union government encountered was clarifying the status of
the Confederacy in relation to the United States. Most of the Western world by the 1800’s
defined civil war and belligerency by the principles previously outlined by Hugo Grotius.
According to Grotius’s De Jure Belli ac Pacis, no people could legitimately declare war on their
sovereign.203 This introduced rival concepts of rebellion, revolution, and civil war. However,
given the unmistakable precedent of the American War for Independence, and the overall
commitment within American jurisprudence to the idea of the sovereignty of the People rather
than their government, it was difficult to argue against the validity of the act of secession at the
time it had taken place. During the War, the US Attorney General Edward Bates recognized the
sovereignty of the People, and in particular the legitimacy of the argument that the legally
constituted representative institutions in the South could secede as an expression of the
People’s sovereignty. In 1863, he stated that “there is no escape…in law or logic. If Virginia be
out of the Union, it must be because her convention voted her out. And that ordinance, to
produce that legal result, must be a lawful and valid act.”204 The conditional clause in his
statement, however, did allow for the possibility that some other principle rendered the issue
of secession unconstitutional.
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The public also displayed an acute understanding of the importance that the trial be
conducted legally. Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune, and Gerrit Smith, one of the
financial supporters of John Brown’s ill-fated raid, both believed it was very important that
Davis’s trial be conducted in a manner that was consistent with the Constitution. Smith
suggested that a constitutional amendment might be necessary to establish the illegality of
secession.205 The reason Davis’ trial created such a conundrum for the Unionists was that he
could only have committed treason if the Southern states had not actually seceded.206
However, in that case, there was no reason to continue the military occupation or
disenfranchisement of the southern states. Pennsylvania had not forfeited its status within the
Union during the Whiskey Rebellion. Not only that, but there was an open question about
whether a military from the Northern States had attacked the Southern States while they
remained in the Union, which was itself would have been an illegitimate and arbitrary
expression of power.
There was an inherent contradiction in the Union’s prosecution of the Civil War and
everyone recognized it. According to Nicoletti, “the Union’s legal policy [was] guided by
pragmatism and innovation rather than brittle adherence to doctrine.”207 There was a dual
legal status that was conferred to the Confederacy, both before the War and after its
conclusion, which both recognized and delegitimized its legal status as a belligerent entity. The
overall goal of the Johnson administration was to prosecute, if possible, high-profile
Confederates like Robert E. Lee and Davis to delegitimize secession and reinforce the Unionist
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interpretation of the Union. Conversely, in certain contexts such as Reconstruction policy, the
former Confederate States needed to be treated as conquered territory to continue to justify
the continuing military occupation and administration of their territories. It was for this reason
that the Radical Republican, Thaddeus Stephens, supported Jefferson Davis and offered to help
in the eventuality of his trial. Stephens recognized that legitimizing secession gave Congress
the right to treat the South as a conquered territory, which served his agenda better than
attempting to maintain the Lincoln and Johnson administrations’ contradictory positions.208
Ultimately, for reasons which will be explored in the final chapter, Davis’ trial was too risky, and
secession was addressed in a different way.
Texas v. White (1869) subsequently stated that secession was unconstitutional. In so
doing, Nicoletti argued that Chief Justice Salmon Chase, who authored its majority opinion, did
so, “as a necessary pronouncement for the courts to make [rather] than a careful exposition of
the law that sounded in reason.”209 Essentially, Chase made the statement to judicially
establish a precedent by fiat, which could be referenced in subsequent cases. This amounted
to essentially amending the Constitution through the common law process, a process
unthinkable to the Levellers understanding of consensual governance, but fully in keeping with
the Independent one. Ultimately, in the opinion of John Codman Hurd, it “establish[ed] every
citizen’s obligation to obey [the national] Government as the only sovereign.”210
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Given the previously held definition of a modern state as one in which the government,
rather than the People are sovereign, this way of understanding the American Civil War and its
constitutional relationship with secession, claims that it was at least in part, a contest to
challenge American Levellerism.211 According to Bassani, Lincoln “took the cult of the nation to
a new level that would have shocked Hamilton and Webster.”212 Hamilton and Webster’s
theories of sovereignty were consonant with the progressive constitutional views of the
Independents and Whigs but had attempted to do so through legislative acts. Within the
framework of a fundamental conflict between the sovereignty of the People and the State, it
becomes possible to view the English Civil Wars, Glorious Revolution, American War for
Independence, and the American Civil War as the same conflict.
The best and most consistent narrative of these “conflicts of sovereignty” within the
history of Anglo-American jurisprudence, therefore, must take account for the status quo
position of sovereignty, relative to the People and the government. Within this framework,
although the Independents were successful in changing the form of government in the English
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Civil Wars, sovereignty continued to reside within the government, merely within a different
branch. The victory of the status quo in the conflict leads to the interpretation that no
revolution had occurred.
Subsequently, the Crown reasserted itself in 1660 with the Restoration of Charles II, and
this remained the case until 1689, when Parliament invited William of Orange and Mary to
usurp the throne from Charles’ younger brother. This was the final success of the Independent
program for governance which had first been achieved by the execution of Charles I, forty years
earlier. The Independents were now identified as “Whigs,” but their constitutional positions
on sovereignty were practically indistinguishable. However, relative to the sovereignty of the
government and People, still nothing had changed. In 1640, Charles I had the negative voice
within English society, although his hold on sovereignty was being eroded by Parliament. The
Independents and eventually the Whigs of the 1680’s successfully relocated the prerogative to
Parliament, and the English Civil Wars were concluded, but the People remained institutionally
subservient to their government.213
The Levellers had proposed a revolution, although their rhetoric claimed to represent
the status quo, as in fact, all Anglo-American revolutionaries have. Rather than merely
relocating sovereignty from one branch to another within Parliament, the Levellers instead had
proposed to re-orient the political axis completely and to transfer sovereignty from the
government to the People out of Parliament. The Leveller Revolution was defeated in England
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and Parliamentary sovereignty has not been seriously challenged within England since the
seventeenth century.214
The primary political debate in eighteenth-century England was over the proper way to
interpret the ancient constitution and the overall constitutional impact of the Glorious
Revolution.215 The Tories, whose attempts at supporting James II had been rebuffed, eventually
adopted an interpretation of the Glorious Revolution as a providential reassertion of the
liberties of the Englishmen as originally expressed in the constitution.216 As this interpretation
gained traction, the Whigs also backed away from the contractual interpretation posited by
Locke, in favor of an interpretation that resistance had been necessary to safeguard English
liberty against the particular threats posed by James II’s tyranny.217 This view became more
entrenched as the Whigs gained power in subsequent Parliaments, since the right to revolution
implied by Lockean contractualism weakened their power.218 This so closely aligned the
Bolingbroke Tory interpretation to the Walpole Whig narrative that it became “the orthodox
interpretation of the establishment Whigs” by the time of David Hume, who interpreted the
Glorious Revolution as the first time that English liberty was secured for the citizens.219
Therefore, by the time of the escalation of conflict with the British colonies in the 1760s, the
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unified narrative within English political discourse of the Glorious Revolution was one which
reinforced the idea of the ancient constitution as affirmed by Parliamentary statute and
common law precedent, rather than a contractual relationship based on the consent of the
People.
Parliamentary sovereignty was challenged within the broader British world of the
eighteenth century by its American colonists. Based on the establishment of their charters,
which they believed had created new constitutional societies, the Americans rejected
Parliamentary sovereignty, and instead asserted the legitimacy of their own legislative bodies.
The fact that these charters were granted by the king, and established by the consent of the
People, marked the creation of separate states, rather than colonies, although few recognized
this distinction explicitly. Through the process of salutary neglect, Levellerism established itself
as the default constitutional interpretation within the minds of the American citizens.220 This
status quo was not challenged in America until Parliament and King George III attempted to
revolutionize these assumptions and to reorient them back to the Independent position of
Parliamentary sovereignty. The Americans first resisted Parliament, and finally even the King,
using the “deriv[ation of] their just powers from the consent of the governed” to legitimize the
reconstitution of the executive functions of their own governments.221 In so doing, the
Americans did not propose to revolutionize the sovereign of their socieites, or even to
reconstitute the entire civil sphere as they understood it, they merely reinforced their pre-
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existing belief that the People were the ultimate sovereign within their societies. The people
chose to withdraw their societies from the relationship they had with the English executive
(King), and instead confederated themselves with one another and appointed new executives
designated by their legislatures or through the renegotiation of new state constitutions.
The true revolution in America began between 1865 and 1870 when the Confederate
States yielded the People’s sovereignty to the American national government as the
consequence of military conquest rather than the consent of the governed. The 14th
Amendment’s interpretation by the Supreme Court, has continually reinforced the sovereignty
of the national government over the states and the People. According to legal historian, Raoul
Berger, this has been accomplished by the Supreme Court’s “invas[ion of] the exclusive
jurisdiction of a sister branch…and it has encroached on the sovereignty reserved to the
States…in the name of a self-created doctrine to legitimate the exercise of power once
rationalized under the garb of natural law.”222 He concluded that the 14th Amendment has
allowed to Court to “continu[al] revision of the Constitution under the guise of interpretation,”
which had effectively established common law as determined by the Supreme Court to be the
sovereign of our contemporary American society.223 Essentially, Berger’s argument pointed to
the idea that although the 10th Amendment asserted the pre-eminence of the States to the
national government in all matters not stipulated in the Constitution, the 14th Amendment has
been used as the rationalization for the application of judicial fiat or Congressional positive law
as an overriding principle to state laws in matters not addressed in the Constitution.
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Functionally, this has subjected the people within a previously and separately constituted
society, as recognized by the 10th Amendment, to what any Leveller would have considered the
arbitrary expression of power from various other entities and factions of society.
However, in the mid nineteenth-century, so strong was the Leveller spirit within
America that even then, the sovereignty of the jury forestalled and ultimately thwarted the
government from charging the leader of the rebellious Southern States with treason. The
impact of Lilburne’s interpretation of jury sovereignty was so poignant that the issue of the
People’s sovereignty needed to be addressed more circumspectly. It was not until 1895 when
all authority related to the interpretation of the rights, liberties, and privileges of the People
were ceded to the national government and the Leveller experiment in America was ended.
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Chapter 6
“Proof Against the Opinion of the Judges”
The Leveller Revolution was defeated where it had begun--in a courtroom. On January
13, 1893, Thomas St. Claire, Herman Sparf, and Hans Hansen boarded a vessel in international
waters, and if the testimony obtained by the ship’s crew while the men were detained was
accurate, killed and tossed the body of Maurice Fitzgerald overboard.1 Since the crime
happened in international waters, the case immediately fell under federal jurisdiction, and
based on the Sixth Amendment, a jury was empaneled and charged by the judge to rule on
points of fact. The Supreme Court appeal, written by John Marshall Harlan made it clear that
the facts of the case were simple, and in point of law, although the confession had been made
in captivity, it was not coerced and was therefore was admissible in court.2
The Supreme Court had not decided to review Sparf’s and Hansen’s appeals because
their guilt was in question. Rather, what was really on trial in Sparf was the issue of jury
supremacy. In 1649 and 1653, Lilburne had successfully made the case to his juries that they
had the authority to rule on points of law as well as the facts of his case. In modern
jurisprudence, the idea of a jury ruling on points of fact is well-understood; juries hear evidence
and then determine if a crime has been committed as alleged by the prosecution. However,
what Lilburne introduced was the concept that the jury also had the authority to rule in points
of law. This meant that a jury had the authority to decide that although in fact, one had
committed an act designated a crime, that the law itself was problematic and therefore
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invalidated the charges. By making this case, he was acquitted in 1649 and 1653, both in cases
where his life was at stake and his unquestioned actions were absolute violations of the law as
it was written. Within the Leveller program of sovereignty, his argument was an ultimate
expression of the sovereignty of the People, via a jury, to overrule unjust laws by acquitting and
introducing natural law precedents to the common law to correct positive law as received from
the government. The supremacy of the American jury, and by extension the People, was the
real issue for which the Supreme Court had agreed to hear the appeal and pass judgement.3
Writing in his dissent, Justice Shiras described the events that had transpired in the
lower court.4 The defendants in the case had requested that the jury be instructed that the
jurors had the ability to rule that the crime was manslaughter rather than murder, but the
judge refused to so instruct the jury, and overruled their objection. After deliberation, one of
the jurors requested to receive instruction from the judge. The juror was concerned with some
legal definitions because he was considering whether the case was truly murder rather than
manslaughter for the two men who had been accomplices but not actually killed the victim.5
The judge replied tersely that he had already instructed the jury on these points of law, and
that there was a higher court to correct his error if it was necessary.
The juror refused to back down. He asked again what the meanings of “aiding” and
“abetting” were, acknowledging that in this case it was necessary before he could decide
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whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty. Clearly implied in the juror’s mind was the
reality that the case was a capital offense, and that the death penalty was the result for the two
men who had not killed the victim. To the juror, this did not absolve the defendants of guilt,
but the punishment was excessive, and so he was looking for a way to reduce the sentence.
The judge responded again, forcefully, that if the facts in the case supported the men’s
involvement, then it was murder. The juror again asked if he might return a verdict other than
guilty or not guilty, seeking instead a verdict of manslaughter. The judge refused. The defense
objected, and the judge again overruled them. The juror repeated the question directly, and
the judge affirmed that “a jury is expected to be governed by law, and the law it should receive
from the court.”6 Since the juror fully understood the statement by the judge in that case, he
stopped questioning the judge, and ultimately returned a “guilty” verdict with the rest of the
jury, and both men were sentenced to death.
The higher tribunal alluded to by the federal judge was appealed to, in which the
statement by the judge was reviewed and upheld. Dissenting, George Shiras Jr. wrote that “the
judge, by instructing the jury that they were bound to accept the law as given to them by the
court, denied their right to decide the law.”7 However, his opinion was overruled in a 5-4
decision, and the People’s sovereignty to determine points of law was dissolved; ironically in a
court which issues rulings without a jury and is wholly unaccountable to the People.8 As
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Walwyn had once written, thus ended the period in American history when “the consciences of
the Jury [were] proof against the opinion of the Judges.”9
Dennis Hale has concluded that Sparf was the critical inflection point that separates our
contemporary jury era from that which came before.10 In summarizing the previous era, he
stated that “[t]he relationship between judges and jurors had once been seen as a partnership
in which the judge, as the senior partner, advised jurors about the meaning and requirements
of the law, while the jurors found the facts and applied the law as they understood it.”11 The
ruling in Sparf fundamentally reversed this role; the judge was solely empowered to exercise
judgement regarding the charges, and the jury only the facts of the case. Hale interpreted this
shift as one which had to do with the democratization of the nation. His basic claim was that as
more states lifted property requirements for voting and also for jury service, there became a
general mistrust of the jury’s ability to perform its duty; since the property requirement in the
early nineteenth-century had ensured a certain level of civic awareness which could not be
assumed of the general populace.12 The solution was to give less power to the jury.
Hale’s interpretation, while no doubt representative of the general republican view of
governance, is completely opposed to the Levellers’ beliefs about juries. Lilburne and the
Levellers believed that especially coupled with their constitutional proposals for laws to be in
plain English and constructed simply, that the meanest Englishman could serve faithfully on a
jury. Given their general fear of an oligarchy of lawyers who weaponized the law to retain
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power, their commitment to an equal playing field within the courtroom becomes even more
clear. The connection between Lilburne and the sovereignty of juries and due process within
Anglo-American jurisprudence was far more explicit than that of the sovereignty of the People
over the government generally. According to Michael Braddick, the Fox Libel Act of 1792 seems
to have had Lilburne’s 1653 trial in mind when it enshrined in British statutory law the principle
that juries did not have to find a writer guilty simply because they authored a work; within this
narrow context, the law enabled them to rule on points of law and fact.13
As has been demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the American colonists and early
Patriots were likely unaware of the philosophical ideology of the Levellers, and therefore
employed the word pejoratively, while unwittingly pursuing the same ideology. However, they
were far more likely to be aware of John Lilburne, and to hold a positive impression of him.
William Sewel had translated a Dutch book on the Quakers (“Antinomians” in Lilburne’s day),
which memorialized Lilburne as “and extraordinary bold man, very stiff and inflexible…Assertor
of the People’s Liberties and Freedoms.”14 Sewel’s book demonstrated an awareness of the
basic facts of Lilburne’s several imprisonments, making a high note of both of his treason trials
in 1649 and 1653, in which he appealed to, and won the favor of the jury against the arbitrary
government of Oliver Cromwell.15 A third edition of the book was reprinted and released by
Isaac Collins in 1774, demonstrating that the Quaker narrative of Lilburne’s heroics would have
been available and considered current to the Founders.16
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According to F.K. Donnelly, Lilburne was associated with his “radical concept of the
rights of juries” throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.17 Donnelly cites Thomas
Green as showing in Verdict According to Conscience (1985) that the idea of jury rights to
interpret law was a key aspect of Leveller ideology.18 Lilburne’s principle of jury privilege was
cited by several British jurists and lawyers around the turn of the nineteenth-century.19
However, during this time period Lilburne was still mostly separated from the remainder of the
Levellers. Donnelly suggests two reasons for this. The first was due to the continued
encumbrance of the “Leveller” moniker and its eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
connotations and the second was the desire to co-opt Lilburne to the Whiggish cause, due to
his objectification as the “object of patriotic hero-worship.”20
The Loyalist governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Hutchinson, was also aware of John
Lilburne, although his reference to Lilburne was merely a way of orienting the history of the
colonists who had been in America in the mid-seventeenth century. One was Sir Richard
Saltonstall, whose name Hutchinson had “seen…among the commissioners for the trial of
Lilburne.”21 That Lilburne was not discussed with the same veneration by Hutchinson is what
one would expect from a Tory, but that his trial was historically significant enough to include in
the narrative is a general indication of the expectation of the author that Lilburne’s trial was a
useful reference. The short inclusion of Lilburne in his narrative held no special significance
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aside from the fact that Hutchinson clearly viewed it as an important case in the history of
seventeenth-century English jurisprudence, and therefore worthy of noting that Saltsonstall
had been involved in that particular case.22
The British historian and philosopher, David Hume, was well-aware of Lilburne and
incorporated his connection to the Levellers. Hume noted that after a Lockier’s funeral, in
which the Leveller supporters wore sea-green ribbons and black, that “Fairfax and Cromwell fell
upon them,” and arrested four hundred or so Leveller leaders.23 His narrative freely allowed
that Lilburne had enjoyed a massive popular support, including among the women of the
nation, who had petitioned for his release.24 According to Hume, the “parliament judged it
necessary to enlarge the laws of high-treason,” in order to prosecute Lilburne and the
Levellers.25 Hume’s narrative was subtitled in the margin at the top of the page, “the Levellers
Supressed” which demonstrated that he was well aware of Lilburne’s connection to the Leveller
Movement; further substantiated by the awareness of the Leveller green ribbons.26 Hume’s
writing had an admirable tone when discussing Lilburne, who had been treated with “such
severity by the star-chamber,” and then had been “ill relished by the parliament.”27
Lilburne was also cited in the famous anti-slavery case, commonly known as the
Somerset Case (1772). Historian Krista Kesselring noted that the Somerset Case “was the first of
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the trials that saw ‘Freeborn John’ become associated with the right to free expression and to
refuse self-incrimination.”28
It is significant to note that Donnelly concluded many Whigs steered clear of Levellers
and Levellerism not due to an unfamiliarity with their writings, but because their arguments did
not fit “within the confines of Whig ‘constitutional rhetoric.’”29 Therefore, John Lilburne,
especially in the context of jury supremacy, was a known figure within the Anglo-American
consciousness. It might be accurately concluded that with respect to this aspect in particular,
the Americans were explicit Lilburnists, and by extension Levellers. Given the fact that the
Patriots were more radical than their Whig contemporaries, it also stands to reason that
although Levellers didn’t fit with Whig constitutional rhetoric, they may have with American
constitutional rhetoric.
The American Declaration of Independence was partially predicated on the fact that the
King had destroyed the People’s influence over the judiciary. The Declaration opined that “he
has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices” and that he was
guilty of “depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.”30 By depriving the
Americans of these two rights, they claimed to be left in a state of arbitrary tyranny where the
citizen was rendered even more powerless than Lilburne had been. This violation of their
sovereignty was serious enough to be included in the list of grievances which stated the reasons
for the disconnection of the People’s government in America from the English Crown.
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The ratification of the US Constitution created immediate controversy regarding the
inclusion of a Bill of Rights. The American Levellers who had declared the People’s sovereignty
in the Declaration had been joined by what could truly be styled as American Independents
who posited that the government, rather than the People, were sovereign. Amongst their
British contemporaries, the Federalists and eventually the Jacksonian Democrats argued for the
superiority of the national state, not only in relation to the states, but in relation to the People.
The Early Republic and Antebellum political struggles were clearly defined between American
Levellers (Jeffersonians) and American Independents (Federalists, Jacksonians, Whigs,
Republicans) and those disagreements began with the debate over the Bill of Rights.31
As a part of the debate over the inclusion of a Bill of Rights, the right to a jury trial was a
major concern for many representatives. James Jackson of Georgia allowed that
“[m]uch has been said by the opponents to this Constitution, respecting the insecurity of
jury trials, that great bulwark of personal safety. All their objections may be done away, by
proper regulations on this point, and I do not fear but such regulations will take place. The
bill is now before the Senate, and a proper attention is shown to this business.”32

While allowing for the significance of a jury trial in the defense of personal liberties, Jackson
expressed a confidence that positive law, as written in Congress, would be sufficient defense of
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this liberty. The Levellers had initially done the same in their first Agreements but eventually
insisted on the protection of a constitutionally enshrined freedom.
James Madison, one of the main proponents for the Bill of Rights, disagreed. He
proceeded to outline his proposal for the necessity of an additional clause in the Constitution
which prohibited states from “violat[ing] the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the
press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.”33 It was telling that he ranked the right to a jury
trial as co-equal to the freedoms of religion and press, since these liberties were largely held to
be the ultimate guarantee of the People’s sovereignty. Madison recognized this as an issue
related to the sovereignty of the People. He explained as much when detailing in his
rationalization for the addition of the Bill of Rights that, “in the declaration of rights which
[Britain] has established, the truth is, they have gone no farther than to raise a barrier against
the power of the Crown; the power of the Legislature is left altogether indefinite.”34 Madison’s
purpose was not to strengthen a particular branch of government to guarantee a balance of
power; it was to buttress the People against their own government completely.
According to Madison, the exclusion of a Bill of Rights opened the People up to two
different forms of tyranny. As demonstrated above, he was aware of the general theory of
jurisprudence which made the legislative branch in England sovereign and the equivalence of
constitutional law to writing positive law. This was an effective “barrier against the power of
the Crown,” as those in the Whig tradition desired, but still vested unlimited power in the
Parliament.
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of the People by the government in general. However, there was another fear that Madison
held, specifically, as he had once written to Jefferson in a letter pressing for the adoption of a
Bill of Rights, “from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number
of constituents.”35 This was what Madison, throughout his political and personal career,
referred to as a “levelling spirit.”36 Ironically, for identical reasons as Madison and Jefferson
vehemently rejected the application of the term “Anti-Federalist” to their political ideology,
they were potentially prevented from recognizing their affinity with the “Levellers,” whom they
believed were socialists based on Ireton’s propagandistic label.
Madison saw the rights of conscience, the press, and a jury trial as sufficiently important
that the sovereignty of the States needed to be intruded upon if necessary.37 Madison also
recognized that unlike the remainder of the rights defended by the proposed Bill of Rights,
which were natural and inalienable rights, “trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural right,
but a right resulting from a social compact, which regulates the action of the community, but is
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as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature.”38
His argument was relatively straightforward. There can be no trial by jury in the state of nature
because there is no society, government, or legal apparatus. However, in the creation of the
state of society, the very process of the creation of that society requires certain institutional
restraints which were otherwise unnecessary in the state of nature. Trial by jury was one such
right, in which the People could only retain sovereignty within society if they had the right to
rule on the justice of the law directly. Juries were the way in which this ruling could take place.
Thomas Jefferson considered trial by jury to be the only effective means to check the
expansion of government power, designating it “the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by
which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”39 When one considers
the operative principle of institutional Parliamentary sovereignty which existed within the
British Empire at the time, this statement made sense. Should all three branches of the
government be corrupted, which many of the Founders including Jefferson took as granted, the
only way the People could force compliance to the Constitution would be for a jury to return
verdicts contrary to the government but in line with the Constitution. This gave the People a
direct veto over all legislation which did or ever could exist.
John Adams, who approached the general Constitutional framework from the opposite
viewpoint, and had very few sympathies for the Leveller ideas of constitutionalism, concurred
with Jefferson’s assessment of the importance of juries as being independent from statutory
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law in certain cases. He confided to his diary on February 12, 1771 that a juror had an
obligation to “find the Verdict according to his own best Understanding, Judgment and
Conscience, tho in Direct opposition to the Direction of the Court.”40 These statements lend
context to the Declaration of Independences’ indictments against King George III for, “depriving
us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury: For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried
for pretended offences…[resulting in] an Arbitrary government, and…introducing…absolute rule
into these Colonies.”41 The colonists held as inviolable, the right of twelve men from their
neighborhoods, to rule in all matters of fact and law which effected them.
Prior to participating in the Bill of Rights debate, Elbridge Gerry, an Anti-federalist from
Massachusetts, had taken great pains to print his problem with the new Constitution. Gerry
found issue that “an appeal should lay to the supreme judiciary of the United States for the
correction of all errors both in law and fact.”42 This was problematic, because Gerry was
“contended for jury trials in civil cases.”43 In his opinion, the establishment of any judicial
authority within the federal government was problematic, because “a federal judiciary with the
powers abovementioned, would be as oppressive and dangerous, as the establishment of
a Star Chamber.”44 The implications of this argumentation cannot be understated. Gerry
clearly trusted a jury to rule on matters of law and fact in civil cases more than he did the
Supreme Court. To place that power within the national government would make it sovereign,
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and establish a Star Chamber Court, which every American understood to mean an arbitrary
court that was beyond the power of the People. Gerry predicted that the United States
Supreme Court would eventually usurp the People’s sovereignty.
The American perspective of jury supremacy was reinforced by the historical narrative
of the English seventeenth century written by David Hume, who explicitly connected it to the
Levellers. Hume was further aware of the decision by the Parliament in subsequent cases to
not empanel juries in treason cases because “they had evidently seen in the trial of Lilburn
what they could expect from juries.”45 He was clear in his own interpretation that jury trials
were the “noble institution, by which the government of this island has ever been so much
distinguished,” and that Parliament had rationalized this “usurpation” based on the ancient
laws of the nation.46 In Hume’s narrative, the entire city of London celebrated Lilburne’s
acquittal, “though he was plainly guilty,” and that this constituted an unprecedented time in
English history where an “established power receive so strong a declaration of its usurpation
and invalidity;” an indictment that “no institution, besides the admirable one of juries” could
return. To prevent all those opposed to Cromwell’s government from having “entire impunity,”
and because “juries were found altogether unmanageable,” the Lord Protector had found it
necessary to create a new legal process for trials.47 Hume attributed this reality to the “restless
Lilburne,” who had been brought to trial on new charges and had again been “acquitted with
new triumph and exultation.”48
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Hume’s historical narrative of the connection between Lilburne, the Levellers, and jury
trials, originally written in the 1750’s, was especially important to recognize. The narrative of
Lilburne in Hume’s multi-volume set published by the Online Library of Liberty from 1778
identically matches that of its reprint in America from 1795. Hume was well-known and
influential to the thinking of the rebellious American colonists, so his narrative of Lilburne, and
in particular the heroic way in which he and the Levellers were portrayed in reference to their
resistance of Cromwell’s illegitimate government, would have informed the American thought
of the history of English jurisprudence.49
Hume’s conclusion on the “Domestic administration of Cromwel” is worth quoting at
length:
It must also be acknowledged, that the protector, in his civil and domestic administration,
displayed as great regard both to justice and clemency, as his usurped authority, derived
from no law, and founded only on the sword, could possibly permit. All the chief offices in
the courts of judicature were filled with men of integrity: Amidst the virulence of faction, the
decrees of the judges were upright and impartial: And to every man but himself, and to
himself, except where necessity required the contrary, the law was the great rule of conduct
and behaviour. Vane and Lilburn, whose credit with the republicans and levellers he
dreaded, were indeed for some time confined to prison: Cony, who refused to pay illegal
taxes, was obliged by menaces to depart from his obstinacy: High courts of justice were
erected to try those who had engaged in conspiracies and insurrections against the
protector’s authority, and whom he could not safely commit to the verdict of juries. But
these irregularities were deemed inevitable consequences of his illegal authority. And
though often urged by his officers, as is pretended to attempt a general massacre of the
royalists, he always with horror rejected such sanguinary counsels.50

The united opposition to Cromwellian tyranny but also political separation of the Levellers and
the Republicans was made clear in their being listed separately, but also in the reference to Sir
Henry Vane (the Younger) and Lilburne separately. Hume concluded that Cromwell’s
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illegitimate rule had necessitated his circumvention of jury trial. Lilburne would not have
written his own history of Cromwell’s usurpation much differently.
Hume consistently carried the narrative of juridical supremacy throughout the sixth
volume of his history. In discussing the charges against the Earl of Shaftsbury, Lord Anthony
Ashley-Cooper, Hume’s narrative almost perfectly mirrored his treatment of Lilburne. He
recognized the similarities in Shaftsbury’s acquittal, and allowed that “the grand jury, therefore,
after weighing all these circumstances, rejected the indictment; and the people, who attended
the hall, testified their joy by the loudest acclamations, which were echoed throughout the
whole city,” despite the jury being packed with royalists.51 Hume repeatedly noted the jurypacking schemes of the royalists as a major impediment to the execution of justice. Due to this
fact, he celebrated the underdog victories but had discovered a fundamental paradox related to
the nature of the juries and the government.
Since Hume was writing in large part to legitimize the Whig ascension to power in the
Glorious Revolution over oppressive monarchial government, he had attempted to fuse Leveller
and republican ideals.52 However, when it came to the resolution of the paradox of jury
supremacy, Hume defaulted to a virtuous republican government, rather than the People.
Juries, at least within Hume’s construct, were too much a construct of government, and
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ultimately subjected to its corruption. While they had acquitted Lilburne and Shaftesbury,
these were outlier cases, rather than a true representative of a refuge for the People’s trust. In
his Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, Hume concluded that “[a]ll crimes are tried within the
county by the magistrates and a jury. But the senate can stop any trial, and bring it before
themselves.”53 Thus, while recognizing the potential for legislative tyranny and celebrating in
both Lilburne and Shaftsbury’s cases that juries had been the ultimate defender of liberty,
Hume resolved the paradox of Oceana’s best government, by choosing to put faith in the virtue
of the Senate rather than the People. However, nothing stopped the American Levellers from
reading Hume’s narrative and arriving at the opposite conclusion about jury sovereignty. Of
equal importance, Hume was a direct source that transmitted the philosophy and success
stories of jury sovereignty from the Levellers to the Americans.
It didn’t take long for Gerry’s prediction to come true; the erosion of the People’s
sovereignty as expressed by the idea of jury sovereignty began with the Supreme Court case of
Marbury v. Madison (1803), in which the principle of judicial review was established. More
broadly, the Marshall Court asserted its predominance within the American constitutional
arrangement. In the ruling issued by the court, Marshall declared that:
…the Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court,
and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This
power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and
consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case, because the right
claimed is given by a law of the United States.54
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The ruling asserted that the Supreme Court was the final arbiter in all cases of law. However, it
was significant to note that from the perspective of the sovereignty of the People, Marbury v.
Madison established that the only branch within the government that was not directly
accountable to the People or the states was the one which would rule on the interpretation of
the People’s (or states’) contract with the general government.
It is only with the historian’s view of the development of common law within the
American system, that Marbury v. Madison marked the beginning of the subversion of the
Leveller Revolution. Although it made the Supreme Court the final arbiter of all laws within the
federal government, the People remained sovereign so long as their individual state laws were
not subject to this process. This was precisely the result of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), when
Maryland, which was a “a sovereign State, denie[d] the obligation of a law enacted by the
legislature of the Union” related to the national bank.55 The case was recognized by both
Marshall and the counsel for the State of Maryland to be primarily an issue of the very nature
of the Constitution, whether it was revolutionary in nature, and had established a new
American society, or whether it was a confederation of states that had retained their
sovereignty.56
It is critical to recognize that Marshall’s conclusion was that the creation of the federal
government, “‘in order to form a more perfect union,’…deemed [it] necessary to change this
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alliance into an effective Government, possessing great and sovereign powers and acting
directly on the people.”57 It didn’t just act on the people; technically now the Supreme Court
could overrule civil juries. The procedural mechanism by which this redefinition took place is
critical to understanding the role that the Marshall Court played in undermining the Leveller
concept of consent within American jurisprudence. Almost two decades earlier, Marshall’s
Court had established that it was the final arbiter within the bounds of the national
government. McCulloch v. Maryland used that power to establish that the Supreme Court also
had the authority to nullify state laws, essentially making it the final sovereign entity of
government within the entirety of the American governmental structure. Furthermore, by its
own created power of judicial review, the Supreme Court overlayed every individuals state
citizenship with a higher national citizenship.
As constitutionally prescribed, the Supreme Court does not incorporate a jury trial, and
is the least accountable instrument of government to the People.58 Marshall’s two rulings
created a closed loop which undermined the People and made the Court the final sovereign of
the National Government, and by extension, the national government of which it was
predominant, sovereign to the People. This revolutionary process was achieved by six
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unelected justices, and against the direct objections of at least one of the previously
acknowledged “sovereign states,” which was a respondent in McCullough v. Maryland.
However, laying the philosophical and common law precedents (de jure) for such a
revolution was different than establishing it in fact (de facto). The political philosophy and work
of John C. Calhoun was representative of the attempt on the part of Americans to put the
proverbial genie back into the bottle, by re-establishing that the general government was only
sovereign within its delegated sphere of influence, as Maryland had unsuccessfully contended
several decades earlier.59 The Taney Court of the 1850s attempted to do the same. In the
infamous Dred Scott Case, Taney held that the government of the United States was only
“sovereign and supreme in its appropriate sphere of action, yet it does not possess all the
powers which usually belong to the sovereignty of a nation…certain specified powers,
enumerated in the Constitution, have been conferred upon it.”60 Taney held that since the
Dred Scott Decision was essentially an issue of conflicting laws between separate sovereign
states or territories within the national confederation, it was appropriate for the Supreme
Court to issue a ruling on the matter. This was procedurally different from the principle of
judicial review of a conflict between state law and federal law, as was the case in McCollough
vs. Maryland, and was one explicitly granted to the Supreme Court in Article Three of the
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Constitution. Also contrary to popular belief, the conflict between the federal Fugitive Slave
Act (1850) and certain state laws in the North which protected fugitive slaves was not at issue
in Dred Scott v. Sandford, since neither Scott, nor his family, were fugitive slaves.61
The legal gymnastics that Taney took to avoid the precedents established by the
Marshall Court are instructive of the conflict within the common law interpretations of the
Constitution’s relationship to state and individual sovereignty. Taney held that the Preamble to
the Constitution was to be correctly interpretated as having been initiated by “the people of
the United States -- that is to say, by those who were members of the different political
communities in the several States.”62 He had previously established that the citizens were
“what we familiarly call the ‘sovereign people,’ and every citizen is one of this people, and a
constituent member of this sovereignty.”63 The Leveller connotations implicit within Taney’s
definition of “sovereign people” cannot be missed.
The reality was that the Taney Court and the prior Marshall Court held two completely
different interpretations of the Constitution, and its relationship to the states and the People.
In Marshall’s interpretation, the initiation of the Constitution was tantamount to a
revolutionary renegotiation of the social contract, in which the people of the separate states
initiated a new American society. By making the Federal Supreme Court the arbiter over all
laws made within either the federal or state jurisdictions, Marshall argued that the Supreme
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Court, rather than the People, or their representatives, were the final sovereign within this
newly constituted society. This was achieved by reading between the lines of the explicit
Constitution, discounting the Tenth Amendment, and referencing his own previous rulings and
interpretations at common law. Taney, on the other hand, argued that the Supreme Court was
only sovereign within its prescribed constitutional jurisdiction, and that this jurisdiction was
subordinate to the “constituent member[s] of this society.”64 However, in matters which
involved the rival claims of the members of two or more societies, the Supreme Court was
explicitly empowered by the Constitution to issue a ruling of the correct relationship between
those rival claims.
The Leveller’s commitment to active and perpetual consensual relationship between the
People and their government would seem to be at fundamental odds with the American
institution of slavery, since definitionally, enslaved persons were subjected to laws of a
government of which they were neither citizens, nor had consented at any point in the past.
The deviation from Leveller jurisprudence, as it pertained to institutionalized slavery, was not
represented in the decentralized tendencies toward the distribution of power to the separate
states within the federalist framework, as represented by the views of Calhoun and the Taney
court. Rather, it was in the fundamental rejection of the personhood of the enslaved person
who, by Taney’s careful evaluation of common law principles, was disqualified from having any
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right to give consent at the time of the constitution of the American confederation. The
Levellers had argued that this was the very purpose of the negative Constitutional framework:
to prevent the incursion of the State into the interference of the experience of certain
freedoms, of which slavery was perhaps the quintessential violation.65
That the Supreme Court would occasionally issue rulings on legislation that had been
previously subjected to a jury trial was not automatically a violation of the principle of jury
sovereignty. For example, in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, at issue was the constitutional
interpretation of the instructions given to the jury by the court. Since there had been
conflicting instructions at different courts, the question before the Supreme Court was as to
which judge had accurately instructed his respective jury, and therefore which finding was
valid. There was never an attempt by either jury to evoke the principle of jury sovereignty, or
to rule on matters of law. In each of the lower courts, the court had provided the jury with a
particular interpretation of the law, and the jury had incorporated that interpretation into its
findings as it pertained to the facts of the case. The Sparf case differed substantively, in the fact
that the juror speaking to the judge in that case was specifically asking if he had the authority to
evoke the principle of jury sovereignty, albeit not in such terms. He was instructed by the judge
that he did not, and after several iterations of the same line of questioning, abided by the
Court’s interpretation, which was subsequently subjected to Supreme Court interpretation.
The particulars of his exchange with the judge mattered. In the dissenting account of
the lower court case, Justice Gray recounted that the juror had asked: “’Then there is no other

65

See: Appendix C: On Slavery.

370
verdict we can bring in, except guilty or not guilty?’"66 The judge had replied: “‘In a proper
case, a verdict for manslaughter may be rendered, as the district attorney has stated, and even
in this case you have the physical power to do so; but, as one of the tribunals of the country, a
jury is expected to be governed by law, and the law it should receive from the court.’” 67 In
asking whether he could change the charge to manslaughter, even though this option had not
been provided by the Court, the judge did not outright deny the technical possibility for the jury
to do it by common law (“even in this case you have the physical power to do so.”) However,
he implicitly cast doubt on the morality and the constitutionality of such an action. His
insinuation that to rule against the instruction of the court was contrary to the right of the jury,
was of itself, according to Justices Gray and Shiras a denial of “their right to decide the law.”68
Jury sovereignty, then, was more than merely returning a “not guilty” verdict, as was commonly
assumed; it represented the ability of a jury to act independent of the instructions received by
the judge on matters of fact and law on behalf of the People.69
The issue of jury sovereignty and the People’s sovereignty overlapped in the non-trial of
Jefferson Davis. Officials within the government knew that if Davis were to be convicted in a
jury trial, the only two possibilities of this occurring would be if he were charged outside of the
South, or if the jury was packed. When briefly considering moving the trial to Indiana or
Pennsylvania, Attorney General James Speed, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, and Speed’s
successor Henry Stanbery all concluded that, according to the Constitution, Davis must be tried

66

Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156.U.S.113.
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
See: Chapter 6, Footnote 82.
67

371
in Virginia, since Richmond had been the capital of the Confederacy.70 Stanton believed that it
was of great “importance that [Davis’s trial] should be conducted in such a manner as to meet
the approval of the American Bar,” and therefore rejected the notion that jury-packing schemes
or movement of the case outside of the jurisdiction of a former-Confederate State would hold
any legitimacy.71
It was important to recognize that the Johnson Cabinet opposed movement of the trial
as a matter of pragmatism, rather than an ideological commitment to the Constitution.
However, as was demonstrated in Chapter 5, even the progressive ideology of the ancient
constitution and governance required the implicit consent of the people. Johnson’s Cabinet
played by certain rules not necessarily because they believed them, but because they were
forced to by the expectations of the People. The only thing that the government wanted more
than a conviction of Davis, was a result that did not reinforce the theory of secession and state
supremacy. Subjecting Davis to a jury trial in 1868 introduced the possibility that a jury would
rule as a point of law, that secession was legitimate. That the Constitution technically required
the trial to take place in the South further complicated this reality, since it would be a jury of
Southerners likely to be predisposed to the idea of secession. Ultimately, the concept of
government sovereignty to that of the People was too risky to put to an empaneled jury in the
South and was therefore avoided at all costs.
For this reason, it was again important to recognize that the Civil War was a key
inflection point for American jurisprudence. The Constitution specifically provided that a
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person charged with treason should be “delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime.”72 The Constitution also required that all trials for all crimes, except
impeachment, be conducted by jury.73 This meant that even in crimes of treason, the Framers
of the Constitution saw it as an issue falling within the jurisdiction of an individual state, and
not within the jurisdiction of the national government. However, not only was it within the
jurisdiction of the state, but quite literally within the sovereignty of the People of that state,
represented directly by the empaneled jury.
This had also been a key feature of the complaint in the Declaration of Rights and
Grievances (1774) against Parliament, where the First Continental Congress complained that a
recent Parliamentary act, “deprive[d] the American subject of a constitutional trial by jury of
the vicinage, by authorizing the trial of any person charged with the committing any offense
described in the said act, out of the realm, to be indicted and tried for the same in any shire or
county within the realm.”74 The Declaration of Rights and Grievances used jury trials to further
distinguish between the colonies and Great Britain as separate realms. The entire philosophy
of British jurisprudence required that the jury be local to where the crime had been committed,
since those individuals were the best aware of the context in which the crime allegedly took
place. Even before the Declaration of Independence, the Americans were thinking about
themselves as separate jurisdictions with their own legislative and judicial powers. This was
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preposterous to the King and Parliament, which both assumed their jurisdiction to legislate and
rule on matters of law.
The Constitution left treason trials within the jurisdiction of a state where the treason
supposedly took place. By stipulating that this trial must be conducted with a jury selected
from that state, the Framers left the People of that state to determine whether the actions of
the accused was treasonous or not. This became highly problematic for the Republicans and
the Johnson administration, leaving one to wonder why the Constitution was constructed this
way.
Logically, there are five potential explanations for the construction of the Constitution
relative to juries and jurisdiction in treason trials, and how these realities would interact with a
possible secession of a state. The first was that the Framers did not consider secession, or any
of the subsequent actions of secession to be treasonous, and therefore assumed that a trial like
the one Davis faced would never happen. The second was that they foresaw that a scenario
like Davis’ might one day arise and wished to ensure that the People of the state which had
seceded had the right to be empaneled on a jury. Presumably, the second possibility would
have a high degree of a “not guilty” verdict being returned. Each of these explanations suggest
a strong Leveller belief in the supremacy of the people over the Union, either by virtue of
states’ rights, or directly in the ability of a jury from a seceded territory to legitimize secession.
The third possibility was that the potential for such a conflict was so far outside of their
consciousness that it was overlooked. Given the reality that the separate states had just
seceded from the British Empire, this possibility seems to be especially unlikely. The fourth
possibility was that they assumed that secession would be granted as a potential right,
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adjudicated by trial of battle, and then the state would be treated as a conquered territory
rather than as a state, and therefore as being unnecessary to address in the Constitution. This
also seems very unlikely, given the reality that the Constitution was directly intended to
arbitrate interstate issues so as to prevent a scenario like the one described from ever
occurring.
There was yet another possibility, which was that secession was viewed as illegitimate
by the Founders, but that they anticipated that actions like Davis’ would be covered under
international law, and therefore that he would not be put on trial for treason by virtue of his
pseudo-country’s internationally recognized belligerent status. This line of argument was
highly unlikely, given the fact that none of the colonial leaders expected to be protected from
accusations or convictions of treason if they lost the war with Britain based on their belligerent
status accorded in international law.75 Additionally, the Framers were ideologically driven, and
would have viewed their trials as traitors and subsequent hangings as being further evidence of
British tyranny and violations of their natural rights. Although this line of argument was
strongly argued in Davis’ defense, it was explicitly to spare him from being convicted of treason
and executed and was deliberately to try to distance Davis’ trial from the issue of secession all
together.
Having explained why the last two options are unlikely, it behooves the historian to
more closely examine the first two. If secession was automatically assumed as a right by the
Framers of the Constitution, then the constitutionality of the Union’s actions against the
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Confederacy is clearly settled against the Union. This would at the very least qualify the Union
as a revolutionary force and depending on if one accepted the legitimacy of the trial by battle
line of argument, potentially even as a conquering entity. The second possibility, that the
Founders intended for a jury within a formerly seceded state to ultimately decide the legitimacy
of that secession, would have produced a powerful restraint on the power of the federal
government, and an extremely strong enshrinement of the sovereignty of the People of a
particular state over the national government. The Due Process Amendments of the Bill of
Rights further clarified this intent by explicitly reserving the right to a jury trial in all criminal
proceedings, of which treason was not excepted by constitutional principle.76
Cynthia Nicoletti demonstrated that the prosecution team for Davis routinely,
deliberately, and systematically circumvented the potential of Davis being tried by a jury.77 The
result of this was that ultimately, “the momentous constitutional question that had animated
the Civil War was never actually argued before the Supreme Court.”78 Chief Justice Salmon
Chase held that Davis was ultimately determined by to have been punished by Congress by
being excluded from holding public office by Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and was
therefore protected from further punishment for his treason.79 Johnson subsequently issued a
general amnesty rather than have the Supreme Court rule definitively on the implications of the
14th Amendment for the treasonous former-Confederates.
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After declaring secession to be unconstitutional in Texas v. White, the Supreme Court
completed the dismantling of the Leveller framework for the People’s sovereignty in Sparf and
Hansen v. United States (1895). The Supreme Court found that “a jury is expected to be
governed by law, and the law it should receive from the court.”80 In essence, this ruling,
expressed by the majority opinion and subsequently admitted as a precedent, established that
the statutory laws created by the Congress of the United States (and ultimately the institution
capable of interpreting such statutes) were sovereign in the country, and that juries had to
receive their instructions from a court based on statutory law, rather than based on their own
conscience. The court also specifically ruled that juries were no longer to be instructed that
they could return verdicts for lesser offenses.81
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of the United States removed
the restraints to the expansion of national power within the American political system, and with
it the last visage of Leveller influence. In 1649, Lilburne had instructed his jury to, in essence,
declare the Parliamentary statutes unconstitutional and refuse to return his conviction, despite
the facts of the case which clearly demonstrated that he had violated the law. The jury obliged,
and the Leveller revolution which aimed to make the People sovereign within the English
political system began. In 1776, the Americans declared independence from the King based
partly on the fact that he failed to recognize individual sovereignty, and in 1787 and 1791,
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those same Americans enshrined the supremacy of juries within the Constitution itself. In
1895, only two of the dissenting justices in the Supreme Court objected, claiming that Sparf and
Hansen were not “submitted to the decision of the jury as required by the Constitution”
because the jury had not been allowed to rule in points of law as well as fact.82
As it related to the American political experience, the Americans were likely aware of
Lilburne’s theatrics and constitutional battles. Hume’s narrative made it clear that Lilburne was
an early champion of jury supremacy, and his view of juries was espoused by Federalist and
Antifederalist leaders. In his 1649 trial, Lilburne had claimed that God would vindicate him
against his political foes, which by that point, included Independents, Presbyterians, and
Monarchists. In one sense, he did not have to wait that long, since the twelve men of London
found him to be not guilty and overruled the censorship law of Parliament in his case.
Lilburne’s position was adroitly opposed by Independents like Henry Parker, who viewed this
doctrine as anathema to true liberty. Parker lamented that “levelling therefore should stand
Liberty amongst men,” rather than with the government, which he believed was “the more
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perfect Order which is amongst the Angels.”83 However, unpopular it was with the regime,
Lilburne’s declared freedom by the jury was incredibly popular with the people, resulting in half
an hour of uninterrupted applause in the courtroom, bonfires in the streets of London, and
cheering even from the soldiers that were presumably present to prevent the kind of bedlam
that had ensued.84 This one tenuous thread of the Leveller Revolution of the 1640s persisted,
and became something to which his name was attached in the American political
consciousness. It was his interpretation of jurisprudence that the Americans adopted when
designing their own Constitution; an interpretation that became so powerful that even the
President of a victorious army in 1865 could not seriously entertain the suspension of jury trials
as Cromwell had done in Lilburne’s day.
Many of the American Patriots and Framers were Levellers, some by direct association
with Lilburne, most through less direct means. However, much as the English Levellers had
been shaped by their opposition, so had their distant American cousins. Already committed to
the natural rights framework espoused by the Levellers as political and religious dissenters,
most Americans immediately formed societies that were more tolerant than those in England
and typically viewed conscience to be a reserved right. The concept of reserved rights led them
to develop a consensual view of government, and to legitimize their charters on this principle.
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When the British Parliament encroached on those governments, it was the Leveller
interpretation of consent that the colonists applied, rather than that of the Independents. As
they Framed their government and subsequently defined the federated nature of the
relationship of the general government to the state governments, political thinkers from the
Southern Tradition continued to espouse the Leveller framework for sovereignty, while the
Unionist thinkers tended to adopt a progressive, Independent view of government sovereignty.
The People’s sovereignty took time to erode and proved too compelling to justify the military
occupation of the rebel states, or to charge their leader with treason.
Recognizing the Leveller in us is critically important to understanding the revolutionary
dimension of the American Civil War. For better or for ill, the philosophy of sovereignty upon
which the Declaration of Independence was created is no longer operative in American
governance and constitutional theory. It is only by understanding the significance of the
Leveller Revolution that one can understand the fact that in addition to being the war that
ended slavery in America, the American Civil War also ended the theory of the People’s
sovereignty upon which the Declaration depended. This provides one possible explanation for
why contemporary Americans often have difficulty truly connecting the jurisprudence of the
twenty-first century to the Founding Fathers. American constitutional and legal thought
became far more recognizable to us today in the wake of the Civil War.
The Levellers redefined the political vocabulary of the seventeenth century. They made
it possible to think of the People as a collection of individuals, each with his or her own
inalienable rights. These inalienable natural rights were the ancient constitution and were
unchanging and unalterable. They recognized that it was impossible to reserve these rights as
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inalienable unless they were specifically reserved negative freedoms, enumerated in a written
and easy to understand Constitution. They also held that all governmental legitimacy was
founded upon consent, which meant that the franchise had to be extended to all whose
freedom would be impacted by the legislation. However, enfranchisement alone was not
sufficient defense for the People’s liberties, nor was a written constitution. To effectively
safeguard freedom, the Levellers argued that juries that could rule in matters of fact and law,
were the final sovereign within the English mixed constitution. Rather than merely
representing the People, the jury was the People. Along the way, they had also created a
framework which made it possible to describe any government as tyrannical when it usurped
the sovereignty of the People. The Levellers were the first and only group within the
seventeenth-century political world to recognize that tyranny was not an imbalanced
constitution of the separate institutions of government. It was an unbalanced relationship
between the government and the individual.
What defined that balance can be summarized in the triumvirate of Levellerism’s
“commons”: “common freedom,” “common equitie,” and the “common cause.” As they wrote
of the “common freedom,” they were not being careless with their semantics; the use of
“freedom” rather than “liberty” was meant to highlight the reality that such a right existed prior
to and eternally beyond the social contract. The Levellers were Christians, and as such,
believed in a higher power who had orchestrated the universe and the existence of man. They
also believed that God interacted with humans on an individual level, and therefore, it was the
common freedom of every human being to relate to God as he or she chose. The Creator could
be the only sovereign in such matters, and he had deferred judgement in such matters to some
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indeterminate point in the future. Therefore, for human institutions to interlope in this process
via its political, social, or religious institutions, was literally to usurp the divine prerogative.
According to Levellerism, the common freedom was the singular, and preconditional
reality of human societies. It could not even be accurately termed an “inalienable right,” since
to think of it in such terms would give to humanity that which belonged to the Creator.
However, there were other conditions, those “common equities”, which were necessary for the
experience of the common freedom within the institutions of man. They were those issues
which were arbitrated within the institutions of man but were rights necessary for the
individual to retain to guarantee the experience of the common freedom. Since consent was
the basis of all institutional authority, each individual was inherently equal within every society
of which he or she was a part. The “common equitie” could only be achieved if these rights
were reserved to the individual at the inception of the social contract. This meant they could
not be violated without consent, for it would amount to the initiation of a state of war between
the institution and the individual; the arbitrary nature of which was normally referred to as
“tyranny.” Since they were “common equities,” although the hypothetical condition of
unanimous consent could legitimately transfer them to an institution, the manifest absurdity of
this occurring in a society of any size, made them inalienable de facto.
Finally, the Levellers believed that the ultimate uniting principle of society was the
“common cause.” The unquestioned pluralistic reality of the common freedom guaranteed to
the Levellers a society with diverse religious beliefs and made dissent a forgone conclusion. To
them, the “common cause” was the literal foundation for society, in which each person and
group respected the ability of other individuals and groups to dissent (common freedom) and
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the means by which to do so peacefully (common equitie). Therefore, the “common cause”
was the united endeavor of all citizens to ensure that government, as the fundamentally
coercive institution of society, would be prevented from interfering with both the “common
freedom” and “common equietie.” Rather than being divisive, the Levellers recognized that the
“common cause” was the only possible unity of a pluralistic society.

383
Appendix A
Index of Political and Religious Groups (listed alphabetically)
Agitators: A dissenter group within the New Model Army in the late 1640s that attempted to
popularize the control of the Army by instituting democratic reform into the command
structure.
Anabaptists: A religious group which began during the early Reformation period in Switzerland,
following the teaching of Ulrich Zwingli. Extreme Anabaptists believed that a Christian
theocracy needed to be established in the nations of Western Europe and endeavored to incite
uprisings in order to institute such governments. Anabaptists were considered to be
nonconformists within the English State-Church in the 1640s and had been routinely
persecuted by the government since Henry VIII.
Anglicans: Those who held to the Protestant doctrinal beliefs held by the Church of England, as
originally instituted by Henry VIII. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Anglican
Church retained many of the rituals of the Roman Catholic Church, attempting to combine the
liturgical history of the catholic Church with Reformational doctrine, and the Protestant
rejection of the sovereignty of the Pope. By definition, at the outset of the First English Civil
War, the King of England was the head of the Anglican Church, as it was the official instituted
State-Church of England.
Anti-federalists (Jeffersonian Democrat-Republicans): An American political group which
became distinct in the American political system around the time of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 and came to be associated with the Constitutional interpretative
framework known as “strict constructivism.” Anti-federalists argued that the individual states
had retained their sovereignty relative to the general government, in part because the People
of the separate states had not unconditionally ceded their own sovereignty to their state, and
therefore the state was unauthorized to do so on their behalf.
Antinomians (Quakers): Within English political literature of the 1640s, it is likely that many
used this term to refer to the Quakers, who called themselves the “Religious Society of
Friends.” From its Greek origins, an “anti-nomian” was anyone who believes that salvation is
achieved without any respect to religious practice or law. The common accusation against the
Quakers as antinomians was essentially an indictment of their emphasis on spiritualism rather
than even attempting to follow basic tenets of the Christian faith, like the Ten Commandments.
Brownists (Pilgrims): Separatist Puritans, commonly referred to as Pilgrims in American
historical texts. They were followers of the teachings of Robert Browne and believed that the
doctrine of the Church of England was irredeemably flawed.
Diggers: The Diggers were perhaps one of the first truly socialist groups within the AngloAmerican tradition and were sometimes referred to as “levellers” or “true levellers.” Their
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primary goal was to institute major land reforms that reversed the enclosure movement within
English society, and to institute small, agrarian societies in which property was shared by others
within the local society.
Federalists: An American political group which arose at the same time as the Anti-federalist
party around the time of the Constitutional Convention. Both groups attempted to claim the
name “federalist” as representative of their beliefs. The Federalist party held that the national
government was institutionally sovereign over the states, and that the Constitution had created
a new American society. As the sovereign, Federalists generally supported a common law
interpretation of the Constitution, which gave increased authority to the national government
over time.
Independents (Puritans): In England, the Independents were the political group led by Oliver
Cromwell. Their main difference from orthodox Presbyterianism was related to church
governance, not necessarily in doctrine. Their name was derived from their congregationalism,
which was a belief that the local congregation should be more independent in its regular
governance than was normally afforded by the Presbyterian Synod. This difference in church
governance became a major caveat to their support of a Church-State, as proposed by the
Anglicans and Presbyterians. Alternately, their other title of “Puritan” was a reference to their
doctrinal differences with the Anglican Church. Independents tended to support a certain level
of religious tolerance, if the beliefs did not stray too far from Orthodox Protestantism.
Puritanism in New England tended to be less religiously tolerant than the Independents in
England. However, the physical distance, combined with congregationalism, paradoxically also
led to a higher degree of democratic governance over non-religious matters.
Levellers: An English political group of the 1640s which emerged from the Independent
Movement. The Levellers advocated for a limited government framework achieved by a
negative constitutional arrangement whereby specific liberties of the People were enumerated
to exist beyond the purview of government intervention. During the Interregnum Period, the
Leveller Movement became less influential, and eventually became somewhat associated with
the more radical elements of the Whig political movement of the late-seventeenth century.
Loyalists: An American political group that opposed secession from the British Empire and
supported the existent constitutional arrangement within Britain as the sovereign political
entity of the British colonies in America.
Monarchists (Cavaliers): An English political group that supported King Charles I’s claim to the
throne of England. Most monarchists also supported the King’s Prerogative, as the legitimate
final veto within the constitutional arrangement of England, although there were those who
believed that the matter should be resolved constitutionally and legislatively, rather than via
rebellion, and opposed the Parliamentary forces due to this principle, rather than as a defense
of Charles’ interpretation of the King as the ultimate sovereign of English society.
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Papists (Roman Catholic): The Roman Catholic Church of the 1640s was the accepted religious
authority in much of Western Europe. The ceremonial coronation of European kings by
religious figures was intended to be representative of the Church’s ultimate sovereignty within
society, over which the monarch was appointed to act as the political head. Catholicism had
ceased to be the official State-sponsored religion in England when Henry VIII created the
Church of England, and had been reinstituted only briefly during the rule of his daughter, Mary
I. Charles I was married to Queen Henrietta of France, who was a Catholic, and there was
increased fear that Archbishop Laud and Charles I had ultimate plans to reunify England with
the Roman Catholic Church. Referring to one as a “Papist” within English society carried the
connotation not only of one whose doctrine aligned with the Roman Catholic Church, but of
one who believed that the English Crown was ultimately subordinate to the Pope on some
level.
Patriots: An American political group of the eighteenth century that wished to secede from the
British government and establish independent and sovereign states in the Americas.
Parliamentarians (Roundheads): A broad coalition of religious and political groups whose only
unified characteristic was a general assertion that King Charles’ authority was limited to some
degree by the legislative instrument of Parliament, and specifically by statutory laws created by
the House of Commons and confirmed by the House of Lords.
Presbyterians: An English political and religious group that was strongly connected to
Orthodox Presbyterianism religiously, and to the hierarchy established by the Synod of the
Presbyterian Church. Although mostly aligned to the Independents on theological grounds, the
Presbyterians believed that political liberties were subservient to religious considerations, and
that one of the greatest purposes for government was to suppress heretical teaching. They also
rejected congregationalism as a church governance framework. The Presbyterians were closely
connected to the House of Lords in the 1640s. Since the state-sponsored church of Scotland
was the Presbyterian Church, and that it operated upon very similar principles to those
espoused by English Presbyterians, many contemporaries feared that the English Civil Wars
(especially the Second War) were merely a pretense to subject English society to religious
domination of the Scottish Synod.
Republicans: An English political group that wished to re-constitute the governmental
structure from a mixed monarchy to a representative republic. This group had a high degree of
influence during the early part of the 1650s, prior to the establishment of the Protectorate.
Those who associated with the republican group were often members of other religious or
political groups as well, since it was defined by its goals for the functional type of government
employed in England.
Tories: An English political group which begin in the late seventeenth century and continues to
influence political ideology in Britain today. Toryism tends to emphasize conservative principles
relative to the current political climate. Hence, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
Tories tended to oppose liberal expansions of freedoms experienced by members of all social
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classes within English society. They also tended to be more invested in a greater role and
emphasis placed on the role that the King or Queen played in the constitutional situation of
Parliament. Prior to the Glorious Revolution, many Tories supported the idea of the monarch
as supreme within the English constitution. After the Glorious Revolution, Toryism tended to
assert Parliamentary sovereignty, but to differ in the ends to which that sovereignty ought to be
expressed from the English Whigs.
Whigs: An English political group which begin in the late seventeenth century and continues to
influence political ideology in Britain today. Whigism tends to emphasize liberal principles
relative to the current political climate. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Whigs
argued for an expansion of the freedom of the citizens. Although some radical Whigs adopted
contractual arguments and advocated for the enshrinement of negative liberties within English
society, most merely believed that liberal ideals ought to be expressed by Parliamentary
statute. Whigs have consistently asserted the sovereignty of the House of Commons within the
British political constitution.
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Appendix B
Constitution, Natural Law, and Natural Rights
Constitutional thought and natural law have been a part of England’s political tradition
for many centuries, although it changed significantly since the medieval period and would be
anachronistic to label it as “constitutional thought” at all before the tumult of the 17th century.
There are several components of this constitutional thought that bear understanding. To a
medieval or early modern English political thinker, the rule of law based on natural law theory
and expressed both in positive and common law traditions was a major part of all legal
thought. So too, was the limitation of the power of the King by various other social forces and
to various degrees including but not necessarily limited to the law, the clergy, and Parliament.1
Finally, the commonwealth tradition derived from antiquity weighed heavily in all English
political thought.2
The eminent English political philosopher of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Sir
John Fortesque, delineated law into three categories: natural law, custom (common law), and
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statutes (positive law.)3 According to his political philosophy, whenever natural law or common
law were written down by the legislature, they became positive law. It is significant to note
that Fortesque claimed that positive law and “constitution” were the same thing. Fortescue
based his framework of laws on the “civil laws. . .[of] the Roman Emperors” and further stated
that the positive laws were legitimized by their adherence to natural law.4 Finally, he believed
that “the Law of England is not only an excellent law, but that, in its kind, it is as well chosen as
the Civil Law.”5 The problem with Fortescue’s construct within the increasingly pluralistic and
rationalist society of seventeenth-century England was that there was no agreed upon
definition for what natural law actually was, or how it ought to be defined.
The jurist responsible for undertaking the codification of these concepts into more
concrete ideas was Sir Edward Coke, in the early part of the seventeenth century. Coke was
primarily concerned that “his Majesty would maintain all his subjects in the just freedom both
of their persons and estates.”6 The combination of the “freedom of persons and estates”
became a fundamental definition for natural rights which became highly influential within
subsequent Anglo-American political thought. Natural law, then, was an unwritten law, which
existed time out of mind (or prior to the establishment of English society), to which just
positive laws aspired. The degree to which these laws conformed to natural law could be
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measured by the level of freedom of person’s and estates that was experienced within English
society.
Coke also wanted to ensure “that [the King] will govern us according to the laws and
statutes.” 7 This was significant because in the common law system that came to define British
legal thought, there was a strong desire to prevent arbitrary rule by a king who could dictate to
his subjects how they ought to be ruled. Coke stated that the purpose for these systems was
“that we shall enjoy all our rights and liberties with as much freedom as ever any subjects have
done in former times.”8
It is important to contrast natural law to the various other types of law that could exist.
Regardless of the specific terminology applied, there are three basic types of law: natural law,
divine law, and positive law. According to Francis Fukayama, John Locke recognized that divine
rights were problematic on a societal level within modern societies, because “it is extremely
difficult to achieve social consensus on issues involving religion,” which ruled out the secular
application of divine law.9 Fukayama argued that civil rights have to be based on some
standard outside of themselves, otherwise anyone who claimed to believe in human rights
would have to concede that their concept of such rights had no moral basis.10 He stated simply
that the “problem. . .in practice if not in theory, is that there are no positive [civil] rights that
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are universal,” and that those who argued that the moral legitimacy for any positive law is the
acquiescence of the governed are forced to concede that this had the limited application to
each particular society, and not humanity as a whole.11 Locke, Jefferson, and Hobbes’s
insistence on basing the authority of civil law upon natural law was necessary for any claims as
to the moral legitimacy of a positive law.12
Furthermore, rights must either be possessions which can be disposed of as one will, or
they are gifts from the Creator that are inseparable from the individual and whose protection is
the genesis of the just rule of government. John Simmons’s discussion of inalienable rights is
helpful to the important task of clarifying exactly what this idea meant to political writers in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He summarized Locke’s interpretation of jurisprudence
by stating that there were three ways in which rights may be lost:
“(a) voluntarily given away or exchanged (alienated),
(b) lost involuntarily through negligence or wrongdoing (forfeited), or
(c) taken away by some other party (prescribed).”13
It was this first category which formed the basis for all contractual views of government.
Groups like the Levellers argued that there were, however, other inalienable rights which could
not be legitimately lost in any of the three ways described above, because they were natural
rights.14 Any attempt to do so by any group within society was definitionally “tyrannical.”
Simmons claimed that the view of inalienability among seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
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political writers often lacked the permanence often prescribed by a narrow interpretation of
the terminology among scholars of the twenty-first century. It was understood by these
political thinkers that members of a society could defer their natural rights for a short period of
time within a limited application without forfeiting the right.15 This belief helps to explain the
apparent paradox of beliefs in men like Cromwell during the Protectorate, or Gordon and
Trenchard in the early eighteenth century, who advocated in Cato’s Letters that there were
times when acts of despotism were called for in the defense of liberty during extenuating
threats to the commonwealth.16
The particulars of natural law, then, continued to be elusive throughout the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, precisely because conceptually, it existed prior to the
society and its subsequent codification of positive laws. It is important to recognize that
political writers and philosophers from this time believed that positive law that was held by the
society to be in any respect just, was at least a partial expression of natural law. Subsequent
laws which updated, nullified and/or replaced, or added to older laws were perceived as a
better embodiment of natural law for the present society, rather than an indictment against
the old, as being invalid. Within the political framework held by most Englishmen at the time,
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the idea of a written constitution was a mere redundancy since positive law already expressed
natural law. This belief made it philosophically impossible to hold that any positive law,
confirmed by the current government in a procedurally valid way, could, de facto, be
considered “unconstitutional.” That the Levellers, and later the Americans, argued that there
was a better way to codify natural law, specifically by enumerating those natural rights which
had been withheld from the social contract as negative liberties, and that such laws could still
be declared “unconstitutional,” was truly revolutionary.
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Appendix C
“Of Slavery”: Levellers, Locke, and Jefferson
The fundamental claim of interpretive frameworks like that espoused by critical race
theorists such as the 1619 Project, are that the constitutional arguments related to state
sovereignty (in relationship to the national government) was institutionally and foundationally
racist in nature. They have claimed that the entire matrix of consensual governance employed
by the Americans was used from its outset to subject one group of people to the arbitrary
expression of power by another group, and that the criterion which distinguished these groups
was race.1
The purpose of Leveller consensualism as a foundational axiom for governmental
legitimacy was to prevent the arbitrary expression of power by any group of people over
another, however those groups were defined. The groups of 1640s England did not incorporate
race nearly so much as they did religion, but the Leveller efforts to create a framework which
would respect and defend the diverse views of those religious groups confirms that this was
their intent, at least to the degree that it was expressed in their society. To argue that the
Americans were attempting to employ a Leveller governmental construct of consent, is to
necessarily reject the proposition that the Western concept of a social contract is, at its core, a
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For one example of historical frameworks like this, see: Alvin B. Tillery. “Tocqueville as Critical Race
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way for one group to institutionally dominate another. This was, in reality, what occurred in
the South during the antebellum period. For a historian to claim that the greatest statesmen of
this society were attempting to employ Leveller principles of government while simultaneously
upholding such a flagrant violation of Levellerism through the institution of slavery, some brief
discussion is warranted.
There was no appeal to natural law within Chief Justice Taney’s argument in the Dred
Scott Case, which was a fundamental contradiction of Levellerism. He did systematically
evaluate the citizenship requirements of the separate states at the time of the Declaration of
Independence and concluded that no enslaved person was considered a citizen at that time of
any of the states, which meant that the federal government had no jurisdiction over citizenship.
He also held that one sovereign state could never express sovereignty in this regard, over
another. The argument to this point was completely sound, based on the ideals expressed by
both the Levellers and the Patriots, and was a solid justification for each state to have the
jurisdiction to determine its own citizenship requirements.
However, the Leveller concept of citizenship, representation, and law required that
every person only be subjected to laws to which he or she had consented. This was their
fundamental argument related to Magna Carta and led to the axiomatic assertion that just
government was established by the consent of the governed. Based on the Leveller definitions
of just governance, since the enslaved people of America had never given consent, to apply
laws made by others to them was tyrannical, by nature.
Their arguments for a restriction of the franchise adopted by the Levellers made it plain
that, to a degree, any resident of a territory who could not vote, could be subjected to certain
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laws. These they referred to as “denizens” rather than citizens. However, it was understood
that these people’s inalienable natural rights were protected by the government, within a
negative constitutional framework. That one such right would be to never be subjected to
chattel slavery could be inferred, if from nothing else than merely by the fact that the Levellers
often used the word “slave” as a synonym for a person subjected to tyrannical or arbitrary
government.
Viewed in this light, the deleted section regarding slavery from Thomas Jefferson’s
Original Rough Draught of the Declaration of Independence takes on a new light. Jefferson
accused the King of:
Wag[ing] cruel war against human nature itself, violating it's most sacred rights of life &
liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating & carrying
them into slavery in another hemisphere…he has prostituted his negative for suppressing
every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce: and that this
assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting those very
people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived
them, & murdering the people upon whom he also obtruded them; thus paying off former
crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to
commit against the lives of another.2

Essentially, he claimed that the King was responsible for instituting a fundamental paradox
between the law of “human nature itself” and the fundamental property rights of British
citizens, which was also identified as one of the inalienable rights of the people. The peculiar
institution was a paradox with which the South had been saddled by the tyrannical actions of
the British government.3 Not only this, but he also claimed that slavery was, in fact, initiated
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It must be noted that even in his original draft, the fact that Jefferson claimed that the King had
committed crimes “against the liberties of one people,” that he was fundamentally claiming that the American
government (or state governments) was not predicated upon the basis of the consent of the enslaved people, who
were essentially outside of the American society. Human nature itself might have been enough to indict the
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and continued by a state of war, rather than society. Since the enslaved persons had been
made thus by “cruel war,” they were not party to or involved in the American society. This did
nothing to justify the state of war, which Jefferson made no attempt to justify, but did provide a
moral rationalization for the consent of the enslaved to be omitted from all consideration of
laws within American society; they were hostages of an unjust war, not consenting participants
of the American society. To free the enslaved people was for the American government to
violate the property rights of its citizens, who had explicitly reserved the regulation of this sort
of property to themselves, rather than the government. It was tyrannical by definition. To
continue the institution of chattel slavery was to persist in an unjust war, initiated by the King
of England, which violated the inalienable rights of those from another society, which was also
a sort of tyranny directed against human nature itself.
Locke had recognized this in his Second Treatise on Government in his Chapter entitled
“Of Slavery.” Locke began with the basic supposition that “the natural liberty of man is to be
free from any superior power on earth.”4 Freedom from slavery was viewed by Locke to be
inalienable, since slavery was antithetical to life itself.5 Locke held that:
This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but the state of war
continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive: for, if once compact enter
between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side, and
obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery ceases, as long as the
compact endures: for, as has been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to
another that which he hath not in himself, a power over his own life.6

actions of the British King, but it was insufficient to nullify the property “rights” of the American slaveholder within
the society as it was constituted.
4
John Locke. Second Treatise on Government. In Project Gutenberg. (London: 1788), Chapter IV, Section
22.
5
Ibid, Chapter IV, Section 23.
6
Ibid, Chapter IV, Section 24.
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When considering that Locke’s Second Treatise was undoubtedly inspirational to the
Declaration of Independence, the interpretation above of Jefferson’s language in his
Draught is confirmed. However, it is obvious that the potential contract to which Locke
alluded in Chapter IV was not viewed by Jefferson to be an option. This meant that, in
his mind, the African American slaves were a conquered group, held in a perpetual state
of war. This was, according to Jefferson, the fault of the British King, and no obvious
remedy for it was proposed by Jefferson in his Draught, or thereafter.7
This paradox persisted throughout the Antebellum period and was fundamentally
irreconcilable with Levellerism at the conceptual level. Compensated emancipation was a
theoretical solution to this paradox but was one that most states were unwilling to support. It
was even universally rejected by the border states of the Civil War; Lincoln was only able to get
a Compensated Emancipation Act passed through Congress which applied to the District of
Columbia and a very limited population of enslaved persons. Delaware, Lincoln’s test case for
the feasibility of the proposition, rejected the idea, despite having a relatively small population
of enslaved persons.
In the crisis leading up to the Compromise of 1820, Jefferson famously stated that “we
have the wolf by the ear, and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. justice is in one
scale, and self-preservation in the other.”8 He favored gradual, compensated emancipation,
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It should be noted, that for Jefferson, the issue of slavery was immeasurably more complicated, given the
educational and vocational disadvantages that he perceived among the enslaved community at large. He believed
that immediate emancipation would only lead to economic and political enslavement, which could have resulted in
even worse living conditions than they experienced as slaves.
8
Thomas Jefferson. “Letter to John Holmes.” (Library of Congress Online: Monticello, VA, April 22,
1820).
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which he believed could be achieved with “due sacrifices.”9 However, he also believed that the
enslaved persons should be allowed to be relocated throughout the country, so as to defray the
cost of the compensated emancipation, since that would be the best way to provide for the
“cessation of that kind of property, for so it is misnamed.”10 Implicit in his thinking, was that
the Compromise of 1820, which prevented slavery from existing above the Mason-Dixon Line,
would hinder these efforts, and place a crushing economic price on the Southern States for this
kind of emancipation. He continued to wrestle with the “property,” since he recognized that
although “misnamed,” it was also economically significant to those who owned it.
It must be noted that the Leveller views of consensual governance which gave rise to
the War for Independence were philosophically inconsistent with slavery as an institution.
Jefferson, at least, seems to have recognized this, and despaired that he had found no de facto
solution in the nearly half-century since authoring the Declaration of Independence. In an
important sense, this made the Thirteenth Amendment a critical addition to the list of
previously enumerated negative freedoms which had been expressed in The Bill of Rights to
express the Leveller ideals in a more complete manner.
The institution of chattel slavery that came to develop in America in the lateseventeenth century was one which simply could not have been anticipated by the Levellers of
the 1640s given their limited experience with the institution of chattel slavery. One of the
benefits of illustrating the development of the Leveller ideological framework within a society
that did not engage in the practice of race-based chattel slavery to any great or institutional
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degree, is to demonstrate that it is anachronistic to claim that the development of such a
philosophy was established solely to reinforce the power of one racial group over another. This
is not to claim that America did not employ institutional, race-based slavery during the colonial
and antebellum periods of its history; such a claim is historically untenable. However, it does
illustrate a far more nuanced historical interpretation, which demonstrates that attempts to tie
institutionalized slavery as derivative of the Founders’ political ideology are as problematic in
historiography as they were to those attempting to reconcile them in the antebellum South.
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Appendix D
Leveller Ideology in the Anglo-American Political Landscape
In discussions related to the history of ideology, there are frequently problems that are
introduced by the tendency to adopt terms that are anachronistic, not carefully defined, or
both. A simple illustration of this idea would be to take modern American concepts of
“Democratic” and “Republican” ideology, and to automatically assume that to say that the
Levellers were democratic, in some way is meant to indicate an agreement in principle or policy
with the platforms of the American Democrat party. However, as problematic as this
interpretation is, at least it has a shared, objective reference point (the platform of a particular
party,) and is in many ways more helpful than the even further abstracted concept of the
political Left and Right, or liberal and conservative. The dialectic understanding of liberal and
conservative are always in reference to the status quo of a particular time, and this is unhelpful
to compare Levellers from the 1640s in any meaningful way to Americans of any time period,
because the reference point (status quo) is different in both places. In fact, it’s not even
particularly helpful in comparing the Levellers to the Whig and Tory positions of the lateeighteenth century, because it is at least possible that a liberal position in 1640 had become so
entrenched over the intervening period to become the status quo, or conservative viewpoint of
the following century.
These realities demand a more sophisticated understanding of political ideologies than
we are familiar with in political discourse of the twenty-first century. The most helpful
dialectic that can be applied and connected to these ideas is the comparison between
democratic and republican government, not as they exist in the American political sphere of
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modern times, but as they are thought of in terms of principles of governance. At their cores,
the republican and democratic views of government differ in the role that voters play in the
governance of a society. The democratic view is one which holds that the majority of a society
should have the ability to shape the policies of that society. Ideas within this tradition tend to
emphasize universal suffrage, since this is the primary way in which the majority is able to
express itself via its representatives. Within the context of the 17th century English world, this
also meant radical reforms to the system which emphasized freedoms (like speech and religion)
and was considered “liberal” because
the status quo was of an aristocratic
constitutional monarchy.
The republican view is one
which holds that res publica (the
state, republic, or commonwealth),

Figure 1

needs to work toward a condition of liberty for the society which is in the best interest of the
citizens. This may mean a limitation of certain freedom, for a greater social good. What
defines the good of the society is the idea of public virtue, which is often embodied in the
concept of traditional values, and it is the defense of these traditional values that earn
republicans within Anglo-American traditions the designation of “conservative.”
Representative republics, which had been the model since antiquity, did not strive for universal
suffrage, but rather to allow the citizens who were qualified, to participate in various levels of
the political discourse, as befitted their education, expertise, and virtue. These processes might
be, but were not always, elective in nature. The primary purpose was for the elected officials
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to represent the interests of the citizen, rather than the citizens in fact. Those elected for
public office could be said to be the benefactors of those who elected them, rather than the
representatives of a constituency. Although not necessarily the same thing, the idea of
monarchy was connected to the republican tradition in the British ideological framework, since
Hobbes’ Leviathan was just another way of ensuring a virtuous society.
If one accepts that this is the dialectic “left and right” of the 1640s, then one may wish
to orient democratic ideology on the left, and republican ideology on the right. The far-right
extreme of republican ideology was monarchy, since it held that the King alone possessed the
virtue necessary to make final decisions regarding the best interest of the commonwealth. This
was assuming that the King made no attempts to abolish the Parliament, and Charles I was not
interested in entertaining such
ideas. Conversely, the far left
would be represented by the
Diggers, who advocated for the
localization of government,
Figure 2

and the democratization of

property rights, which in their concept meant the abolishing of private property, and the shared
use of arable land for locally (and democratically) designated purposes.
The next, and at the outset the only, remaining issue seems to be to locate the Levellers
within this continuum of beliefs, and then describe that location relative to other beliefs. In
theory, this should be a simple exercise, because the terminology has been carefully defined,
the extremes noted, and the matrix established. However, not only is there not a consensus for
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establishing the Leveller position, but there doesn’t even seem to be a uniformly agreed upon
set of principles to debate in order to situate the Levellers. For example, Professor Ashcraft
argued explicitly against the Marxist historians that the Levellers favored a greatly expanded
franchise, and therefore belong on the liberal (left) side of the continuum.1 Macpherson and
many Revisionist Marxists argued that the Levellers were a conservative (right) party that was
interested in the preservation of the status quo for the land holders via the social contract and
a restricted franchise.2 The primary argument between the two was related to the number of
men who would have gained the franchise as a result of the implementation of the Leveller
concept of the right to vote, and although this would have been a daunting task in and of itself,
it was a relatively straightforward metric, as far as such things go. However, this metric proved
to be insufficient in determining the Leveller ideological alignment.
Andrew Edward critiqued both views, partially on the grounds that he claimed John
Locke was more conservative than Ashcraft had allowed. Since Ashcraft’s historical reference
point was Locke the liberal, then Ashcraft’s view of the Levellers must be equally distorted.3
However, in Edward’s view, this didn’t mean that the Levellers were necessarily conservative
either, as Macpherson’s Marxist dialectic forced. Within the Marxist understanding, one can
only ever be bourgeoisie or proletarian, and this was deeply flawed. So then, were the
Levellers moderates? This is a claim that has seldom been applied to the Levellers, and Edward
never attempted this tack.
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The complicated views on the franchise espoused by the Levellers, and addressed in
Chapter 3, led some historians like Alan Craig Houston to rhetorically throw their hands up, and
conclude that, “it would appear the Levellers were democrats in spite of themselves, a
conclusion that is singularly unhelpful in making sense of their efforts…”4 Edmund Leites’
conclusion that the Levellers believed “all Englishmen have the right to vote, in the absence of
any overriding consideration,” was specific, but tended to give the impression of their being
moderate, which was certainly not how their contemporaries viewed them, nor even how
Leites wished to characterize them.5 These somewhat nuanced, although unhelpful positions,
flew in the face of the assumptions of other historians, like Michael Kent Curtis, who concluded
unequivocably that “the Levellers were the first mass-based, pro-democracy protest movement
in modern history.”6
The attempts to locate the Levellers within the English Left-Right political continuum is
not limited to evaluations of their democratic inclinations either. Hugh Jenkins claimed that
Milton had expressed acceptance of the Levellers’ ideology by refusing to take a strong stand
on their ideas during the early republican years of the Interregnum. 7 He argued that this
striking silence by Milton was an implicit approval of their policies, which Milton, and therefore
the historian, should interpret as consistent with republican ideals. Conversely, according to
Martin Dzelzainis, the Levellers were definitely not republicans, because they were the sworn
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enemies of the republican government attempted during the Interregnum Period, and were
some of its harshest critics.8 Mark Knights bundled Locke into both the republican and
Leveller camps, claiming that Locke was a “Neo-Harringtonian” or “Neo-Leveller,” treating them
as synonymous, with the addition of “neo” to indicate a temporally updated but otherwise
ideological consistent position with both traditions. 9 Since Harrington was a republican, and
the historical evidence suggests that Levellers were at least not, it makes one wonder how
Locke could be a new and updated version of both simultaneously? David McNally flatly
rejected that there was any way Locke could be a Leveller because he supported the concept of
parliamentary sovereignty, rather than the institutional sovereignty of the People.10
These confused arguments often find the introduction of nuances to the definition of
the liberal or conservative tradition, in an attempt to make it consistent with the evidence, at
least within narrow bounds. For example, Samuel Davis Glover, concluded that the Levellers
had picked up certain beliefs like the citizen-soldier, recall elections, and others from the classic
Roman texts with which they were familiar, and therefore, they were attempting to institute a
“popular” form of republicanism as contrasted to an “elite” republicanism.11 As far as
comparative history goes, this can be pretty definitely ascertained; Roman sources available in
English glorified the citizen soldier and the Levellers applied this line of thinking with their
overtures toward the Agitators. However, to take this comparison, and to argue that the
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Levellers were proposing to implement a particular version of republicanism systematically,
would seem to demand further evidence than this argument can supply.
All of these rival interpretations result in the kind of completely unhelpful claim made
by Francis D. Wormuth on a review of a posthumous book written by the Marxist historian H. N.
Brailsford. Wormuth concluded that Brailsworth’s interpretation was flawed because “the
ideology of the Levellers was not…removed from that of the republicans… In general it appears
to this reviewer that Brailsford draws too sharp a line between the Levellers and other factions
of the left.”12 In a book review of a scant two pages, it is evident that this claim was intended
to be a clear critique, as well as a reorientation of Brailsworth’s interpretation, based on
Wormuth’s understanding of the political spectrum, which in turn he assumed the reader
would share. However, as the brief historiographical overview of Leveller ideologies above
illustrates, this is not a simple task. Even if one could accept Wormuth’s statements at facevalue, it is completely unclear how a historian is to understand the Levellers in reference to
other political figures of their own time, let alone other figures operating in their own political
spectrum, either in the past or the future.
This illustration points to one of two potential problems: either we are hopelessly
partisan in our evaluations of things like ideology, or our typical matrix is too simplistic to allow
for the complexity of political thought within the Anglo-American world. The first perspective
seems too nihilistic, and ultimately if it is true, there is no way to escape its logic and no point
to proceeding further. Far too many historians that appear to made otherwise honest attempts
at representing a true narrative of the ideological past have come to such contradictory

12

Francis D. Wormuth. (The Western Political Quarterly 15, no. 2, 1962), 365.

407
conclusions without even a commonly agreed upon metric for resolving their differences. It has
been the argument of this dissertation that the second potential is correct, and that many of
the problems illustrated above can be reconciled when one introduces a new dimension to the
political axis. Rather than merely understanding ideology as either left or right, it is equally
important to understand it as up or down.
The Levellers (and even some early Independents like John Goodwin) repeatedly
indicated a willingness to have a democratic, republican, or even monarchial forms of
government, so long as the freedoms of the People were protected from the government. To
borrow from Thomas Hobbes, the Levellers argued that Leviathan needed to be constrained in
meaningful ways. This axis might be most helpfully labelled as one which has the sovereignty of
the State as “up” and the sovereignty of the People as “down.” In doing this, it is important
that one adopts the Leveller understanding of “People,” which institutionally was not
democratic (left) but actually better understood as the common rights of each individual. It is
also critical to understand that anarchism, as defined, literally cannot exist on this matrix at any
point, since it precludes government in any sense. Therefore, anarchism is not the opposite of
authoritarianism, it is antithetical to it.
Now that we have a full coordinate plane of ideologies from which to choose, we may
set about reconciling some of the disagreements above. For example, Macpherson interpreted
that Hobbes, Locke, Harrington, and the Levellers, in positing the idea of a social contract, were
by nature, asserting the rights of certain individuals over other individuals, via the power of the
State. Within the framework that he described, any view of a social contract and rights that
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corresponded to it would be up.13 Macpherson failed to recognize this, and mistakenly
identified universal suffrage and a systematic rejection of possessive individualism as true
“leftism” and therefore since
Hobbes, Locke, Harrington, and
Lilburne were anti-majoritarian,
they all must have been
conservative in some sense, and
grouped them together. They may
Figure 3

have even been equally, or roughly

equivalent in their aversion to democracy in the Left-Right analysis, but with a more
sophisticated understanding, it is clear that they are not ideologically the same. Other
Marxists, picking up on the fact that the Levellers were undeniably more democratic than
Ireton and Cromwell, identified them as social democrats.14 One of Marxism’s major failings is
that its interpretative framework explicitly forces a one-dimensional evaluation (oppressoroppressed) of a multi-dimensional political system. This limits the nuanced descriptions of
ideology in a seriously constraining way.
It is often in the failure to employ a multi-dimensional matrix that many historians rely
on terms like “radical” to attempt to distinguish ideologies on parallel axes that need to be
shifted in a perpendicular direction. This was the case for Christopher Hill, who turned to the
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concept of “radicalism” in many of his works to allow for some of the ideological differences
between the Levellers and Independents, but in a way which still placed them in the
“conservative” camp.15 One of the biggest dangers with using “radical” in this way is that it
would seem to place the ideology on the extreme, but at least in the case of the Levellers, Hill
was not arguing that they were extremely conservative. His argument was that the Levellers
were radical within the broad
range of conservativism, largely
based on their commitment to
natural rights, even if that
commitment served to reinforce
rather than disrupt the status
quo.
Figure 4

This explanation is

mirrored by William Leiss’ explanation of Macpherson’s views of the Levellers: Macpherson
admired their commitment to the concept of rights, and therefore included the Levellers as the
radical democratic-leaning extreme, so to speak, of the possessive individualists of the
seventeenth century.16 However, It was not just the Marxists whose interpretations failed
when attempting to create a two-dimensional picture in a one-dimensional space. One of
Macpherson’s greatest critics, Ashcraft, fell prey to the same mistake, employing the idea of

15

Christopher Hill. The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution. (New
York: Penguin Books, 1984).
16
William Leiss and C. B. Macpherson. C.B. Macpherson: Dilemmas of Liberalism and Socialism, (Online:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009).

410
“radicalism” to describe Locke’s (and the Levellers’) contractual views of society.17 Ashcraft
was attempting to emphasize Locke’s description of the social contract as an institutional
restraint to some degree, on the general authoritative republicanism of the Whigs of his time.
In other words, he was trying to orient Locke downward, but since he lacked that dimension in
the left-right dialectic, he employed the term “radical” instead.
Our matrix is even further complicated by the reality that the Whigs prior to the
establishment of the Glorious Revolution were fundamentally different than those of the
eighteenth century. Whiggism, often referred to as “oppositionist ideology,” was initially
focused on the republican limitation of the English monarch, mostly in line with the
Independent tradition of the 1640s and 1650s. It is termed “oppositionist” because it was,
definitionally, anti-conservative in nature. After the Glorious Revolution, the Tories moved
away from a defense of absolute monarchy and adopted a view of Parliamentary sovereignty.
Since both Levellerism and democracy were anti-conservative (in separate political
dimensions), conceptually speaking, the Whigs had two available directions in which to be
oppositionist. This cannot be understood in a one-dimensional framework.
They incorporated variations of both. This also serves to complicate the history of the
term “liberal,” because it tended to be implicitly related to the Whigs during this time. IT also
helps to explain why Locke is widely considered to be the representative of the liberal tradition
within Western society. However, there is a lot of ambiguity over whether the so-called
“liberal” shift was toward libertarianism (up) or toward democratic government (left). Those
that claim Locke was a liberal, tend to emphasize his refutation of Filmer’s view of absolute
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monarchy, and relative to that position, Locke appears quite liberal. Whereas those who refute
his liberalism focus on his stalwart commitment to Parliamentary sovereignty, and an
overwhelming commitment to the opposition of democratic government, making him seem
conservative. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the Whig Party policies eventually
drifted back toward statism, albeit as a means of promoting democratic government. This
example merely serves to illustrate the point that there are times, often referred to by political

Figure 5

scientists, as critical realignment periods in politics, in which one or more political parties within
a system shift ideological and/or policy positions in substantive ways. The time between the
coronations of William (III) and Mary and King George I represented one such time in English
history, and to the casual observer, this can wreak havoc on attempts to position ideological
positions of various individuals or groups. In particular, since Locke is such a touchstone of
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ideological familiarity to many casual observers of political history, and his own position was so
nebulous due to the realignment of ideologies within his contemporary time, it is no wonder
that so many lay people, and even historians, become disoriented in trying to describe the
influence of Lockean thought on subsequent political groups.
By adopting the general framework which orients the tension between republicanism
(conservative) and democracy (liberal) on the x-axis, and authoritarianism and libertarianism on
the y-axis, it is at least becomes possible to attempt to establish some sort of meaningful
reference for the Levellers within their own time. The final piece of the puzzle, but an
incredibly important one for this exercise, is to identify the origin point, or that point in which
the axes cross. In a real sense, if this discussion has proven any point at all thus far, it is that all
ideology is relative, and therefore the selection of the origin is arbitrary. However, arbitrary
doesn’t necessarily mean de-void of meaning, and in this sense, a relatively easy reference
point suggests itself.
The Independents of the 1640s were a political force that has had some staying power
within the Anglo-American political world.18 As Puritan congregationalists, they were
democratic in some limited sense, but that democratic spirit had very clearly defined moral and
socio-economic limitations, connected to the republican sense of virtue. This was not saying
that they represent a true mid-point between the republican and democratic ideals, but they
are a fair enough approximation for our purposes. Additionally, they adopted a contractual
view of the establishment of the government, which automatically implicated some kind of
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restraint on the just application of power within society, even if it was constrained primarily by
those elected to serve in government. They emphasized the role of the Commons within the
English government, as having derived its power from the people, and at least recognized the
preservation of certain freedoms and promotion of liberties as being the aims of government.
Again, although this may not have been a true median for the authoritarian-individualism axis,
it is at least a midpoint.
Having identified the Independents of the 1640s as the origin point, a historian can now
locate other political groups in reference to their ideas. The Presbyterians, as architects of a
state-church and stricter limitations on the freedoms of the press and freedom of speech were
clearly more authoritarian than the Independents. Their emphasis on the prominent role of the
aristocracy through the House of Lords, and the moral (virtuous) imperatives of government in
legislating the morality of its citizens, also tended to be more conservative in nature. This
oriented them up and to the right of the Independents. Monarchists, as proponents of the
King’s singular veto within society, were shifted even further to the right. However, there was
very little difference of substance in their general approach toward the role of the State in
regulating the freedoms of the press, speech or conscience from the Presbyterians.
Lilburne’s Levellers (so-called) proposed a fully contractual view of government that
emphasized the rights of the individuals as sovereign over the government. This was a major
shift downward from the Independents. The corresponding commitment to the freedoms of
conscience, the press, and speech indicated their willingness to live within a pluralistic society,
and their proposals for an expanded franchise supported this, representing a shift toward the
political left as well. This shift was pronounced, but nowhere near complete. The Levellers
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were evidently and consistently not democrats, although they were more democratic than their
contemporaries. The True Levellers (Diggers) proposed the encroachment of private property
rights and the redistribution and management of that property through government
intervention, which was more authoritarian than the monarchists of their day. Their
communities were the most egalitarian among their contemporaries, which also positioned
them farther left than any other group. The Diggers were true levellers, in keeping with the
political connotations of the term at the time. To a group like the Levellers, who were
somewhat ambivalent in their preferences on the left-right axis, there was literally no group
that was more opposed to their view of contractualism than the Diggers, and this massive
discrepancy serves to demonstrate the vehemence with which Lilburne rejected the idea of
levellerism. It also helps to explain the damage done by the moniker in others’ historical
understanding of the Levellers, as such.

Figure 6
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As long as the historian is not hung up on the scale of the distance between plot points
(i.e. the distance between them as representing proportionate discrepancies in ideological
positions, as if such a thing could be easily quantified), it is a relatively simple exercise to plot
contemporary political groups relative to one another. Attempting to position other historical
groups or individuals in other time periods can become relatively more difficult. It is helpful to
bear in mind that if Bertrand de Jouvenel and Luigi Marco Bassani are correct, then one should
expect that any modern political society will drift steadily upwards over time.19 It can be
helpful to identify commonly held ideas, and compare them across time periods, but since so
much ideology is relative, there is no way to fully allow for the context of different situations.
Having acknowledged this reality, it still may be more helpful than nothing.
As has already been established, the Tory position of the 1720s was close to the same as
the Independent position of the 1640s. They had fully adopted the English Bill of Rights,
Parliamentary sovereignty over the people and the Crown, and an aristocratic limitation on
franchise. The Whigs of this time were somewhere down and left of this position, although if
O.W. Furley is to be trusted still substantively differentiated from the Levellers.20 Many
ideological historians claim that when it came to the sovereignty of Parliament over the People
at the time of the American War for Independence, there was no difference at all between the
Whigs and the Tories; the discrepancy was in their views as to the correct democratic or
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republican application of that power.21 Applying Jouvenel’s prediction about the expansion of
Power, and in particular its retarded nature within English society, one can migrate the entire
spectrum slightly upward from the Tory position of 1720, occupying a general range between
the left and right axis.
The primary purpose in locating the Whig and Tory positions of the 1770s is to then
locate their contemporary American counterparts. There is a strong inclination to argue that
the American Patriots were Whigs, and some of them were, after all, Loyalists were often
considered “Tories,” so what else would they be? However, it is helpful to recognize that in the
1770s, it was more accurate to note that the Americans themselves probably defined
themselves ideologically by what they were opposed to (in this case the British government
generally) than what corresponding British political party their ideology was most affiliated
with, or the degree to which this was applicable. This was analogous to the reality of the
Presbyterians, Independents, and Levellers of 1642 all considering themselves
“Parliamentarians.” Their primary ideological identity was defined almost exclusively by what
they were opposed to, rather than what type of government or ideology they were fighting for.
However, by the time of the Constitutional Convention, ideological differences had
begun to matter quite a bit more. Lance Banning noted that the Anti-federalist, or
“Jeffersonian Democrat-Republican” Party’s ideology had undergone a significant
transformation from British republicanism to “a literal conception of the people’s sovereignty…

21

See: G.H. Guttridge. “The Whig Opposition in England during the American Revolution.” (The Journal of
Modern History 6, no. 1, 1934): 1-13.
See also: Owen Edwards. “Edmund Burke on Rights: Inherited, not Inherent.” (The Imaginative
Conservative. Online. June 16, 2020).
See also: H.T. Dickenson. “The Eighteenth-Century Debate on the ‘Glorious Revolution.’” (History 61, no.
201, 1976), 28-45.

417
on the value of a written constitution and to alterations of perspective that denied that any
group except the people or their representatives could have a separate share of governmental
power.”22 In other words, the Anti-federalist party was a major shift down, in the direction of
the Levellers of the 1640s, which is why they have been referred to as “American Levellers” in
Chapters 5 and 6. Banning located Adams and the Federalist party as being true American
versions of the British Whigs, more democratic than the British Tories, but far more

Figure 7

It is important to recognize that this chart only attempts to compare ideologies to each other, rather than to the concepts of
“republicanism” and “democracy” generally. As such, although it may give the impression that the Americans were not
republican in their ideological disposition, that is not intended to be the case. It can be argued that they were more “liberal”
or “democratic” than the Tories of 1776. It is much easier to locate ideologies relative to one another than to a set of abstract
ideas, and this particular thought experiment began by locating the Independents of 1650 as the origin. All subsequent points
have been determined based on that relative (and somewhat arbitrary) designation, rather than their relationship to the labels
of the vertices.
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authoritarian than the Jeffersonian Democrat-Republicans.23 This makes sense when one
considers the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, which were consistent with the
Independent views (1640s) of the freedom of the press and speech, as well as the government
mandate to ensure virtue and appropriately restrain unchecked democracy. This is not to say
they were the same thing, but they seem relatable in a meaningful way.
The adoption of the American Bill of Rights was especially important because it literally
enshrined libertarian principles into the American frame of government. As John Philip Reid
noted, there is no way to conceive of the subsequent American principles of strict and loose
constructivism related to the Constitution without the Bill of Rights, and the philosophy of the
People’s sovereignty which it represented.24 This is a practical and constitutional explanation
for the importance of understanding the up-down component of American politics, relative to
political ideologies in Europe. The existence of the Bill of Rights within American constitutional
and common law continues to ensure a degree of Levellerism within the American political
process. Raoul Berger’s demonstration of the slow but steady circumvention of the Bill of
Rights by the common law precedents in Supreme Court rulings related to the Fourteenth
Amendment does not completely negate the restriction exercised on the government by the
first ten amendments.25 Another way to think about it would be to simply note that theoretical
sovereignty (de jure) is different from common law practice (de facto), and although the
Supreme Court may have usurped supremacy from the states or the People, this does not mean
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they can issue any ruling restricting liberties that they wish. The popular expectations and
shared value of the Bill of Rights
by most Americans is too
ingrained in the American
political conscience to allow for
flagrant or sudden alterations.
It is at this point that the
American diagram must become
three-dimensional because one

Figure 8

cannot explain American ideology as it related to the Alien and Sedition Acts, without also
considering the complicated relationship introduced by the interlocking of the federal and state
governments. This is not causally linked to either of the other axes, since there were Antifederalists who had no problem with a Whig-level of control at the state level but were
concerned about the federal government exerting such power, in no small part due to the
dilution of the influence of their votes at the expanding concentric levels of government. This
helps to explain how the First Amendment did not automatically cancel the state church in
Massachusetts, because it defined the relationship of the federal government to United States
citizens, and not the relationship of a state government to its citizens (authoritarian states’
rights). For his part, Madison argued during the introduction of the Bill of Rights that in some
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cases of individual freedom (i.e. Levellerism), the federal government needed to override state
governments to protect citizens’ negative freedoms (national libertarianism).26
Although this is technically necessary to fully understand the American political
developments of the antebellum period, it also becomes unwieldy, and useless as a comparison
tool to the essentially non-federalist system of the English government of the seventeenth
century. Leaving the issue of federalism aside for clarity and simplicity’s sake, there are several
final observations which can be made. The first is that Jefferson’s party disappeared from the
political landscape with the Jacksonian Democrats, which represented a strong move both up
and slightly left and helps to explain John C. Calhoun’s falling out with the President and the
subsequent Tariff Crisis of 1828. Based on strong democratic rhetoric, Jackson justified the
expansion of the powers of the government, especially via the executive office, for the benefit
of the common man. Calhoun, and what might be termed the “Southern Democrats,”
splintered from the Jacksonian Democrats, but the ideological rift was permanent within the
Democrat party. Meanwhile, the advent of first the Whig, which eventually became the
Republican party of Lincoln, formed as a sort of reverse-oppositionist party from their European
cousins, and occupied the area to the political right of the Jacksonian Democrats. The American
Civil War and Reconstruction essentially sealed the fate of the Southern Democrats, and
ensured that the Jacksonian, rather than the Jeffersonian version of the Democrat party
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survived the 19th century. This effectively rotated the up-down American political spectrum of
the Federalists and Anti-federalists ninety degrees, reorienting it to the left-right DemocratRepublican political alignment with which Americans are familiar today.
A few final points bear remembrance, in the endeavor to compare the British (which
would here also encompass the rest of European politics) Left-Right dynamic, as it compares to
the American equivalent. First, is that the term “liberal” and “conservative,” as they are applied
in contemporary political language tend to align across countries. Secondly, the American
political system is significantly retarded in the growth of the State at the expense of the
People’s freedoms. This is in part because of the power that the Anti-federalist party held in
American politics for the first thirty years of its existence, in part due to the existence of the Bill
of Rights and the continuing legitimacy of a strict-constructivist view of American jurisprudence
relative to its written constitution, and in part due to the residual conflict between the
overlapping jurisdictions of the state and national governments. This tends to make any claims
of mainline American parties in reference to their European extremes (Marxists on the Left or
Nazis on the Right) to be overstated. There simply is not enough authoritarianism in the
present American system to effectively manage either form of totalitarianism as represented in
the corresponding European extremes.
Our prior discussion of the application of the term “radical” also applies here. It bears
noting that indictments against the American “radical Left” or “radical Right” may indeed be an
attempt at describing a political ideology which is significantly shifted up or down from the
current party position. Since we make the mistake of attempting to describe a two-dimensional
(at least) political reality in a one-dimensional way, the false impression is that there is a
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continuity between what are termed the “radical” wings of the American political spectrum,
and their mainstream counterparts. Ideologically speaking, orienting Neo-nazism or Antifa’s
ideologies within the two dimensional political dynamic demonstrates a far greater separation
from mainline Democrats and Republicans than the traditional Left-Right orientation allows for.
One of the practical applications of this research project has been to call attention to
the need for an expansion of the way in which we discuss political ideology. The polarization of
twenty-first century American society is due, at least in part, to the fact that we are constantly
attempting to describe three-dimensional politics in a dialectic, binary framework. By
understanding the “Leveller in U.S,” one of my goals has been to draw our attention back to the
“common freedom,” “common equities,” and most importantly the “common cause” which the
Levellers proposed as the ultimate uniting principle of a diverse society.
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Appendix E
Lexicon of the Levellers
The political orientation of the Levellers was something completely new within AngloAmerican jurisprudence, and this required new phrases, or adaptations in the usage of existing
terminology. Here appears, In alphabetical order, select words and phrases which the Levellers
employed in new ways to highlight their natural rights ideology.

Agreement: Written constitution, as the embodiment of the literal social contract
Arbitrary: Any law which applied to a subject to which he or she had not given consent.
Civill Magistrate: A Leveller way of emphasizing the government’s subservience to law
Commishioner: A term for MPs which emphasized the concept that they operated “at will” to
those who had commissioned them. A different way of emphasizing the ascendency of the
constituents.
Common Cause: Opposed to Machivells schemes related to an issue of natural rights with
which every Englishman ought to be concerned.
Common Equitie: natural and inalienable rights
Common Freedom: Freedom of conscience
Freeborne: Englishmen with any amount of property who were entitled to active political
participation through voting and serving on a jury.
Honest-hearted: A believer who, in Christian liberty, was an honest actor and ought to be
afforded freedom of expression by virtue of his earnestness, regardless of doctrinal differences
with any establishment church.
In Parliament, Assembled: A way to emphasize the constituent relationship between the
Parliament and those it actively represented, literally meant to represent the concept of the
People being symbolically brought together, via their representatives.
Levellers so-called: Lilburne’s attempt to redirect the moniker assigned to the political group by
Ireton and Cromwell.
Machiavells: Divisive people who used a divide and conquer approach to alienate citizens from
one another.
Meanest, Denizen: The status of a subject with corresponding rights accessible to any
Englishman
Native country: State of nature, prior to the initiation of the social contract
People: Each individual person, collected institutionally within the government as political body
Popish: Any claim to special revelation of the true ecclesiastical state
Prerogative Men: A Leveller trope of any group or individual that argued for governmental
sovereignty over the People.
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Principall, Fountaine: The sovereign People, who had retained sovereignty within the social
contract
Slavery: Passive compliance by citizens to tyrannical government
Supreame: The predominant branch of government within the English Constitution. Used to
avoid the use of sovereign.
Tender: The idea that legal punishment should befit the severity of a crime. This was
connected to the Leveller principle of closing debtors’ prisons, reasonable bail, and other due
process principles.
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